पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

54 PANIPAT 1761 first taking the offensive himself His difficulties at Delhi obliged him to take this decision which was urged on him by all and sundry in the Maratha camp Before he could continue his march, Bhau thought it wise to make a political move to counteract the anti Maratha propaganda of Najib and men of his ilk He had already estranged Wazir Ghazi ud din and his supporter Surajmal Jat by his non committal attitude towards their aspirations and de signs All his approaches to Shuja had proved futile It became necessary for him now to give a demonstrable proof of his ultimate intentions So, setting aside the boy Emperor, Shah Jahan III (elevated to that dignity by Ghazi ud din after the murder of Alamgir II in the previous year), Bhau proclaimed the wandering Prince Ali Gauhar as Emperor with the title of Shah Alam II In his unavoidable absence his son Prince Javan Bakht, residing at Delhi, was installed as Vali Ahad or Crown Prince and Vicar of the absentee Emperor on 10th October 1760 ⁷ Mints struck new coins in the new Emperor's name, and his seals were also prepared and brought into use The ceremonies and proces- sions connected with these acts were seen through by Nana Purandare and Satvoji Jadhavrao, who had been specially deputed by Bhau for the purpose while encamped at Lalera, three miles to the south of Gannaur⁸ while on his way to Kunjpura The office of the Wazir is said to have been conferred on Shuja in absent a, but there is no mention of this fact in Marathi corre- spondence and hence seems improbable The details of this occurrence in Delhi throw a flood of light on Maratha manners in politics The puppet Emperor, Shah Jahan, was politely asked to vacate his seat as his days were over This was perhaps the first time in Mughal history when an emperor had been set aside without violence to his person The Prince Javan Bakht was escorted to the Juma Masjid by Bapuji Hingne, the Maratha envoy, who sat with the prince on the elephant, while Satvoji stood behind with peacock feathers, a sign of royal insignia, in his hand The ex Empress Zinat Mahal, the grand mother of the prince, was civilly asked to pay 25 lakhs from her privy purse for the expenses, but she paid only 5 lakhs The Marathas never set their hands on the persons of the royal household to get money, like the Afghans of Abdali or the Persians of Nadir Shah The grateful ex Empress took it upon herself to inform Abdali of these proceedings and tried her best to bring about a settlement between him and the Marathas, by forwarding the Maratha draft treaty to him with her recommendations and consent The good result of this action was seen in the satisfaction of Surajmal who was now convinced of the Maratha intentions and henceforward helped the Marathas, though he could not join them with his army The Afghan rule in the Panjab was challenged by the rebellious Sikhs who wholeheartedly came over to the Maratha side They proclaimed Bhau Sahib as the coming ruler with a beat of drums, and devoutly prayed for his victory in Lahore They beseeched their Guru Sahib to punish Abdali for his misdeeds Khwajah Mirza Khan, the son in law of Adina Beg, with the Maratha troops under Krishnaji Pawar stationed at Jammu, invaded Gujrat ⁷ Raj 1.259, Parasnis' Persian Akhbars (unpublished) ⁸ Ibid 1.259

KUNJPURA 55 Shahdaula and cleared the regions upto Attock In the Jalandar Doab, the Sikhs firmly established themselves, driving out the Afghan posts Alasingh, the founder of the Patiala State, promised to join Bhau with his troops Thus, at the beginning of October 1760, Abdali's hold over the Panjab had been completely lost, but for a post here and there Abdus Samad Khan found his position in Sarhind untenable and was reported to be coming down to Kunj- pura on the Jamuna on his way to join Abdali in the Doab (Pers an Akhbar MS ) From the news available in the Persian Akhbar dated 15 10 1760 it seems as if Abdali also had become weary of waiting and was ready to solve the political tangle by negotiations Up till then, Shah Abdullah Darvesh Pirzada had come as the envoy of Abdali But now it was thought necessary that these roundabout ways should cease and the plenipotentiaries of the two sides, if not the chiefs themselves, should meet face to face to have a personal talk before taking the final plunge It was suggested that the rendezvous should be near the Buradi Ghat, strongly guarded by Damaji Gaikawad, the chiefs should meet in midstream, each in his own boat, standing in juxtaposi tion But this meeting never took place, however, as Bhau had to hurry up to Kunjpura so as to cut off Abdus Samad Khan The plan of marching to Kunjpura was maturing in the mind of Bhau for more than a month,⁹ but the rainy season had delayed the project The Deccan bullocks, connected with the artillery department, had suffered most from the rains Many of them died, probably on account of the northern Indian climate being unsuitable to them Bhau had sent an express letter to Govind Ballal for sending 500 bullocks, as early as 17th August, and had also called for 400 Pathans or northern Indian men capable of enrolment in the artillery on 27th August ¹⁰ He took over all the ghats on the Jamuna and made arrangements for guarding the same This had made Abdali power less to do anything in the matter Nothing remained for him but to wait till the subsidence of the river When Bhau started for Kunjpura in the first week of October, he had calculated that the water of the Jamuna would not subside for at least one month ¹¹ But his calculation seems to have been based on incorrect informa tion Two important persons of Bhau's office, writing three weeks before he wrote, calculate one month or even a fortnight as the period necessary for the river level to go down ¹² According to them, the water should have subsided by the middle of October, almost the time when Bhau wrote and started for Kunjpura If we take the calculation of the two officers to be mere guess work and very rough, we cannot say the same thing of the written opinion of Balvantrao Mehendale, supposed to be the most intimate friend and ad- viser of Bhau during the Panipat campaign Writing on 14th October he 9 Ibid 1.237 10 Ibid 1.231, 237 11 Ibid 1.252 12 SPD XXI

56 PANIPAT: 1761 says, "Four to eight' days are necessary for the river water to go down."¹³ And Abdali actually crossed the river at Gauripur on 24th October.¹⁴ It is impossible to account for this wide discrepancy in the information and calcula- tion of the two most important personages in the Peshwa's army, the com- mander-in-chief and his first general. It is difficult to imagine that these two persons, living in the same camp or even as neighbours, should not have ex- changed ideas and discussed the probabilities amongst themselves. But un- fortunately for the Marathas, some such untoward thing seems to have hap- pened. Bhau, basing his calculation on the idea that the river water would not go down before the second week of November, planned his campaign ac- cordingly. His plan was to take Kunjpura, then proceed to Kurukshetra to perform the pilgrimage, seek allies amongst the Sikhs and the Jats of those regions¹⁵ and then return in time to meet Abdali after refreshing his starved troops, horses, and other animals with the ample grain and fodder supplies of those fertile regions. This plan succeeded as far as the capture of Kunjpura was concerned, but failed in its second part: to obstruct Abdali while crossing the Jamuna. The immediate cause which made Bhau hurry up to Kunjpura within a week was the news received from the Panjab as mentioned already. Abdus Samad Khan whom Abdali had kept back in the Panjab as the Faujdar of Sarhind, had come to Kunjpura with an army of ten thousand and more for carrying supplies to Abdali in the Doab. He was waiting there for the river to subside. It was necessary to defeat him before he could cross the Jamuna and strengthen Abdali's forces. Starting from his camp at Shalimar Bag, seven miles to the north of Delhi on 7th October, Bhau reached Lalera, three miles south of Gannaur on 8th October in the evening. He was at Panipat on the 14th and reached his destination on the evening of the 16th. Abdali who had full information of Bhau's movements, sent an army to aid his men at Kunjpura along the eastern bank of the Jamuna. But it had to stop opposite Kunjpura for want of transport. Viewing this additional peril, the Maratha army decided to storm the fort forthwith. Bhau sent for Ibrahim Khan Gardi- who was lagging behind by one march. He came hurrying up on the night of the 16th and commenced the bombardment of the fort soon after his arrival, on the morning of the 17th The fort of Kunjpura lies seventy-eight miles to the north of Delhi, and is situated some two miles distant from the west bank of the Jamuna. It guarded one of the most frequented roads through the Doab to the Panjab. The river Jamuna to the south-east of Kunjpura, being divided into several channels, was easily fordable by men and animals. The important town of Karnal on the main imperial road lay only six miles to the west of it. The riverside of the fort was marshy and hence easily defensible. Nejabat Khan Ruhela was in possession of the fort and he had a few thousand footmen of his tribe with him to defend the fort. Abdus Samad Khan, Mian Qutb Shah and Momin Khan, the Ghilzai Sardar who had come from Sarhind, had with ¹³ Ait. Tip. 1.14. ¹⁴ RAJ. 1.260. ¹⁵ SPD 21.197.

KUNJPURA 57 them some seven thousand horse.¹⁶ They were encamped outside the fort and tried to defend it to the utmost. But the musketry fire of the Gardis soon broke their resistance by fast withering away their ranks, and they tried to save themselves by entering the fort. Nejabat Khan was at first apprehensive of opening the fort gates to get them in, but had to yield to their entreaties and open the same. Taking advantage of this opportunity, the Marathas also fol- lowed behind them and forced themselves into the fort along with the Durranis The Durrani horse and Ruhela footmen fought for some time but were ulti- mately overpowered by the Maratha arms and defeated with heavy slaughter. Four thousand Ghilzais were put to the sword¹⁷ and the rest, taking grass in their mouths and uttering the words, "We are your cows,"¹⁸ were allowed to go, after laying down their arms. The majority of the Ruhela footmen had been wounded together with Nejabat Khan, who died soon afterwards of his wounds. Momin Khan died in the battle from a bullet-shot. Abdus Samad Khan and Mian Qutb Shah were captured alive, beheaded after heaping in- sults on them and their heads paraded through the Maratha camp. Mian Qutb Shah was derided, cursed and insulted most, especially by Shinde's men, as he was responsible for the decapitation of Dattaji Shinde on the battlefield of Buradi, the previous year. Their bodies were exposed to be eaten up by vultures and jackals, no funeral rites being allowed them. The conversa- tion between Qutb Shah and Bhau given in the Bhau Bakhar seems imaginary, as contemporary letters from Shinde's camp do not say a word hinting at such a thing. It has been fabricated to suit the dramatic tone of the whole of the Bhau Bakhar. Bhau got some seven lakhs of rupees in cash, five thousand horses, camels and elephants, arms and the rest, as spoils. But the most opportune gain was of 10,000 khandis of wheat collected at this depot for the Abdali troops. Starvation in the Maratha army ended for the time being, as the troops were paid in kind instead of cash.¹⁹ Horses and other animals also got fodder and grain. More important than this material gain was the revival of optimism in the Maratha army after a four months' period of doldrums, leading to a deterioration of morale. The prowess of the Gardi fire had been put to the test and proved up to the hilt. Bhau spent a week at Kunjpura destroying the fortifications and ar- ranging matters in the new light. He seems to have felt no apprehension of any impending danger as he ordered a march to Kurukshetra of at least a part of the army. While on his way to Kunjpura, Bhau's idea was to finish the work there in four days and then to cross the Jamuna by some upper ghat like that at Budhia, into Saharanpur. He had already seized practically all the boats on the Jamuna on which he could lay hands, and kept them to- gether near the Selimgad fort on the bank of the Jamuna at Delhi with a view to making use of them in case of necessity. He had also kept pickets with small parties of soldiers to guard the main ghats over the Jamuna from ¹⁶ Shinde 3.234, 392; RAJ 1.260, 265 ¹⁷ Purandare 1.391. ¹⁸ Shinde 3.234. ¹⁹ SPD. 21.197-8

58 PANIPAT 1761 Agra to Kunjpura, a distance of nearly two hundred miles Thus he had unwittingly lengthened his line of communication and taken a certain risk in proceeding to Kunjpura Had he, after quickly finishing the job, crossed over the Jamuna into Saharanpur as intended, or, failing that, at once re turned to Delhi, he would have been saved But here his miscalculation about the fall in the level of the Jamuna waters proved wrong as we have already noted The second factor which delayed the Maratha army was that after a long period of comparative starvation they had found themselves in a land of plenty, which the army was naturally reluctant to leave and return to bar ren Delhi The third and the human factor which made Bhau delay his march was the encumbrance of a horde of women folk family members and priests, who had accompanied the army for performing distant and dangerous pil grimages under its protection Kurukshetra is less than thirty miles from Kunjpura and it was but natural that all the devout people in the army should wish to visit that holy place of the Mahabharata war where Lord Shri Krishna preached his philosophy of life to the hero Arjuna But this natural desire re sulted in an unforeseen calamity and thus proved a veritable Kurukshetra to the Marathas The Maratha army, after spending or rather wasting a week at Kunj pura, moved toward the holy place for one day, but before they could reach their destination at the first halt for the night Bhau received the disquieting news of Abdalis beginning to cross the river, on 25th October 20 He at once made up his mind and turned back toward Delhi with a view to intercepting Abdali before he crossed the river But such a fully equipped army made up of three lakhs of people can move but slowly All became disappointed and sullen as they missed by a hairbreadth the pilgrimage to Kurukshetra They were still more scared by the news of Abdalis crossing the river and blocking their re turn On the first day of their return march they halted near the ancient bridge at Karnal²¹ for the night, the bridge over the famous canal of Firuz Shah Tughaliq and Ali Mardan Khan which flowed from the eastern to its western side Because the editor of Bhau's Kaifiyat was unaware of the geography of these regions, he could not with confidence read the description in Modi script and the place of halt on the bridge Though Bhau made a long march of fifteen miles for the day, the camp could not move as fast, so on the next day he could cover only eight miles and on the third day came, near Panipat Here he heard the news that Abdalis army had completely crossed the river, bag and baggage, and was halting at Sonepat Bhau cautiously sent a party of five thousand men under Baji Hari Deshpande of Supa to meet and check the advance guard of Abdali and take a view of his camp and movement there They were in the vicinity of Sonepat, resting unguardedly after a long march Half of the party was composed of Shinde's men who had already known and experienced the scourge of the Durrani army Their leader asked Baji Hari to be on his guard lest he should find himself surprised But Baji Hari's inexperienced and unbeaten troops 20 RS 1201 1 Bhau Kaifiyat p. 12.

KUNJPURA 59 took the warning lightly and slept soundly on the plains, allowing their horses to roam in the green fields for grazing, and the unexpected attack came as forewarned. Shah Pasand Khan, one of Abdali's best captains of cavalry, suddenly pounced upon the sleeping party. Shinde's men had kept a picket on a tall tree watching for the danger. As soon as clouds of dust were seen at a distance the picket came down and cried aloud of the danger. Shinde's men who were on guard at once took to their horses and ran away.²²· Baji Hari's party found it impossible to get hold of their horses in the grazing field and it was some time before they could get them. In the meanwhile, men of Shah Pasand Khan came, seized as many horses of the Marathas as they could and • cut down the horsemen. Very few were fortunate enough to escape and carrry back the news to Bhau. This event checked the further march southwards, and Bhau had to fall back on Panipat and begin encampment there. We shall now turn to study Abdali's movements He and his Indian allies were encamping on the opposite bank of the Jamuna near Delhi. Shuja- ud-daulah was the first to move to that place in the beginning of August and encamp to the south of the area near the grain mart of Patpatganj. The Ruhelas and Abdalis followed sometime later, probably at the end of the month. They encamped to Shuja's north, near Shahdhada. When Bhau came to Delhi at the beginning of August, he had encamped to the south of Delhi near the Kalkadevi Temple, just opposite to Shuja on the other bank. In Septem- ber, Bhau moved his camp to the Shalimar gardens, seven miles to the north- west of Delhi amidst pleasant surroundings, and his army encamped to his south, to the west and north of the city. From these encampments the rival armies were eying each other inquisitively. They occasionally discharged their heavy long-range guns and threw some heavy cannon-balls into each other's camps just to create confusion and fear. But the river flowed roaringly be- tween. None dare cross the river in the face of the other, though diplomats were individually going and coming and carrying on peace-talks. As Abdali had the fertile Doab at his back, and as the home lands of the Ruhelas were on the other side of the Ganges, his army was comparatively well supplied with the necessaries of life. To lighten the burden, he had allowed many of the Ruhela soldiers to return to their homes, asking them to keep themselves ready to return at the first call. The Maratha army, on the other hand, was living from hand to mouth. The whole of the surrounding area had been eaten up by the constant movements of the rival armies in the fields during the last seven years. The districts to the west of Delhi had been assigned as jagirs to the Baluch sardars of the Emperor. They were recalcitrant generally, and just then at loggerheads with the Marathas. Tukoji Holkar and Khandoji Kadam²²ᵃ had been sent against them at the beginning of October. For getting the food stuffs from a distance the Marathas had to pay fancy prices to the Banjaras. Nana Phadnis, Bapuji Ballal Phadke,²²ᵇ Balvantrao Mehendale and others, writing from Delhi during September and October, describe the woeful state of the Maratha army: "The horses have forgotten to chew the grain; the

²² Bhau Bakhar 0.126. ²²ᵃ Persian MS ²²ᵇ SPD 2.130-1.

60 PANIPAT 1761 grain is selling at seven or eight seers a rupee High class people like us had to sell our gold and silver trinkets and live from the proceeds The climate of Delhi has been found unsuitable to the Deccani oxen of the artillery depart ment, and they are dying in hundreds" To escape from this dilemma, the Maratha army had moved to Kunjpura to feed themselves and their horses, with the consequence noted above When Bhau moved toward the north, Abdali also sent a party to ac cost him from the other side of the river, that party could not do anything to save their brethren on the other side and had to see with open eyes the fall of Kunjpura They returned to Abdali who was chafing at the result He at once issued orders to his army and his allies to be ready for the march From Shahdhada he moved to Luni, thence he came to Baghpat, twenty miles north of Delhi, in search of a ford for crossing But he searched in vain He chided his Indian allies for not knowing the fords, but they pleaded their inability to find any After two days' vain search, Ahmad Shah who was a devout Mus lim fasted in his agony and beseeched God to point out a ford and tried all the superstitious and religious methods of search After getting an inspiration from that source he made his horsemen plunge into an unusual and less fre quented part of the river and tried to cross He succeeded in the trial, though a number of horsemen were carried away by the current before the exact line of crossing could be fixed by driving wooden stakes in the river on the two sides of the shallow passage and thus clearly lining the way The place where he actually crossed is not given in histories, though all say that it was near Baghpat A pontoon bridge used to be constructed at Baghpat in the fair season in those days as at present, but in the rainy season the place was not suitable for crossing as the river has a somewhat sharp fall here and con- sequently the stream turns into a torrent Where the river divides itself into several streams and spreads over a wider area, it becomes easily fordable Such a place Ahmad Shah seems to have found five miles to the north of old Bagh- pat near the village of Gauripur This place is mentioned in the Bhau's ballad we have copied down from the bard of Siva ²³ Because Ahmad Shah crossed at this place, he could come straight to Sonepat through Kheora and could elude the Maratha pickets placed at well known crossings such as Baghpat Ahmad Shah could dare attempt this because he was experienced in crossing the rivers and knew all the intricacies connected with such crossings The Marathas seem to have never taken to such daring Big rivers seem to have blocked their way throughout their military career They could never cross the Ganges without the help of local allies A Najib ud daulah could always laugh at Dattaji and keep him waiting at the ford Ahmad Shah, because he could take such a risk with confidence, was able to entrap the Maratha army under Sadashivrao Bhau Bhau, on the other hand, could never perform such a feat, and hence had perforce to entrench himself at Panipat Ahmad Shah must have begun his crossing on the 24th October, as Bhau had received the news the next day at his first halt on the way to Kuru ²³ BDCRI 4 3 stanza 33

KUNJPURA 61 kshetra. Abdali took three days to cross the river with all his army, cannon, elephants and other camp equipage. The place where he crossed was a little out of the way where there was no proper ghat for landing. The army had to cross the various streams and shallows over a distance of half a mile. Some- times the horses would swim, at others they would wade through sands in knee- deep water. On the other side was the silt deposited by monsoon floods. Horses and men found themselves bogged in the soft mud. It was difficult, al- most impossible, to take a step without sinking still deeper. This difficulty they overcame by cutting down the various water plants and rushes growing on the river-bank, and spreading them deep over the passage all along the route. When these had sunk into the mud, a thatchy road was naturally built over it by the trampling of thousands of horses and men. Had there been a daring and resourceful guard of a few thousand troops with a few guns of precision, a crossing would never have been possible. After safely reaching the other bank, Ahmad Shah at once sent a small party to drive away all the Maratha pickets on the western bank, and seize any boats they could find bound fast at the ghats. They seem to have succeeded in collecting some, which were used in ferrying the baggage on the second day. Ahmad Shah himself crossed after half the army was on the other side. There were a few casualties, no doubt, in the tumult and hurry of crossing. But at last the whole army was safe on the other bank and began their march to Sonepat, which they reached on the 27th October. Next day they moved to Gannaur where Ahmad Shah halted for three²⁴ days. Baji Hari's attempt to scout must have happened during this interval. The number of casualties in this attempt is not correctly reported anywhere, though Kashiraj gives the figure at two thousand, and the place where they crossed swords as near the serai of Samalkha. Bhau fell back as a result of it and encamped at Panipat. Ahmad Shah advanced to Samalkha on 31st October, and to Pasina the next day. A distance of some three miles was left between the advanced posts of the two armies. The two armies came face to face at last after four months of eying each other on the opposite banks of the swollen Jamuna. It was seven months since Bhau had started to meet Abdali, and here he was at last. But for a final decision by arms, two and a half months had still to pass. From the first of November 1760 to 14th January, 1761 the two sides in the struggle for power put their faith in strategy and manœuvring, living in entrenched camps. ²⁴ RAJ. 1.261.

60 PANIPAT 1761 grain is selling at seven or eight seers a rupee High class people like us had to sell our gold and silver trinkets and live from the proceeds The climate of Delhi has been found unsuitable to the Deccani oxen of the artillery depart ment, and they are dying in hundreds " To escape from this dilemma, the Maratha army had moved to Kunjpura to feed themselves and their horses, with the consequence noted above When Bhau moved toward the north, Abdali also sent a party to ac cost him from the other side of the river, that party could not do anything to save their brethren on the other side and had to see with open eyes the fall of Kunjpura They returned to Abdali who was chafing at the result He at once issued orders to his army and his allies to be ready for the march From Shahdhada he moved to Luni, thence he came to Baghpat, twenty miles north of Delhi in search of a ford for crossing But he searched in vain He chided his Indian allies for not knowing the fords, but they pleaded their inability to find any After two days' vain search, Ahmad Shah who was a devout Mus lim fasted in his agony and beseeched God to point out a ford and tried all the superstitious and religious methods of search After getting an inspiration from that source he made his horsemen plunge into an unusual and less fre quented part of the river and tried to cross He succeeded in the trial, though a number of horsemen were carried away by the current before the exact line of crossing could be fixed by driving wooden stakes in the river on the two sides of the shallow passage and thus clearly lining the way The place where he actually crossed is not given in histories, though all say that it was near Baghpat A pontoon bridge used to be constructed at Baghpat in the fair season in those days as at present, but in the rainy season the place was not suitable for crossing as the river has a somewhat sharp fall here and con sequently the stream turns into a torrent Where the river divides itself into several streams and spreads over a wider area, it becomes easily fordable Such a place Ahmad Shah seems to have found five miles to the north of old Bagh pat near the village of Gauripur This place is mentioned in the Bhau's ballad we have copied down from the bard of Siwa ²³ Because Ahmad Shah crossed at this place, he could come straight to Sonepat through Kheora and could elude the Maratha pickets placed at well known crossings such as Baghpat Ahmad Shah could dare attempt this because he was experienced in crossing the rivers and knew all the intricacies connected with such crossings The Marathas seem to have never taken to such daring Big rivers seem to have blocked their way throughout their military career They could never cross the Ganges without the help of local allies A Najib ud daulah could always laugh at Dattaji and keep him waiting at the ford Ahmad Shah, because he could take such a risk with confidence, was able to entrap the Maratha army under Sadashivrao Bhau Bhau, on the other hand, could never perform such a feat, and hence had perforce to entrench himself at Panipat Ahmad Shah must have begun his crossing on the 24th October, as Bhau had received the news the next day at his first halt on the way to Kuru-

²³ BDCRI 4.3 stanza 33

CHAPTER V PANIPAT To JUDGE from the letters which were sent out in the first fortnight¹ from the Maratha camp at Panipat and even for a month after, the Maratha army and its commander² seem to be quite confident of victory This seems strange when we remember the hardships which the Maratha army had to bear since it started for the north, seven months earlier Not that they had no proper understanding of the strength of Abdali's army, but the spectacular vic tory at Kunjpura and freedom from want of grain and fodder which followed seem to have worked out a change in the despondent mood on the Maratha side They had seen with their eyes the strength and use of Ibrahim Khan's splendid corps which, as Kashīrāj says, 'in the twinkle of an eye smashed the defences of Kunjpura fort and entered it in no time" Intimate friends of Bhau like Nana Purandare and Krishna Joshi Sangmeshvarkar, are not only confident but over-jubilant with expectancy of (what they judged as) Abdali's sure defeat It is true that full stomachs are prone to create enthusiasm and confidence, still it is strange to think that these intimates of Bhau who should have known better, were writing in the vein they have done Even Bhau is found writing in the same tone for a month more Only during the last fort- night the crisis seems to have developed though even then Janakoji Shinde³ —writing no doubt to the revenue collector—does not betray any sign of hope lessness when giving out the news at Panipat This is in sharp contrast with the writing of Kashiraj and the whole tone of it The Marathi chronicles, though they do not enumerate the events in a similar tone, are found criticizing Bhau for his attitude during the entire struggle It is difficult to believe that all the writers on the Maratha side were ignorant, not to understand the real situation and the strategy of such a consumate general as Abdali, and still that is the impression created while reading Kashiraj and even historians like Sır Jadunath Now we know by complete analysis of the whole material that, because the chroniclers wrote after the event, and because they wanted to shift and fix the responsibility of the disaster on those who had not survived it, they have assumed a sliding attitude so as dramatically to break on the rock of final disaster But we think this methodology wrong in history, and for that reason have not accepted chronicles as history where psychology plays a part In the first fortnight, before Abdali could build up his line of com munication to bring in the supplies from the Doab and beyond, his army was definitely in a weak position, and comparatively the Maratha army was in a better position Why Bhau did not try to decide the conflict by a bold attack at that favourable juncture, we cannot say He seems to have put his faith in quite a different strategy—that of tiring out Abdali and his allies and mak- ing them fall on his well fortified, almost impregnable lines In this strategy 1 SPD 21 197, 27, Raj 1.261, 62, 64, 65, Purandare 391 2 SPD 2.134 3 Shinde 1.222. [ 62 ]

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PĀNĪPAT VICINITY AT PRESENT SCALE FURLONGS 8 4 0 1 2 3 4 MILES

मानचित्र पर प्रमुख अंकित विवरण / Prominent Text on Map:

• मुख्य स्थल / Major Town: PĀNĪPAT (पानीपत)
• नदियाँ एवं नहरें / Rivers & Canals:
  • JUMNA RIVER (यमुना नदी)
  • W. J. CANAL / WESTERN JUMNA CANAL (पश्चिमी यमुना नहर)
• दिशानिर्देश / Direction: North Indicator (उत्तर दिशा सूचक चिन्ह)
• अक्षांश एवं देशांतर / Coordinates:
  • 29° 25' N — 29° 20' N
  • 76° 55' E — 77° 10' E

CHAPTER V PANIPAT To judge from the letters which were sent out in the first fortnight¹ from the Maratha camp at Panipat and even for a month after, the Maratha army and its commander² seem to be quite confident of victory This seems strange when we remember the hardships which the Maratha army had to bear since it started for the north, seven months earlier Not that they had no proper understanding of the strength of Abdali's army, but the spectacular vic- tory at Kunjpura and freedom from want of grain and fodder which followed seem to have worked out a change in the despondent mood on the Maratha side They had seen with their eyes the strength and use of Ibrahim Khan's splendid corps which, as Kashiraj says, 'in the twinkle of an eye smashed the defences of Kunjpura fort and entered it in no time" Intimate friends of Bhau, like Nana Purandare and Krishna Joshi Sangmeshvarkar, are not only confident but over-jubilant with expectancy of (what they judged as) Abdali's sure defeat It is true that full stomachs are prone to create enthusiasm and confidence, still it is strange to think that these intimates of Bhau who should have known better, were writing in the vein they have done Even Bhau is found writing in the same tone for a month more. Only during the last fort- night the crisis seems to have developed though even then Janakoji Shinde³ --writing no doubt to the revenue collector--does not betray any sign of hope- lessness when giving out the news at Panipat This is in sharp contrast with the writing of Kashiraj and the whole tone of it The Marathi chronicles, though they do not enumerate the events in a similar tone, are found criticizing Bhau for his attitude during the entire struggle It is difficult to believe that all the writers on the Maratha side were ignorant, not to understand the real situation and the strategy of such a consumate general as Abdali, and still that is the impression created while reading Kashiraj and even historians like Sir Jadunath Now we know by complete analysis of the whole material that, because the chroniclers wrote after the event, and because they wanted to shift and fix the responsibility of the disaster on those who had not survived it, they have assumed a sliding attitude so as dramatically to break on the rock of final disaster But we think this methodology wrong in history, and for that reason have not accepted chronicles as history where psychology plays a part In the first fortnight, before Abdali could build up his line of com- munication to bring in the supplies from the Doab and beyond, his army was definitely in a weak position, and comparatively the Maratha army was in a better position Why Bhau did not try to decide the conflict by a bold attack at that favourable juncture, we cannot say He seems to have put his faith in quite a different strategy--that of tiring out Abdali and his allies and mak- ing them fall on his well-fortified, almost impregnable lines In this strategy ¹ SPD 21 197, 27, Raj 1.261, 62, 64, 65, Purandare 391 ² SPD 2 134 ³ Shinde 1.222 [62]

TO FACE PAGE 62 PĀNĪPAT VICINITY AT PRESENT SCALE FURLONGS 8 4 0 1 2 3 4 MILES PĀNĪPAT KALKA RAILWAY TO DELHI WESTERN JUMNA CANAL JUMNA RIVER

PANIPAT 63 Bhau was depending upon the activities of Govindpant Bundele and Naro Shankar. Had they succeeded in cutting off Abdali’s supplies and making him move from his camp, Abdali would have had only two alternatives before him, either to run away to his home without offering a battle, or attacking the Mara- thas in their strong positions. We do not think that it would have been dif- ficult for him and his allies to disperse to their homes, as suggested by Krishna Joshi in his letter,⁴ though ostensibly his road to Afghanistan was blocked by the Maratha camp at the very onset. But Govindpant was scarcely a fit man to carry out the orders of Bhau, because primarily he was not a soldier but a civilian. The military circumstances in the regions surrounding his area have also to be taken into account. Not only were the Rajput zamindars, with their strong fortalices, disaffected towards the rule of the Marathas internally, but externally also the Ruhela chiefs and Shuja’s nominee, Veni Bahadur, were vigilant and bent on taking advantage of the difficulties of the Marathas Shuja had taken only a small part of his army to the battlefield, leaving the main portion under Veni Bahadur⁵ to defend his dominions in his absence. Shuja himself had only willynilly gone to Abdali under strong pressure for avoiding the invasion of his own territories by Abdali and his Ruhela allies, and never took any important part in the whole campaign or in the final bat- tle. By his behaviour he was insuring his safety between two powerful rivals. When Bhau blames Govindpant for not devastating Shuja’s dominions so as to exert a pressure on him to return to his dominions for defence, he seems to be unaware of the fact that there was sufficient army on the spot to defend it. Govindpant’s leaving his dominions meant exposing them to an invasion by Veni Bahadur, as was found to his cost by Gopalrao Govind Barve⁶ in his attempt.⁷ But sometimes it is necessary to take the risk of completely exposing one’s dominions in order to gain a necessary military advantage. Only a man like Frederick the Great of Prussia or a Madhavrao Peshwa could dare it and reap the harvest. It was too much to expect such an action from Govindpant, and when he tried to perform it for escaping the charge of disobedience, he had to pay for the attempt with his life and complete defeat. This exposition should convince the reader that Bhau’s strategy was based on precarious means, and he was misguided in depending on a man of Govindpant’s calibre. There were other means of gaining his end, but Bhau never seems to have tried these. In the last resort, why Bhau should have waited up to the breaking point of the 14th of January, completely passes our understanding. Bhau knew of Govindpant’s death on 23rd December, and we can find no excuse for Bhau to defer the attack for three weeks, thus weak- ening still further the Maratha side during this long interval by starvation, exposure and disease. The only suggestion that might explain Bhau’s delay is the idea of his waiting for the coming of Nanasaheb from the Deccan so as to catch Abdali between two grind-stones. This suggestion finds no conclusive evidence in documents. The Peshwa seems to have been informed by his son, ⁴ Raj. 1.265. ⁵ A. L. Shrivastava, op cit., pp. 94, 111. ⁶ Ibid. 111. ⁷ See the section on The Trans-Ganges raids further on.

94 PANIPAT: 1761 Vishwasrao, and some other men about the gravity of the Maratha situation at Panipat, and if the Peshwa had correctly judged the situation, he should certainly have gone immediately to succour his cousin. From the correspondence it seems that the Peshwa had not received any communication from Bhau for more than a month, which means that Abdali was successfully intercepting all couriers. On the other hand, when the Peshwa's suspicions about the real state of the army in the north had reached their climax and silent dread had taken their place, he is found writing to Bhau in an almost repentent tone for not having done his duty, or, as previously promised, succoured Bhau. From this letter, the Peshwa seems to have promised to send a contingent from the Deccan so as to reach Panipat in February 1761.* If Bhau was hoping to carry on till this promised contingent reached its destination, by being able somehow to get supplies, then a different turn would have been given to the whole narration of the campaign. Apart from the truth of such a promise, it looks impossible from the military point of view that the promised help could have reached Bhau in time. If Bhau had been able to get supplies ad infinitum, there was no particular point why he should be wanting support from the south. If supplies were not forthcoming, the coming of the support would not have helped the matters in any way, at least not in time. Only such an il- lustrious captain of cavalry as Bajirao could possibly have reached Panipat in time to be of any help. But there was no such man available at Poona, at least not of such great calibre, to lead this express expedition. All these con- siderations, which historians can discuss at leisure now, should have been bet- ter understood by Bhau. He should have made up his mind, at least after Govindpant's death, to offer battle—whatever the result—then and there, without waiting till the last day, as he actually did. This waiting seems to

64 PANIPAT 1761 Vishwasrao, and some other men about the gravity of the Maratha situation at Panipat, and if the Peshwa had correctly judged the situation, he should certainly have gone immediately to succour his cousin. From the correspondence it seems that the Peshwa had not received any communication from Bhau for more than a month, which means that Abdali was successfully intercepting all couriers On the other hand, when the Peshwa's suspicions about the real state of the army in the north had reached their climax and silent dread had taken their place, he is found writing to Bhau in an almost repentent tone for not having done his duty, or, as previously promised, succoured Bhau From this letter, the Peshwa seems to have promised to send a contingent from the Deccan so as to reach Panipat in February 1761 ⁸ If Bhau was hoping to carry on till this promised contingent reached its destination, by being able somehow to get supplies, then a different turn would have been given to the whole narration of the campaign Apart from the truth of such a promise, it looks impossible from the military point of view that the promised help could have reached Bhau in time If Bhau had been able to get supplies ad infinitum, there was no particular point why he should be wanting support from the south If supplies were not forthcoming, the coming of the support would not have helped the matters in any way, at least not in time Only such an il lustrious captain of cavalry as Bajirao could possibly have reached Panipat in time to be of any help But there was no such man available at Poona, at least not of such great calibre, to lead this express expedition All these con siderations, which historians can discuss at leisure now, should have been bet- ter understood by Bhau He should have made up his mind, at least after Govindpant s death, to offer battle—whatever the result—then and there, without waiting till the last day, as he actually did This waiting seems to have considerably changed the prospect of giving the slip to the enemy, for- tune favouring, and marching past Abdali to Delhi, after losing only a part of the army instead of the whole For, on the 30th of December, 1760, Abdali changed his camp for the last time, and leaving his river side position, took post directly across the imperial road to Delhi so as completely to block the Maratha movement to the south We shall now proceed to describe the strategical position in the area surrounding Panipat This city is situated on the slopes of a small hillock, less than a hundred feet in height above the surrounding plain. In ancient times, the river Jamuna is reputed to have passed along the eastern edge of the * hill, but now it is some eight miles away to the east The river changes its course now and then, and we cannot be very sure what its actual course was in 1760 From our observations, it seems to have been a mile to the west of its present course in some places The river does not flow in one stream always, but now and then divides into a number of channels when it comes into a comparatively plain country Nowhere is the edge along the bank more than thirty feet high In most places it is less than twenty, and the average is somewhere near ten. There are large areas along the banks on both sides where there is scarcely any edge visible, the flood-water spreading far and wide into the interior where it ⁸ Purandare 1.395, Bhau Kaifiyat p. 20.

TO FACE PAGE 65 POSITIONS OF THE RIVAL CAMPS FROM 3RD TO 30TH NOVEMBER 1760 SCALE FURLONGS 8 6 4 2 0 1 2 3 4 5 MILES N KOH-I-MAULANA W. JUMNA CANAL SH. BEG UGRA KHERI SH. SHARAFUDDIN SIKANDARPUR SIKANDARPUR KHURD SH. FAKHRUDDIN BABARPUR MACHHROULI RAJAHERI NANHERA JUMNA RIVER SANOLI KALAN SHAH KUTUB PANIPAT V. THAL SH. GTY. B. DILIR KHAN SH. FAZLULLAH J. ABDUL AZIZ D. ALI KHAN SIKANDARPUR DILIRPUR SANOLI KHURD SH. HUSAIN D. ALI KHAN D. ALI KHAN MARATHA CAMP GAURI SHANKAR NALA AM SIWAH SIWAH KHURD KABIR RESHAPUR SONDHAPUR CHHAJJPUR KALAN JALALPUR RASLAPUR OLD JUMNA BED KHERI NANGAL PATTAN M. ALIPUR JALALPUR RAMPUR JAUHPUR ABDALI CAMP DIWANA PASINA KALAN PASINA KHURD GAURA KALAN GAURA KHURD M. B. BARTANKE, D. G. S.

creates a marsh and a bog To the south-east of Panipat such a condition prevails near the village of Goyenla At such places, ferrying by boats is neither possible nor necessary during the fair season, and people ford the river through knee-deep to chest deep water Where the edges are sharp and the river basin narrow—though nowhere would it be less than half a mile in breadth—the waters generally collect in one deep stream wh ch has then to be crossed by boat. This situation must ever be borne in mind when visualising Abdali's movements and changing camps The Maratha army had chosen for its camp the site to the north west and south west of Panipat The imperial road passed directly through the town of Panipat, and the Maratha army had completely taken possession of it on the northern side Though there is no mention of the canal in any original letter on Panipat, we believe that the famous Alı Mardan Khan Canal was still⁹ flowing along or at a short distance to the west of the Maratha camp, thus at once supplying a part of the camp with water, and also acting as a fosse to the Maratha camp on that side The Maratha camp seems to have spread over a long distance to the north of Panipat, if we are to believe in the traditional description supplied by the ballad singer o Siwa It provides the information that the 700 elephants of Bhau were kept at Gharonda, which is ten miles to the north of Panipat. Incidentally, it means that there was a sufficient water supply for these elephants in the vicinity, sug gesting that the place must be along a tank or canal ¹⁰ We have come to this conclusion from the fact that there was no complaint about the dearth of water, though there was a dearth of everything else Abdalı first came dı rectly opposite to Panipat with a view to meeting the Marathas and deciding the contest at one stroke But the Marathas, entrenching themselves strongly foiled Abdalı s plan of taking a quick decision by direct attack From their secure base they were able to defy hım in his camp and even to assume an of fensive Bhau marched out of his moat a little under the cover of his strongly placed guns, built temporary stands for his movable guns and from them opened fire on Abdalı s camp ¹¹ The shots reaching Abdalı s tents and killing his men and anımals, obliged hım to vacate it and pitch again at a distance of some five miles to the south east along the river bank near the villages of Behrampur, Bapaulı, Mırzapur and Goyen'a ¹² In making this retrograde movement, Abdali seems to have cared for the supply of water which was per haps completely stopped by the Marathas using up the canal water higher up above Panipat, as well as for the easy communication with the Doab by merely fording the river, so as to need no boats to fetch his supplies The Marathas had hit upon a well protected site, no doubt, with the canal marshes on the west side, the Panipat hill on the east side and a deep broad, dry moat on the front and facing side But once entrenched, they had no space to move one way or the other, while Abdalı remained free to change his camp as it suited hım At first his line had spread along the Dahad, Siwa, Risalu villages, but in a few days he receded and settled down along the Dimana village This first 9 See Appendix. "Was the Imperial Canal Flowing, etc" at the end of this chapter 10 BDCRI 41 3 11 SPD 2.131 12 Raj 3.224 Bhau Kaifiyat p 14, SPD 2.131, BDCRI 4.1 2-81 P F.-9

66 PANIPAT: 1761 camp he changed between the 26th and the 30th of November as a result of Bhau's cannonading as stated above, when he retreated to the riverside, the centre of the battlefield between the two armies lying along the village of Chhajpur. The reputed wooden war-pillar¹³ erected by the Marathas and found described in the Bakhar was somewhere on the plain of Chhajpur, and here the fight on the 7th of December took place, resulting in the death of Balvantrao Mehendale. For a month Abdali remained in the second camp till he moved to Pasina on 30th December, and his line spread across the im- perial road to Dimana. The main site of the final battle was between Risalu and Nimbdi This last move on the part of Abdali obliged Bhau to change his final plan of battle to suit the new disposition by Abdali. During the first month, or almost for five weeks, the Maratha army was on the aggressive. Every day they came out with their field guns, supported by some sardar's contingent, to the front and tried to cut off anyone from the Afghan side who had come out of his camp for skirmishing, or was loitering on the plain. The Pendharis on the Maratha side wandered round Abdali's camp and carried away horses, camels and even elephants which had been let loose for grazing outside. Still nobody from Abdali's side would come out and try to protect their animals and men The discipline in Abdali's camp was of the strictest type and he had issued orders to his army not to stir out of the camp and offer battle themselves. This seems to be due to the superiority of the long-range fire on the Maratha side. The big guns placed advantageously on the mud ramparts surrounding the Maratha camp were able to mow down anyone coming within their range for some two miles. The Marathas cap- tured more than a thousand horses, four hundred camels and four elephants during the first three weeks.¹⁴ The guns on the Afghan side were also not less effective though somewhat shorter in range, and their shots also could reach and kill men in the Maratha trenches. Krishna Joshi met his death from one such shot while he was sitting in his kitchen behind the trenches.¹⁵ But Abdali had probably taken the decision of not attacking in order to economise his powder and shot, which he thought could be used more effectively in an open battle. On the 22nd November there was a lunar eclipse and the Maratha camp was rather inactive on account of this. No one had possibly come out of the camp that day as usual. Abdali's Wazir Shah Wali Khan had come out to watch the Marathas that day. Seeing no danger nearby, he ventured to go very near the Maratha lines in the course of his patrol. As he was wait- ing near a well, the Maratha troops on the opposite side saw him and came out suddenly to take advantage of his unprotected state. A desperate battle ensued and the Wazir had great difficulty in holding his ground. But the Afghans in the rear were also watchful and ran to his rescue. Shinde's men drove them all back to their lines and inflicted considerable loss on them The Wazir lost four hundred of his troops and double that number were wounded.¹⁶ The loss on the Maratha side was forty dead and one hundred and fifty. —————————————— 13 Bhau Kaifiyat, p. 15; BDCRI 4.179 verse 36 14 SPD 21.197. 15 Ibid. 16 JADUNATH.SARKAR, op. cit., 2.302; Aitihasika Patra Vyavahar p. 97.

PANIPAT 67 wounded.¹⁷ The Marathas were able to capture more than a hundred horses and but for the nightfall the result would have been still more decisive, as men from that part of the Abdali camp which was attacked by the Marathas had begun to run away from their posts. There was again a similar skirmish after a few days, with no decisive result. The tone of the rank and file in the Maratha army, as well as of the commander-in-chief himself, is found to be all optimistic for over a month, and there is no ground for taking Kashiraj as a correct reporter for this period. Not only are Kashiraj's forebodings incor- rect, but the tone also of his narrative is vitiated by his personal predilections. As Abdali had to retreat from his first position to the riverside, it is proved thereby that the Marathas were in the ascendant till then. Kashiraj describes with awe all the actions of Abdali. He praises his arrangement to guard his camp and to watch the other side day and night. As no such vivid description is forthcoming from the Maratha side, a wrong impression is created in the mind of the reader, and he thinks that there was no such system followed by the Marathas. This is absolutely wrong. Just as parties of thou- sands were appointed to guard the camp on the Afghan side, similarly the Marathas were also mounting guard and patrolling around their camp at night. Kashiraj says that the Afghan monarch was in the habit of going round not only his own camp and that of his allies, but he also took a round about the entire Maratha camp from a distance, and every day returned by noon after having ridden fifty kos in person with a small escort. This seems a gross exaggeration of Kashiraj. We do not think that the Maratha watch- men and patrols were so slack as not to see even once the Afghan monarch go- ing round their camp during a period of more than two months, and one can guess that it was impossible for the daily rounds of Ahmad Shah to go un- seen, at whatever distance he might be encircling the Maratha camp. We also think that it was geographically not possible. The canal on the west side of the Maratha camp was a great impediment to such a movement, and on the east side also the land was not very favourable for such an excursion. The river on the north-east side coming very near and the bogs and the zils, which exist to this day, do not make such a supposition look feasible. Only during the last fortnight, when the Maratha army had become quite despondent and taken to heart the lesson of cold massacre, the Afghan monarch might have indulged in his rounds, though at great risk even then to himself. Kashiraj was perhaps remembering this last period when he wrote nineteen years after, and made it applicable to the whole period of two and a half months. A fortnight after the Wazir's discomfiture, a major engagement took place between the two armies. As we have noted above, Abdali had moved to the riverside by then. As the Afghan camp had now gone far beyond the range of Maratha fire and in a somewhat difficult terrain, and as the Afghans would not come out of their own accord to offer a battle, it became a teasing problem for the Marathas to pass the days in futile inactivity. The Marathas, therefore, hit upon a plan to call them out. At some distance from 17 Bhau Kaifiyat, p. 24