द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

THE FIGHT RESUMED 283 in which Pandit Malaviya and Moulana Shaukat Ali took a leading part. The Conference met on November 1st, under the presidentship of Mr. Vijayaraghav Achariar, ex-President of the Congress and a large number of representative Hindus and Moslems attended. The atmosphere was one of perfect cordiality. A great deal of progress was made in the nego- tiations for a Hindu-Moslem settlement. But ultimately two obstacles arose. On one side, the leaders of the communalist section of the Moslems condemned the unity efforts. On the other side, the Bengal problem proved insoluble, since the Europeans would not surrender any seat allowed them under the Communal Award and the Moslems would not be content with less than 51 per cent. of the total number of seats. Though the Conference did not come to a successful conclusion, it had a moral value and it helped to clear the atmosphere considerably. We may now review the actions of the Government during the year 1932. While taking the severest measures against the Congress, the Viceroy constantly urged that the Government would simultaneously push on the work of constitution- making. About the middle of January, the Consultative Committee was appointed for keeping the Government in close touch with all the leaders of the other parties, barring the Congress, through the Viceroy and especially for con- sidering the recommendations of the Franchise, Federal Finance and Indian States Inquiry Committees as a pre- liminary to their consideration by His Majesty's Government. Owing to the delay in issuing the Communal Award, the Consultative Committee was twice postponed on the insistence of the Moslem members. On June 27th, an announcement was made by the Government to the effect that they had decided to provide for Provincial Autonomy and Federation in a single Bill and that they would abandon the Third Session of the Round Table Conference. The Indian Liberal leaders immediately lodged a strong protest against the abandonment of the Round Table Conference and following this, Messrs. Sastri, Jayakar, Joshi and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru resigned from the Consultative Committee. This made the Government climb down a bit, and on July 7th,

284 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE Sir Samuel Hoare, in a speech before the Central Asian Society, explained that the change of procedure did not imply a change of policy. He further stated that when the Joint Parliamentary Committee met to consider the Govern- ment proposals, Indians would be enabled to appear not only as witnesses but also to participate in the discussions of the Committee. The explanation of the Secretary of State for India was not considered adequate by the Liberal leaders who persisted in their opposition. On September 5th, a fresh announcement was made by the Viceroy before the Indian Legislative Assembly to the effect that since the Consultative Committee would not be able to make the contribution anticipated from it, it had been decided to hold further discussions in London. A small body of representatives from British India and from the Indian States would therefore meet in London about the middle of November. The work would be in accordance with a fixed agenda and there would be no public session. The Liberal leaders now felt satisfied that their trip to London was restored. The Third Round Table Conference commenced work on November 17th; and ended on December 24th, the final session being open to the public. The Labour Party did not participate in this Con- ference on the ground that the Government had gone back on the policy of conciliation. They also wanted that the Indian members should keep aloof, but that desire was not complied with. Sir Samuel Hoare summed up the results of the Conference at the close of the session. The following are some of the decisions made by the Government to which he referred:

1. The Moslem community would have a representation of 33⅓ per cent. in the Federal legislature so far as British India was concerned.
2. It was not possible to give any definite date as to when the Federation would be in operation.
3. Sindh and Orissa would be separate provinces.
4. The Defence Budget would be non-votable.
5. For employing Indian troops outside India for purposes other than Indian, the decision of the Federal Ministry and the Federal Legislature would

THE FIGHT RESUMED 285 be taken, but the Crown would have full authority when Indian troops were to be employed outside India in the defence of India. Finally, in response to an appeal for co-operation made by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Sir Samuel Hoare said that he wanted to see no empty chairs at the Round Table Con- ference of the Joint Select Committee. During the year the revolutionary movement was strong in the province of Bengal. Special powers were given to the Bengal Government by the Viceroy, in. addition to the Viceregal ordinances. The Viceregal Ordinances, four in number, designed mainly for coping with the civil-dis- obedience movement, were issued on January 4th, 1932. On June 30th, before these Ordinances were due to lapse, a fresh but comprehensive Ordinance, called the Special Powers Ordinance 1932, was promulgated by the Government of India. In addition to this, the Bengal Emergency Powers Ordinance had been issued in November 1931, for arming the Bengal Government with powers similar to those enjoyed by martial law authorities, for the suppression of the terrorist movement. This Ordinance was renewed on May 29th, 1932. Further powers were given to the Bengal Government on July 20th, by the Government of India through the Bengal Emergency Powers (Second Amendment) Ordinance 1932. On September 1st, the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932, was passed by the Bengal Legislative Council which gave increased powers to the Executive, the most important provision being that attempt at murder was made punishable with death sentence. Another Act was passed on September 6th, called the Bengal Suppression of Terrorist Outrages Act, 1932, which empowered the executive to seize buildings, to order citizens on pain of punishment to assist them in the suppression of terrorism, to impose collective fines on villagers, etc. The Legislation passed in the Bengal Legislative Council armed the Government with permanent powers—so that in future, emergency ordinances would not be necessary. During the year, terrorist outrages took place from time to time, the most important of them being the

286 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE murder of Mr. Douglas, the District Magistrate of Midnapore and Mr. Ellison, Additional Superintendent of Police, Comilla. On the side of the Government the severest measures were taken. Troops were quartered in many districts where trouble had taken place or was apprehended and heavy collective fines were imposed in Chittagong, Midnapore and twenty-four Parganas Districts. Moreover, the abandoned prison for revolutionary prisoners in the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal was reopened in spite of public protest and political prisoners were transported there. During the year, two important Labour Conferences were held. The first session of the Indian Trades Union Federation (former Right Wing of the Trade Union Congress) was held at Madras on July 15th, with Mr. V. V. Giri in the chair. Among the resolutions passed was one relating to the position of labour in the future Indian Constitution. The All-India Trade Union Congress met on September 12th at Madras, with Mr. J. N. Mitra as President. The Trade Union Con- gress condemned the Communal Award and the Ottawa Pact as harmful to the best interests of the workers. It also passed a resolution saying that in view of the sporadic strikes at Matunga (near Bombay), Kharagpur (seventy miles from Calcutta), Lillooah (near Calcutta), Lucknow (in the United Provinces) and other places, it was clear that the workers in all the railways were resolved to declare a general strike and that the responsibility for postponing it indefinitely, lay upon leaders like Mr. Jamnadas Mehta,`Mr. V. V. Giri and Mr. S. C. Joshi (Right-Wing leaders), who were guiding the policy of the Railwaymen's Federation. Attempts were made during the year to bring about unity between the Trades Union Federation and the Trade Union Congress, but they proved abortive. Though a ballot of the railway workers in May resulted in a vote for a general strike, the strike was not launched. There were sporadic strikes, however, in many centres and in October there was a strike at the Perambur rail- way workshop, near Madras, which dragged on for some months. The communal situation in India was, on the whole, fairly satisfactory—the only exception being Bombay, where. Hindu-Moslem riots broke out in May. In some of the Indian

THE FIGHT RESUMED 287 States, however, there was trouble. The year before, there was trouble in Kashmir, where the peasants (who are pre- dominantly Moslems) rose in revolt against the Hindu Maharajah. Though the grievances were mainly economic, a communal colouring was given to the movement by Moslem sympathisers in British India and also by the peasants them- selves, who in some cases attacked their Hindu fellow-subjects. However, with the help of troops from British India, the revolt was suppressed but as a price for the assistance rendered him, the Maharajah had to submit to the terms of the British Government in the matter of appointing British officers. To appease his subjects, the Maharajah undertook to make concessions in land revenue, to extend primary education, to give a share of state-appointments to all communities and to introduce a measure of constitutional reforms, including a Legislative Assembly. The first elections to the Kashmir Legislative Assembly took place in September 1934. In May 1932, trouble broke out in Alwar State, similar to that in Kashmir, the only difference being that the trouble was more communal and less economic than in Kashmir. To put down the rebellious Moslem subjects, troops from British India had to be called in. The assistance was welcomed by the Maharaja, but when the British Government sought to impose their conditions,¹ the Maharajah refused to submit. The dispute between the Maharajah, and the British Govern- ment went on for some time, but ultimately the former was ordered to leave his state. That order holds good to-day. One of the surprises of the year was the result of the elections held in Burma in November 1932 to decide whether Burma was in favour of separation from India. The year before, Burma had been in the throes of a peasant rebellion, a serious disturbance, the like of which India had not seen since 1857. The rebellion continued for more than a year. In 1932, the situation gradually became quiet and orders were issued for a General Election. On the ground that the electoral rolls had been prepared in 1931, when many of the ¹ One of the conditions was that the Maharajah should submit to a Control Commission, The trouble of May 1932 subsided by September. But agrarian unrest of a violent type broke out in January 1933. In May 1933 the Maharajah was ordered to leave his state.

288. THE INDIAN STRUGGLE districts were in a state of revolt and the Anti-Separationist Party had no interest in an election, the Anti-Separationist leaders asked for fresh electoral rolls. The Government turned down the request and the elections were held on the basis of the old rolls. Nevertheless, the Anti-Separationists came out with a clear majority. When the newly-elected Council met in December, after a lengthy debate, the follow- ing resolution was carried without a division:
289. This Council opposes the separation of Burma from India on the basis of the Constitution for a separated Burma as outlined in the statement of the Prime Minister at the Burma Round Table Conference on January 12th, 1932.
290. This Council emphatically opposes the unconditional and permanent federation of Burma with India.
291. This Council will continue to oppose the separation of Burma from India until Burma is granted a Con- stitution on certain terms (as defined in the amend- ment). In the alternative, the Council proposes that Burma shall enter the Indian Federation on certain terms and conditions including the right of secession.
292. The Council urges that a conference be called at an early date for the purpose of determining the future Constitution of Burma as a separate unit on the basis defined or as a unit in the Indian Federation accord- ing to the terms defined with right to secede. (Clauses three and four were the amendments incor- porated in the resolution.) The Government, however, interpreted this resolution as a vote not given for unqualified federation with India, and they maintained that conditional federation, i.e., federation with the right to secede, was not possible. The present policy of the Government is to separate Burma from India and in accordance with that policy, Burma was not invited to send members to the third session of the Round Table Conference in November-December, 1932. Towards the end of November a very important matter came up for consideration before the Indian Legislative

THE FIGHT RESUMED 289 Assembly—the Ottawa Agreement. This Agreement had been entered into by the nominees of the Government of India who had attended the Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa, in Canada, in August 1932. The purpose of the Agreement was to force on India a scheme of Empire pre- ference whereby India was to give to Great Britain pre- ferences covering no less than twenty-six per cent. of her imports. There was considerable agitation in the country against the ratification of the Ottawa Agreement. In the absence of the Nationalist members in the Assembly, it was however impossible to throw out the Agreement. The Agreement was referred to a Select Committee and the majority report moved by Sir H. S. Gour was adopted by the Assembly. The Agreement was ratified for a period of three years at the end of which the matter would come up again before the Assembly for consideration. It was further provided that the Government should prepare an annual report reviewing the effect on India’s export and import trade of the preferences and that the report should be examined by a Committee of fifteen members appointed by the Assembly. The new Ottawa duties came into operation on January 16th, 1933. In this connection it should be noted that since England went off the Gold Standard on September 21st, 1931, the total value of gold exported from Bombay up to December 31st, 1932, amounted to Rs. 105, 27, 60, 190 (Rs. 13½ = £1 approximately) or about 1,053 million rupees. Repeated appeals were made to the Government by Chambers of Commerce, business men and public leaders to stop this flow of gold from the country, but to no avail. The Maharashtra Chamber of Commerce, Bombay, for instance, wrote to the Government of India towards the end of October, that fol- lowing the example of the Bank of England, the Government of India should buy up gold. According to the Chamber, since India had a gold bullion reserve of only Rs. 112.3 millions against a note circulation of Rs. 1,752.6 millions, the Govern- ment would be well advised to buy up more gold.¹ ¹ The flow of gold from India has been going on unchecked ever since. According to a Press statement issued from Bombay on October 6th, 1934, the total value of gold exported from Bombay since England went off the Gold Standard amounts to Rs. 197,89,40,886—or about 1979 million rupees. T

290 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE There was another important matter which came up before the Assembly in September—the Criminal Law Amendment Bill 1932. The purpose of this Bill was to place on the Statute Book the Ordinances which had been promulgated in January by the Viceroy and had been renewed in June as Special Powers Ordinance, 1932. As the Ordinance was to lapse in December, it had either to be renewed again or permanently placed on the Statute Book. In connection with this Bill, as in connection with the Ottawa Agreement, the absence of the Nationalist members, who had resigned in 1930, was keenly felt. The Bill was passed into Law in November. In August a delegation of the India League of London, consisting of Miss Wilkinson, ex-M.P., Miss Monica Whately, Mr. Leonard Matters and Mr. Krishna Menon (Secretary), arrived in India to study the political situation in the country. During their stay in India they did not make public speeches, nor did they give interviews to the Press. Only once on the occasion of the fast of Mahatma Gandhi—were they moved to breaking their silence and they declared: ‘The removal of Mahatma Gandhi means the disappearance of the greatest force working for moderation, peace and friendship towards Britain.’ Reviewing the year 1932 as a whole, one may say that it opened in the midst of excitement and enthusiasm. But as had happened before with Mahatma Gandhi’s movement, it ended in an anti-climax. The ‘epic fast’ of the Mahatma was the turning-point and from that moment onwards, the Government definitely got the better of the Congress. As the year came to a close, the thought that was uppermost in the minds of most Congressmen was how to push on the anti-untouchability campaign and resolutions were being passed from many a platform at the instance of the Congress leaders, asking the Viceroy to accord sanction to the Temple Entry Bills in the Madras Legislative Council and the Indian Legislative Assembly. Civil disobedience indeed!

CHAPTER XIV DEFEAT AND SURRENDER (1933-34) WITH the dawn of the new year, Congressmen who were more politically-minded, began to realise that the civil-disobedience movement was in danger of fizzling out. The Independence Day celebrations on January 26th, 1933, were therefore organised with much enthusiasm with a view to rousing the people again. The response everywhere was encouraging. In Calcutta alone, the police had to make 300 arrests besides using force to break up the demonstrations. In Badanganj in Arambagh Sub-division of Hooghly District in Bengal, the police resorted to shooting for dispersing the Congress procession. 'Following the Independence Day celebrations, Mrs. Gandhi was arrested at Borsad in Gujerat and sentenced to six months' imprisonment on February 7th, for leading a procession of women. As soon as the White Paper embodying the Government proposals regarding the Indian Con- stitutional Reforms was announced on March 17th, the annual session of the India National Congress was convened at Calcutta with Pandit Madan Mohon Malaviya as the President- elect. The Congress session was at once banned like the Delhi session of 1932—nevertheless, delegates and leaders assembled in Calcutta from all parts of the country on April 11th, for the occasion. The important leaders who could be easily spotted out were all arrested—including Pandit Mala- viya, Mrs. Motilal Nehru, Mr. M. S. Aney (Central Pro- vinces), Dr. Alam (Punjab), Dr. Syed Mahmud (Bihar), all of them being members of the Congress Working Committee with the exception of Mrs. Nehru. Thereafter, Mrs. J. M. Sengupta proceeded to the appointed place at the head of 2,500 Congressmen for holding the meeting and under her presidentship the meeting was held. Resolutions were passed reaffirming (1) the goal of independence; (2) the efficacy of the method of civil disobedience for attaining that goal, and 291

292 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE (3) the boycott of foreign cloth and of British goods of all kinds. The most important resolution was one emphatically condemning the White Paper proposals. Before the meeting ended, large contingents of police arrived on the scene, arrested Mrs. Sengupta and 250 others, including 40 ladies and dispersed the meeting by force. The following extract from the speech of the President-elect, the venerable Pandit Malaviya, reflects the feeling of the country at the time: 'It is estimated that nearly 120,000 persons including several thousand women and quite a number of children have been arrested and imprisoned during the last fifteen months. It is an open secret that when the Government started repression, the official expectation was that they would crush the Congress in six weeks' time. Fifteen months have not enabled the Government to achieve that object. Twice fifteen months will not enable it to do so.' This was not the review made by a young hot-head but by one of the oldest and most moderate leaders of the Congress. Consequently, the response made by the country to the Congress appeal in 1932 and 1933, in spite of lack of prepara- tion, in spite of the sudden arrest of the organisers and financiers of the Party early in January 1932, and in spite of the diversion caused by the Mahatma's fast in September 1932 and the anti-untouchability campaign thereafter—can by no means be regarded as unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, the country was startled one fine morning in May to hear that the Mahatma had suspended the civil-disobedience campaign. While in prison the Mahatma had decided to go on a three weeks' fast¹ as a penance, because his followers outside had not made sufficient progress with the anti-untouchability campaign. The object of the fast was to bring about a change of heart—not in the bureaucracy but in his countrymen— who were responsible for the sad plight of the untouchables. The Government had no objection to a fast of that kind and ¹ After the famous September fast, the Mahatma had fasted once again in December, but that fast had been a short one. The present fast was described by him as a 'heart-prayer for purification of myself and my associates for greater vigilance and watchfulness in connection with the Harijan cause.'

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 293 as a matter of fact, thanks to British news-agencies, the fast was given wide publicity in the European Press,¹ because it helped to advertise the internal differences of the Indian people. However, the Government considered it prudent to set him free. The day after his release he made the announce- ment referred to above.² At first the civil-disobedience cam- paign was suspended for six weeks, but the suspension was subsequently extended for six weeks more, i.e., till the end of July. The sudden suspension of the campaign without rhyme or reason, would under ordinary circumstances have produced a widespread revolt in the Congress organi- sation, but since he was in the middle of a fast which could end fatally, all judgment was suspended for the time being. While suspending the civil-disobedience campaign, the Mahatma made an appeal to the Government of India to withdraw the Ordinances and release the civil-disobedience prisoners. But, unfortunately, a settled Government pre- serves a continuity of policy and cannot alter its policy over- night as an individual can. The Government’s reply was therefore a refusal. While responsible Congressmen in India were unwilling or afraid to speak out against the Mahatma after his surrender of May 1933, a manifesto was issued by the late Mr. Vithalbhai J. Patel³ and the writer from Vienna, condemning the Mahatma’s decision. The manifesto stated that the decision virtually undid the work and the sacrifice of the last thirteen years. It signified a failure of the civil- ¹ The writer was in Vienna when the news regarding the fast appeared in the Continental Press. After 14 months' incarceration when his health was in an alarming condition, Lt.-Col. Buckley, I.M.S. of Lucknow who had been treating him, recommended his transfer to Europe for treatment. Thereupon the Government of India permitted him to leave for Europe on his own financial responsibility. He was released at Bombay when he sailed and arrived in Vienna in March, 1933. ² It is a matter for conjecture if the Government knew that the Mahatma would suspend the civil-disobedience campaign if he were set free. On May 8th, 1933, when the Mahatma started his fast the Government issued a communiqué stating that in view of the nature of the object of the fast and the attitude of mind which it disclosed, the Government had decided that the Mahatma should be set at liberty. After his release, the sus- pension of civil disobedience was ordered by the Acting President of the Congress, Mr. Aney, on the 'recommendation' of the Mahatma. ³ The late Mr. V. J. Patel had returned from the United States after three months' strenuous propaganda on behalf of India which ultimately cost him his life. He, as well as the writer, were undergoing treatment in Vienna at the time.

294 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE disobedience campaign, as also of Mahatma Gandhi's leader- ship. It was therefore time to turn to a more radical policy and leadership. Owing to the preoccupation of the public over Mahatma Gandhi's health, the manifesto did not, how- ever, produce the effect which it would otherwise have. Even friends thought that it was an outrageous act to criticise the Mahatma when his life was in jeopardy because of the fast. In July, a Conference of important Congressmen, then out of prison, was held at Poona. It could be regarded as an unofficial meeting of the All-India Congress Committee. Two groups were represented at the Conference—one in favour of calling off the movement altogether and the other in favour of resuming it with full vigour. The former group had probably a majority and most of the members of this group were in favour of reviving the Swarajist policy of carrying the fight inside the Legislatures which had been abandoned at the Lahore Congress in December 1929. Never- theless, at the end, the Conference decided to give in to the, Mahatma. At his instance it was decided that the Mahatma should make a further attempt to see the Viceroy and come to an understanding with him. If this failed, the Congress should resume 'individual' civil disobedience, but that 'mass' civil disobedience should be given up altogether. The purpose of this was that the Congress should not organise any cam- paign on a mass scale but should leave it to individuals to break any laws that they felt called upon to on their personal responsibility. Soon after the Poona Conference the Mahatma approached the Viceroy for an interview—but all that he got was a humiliating rebuff. He and some of his closest fol- lowers, thereupon, proceeded to start civil disobedience individually and by August 1933, they found themselves in prison once again. This time even the Mahatma's incarcera- tion did not create a great stir. 'Individual' civil disobedience was offered all over India by the loyal adherents of the Mahatma and a few hundred persons were thereby thrust back into prison. But it was a foregone conclusion that where mass civil disobedience had failed, individual civil disobedience would not produce any appreciable effect. On reaching prison, the Mahatma found

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 295 that the facilities afforded him since September 1932, during his last incarceration, for conducting the anti-untouchability campaign from behind the prison walls—would not be given *him this time.*¹ He thereupon gave notice to the Government that if he did not get those facilities, he would feel called upon to resort to fasting. It is difficult for a layman to reconcile this attitude of the Mahatma with his lifelong principle that a Satyagrahi prisoner should voluntarily submit to jail dis- cipline. However, the Government once again found them- selves in an uncomfortable position. By that time they had realised that individual civil disobedience was going to fizzle out and consequently there would be no risk in setting the Mahatma at liberty. So once more the Mahatma found himself a free man. On coming out from prison, the Mahatma announced that since he had been sentenced to one year's imprisonment in August 1933, and since he had been released by the Government before the expiry of his term, he would consider himself as a prisoner till August 1934, and would not offer civil disobedience during that period. Before offering civil disobedience, the Mahatma had issued a statement in July to the effect that there was too much secrecy in the affairs of the Congress and in the management of the civil-disobedience campaign and this secrecy was largely responsible for the failure that had overtaken the Congress. In the Mahatma's opinion, the Congress organisa- tions had become corrupt bodies. Soon after this, at the instance of the Mahatma, the Acting-President of the Congress, Mr. M. S. Aney, issued orders, dissolving all Congress organisations in the country. Confusion worse confounded! What were the people to do? Normal human reason could not follow the logic of the Mahatma and those who could be expected to speak out 'the plain truth, were not available. At this juncture, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was released from prison after serving his term of two years' imprisonment. All eyes were turned on him. He was the one man who could influence the Mahatma—who could drag the Congress out of ¹ The reason given by the Government was that on the former occasion he had been incarcerated without trial, whereas on this occasion he was convicted after trial.

296 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE the mess into which it had fallen. Pandit Nehru had long talks with the Mahatma and following that, an interchange of letters. The correspondence was duly published, but on perusal it was found to be more doctrinaire than practical. What the public wanted to know urgently was not whether and wherein Pandit J. L. Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi agreed or disagreed fundamentally—but how the Congress could be restored to life and vigour. During his four months of comparative freedom, Pandit Nehru wrote and spoke freely and gave expression to his socialistic—or communistic —ideas, but the Congress did not show any signs of resus- citation. In an exceedingly interesting and able article under the caption 'Whither India?'—he pleaded for social and economic equality—for the ending of all special class-privi- leges and vested interests—but that did not help the Congress one jot or tittle. With a popularity only second to that of the Mahatma, with unbounded prestige among his countrymen, with a clear brain possessing the finest ideas, with an up-to- date knowledge of modern world movements—that he should be found wanting in the essential quality of leadership, namely the capacity to make decisions and face unpopularity if need be,¹ was a great disappointment. But there was no help for it. What had been expected of him had to be accom- plished by lesser men. After Pandit Nehru, Mr. K. F. Nariman the Bombay leader, was released and without delay he began to give public expression to his views² on the decisions of the Poona Conference in July 1933. Referring to the Mahatma's decision to start civil disobedience in August 1933, because the Viceroy did not grant him an unconditional interview, he said, ' "Inter- view or Death" is the national slogan for the present. : . . The renewed fight in August last is not for Swaraj, nor even for political constitutional advance, but for the assertion of a supposed "national right" of an unconditional interview. If ¹ This defect in Pandit J. L. Nehru was manifest on other occasions as well, when the Congress was passing through a crisis—e.g., in the crisis of 1923-24 and subsequently in the crisis of 1928-29. ² For a full statement of his views one should refer to his book, Whither Congress? Bombay Book Depot, Girgaon, Bombay, November 1933. Mr. Nariman has been a member of the Congress Working Committee since January 1930.

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 297 that right was conceded, even the modified individual fight would be called off and peace between Government' and the people restored, though the Congress political goal is not satisfied.' Speaking of the Mahatma's condemnation of secrecy, he remarked: 'By what rule of modern warfare or sport are we bound to disclose our plans and schemes before- hand to the enemy? But I forget, it is a religious fight and not political; so neither the rules of sport nor the canons of modern warfare apply! Secrecy of one's plans and future actions is the very essence of all modern national movements and struggles.' On the decision to call off 'mass,' but retain 'individual' civil disobedience, he stated: 'Does it need an Indian National Congress to tell an individual to break laws on his own responsibility and take the consequences? . . . That eternal liberty to act as he likes and take the consequences is given to man since the days of Adam.' Then he dealt with the Mahatma's assertion that 'continuance by even one person (of civil disobedience) ensures revival into such an irrepressible mass movement as no amount of repression will suppress.' And Mr. Nariman asserted on the contrary: 'If this "one man" theory were true, India as well as Ireland should have been transformed after this most inspiring, unforgettable, blood-curdling, patriotic, heroic example (referring to the self-immolation of Terence MacSwiney and Jatin Das).... The whole misconception is again based on the same unsustainable theory and slippery foundation—the "change of heart" theory exploded above, that the Britisher would pine at the suffering and yield.' Criticising the decision to dissolve or suspend all Congress organisations, he main- tained: 'None can dissolve the National Assemblies that have come into existence by popular vote.' Then finally he asked: 'How can we induce Gandhiji to rid himself of this almost incorrigible habit . . . this perpetual blundering, blending of religion and politics?' Mr. Nariman opined that the remedy lay in securing for Gandhiji, in place of the late Pandit Motilal Nehru, another political taskmaster—'a plain-speaking outspoken giant and not lip-sealed mummies who always shake their heads like spring dolls, perpendicularly or horizontally, accord- ing as the Mahatma pulls the strings straight or sideways.'

298 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE It was refreshing and heartening to find in the Working Committee, at least one man who could think boldly and have the courage to call a spade a spade. But though Mr. Nariman was brilliant in his analysis, he was weak in action. His suggestion for summoning the All-India Congress Committee to end the existing stalemate was not taken seriously by the General Secretary, Pandit Nehru and when the latter was clapped in prison in January 1934, for making an alleged seditious speech in Calcutta, no silver lining was visible in the dark horizon. It was left to Dr. M. A. Ansari, the Moslem leader of Delhi, to tackle the situation. During his visit to England in 1933 he had been pained and humiliated by the arrogance of the Conservative politicians and their assertion that the Congress was down and out. That feeling was heightened on finding on his return to India that the Congress was in a state of suspended animation. After appealing to the Mahatma to bring the Congress back to life once again, he along with Dr. B. C. Roy of Calcutta, summoned a con- ference of Congressmen of their way of thinking at Delhi in March 1934. By that time, civil disobedience was as dead as a door-nail, but the Congress could not function because of the Ordinances and the Ordinances would not be withdrawn by the Government till civil disobedience was unconditionally withdrawn. The only way out of the mess was for the Congress leaders to eat the humble pie, call off the civil- disobedience campaign and thereby secure the withdrawal or suspension of the Ordinances. The Delhi Conference pre- pared the ground for that by resolving to revive the All-India Swaraj Party to contest the elections to the Legislatures.¹ The next month a larger Conference was summoned to pursue the same topic and Ranchi (in Bihar) was chosen as the venue, because the Mahatma would be there at the time. The Conference confirmed the decision arrived at at Delhi to revive the All-India Swaraj Party and the prime-movers, Drs. Ansari and Roy, were able to secure the support of the ¹ Before the Delhi Conference, another Conference, called the Democratic Swarajya Party Conference, had been held at Bombay at the instance of Mr. N. C. Kelkar of Poona and Mr. Jamnadas Mehta of Bombay for popularising the idea of fighting the next elections. This Conference had large support from all parts of Maharashtra.

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 299 Mahatma. The next month in May—a meeting of the All- India Congress Committee was summoned at Patna after an interval of about three years. This meeting offered a surprise to the public in as much as Mahatma Gandhi himself spon- sored the idea that Congressmen should enter the Legislatures. This decision had added importance in view of the fact that meanwhile the Government had decided to dissolve the Indian Legislative Assembly and hold a General Election in November. The All-India Congress Committee decided that instead of permitting the Swaraj Party to function, the Con- gress should itself undertake the responsibility and a Parlia- mentary Board was therefore set up for running the elections. The Committee further decided to call off the civil-dis- obedience campaign, the Mahatma, however, retaining the right to offer civil disobedience.¹ Once again the Government came to know in advance what the decision of the All-India Congress Committee would be and no obstacles were there- fore placed in the way of the Committee meeting openly, though it was still an unlawful body. After the meeting, when the Government felt that the defeat and humiliation of the Congress were complete—they withdrew the ban on most of the Congress organisations in the country and allowed them to function. The decision of the All-India Congress Committee to contest the coming elections did not pass unchallenged. There was a solid group opposed to it—but this time it was not the old ‘No-Change’ Party that was opposing, because the leader of that Party, the Mahatma, was himself the sponsor of the council-entry proposal—but the newly-formed Congress Socialist Party. While the All-India Congress Committee was deliberating, the oppositionists held an All-India Con- ference of their Party. This Party had strong support from the United Provinces and Bombay, besides a fair measure of support from all parts of India. From such information as is ¹ As early as April 7th, 1934, the Mahatma issued a statement advising all Congressmen to suspend civil disobedience as a means of obtaining Swaraj and asserting that in the existing circumstances, only one person, and that himself, should bear the responsibility of civil disobedience. This curious reservation was accepted by the All-India Congress Committee in May and the Bombay Congress in October 1934.

300 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE available, it appears that the Congress Socialist Party has offered a platform not only to those who are Socialists by conviction, but also to those who are dissatisfied with the Congress policy of council-entry. It is unfortunate that the opposition to council-entry came from the Socialist Party, because there is nothing anti-Socialist in fighting within the Legislatures, if such a policy is otherwise deemed expedient. But it may be that the Socialist Party, representing some of the radical forces in the Congress, instinctively felt called upon to oppose a party that had rallied all the moderate elements. And there is no doubt that those who have taken a leading part in the Swarajist revival of 1934, are of a different calibre from that militant group which formed the backbone of the Swaraj Party in 1923. It is interesting to note here that as in 1928, the erstwhile Swarajists and 'No-Changers' made common cause against the Independence-wallahs—so also in 1934, these two groups seem to have closed up their ranks against the common enemy. Though the Congress Socialist Party has, in some respects, been harking back to the ideas and shibboleths that were popular forty or fifty years ago, it does stand for a radical tendency in the Nationalist movement and the formation of such a party is a very hopeful feature of the times. The latest reports go to show that the organisation of the party is making headway in most of the provinces and in the recent elections to the Bombay Congress Committee, the Socialists claimed to have captured half the seats. In spite of the menace of the Socialists, the official bloc in the Congress have not been a happy family. At the meetings of the Working Committee held at Bombay and Benares, after the Patna meeting in May, differences appeared over the attitude that should be adopted towards the so-called 'Com- munal Award' of the British Government. Pandit M. M. Malaviya and Mr. M. S. Aney held that the Communal Award, like the White Paper, should be strongly condemned. The rest of the Working Committee under the influence of the Moslem members, maintained that the Congress should 'neither accept nor reject' the Communal Award, though they admitted that the Award was thoroughly obnoxious.

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 301 Why the Moslem leaders in the Congress have taken up this attitude, it is difficult to say—especially when one remembers that after the Karachi Congress, it was they, who by their firm attitude, prevented the Mahatma from yielding to the demand of the communalist Moslems for separate electorate. Whatever the reason may be, the fact remains that to-day they are holding a pistol at the Working Committee—and because of their insistence, the Committee has been forced to take up this ridiculous attitude of neither accepting nor rejecting the Award. The argument ordinarily urged in favour of not rejecting the Award is a twofold one. Firstly, the Congress should represent all parties in the country, including the Communalist Moslems, and secondly, that until the parties arrive at an agreed solution, the present solution should stand. Both the arguments are fallacious. The Congress does not represent all the parties in the land—for instance, it certainly does not represent the loyalists, whether Hindus or Moslems. Secondly, it is the rejection of a bad solution that will force us to arrive at a good solution. Like the White Paper, the Communal Award should be straight away rejected—no matter whether an alternative solution is immediately available or not. Moreover, this ‘all parties’ idea is a false and dangerous idea. The party that is fighting for freedom is the party that is solely responsible for producing the Constitution. And so far as the Communal question is concerned, the Congress solution is already there. Be that as it may, in the present circumstances one is reluctantly driven to the conclusion that the Nationalist Moslems have been gradually—may be unconsciously—coming into line with their Communalist co-religionists. All attempts at a compromise having failed, Pandit Malaviya and Mr. Aney resigned from the Congress Working Committee and the Parliamentary Board and proceeded to form a separate party—under the name of the Congress Nationalist Party— with the object of fighting the Communal Award and the White Paper. This Party held an All-India Conference in Calcutta on August 19th, under the Presidentship of Pandit M. M. Malaviya—the Chairman of the Reception Com- mittee being Sir P. C. Roy, the well-known chemist and

302 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE philanthropist. The Conference was a successful one and it was evident that public opinion in Bengal—especially of the Hindu community—was behind the Party. Bengal Hindus have been suffering from a just grievance because the Communal Award has allotted them only 80 seats out of 250 in the new Legislature, while Moslems have been given 119 seats.¹ To add to this, the Poona Agreement concluded at the time of the Mahatma's fast, has allotted 30 seats to the depressed classes, out of these 80 seats, as against the pro- vision for 10 in the Communal Award, though the depressed classes issue hardly exists in Bengal. Bengal Hindus² have therefore been greatly offended by the decision of the Work- ing Committee not to reject the Communal Award. It is difficult to say at this stage what will be the result of the elections. It may, however, be a safe forecast to say that the majority of the elected seats for Hindus will be captured by the official Congress Party. But though the Congress Nationalist Party will have a smaller number of seats, they will have the solid support of the Hindu community in their propaganda as also in their work in the Assembly. In non- communal matters, the two Congress groups will be found in the same lobby. So far as the Nationalist Moslems are concerned, they hope to capture a fair percentage of the seats. The last meeting of the Congress Working Committee and of the Congress Parliamentary Board was held at Wardha (Central Provinces) on September 8th, 9th and 10th. An eleventh-hour attempt was made to bring about a com- promise between the two Congress groups, but the effort failed. At this meeting it transpired that the Mahatma had been thinking seriously of retiring from active politics. It was first surmised that the split among the Congress leaders over the Communal Award had upset him seriously. But one of his trusted lieutenants, Mr. Rajagopalachariar of Madras, issued a statement on September 7th, saying: 'The cause of ¹ Under the existing Constitution, Hindus have 60 per cent. of the elected seats in the Bengal Legislative Council. This is in accordance with the Lucknow Pact of 1916—the agreement arrived at between the Indian National Congress and the All-India Moslem League. ² This is also the case with the Punjab Hindus. Many of the Hindu constituencies in Bengal and Punjab have therefore returned members of the Congress Nationalist Party to the Assembly.