द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

THE FIGHT RESUMED 269 between us are closed or whether you expect me still to see and receive guidance from you as to the course I am to pursue in advising the Congress.' The Viceroy sent a long reply on December 31st and stated at the end: 'His Excellency feels bound to emphasis that he will not be prepared to discuss with you any measures which the Government of India, with the fullest approval of His Majesty's Government, found it necessary to adopt in Bengal, the United Provinces and the North-West Frontier Province.' Soon after receipt of this telegram the Working Committee met on January 1st, 1932, and adopted the following resolution: ' . . . The Committee regards the Premier's declaration as wholly unsatisfactory and inadequate, and in terms of the Congress demands, opines that nothing short of complete independence, carrying full control of defence, external affairs and finance, with such safeguards as may be demonstrably necessary in the interest of the nation, can be regarded by the Congress as satisfactory. The Committee notes that the British Government was not prepared to regard the Congress at the Round Table Conference as entitled to speak on behalf of the nation as a whole. At the same time the Committee recognises, with sorrow that communal harmony could not be attained at the said Conference. The Committee invites the nation, therefore, to make ceaseless efforts to demonstrate the capacity of the Congress to represent the nation as a whole and promote an atmosphere that would make the Constitution, framed purely on a national basis, acceptable to the various com- munities composing the nation. Meanwhile, the Com- mittee is prepared to render co-operation to Government, provided the Viceroy reconsiders his Thursday's telegram to Mahatma Gandhi, adequate relief is granted in respect of the Ordinances and its recent acts, a free scope is left to the Congress in any future negotiations and consultations to prosecute the Congress's claim for complete independence and administration of the country is carried on with popular representatives pending the attainment of such independence. 'In the absence of a satisfactory response from Govern- ment in terms of the foregoing paragraph, the Working

270 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE Committee will regard it as an indication on the part of the Government that it has reduced to nullity the Delhi Pact. ‘In the event of a satisfactory response not forthcoming, the Committee calls upon the nation to resume civil disobedience.’ The same day the Mahatma sent a long rejoinder to the Viceroy asking him to reconsider his decision and grant an interview without imposing any conditions as to the scope of discussion. He enclosed a copy of the Working Committee’s resolution and added: ‘If His Excellency thinks it worth while to see me, the operation of the resolution will be suspended pending our discussion, in the hope that it may result in the resolution being finally given up.’ On January 2nd, 1932, the Viceroy informed Mahatma Gandhi that an interview under the threat of civil disobedience was out of the question. The Mahatma replied as follows: ‘... Surely it is wrong to describe an honest expression of opinion as a threat. May I remind the Government that the Delhi negotiations were opened and carried on whilst civil disobedience was on and that when the Pact was made, civil disobedience was not given up but only discontinued. This position was reasserted and accepted by His Excellency and his Government last year prior to my departure for London.... Meanwhile I wish to assure the Government that every endeavour will be made on the part of the Congress to carry on the struggle without malice and in a strictly non-violent manner....’ That was the end of the negotiations. On January 4th, the Government of India issued a statement justifying their attitude and conduct. Simultaneously orders were issued to local authorities throughout India to strike at the Congress organisations at once. The ordinances carefully prepared by the Government of India in 1931 during the period of the truce, were at once put into operation. According to lists previously prepared by the local authorities, sweeping arrests of Congress leaders were made before they could find time to launch the civil-disobedience campaign. Within a week almost everybody who was somebody in the Congress Party was in prison. Nevertheless, the campaign began to

THE FIGHT RESUMED 271 gain in strength and volume without any direction from head-quarters. According to official statistics, 14,800 arrests were made in January and 17,800 in February. The Govern- ment soon realised that if arrests were continued at that rate it would be impossible to deal with the large prison population. In March, tactics were therefore changed and instead of making arrests, force was used in dealing with Congressmen and their demonstrations. Under the ordinances, the follow- ing steps among others, were taken by the local authorities all over India: orders were issued prohibiting meetings and processions; Congress organisations were declared illegal and Congress offices were taken possession of; Congress funds were seized; orders were served on people not to help the Congress in any way nor to harbour Congress volunteers, on pain of punishment; land and property were seized for not paying land revenue or other taxes; National literature was banned; the Nationalist Press was gagged; shopkeepers were ordered not to close their shops when asked by the Congress to do so; 'lathi charges' and even firing were resorted to for dispersing Congress demonstrations. Despite all these restrictions, the civil-disobedience cam- paign was in full swing. The following were some of the activities of the Congress: holding meetings and conferences in spite of Government prohibition; organising processions in defiance of police orders; picketing foreign-cloth and liquor shops; picketing British goods, banks, insurance companies, etc.; publishing unauthorised bulletins, newspapers, etc.; saluting the national flag in public and hoisting it over Government buildings; manufacturing salt; attempting to re-occupy buildings seized by the Government; withholding of land revenue and taxes. Besides these activities, during the first six months of the year, special campaigns were conducted on an all-India basis under the orders of the Congress Working Committee or of the Congress President. From April 6th to April 13th, the national week was observed in commemoration of the Amritsar massacre of 1919. This was followed by the holding of the 47th session of the Congress at Delhi on April 24th, in spite of the severest police restric- tions. The Delhi Congress was followed up by a series of

272 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE provincial, district and sub-divisional political conferences held throughout India in defiance of the police ban. A raid on the Wadala Salt Depot was attempted on May 15th. An All- India Swadeshi Day was observed on May 29th, to stimulate the Swadeshi¹ (i.e., national industry) movement and an All- India Prisoners' Day was observed on July 4th, to express sympathy for political prisoners. On April 8th, during the National Week Celebration at Allahabad, the police attempted to disperse by force a Congress procession led by the revered widow of Pandit Motilal Nehru. Among those who were seriously injured during the police attack was Mrs. Motilal Nehru herself. This event sent a thrill of horror and indignation throughout the country.² The Delhi Congress was carefully planned. Though the President- elect, Pandit Madan Mohon Malaviya, was arrested on his way to Delhi, the police could not prevent a large number of delegates from arriving there for participating in the Congress. The Congress session having been banned by the Govern- ment, in the absence of a better arrangement, it was held near the Clock Tower in the Chandni Chowk and Mr. Ranchoddas Amritlal of Ahmedabad presided. There was a short session and the resolutions adopted by the Subjects Committee, which had been printed beforehand, were dis- tributed among the public. The Congress reiterated the resolution on independence, approved of the decision of the Working Committee to revive the civil-disobedience move- ment and reaffirmed its faith in the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi. Soon after, the police arrived on the scene, dispersed the gathering by force and made a large number of arrests. Reviewing the Congress movement during the first four months, Pandit M. M. Malaviya in a public statement, issued on May 2nd, 1932, declared: 'During these four months up to April 20th last, accord- ing to the reports published in the Press, 66,646 persons, ¹ After the Congress was banned, 'Buy Indian' Leagues were organised within the ambit of the Law. ² The medical officer who attended on Mrs. Nehru reported as follows :- 'Her injuries were caused by something like a lathi. She has received half a dozen injuries, including a bad cut on her head which caused profuse bleeding.'

THE FIGHT RESUMED 273 among whom were included 5,325 women and many children, have been arrested, imprisoned and humiliated. This could not possibly include arrests in the far-off villages in the interior of the country and, therefore, the Congress estimates the total arrests to be over 80,000 up to that date. The jails are overcrowded and ordinary prisoners are being released before their time to make room for political prisoners. To this has to be added the number of arrests made during the last ten days, including those of the delegates to the Delhi Congress. According to the reports in the Press, firing has been resorted to in at least 29 cases with considerable loss of life. There have been lathi charges on unarmed crowds at 325 places. There have been 633 cases of house searches and 102 cases of confiscation of property. A general policy has been pursued of imposing extraordinarily heavy fines on persons who have been con- victed in connection with the movement and property far in excess of what was necessary for realising the amount of the fines has been attached and sold. The Press has been gagged as it has never been gagged before. 163 cases have been reported where the newspapers and public presses have been regulated by orders for confiscation, demands for security and consequent closing down of the presses, warnings, searches and arrests of editors, printers or keepers. Numerous public meetings and processions of non-violent men and women have been dispersed by lathi charges, and sometimes by firing.' (Indian Recorder, Calcutta, p. 271.) In connection with the above report, it may be noted, that during the period under review, political prisoners in Karachi Jail and in Haripur Jail in the Frontier Province were subjected to whipping. In Rajshahi Jail in Bengal, political prisoners were subjected to numerous humiliating punishments like bar-fetters, night handcuffs, gunny clothing, etc. In Suri Jail in Bengal, women prisoners went on hunger-strike as a protest against ill-treatment.¹ ¹ In many other prisons similar incidents took place. In Rajmundhry Jail, a prisoner belonging to the Lahore Conspiracy Case was flogged. In Bellary Jail, political prisoners were attacked by warders with sticks (lathis). In the Deoli Detention Camp for Bengal state-prisoners near Ajmer, the state-prisoners were assaulted by the guards and seriously injured. In all such cases the usual charge against the prisoners was one of insubordination. S

274 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE On the whole the activities of the Congress in 1932 did not compare unfavourably with those of 1930. Nevertheless, every Congressman could feel one difference. In 1930, the Congress had taken the offensive, while the Government was on the defensive. In 1932 it was just the reverse. There is no doubt that in spite of the manifold defects of the Delhi Pact, die-hards in England and in India took it as a defeat or a humiliation for the all-powerful British Government. They were smarting under a sense of defeat and wanted to avenge themselves. The overwhelming majority gained by the Conservatives at the General Election in October 1931, encouraged them greatly. Moreover, the attitude of Mahatma Gandhi and the statements made by him in England, gave them the impression that he was unwilling or unprepared to face a fight again. That the Mahatma was honestly pursuing a peaceful policy has to be admitted on all hands and his very unpreparedness can be regarded as a proof of his sincerity of purpose. In fact, the Mahatma carried his peaceful inten- tions so far that he neglected to keep his 'powder dry.' He was in reality dragged into a fight in 1932 because of the non possumus attitude of the Viceroy on the one hand and the rising temper of the public on the other. In this connection it is significant that the aggressive steps taken by the Govern- ment of India during the absence of the Mahatma, had the full approval of His Majesty's Government. Apart from the Government's attitude there were two other factors that forced the Mahatma to resume the fight, the general temper of the public and the influence of the Left Wing. As for the first, in none of the major provinces was the public satisfied at the attitude of the Government. Those who had given in to the Mahatma hoping that something tangible would come out of the Round Table Conference were disillusioned. Further, the steady propaganda carried on by Left-Wing Congressmen, youth-leaguers¹ and Left-Wing Labourites, also had its effect. While in England the Mahatma did feel now and again that another fight was unavoidable but the pit ¹ On December 22nd, 1931, the Maharashtra Youth Conference met at Poona with the writer in the chair and passed a resolution calling upon the Congress Working Committee to resume the civil-disobedience campaign.

THE FIGHT RESUMED 275 of it is that no preparations were made by the Congress for the coming campaign and no plans were prepared in advance. The campaign of 1932 was an imitation of that of 1930 and the Government had prepared effective counter-measures for dealing with a campaign of that sort. If the Congress wanted to be successful in 1932 as well—it should have devised new tactics to take the Government by surprise. It is not generally understood why the Congress was unsuccessful in 1932, though the same tactics had been successful in 1930. The reason is that in 1930 the tactics of the Congress had taken the Government by surprise. No doubt, the same tactics had been employed in 1921 and 1922, but owing to the sudden termination of the campaign in February 1922, the Congress did not have to disclose all its secrets. Moreover, eight years had elapsed since that cam- paign and most of the men who had dealt with that campaign were no longer in the service of the Government. Conse- quently, the 1930 campaign was to all intents and purposes a novel campaign and it took the Government some time to comprehend it and to develop counter-tactics thereafter to cope with it. The Delhi Truce gave the Government time to do this work and on January 1st, 1932, when the Working Com- mittee resolved to resume the civil-disobedience campaign, the Government forces were in complete readiness to strike immediately and ruthlessly. And they were not content with striking at those who worked in the open, but made a clean sweep of the brains and financiers of the movement as well.¹ During the first eight months of the year the fight went on with unabated zeal. The declaration of the Government that the Congress would soon be down and out was falsified. The Congress was still alive and kicking, and there was no sign that it would meet with an early death. In March the movement was further strengthened because the Jamiat-ul- ulema, the All-India organisation of the Moslem priests and divines, under the leadership of Mufti Kifayetullah, declared ¹ Among those imprisoned in this way were Mr. Bhulabhai Desai, former Advocate-General of Bombay and Mr. Sarat C. Bose, a prominent advocate of Calcutta and a front-rank Congressman who was then an Alderman of the Calcutta Municipality. At present (November 1934) the latter is still in detention.

276 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE for non-co-operation and the leaders of the Jamiat soon found themselves in prison. This decision of the Jamiat considerably strengthened the position of the Nationalist Moslems, who had all along been an integral part of the Congress, and of the Moslems of the Frontier Province who were going through the worst form of official repression. Nevertheless, the odds were against the Congress. In Bombay, which had been the storm centre in 1930, Hindu-Moslem riots broke out in May and dragged on for nearly six weeks. Owing to this outbreak, the Congress campaign in Bombay suffered a terrible set-back from which it could not recover. In Gujerat, the harassed, persecuted and impoverished peasantry could no longer wage the brave fight of which they could boast in 1930. In the United Provinces, after some months, the no-rent campaign could not make further headway in the face of official repression. In Bengal, more serious than the civil- disobedience movement was the terrorist campaign of the revolutionaries. But though terrorism was a thorn to the Government, it brought untold hardship on the people, since several districts like Chittagong, Midnapore and Dacca were virtually handed over to martial law and the innocent villagers were subjected to heavy collective fines for the misdeeds committed by unknown people. During the year a liberal use was made of fire-arms for dispersing Congress demonstrations. Replying to a question in the Indian Legis- lative Assembly, the Home member to the Government of India, Mr. (now Sir) H. G. Haig stated that in dispersing 'assemblies, firing was resorted to seventeen times in Bengal, seven times in the United Provinces, three times in Bihar and Orissa, once in Madras Presidency, once in the Frontier Province—while in Bombay Presidency the casualties from shooting, were thirty-four killed and ninety-one wounded. In this situation, when the Congress was engaged in a life and death struggle, an unexpected development took place which led to a complete side-tracking of the civil-disobedience movement in the country. That was the fast of Mahatma Gandhi on September 20th, 1932. On March 11th, the Mahatma had written to Sir Samuel Hoare informing him that in keeping with what he had

THE FIGHT RESUMED 277 stated at the Round Table Conference in London on Novem- ber 13th, 1931, if the depressed classes were torn away from the main body of Hindus by the grant of a separate electorate, he would resist it with his life and in pursuance of that resolve, he would fast unto death. On April 13th, Sir Samuel Hoare had replied in a non-committal way, saying that the Government would give the matter their fullest consideration before coming to a decision. The 'Communal Award'¹ of the Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, was thereafter announced on August 17th. It provided for a certain number of seats for the depressed classes in the Provincial Legislatures which would be filled up on the basis of a separate electorate. In addition to this, members of the depressed classes would be entitled to stand for election from the general con- stituencies earmarked for Hindus and would be registered in a common electoral rôle along with other Hindus. The award further provided that if His Majesty's Government were satisfied that the communities concerned were mutually agreed upon a practicable alternative scheme, either in respect of one or more of the Governor's provinces or in respect of the whole of British India, before the new Government of India Bill was passed into law, they would be prepared to recom- mend to Parliament that the alternative should be substituted for the provisions now outlined. On August 18th the Mahatma addressed a letter to the Premier informing him that in accordance with what he had written to Sir Samuel Hoare on March 11th, he had resolved to commence fast unto death at noon on September 20th. 'The fast will cease if during its progress, the British Government, of its own motion or under pressure of public opinion, revise their decision and withdraw their scheme of communal electorates for the depressed classes whose representatives should be elected by general electorate under common franchise, no matter how wide it is.' The Mahatma further asked that the entire correspondence be given immediate and full publicity. ¹ As the members nominated by the British Government to the Second Round Table Conference in 1931 could not come to an agreement on the question of representation, electorate, etc., for the legislatures under the New Constitution, the British Prime Minister announced the Government's decision. This decision is known as the Communal Award.

278 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE The Premier replied on September 8th, regretting the decision of the Mahatma but affirming that the provisions of the award could not be altered except on the condition stated therein. The Mahatma received this communication the next day and immediately replied saying that he felt compelled reluctantly to adhere to the decision he had already conveyed. Words cannot describe the anxiety and alarm that passed from one end of the country to the other when the news about the impending fast was published on September 13th. Frantic appeals were made to the Mahatma to desist but the appeals proved ineffective. Government offered to release him under certain conditions but he declined conditional release. It was therefore decided to leave him undisturbed in Poona Prison, but to remove all restrictions regarding interviews and correspondence. On an appeal from Pandit M. M. Malaviya, a conference of Hindu leaders met at Bombay on September 19th, in order to deliberate how the Mahatma's life could be saved. After a preliminary discussion there, the leaders adjourned to Poona in order to be in constant touch with the Mahatma. After prolonged discussions, an agree- ment was arrived at between the Hindu leaders on September 24th, which virtually did away with separate electorate for the depressed classes. This agreement, hereafter known as the Poona Agreement,¹ was ratified by the Hindu leaders' con- ference and by the Hindu Mahasabha on September 25th, and was cabled to the Government of India and to the Prime Minister. On September 26th, His Majesty's Government announced that they were prepared to recommend to Parlia- ment to endorse the Poona Agreement. The whole country breathed a sigh of relief. Prayers went up to heaven that the Mahatma's life had been saved. The Poona Agreement provided for a certain number of reserved seats for members of the depressed classes in the Legislatures on the basis of a common electorate for all classes of Hindus. There was, however, one qualification. The members of the depressed classes registered in the general electoral roll in a constituency would form an electoral college which would elect a panel of four candidates belonging ¹ Also called the Poona Pact.

THE FIGHT RESUMED 279 to the depressed classes for each of such reserved seats by the method of the single vote. The provision for a primary election, to be in operation for ten years, was insisted on by Dr. Ambedkar (who had been nominated by the Government to the Round Table Conference) though before the Simon Commission and at the first Round Table Conference, he had demanded reservation of seats for the depressed classes on the basis of a common electorate for all Hindus. Mr. M. C. Rajah, a prominent leader of the depressed classes had, on the contrary, consistently stood for reservation of seats for his community on the basis of a common electorate. Earlier in the year he had entered into a pact with Dr. Moonje, President of the Hindu Mahasabha, on this basis. This pact—known popularly as the Rajah-Moonje Pact—was however opposed by Dr. Ambedkar and his followers and on that ground it was not accepted by the British Government. As long as the Mahatma was on fast, rational thinking was completely suspended and the one thought of his country- men was how to save his life. Once he was out of danger, people began to examine the Poona Agreement in the cold light of reason. Then it was realised that while the Communal Award had provided 71 seats in the Provincial Legislatures for the depressed classes, the Poona Agreement had provided 148. These additional seats would be given them at the expense of the rest of the Hindu community. In provinces like Bengal, where Hindus had already been unjustly treated in the award, the Poona Agreement was regarded as a further injustice by the rest of the Hindu community—particularly in view of the fact that the depressed classes problem hardly existed there. Moreover, it was realised that the Poona Agreement had not done away with separate electorate altogether. People began to ask seriously if after all it was worth while for Mahatma Gandhi to have staked his life for such an issue, especially when the Communal Award was from start to finish an objectionable document. But whatever may be the permanent value of the Poona Agreement, there is no doubt that the fast of Mahatma Gandhi had a permanent and far-reaching effect in rous- ing the conscience of the Hindu community. It was a

280 · THE INDIAN STRUGGLE unique spectacle to see how the heart of the entire nation throbbed for one man. All sections of the Hindus were stirred to activity as they had never been before. The most important result of the 'epic fast' was to give a powerful impetus to the movement for the eradication of untouch- ability. During the fast such a colossal amount of sympathy had been generated not only for the Mahatma personally but for the cause of the depressed classes as well, that it would have been a great pity if that sympathy had not been harnessed into permanent channels of activity through the organisation of the All-India Anti-Untouchability League. While the Mahatma's fast had a remarkable effect on his countrymen, in the international sphere it did not prove to be an unmixed blessing. It served to advertise to a dis- proportionate degree the issue of the depressed classes. Hitherto the world had known only one issue relating to India, the political issue—India's grievance against England. Now the leader of the Nationalist movement himself announced to the world that there was another issue—the internal issue —of such vital importance to India that he was prepared to stake his life for it. And British propagandists were not slow to take advantage of the opportunity. In September 1932, the whole of Europe was told that the Mahatma was fasting because he was against granting certain rights to the un- touchables.¹ Ever since then the European public have been constantly fed with stories that India is a land full of internal dissensions where not only Hindus and Moslems, but Hindus themselves are perpetually fighting with one another and only the strong hand of Britain is able to maintain peace and order. The fast had another unfortunate effect which proved to be more serious. It served to side-track the political move- ment at a time when all possible attention should have been devoted to it. If with the termination of the fast the Mahatma had handed over the anti-untouchability work to friends outside, the effect of the fast would not have been so harmful. But when the leader himself began to conduct the anti- ¹ In many countries in Europe the writer has heard this remark made by people generally interested in Indian affairs. At first he did not realise the significance of this remark—but later on he found out that in September 1932, this story had been told all over Europe.

THE FIGHT RESUMED 281 untouchability campaign from behind the prison-walls, what could his followers do? The Mahatma had all along held that a Satyagraha prisoner should regard himself as 'civilly dead' and should not bother about the work outside prison. But on this occasion he did not stick to his usual principle. To make matters worse, when questions were put to him, at this time, as to whether political work should be done or social work, he gave replies that were rather confusing or he did not reply at all, which led people to think that he preferred social work to political. This lead of the Mahatma was naturally followed more by his blind followers and by those who were tired of repeated suffering and imprisonment and wanted a convenient excuse for giving up the political fight. Another theory has been put forward to explain the Mahatma's conduct. It is advanced that he realised the ultimate failure of the movement and therefore wanted to create out of it—another movement which would be of benefit to his countrymen. This theory cannot be accepted since in November 1931, in London, the Mahatma had spoken of his determination to resist with his life, special electorate for the depressed classes. One feels inclined to think that this side-tracking of the civil-disobedience movement was the result of that subjectivism which seizes him at times and makes him utterly blind to and oblivious of objective realities. Ever since the Round Table Conference, he had begun to ponder so deeply over the depressed classes problem that the other problems receded to the background for the time being. Whatever the real explanation may be, there is no doubt that the fast served to side-track the civil-disobedience move- ment and cause a diversion of men, money and public enthusiasm to the anti-untouchability (or 'Harijan')¹ campaign at a time when the position of the Congress, vis-à-vis the Government, was none too strong. The effect was the same as it would be if in the middle of a battle, a general gave the order to his troops to start excavating a canal in order to supply water to the thirsty people of the countryside. In response to the appeal made by the Mahatma on ¹ The word 'Harijan' (literally, 'a man of God') was coined by the Mahatma to denote a member of the depressed classes or untouchables.

282 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE September 26th, temples and public wells throughout India began to be thrown open to the untouchables. In fact so rapid was the march of progress, that it looked as if the demon of untouchability would be laid low in no time. However, a resistance was met with at Guruvayur in South India where the Zamorin, the trustee of the temple, refused to throw it open to the untouchables on the plea of tradition and legal difficulties. Thereupon, Mr. Kelappan, a well-known and highly-esteemed Congress worker, commenced a fast as a protest against the exclusion of untouchables from the temple. When his condition became critical, the Mahatma was pre- vailed upon to intervene and save his life. At the request of the Mahatma, who undertook to continue the fight, Kelap- pan gave up the fast. About this time it was found that in many places the authorities or trustees of several temples were raising legal obstacles in the,way of throwing open the temples to untouchables. It was therefore considered desirable to introduce legislation in the Madras Legislative Council and in the Indian Legislative Assembly to remove such legal difficulties once for all. The Bill drafted for the Madras Council was refused sanction by the Viceroy. Permission for introduction of the Bill drafted for the Indian Legislative Assembly was granted by the Viceroy on January 23rd, 1933, but it was made clear that the Government would not commit itself in any way with regard to the Bill and would afford full opportunity for public opinion to express itself on the question. A special request was made to the Government of India for affording facilities for the speedy passage of the Temple Entry Bill, but the Viceroy declined to offer any such facilities and thanks to the dilatory tactics of the Government, the Bill is still hanging fire. To strengthen the demand for temple entry for untouchables, a plebiscite of temple-goers was taken at Guruvayur on December 25th, 1932. Though Guruvayur is regarded to be a socially backward place, out of 20,163 votes recorded, 77 per cent. were in favour of temple entry, 13 per cent. were against, while 10 per cent. were neutral. Another beneficial result followed from the appeal of the Mahatma made on September 26th to settle Hindu-Moslem differences. A Unity Conference was convened at Allahabad

THE FIGHT RESUMED 283 in which Pandit Malaviya and Moulana Shaukat Ali took a leading part. The Conference met on November 1st, under the presidentship of Mr. Vijayaraghav Achariar, ex-President of the Congress and a large number of representative Hindus and Moslems attended. The atmosphere was one of perfect cordiality. A great deal of progress was made in the nego- tiations for a Hindu-Moslem settlement. But ultimately two obstacles arose. On one side, the leaders of the communalist section of the Moslems condemned the unity efforts. On the other side, the Bengal problem proved insoluble, since the Europeans would not surrender any seat allowed them under the Communal Award and the Moslems would not be content with less than 51 per cent. of the total number of seats. Though the Conference did not come to a successful conclusion, it had a moral value and it helped to clear the atmosphere considerably. We may now review the actions of the Government during the year 1932. While taking the severest measures against the Congress, the Viceroy constantly urged that the Government would simultaneously push on the work of constitution- making. About the middle of January, the Consultative Committee was appointed for keeping the Government in close touch with all the leaders of the other parties, barring the Congress, through the Viceroy and especially for con- sidering the recommendations of the Franchise, Federal Finance and Indian States Inquiry Committees as a pre- liminary to their consideration by His Majesty's Government. Owing to the delay in issuing the Communal Award, the Consultative Committee was twice postponed on the insistence of the Moslem members. On June 27th, an announcement was made by the Government to the effect that they had decided to provide for Provincial Autonomy and Federation in a single Bill and that they would abandon the Third Session of the Round Table Conference. The Indian Liberal leaders immediately lodged a strong protest against the abandonment of the Round Table Conference and following this, Messrs. Sastri, Jayakar, Joshi and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru resigned from the Consultative Committee. This made the Government climb down a bit, and on July 7th,

284 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE Sir Samuel Hoare, in a speech before the Central Asian Society, explained that the change of procedure did not imply a change of policy. He further stated that when the Joint Parliamentary Committee met to consider the Govern- ment proposals, Indians would be enabled to appear not only as witnesses but also to participate in the discussions of the Committee. The explanation of the Secretary of State for India was not considered adequate by the Liberal leaders who persisted in their opposition. On September 5th, a fresh announcement was made by the Viceroy before the Indian Legislative Assembly to the effect that since the Consultative Committee would not be able to make the contribution anticipated from it, it had been decided to hold further discussions in London. A small body of representatives from British India and from the Indian States would therefore meet in London about the middle of November. The work would be in accordance with a fixed agenda and there would be no public session. The Liberal leaders now felt satisfied that their trip to London was restored. The Third Round Table Conference commenced work on November 17th; and ended on December 24th, the final session being open to the public. The Labour Party did not participate in this Con- ference on the ground that the Government had gone back on the policy of conciliation. They also wanted that the Indian members should keep aloof, but that desire was not complied with. Sir Samuel Hoare summed up the results of the Conference at the close of the session. The following are some of the decisions made by the Government to which he referred:

1. The Moslem community would have a representation of 33⅓ per cent. in the Federal legislature so far as British India was concerned.
2. It was not possible to give any definite date as to when the Federation would be in operation.
3. Sindh and Orissa would be separate provinces.
4. The Defence Budget would be non-votable.
5. For employing Indian troops outside India for purposes other than Indian, the decision of the Federal Ministry and the Federal Legislature would

THE FIGHT RESUMED 285 be taken, but the Crown would have full authority when Indian troops were to be employed outside India in the defence of India. Finally, in response to an appeal for co-operation made by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Sir Samuel Hoare said that he wanted to see no empty chairs at the Round Table Con- ference of the Joint Select Committee. During the year the revolutionary movement was strong in the province of Bengal. Special powers were given to the Bengal Government by the Viceroy, in. addition to the Viceregal ordinances. The Viceregal Ordinances, four in number, designed mainly for coping with the civil-dis- obedience movement, were issued on January 4th, 1932. On June 30th, before these Ordinances were due to lapse, a fresh but comprehensive Ordinance, called the Special Powers Ordinance 1932, was promulgated by the Government of India. In addition to this, the Bengal Emergency Powers Ordinance had been issued in November 1931, for arming the Bengal Government with powers similar to those enjoyed by martial law authorities, for the suppression of the terrorist movement. This Ordinance was renewed on May 29th, 1932. Further powers were given to the Bengal Government on July 20th, by the Government of India through the Bengal Emergency Powers (Second Amendment) Ordinance 1932. On September 1st, the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932, was passed by the Bengal Legislative Council which gave increased powers to the Executive, the most important provision being that attempt at murder was made punishable with death sentence. Another Act was passed on September 6th, called the Bengal Suppression of Terrorist Outrages Act, 1932, which empowered the executive to seize buildings, to order citizens on pain of punishment to assist them in the suppression of terrorism, to impose collective fines on villagers, etc. The Legislation passed in the Bengal Legislative Council armed the Government with permanent powers—so that in future, emergency ordinances would not be necessary. During the year, terrorist outrages took place from time to time, the most important of them being the

286 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE murder of Mr. Douglas, the District Magistrate of Midnapore and Mr. Ellison, Additional Superintendent of Police, Comilla. On the side of the Government the severest measures were taken. Troops were quartered in many districts where trouble had taken place or was apprehended and heavy collective fines were imposed in Chittagong, Midnapore and twenty-four Parganas Districts. Moreover, the abandoned prison for revolutionary prisoners in the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal was reopened in spite of public protest and political prisoners were transported there. During the year, two important Labour Conferences were held. The first session of the Indian Trades Union Federation (former Right Wing of the Trade Union Congress) was held at Madras on July 15th, with Mr. V. V. Giri in the chair. Among the resolutions passed was one relating to the position of labour in the future Indian Constitution. The All-India Trade Union Congress met on September 12th at Madras, with Mr. J. N. Mitra as President. The Trade Union Con- gress condemned the Communal Award and the Ottawa Pact as harmful to the best interests of the workers. It also passed a resolution saying that in view of the sporadic strikes at Matunga (near Bombay), Kharagpur (seventy miles from Calcutta), Lillooah (near Calcutta), Lucknow (in the United Provinces) and other places, it was clear that the workers in all the railways were resolved to declare a general strike and that the responsibility for postponing it indefinitely, lay upon leaders like Mr. Jamnadas Mehta,`Mr. V. V. Giri and Mr. S. C. Joshi (Right-Wing leaders), who were guiding the policy of the Railwaymen's Federation. Attempts were made during the year to bring about unity between the Trades Union Federation and the Trade Union Congress, but they proved abortive. Though a ballot of the railway workers in May resulted in a vote for a general strike, the strike was not launched. There were sporadic strikes, however, in many centres and in October there was a strike at the Perambur rail- way workshop, near Madras, which dragged on for some months. The communal situation in India was, on the whole, fairly satisfactory—the only exception being Bombay, where. Hindu-Moslem riots broke out in May. In some of the Indian

THE FIGHT RESUMED 287 States, however, there was trouble. The year before, there was trouble in Kashmir, where the peasants (who are pre- dominantly Moslems) rose in revolt against the Hindu Maharajah. Though the grievances were mainly economic, a communal colouring was given to the movement by Moslem sympathisers in British India and also by the peasants them- selves, who in some cases attacked their Hindu fellow-subjects. However, with the help of troops from British India, the revolt was suppressed but as a price for the assistance rendered him, the Maharajah had to submit to the terms of the British Government in the matter of appointing British officers. To appease his subjects, the Maharajah undertook to make concessions in land revenue, to extend primary education, to give a share of state-appointments to all communities and to introduce a measure of constitutional reforms, including a Legislative Assembly. The first elections to the Kashmir Legislative Assembly took place in September 1934. In May 1932, trouble broke out in Alwar State, similar to that in Kashmir, the only difference being that the trouble was more communal and less economic than in Kashmir. To put down the rebellious Moslem subjects, troops from British India had to be called in. The assistance was welcomed by the Maharaja, but when the British Government sought to impose their conditions,¹ the Maharajah refused to submit. The dispute between the Maharajah, and the British Govern- ment went on for some time, but ultimately the former was ordered to leave his state. That order holds good to-day. One of the surprises of the year was the result of the elections held in Burma in November 1932 to decide whether Burma was in favour of separation from India. The year before, Burma had been in the throes of a peasant rebellion, a serious disturbance, the like of which India had not seen since 1857. The rebellion continued for more than a year. In 1932, the situation gradually became quiet and orders were issued for a General Election. On the ground that the electoral rolls had been prepared in 1931, when many of the ¹ One of the conditions was that the Maharajah should submit to a Control Commission, The trouble of May 1932 subsided by September. But agrarian unrest of a violent type broke out in January 1933. In May 1933 the Maharajah was ordered to leave his state.

288. THE INDIAN STRUGGLE districts were in a state of revolt and the Anti-Separationist Party had no interest in an election, the Anti-Separationist leaders asked for fresh electoral rolls. The Government turned down the request and the elections were held on the basis of the old rolls. Nevertheless, the Anti-Separationists came out with a clear majority. When the newly-elected Council met in December, after a lengthy debate, the follow- ing resolution was carried without a division:
289. This Council opposes the separation of Burma from India on the basis of the Constitution for a separated Burma as outlined in the statement of the Prime Minister at the Burma Round Table Conference on January 12th, 1932.
290. This Council emphatically opposes the unconditional and permanent federation of Burma with India.
291. This Council will continue to oppose the separation of Burma from India until Burma is granted a Con- stitution on certain terms (as defined in the amend- ment). In the alternative, the Council proposes that Burma shall enter the Indian Federation on certain terms and conditions including the right of secession.
292. The Council urges that a conference be called at an early date for the purpose of determining the future Constitution of Burma as a separate unit on the basis defined or as a unit in the Indian Federation accord- ing to the terms defined with right to secede. (Clauses three and four were the amendments incor- porated in the resolution.) The Government, however, interpreted this resolution as a vote not given for unqualified federation with India, and they maintained that conditional federation, i.e., federation with the right to secede, was not possible. The present policy of the Government is to separate Burma from India and in accordance with that policy, Burma was not invited to send members to the third session of the Round Table Conference in November-December, 1932. Towards the end of November a very important matter came up for consideration before the Indian Legislative