द इण्डियन स्ट्रगल / भारतीय स्वाधीनता संग्राम (नेताजी सुभाष चन्द्र बोस - ऐतिहासिक विश्लेषण)

THE FIGHT RESUMED 289 Assembly—the Ottawa Agreement. This Agreement had been entered into by the nominees of the Government of India who had attended the Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa, in Canada, in August 1932. The purpose of the Agreement was to force on India a scheme of Empire pre- ference whereby India was to give to Great Britain pre- ferences covering no less than twenty-six per cent. of her imports. There was considerable agitation in the country against the ratification of the Ottawa Agreement. In the absence of the Nationalist members in the Assembly, it was however impossible to throw out the Agreement. The Agreement was referred to a Select Committee and the majority report moved by Sir H. S. Gour was adopted by the Assembly. The Agreement was ratified for a period of three years at the end of which the matter would come up again before the Assembly for consideration. It was further provided that the Government should prepare an annual report reviewing the effect on India’s export and import trade of the preferences and that the report should be examined by a Committee of fifteen members appointed by the Assembly. The new Ottawa duties came into operation on January 16th, 1933. In this connection it should be noted that since England went off the Gold Standard on September 21st, 1931, the total value of gold exported from Bombay up to December 31st, 1932, amounted to Rs. 105, 27, 60, 190 (Rs. 13½ = £1 approximately) or about 1,053 million rupees. Repeated appeals were made to the Government by Chambers of Commerce, business men and public leaders to stop this flow of gold from the country, but to no avail. The Maharashtra Chamber of Commerce, Bombay, for instance, wrote to the Government of India towards the end of October, that fol- lowing the example of the Bank of England, the Government of India should buy up gold. According to the Chamber, since India had a gold bullion reserve of only Rs. 112.3 millions against a note circulation of Rs. 1,752.6 millions, the Govern- ment would be well advised to buy up more gold.¹ ¹ The flow of gold from India has been going on unchecked ever since. According to a Press statement issued from Bombay on October 6th, 1934, the total value of gold exported from Bombay since England went off the Gold Standard amounts to Rs. 197,89,40,886—or about 1979 million rupees. T

290 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE There was another important matter which came up before the Assembly in September—the Criminal Law Amendment Bill 1932. The purpose of this Bill was to place on the Statute Book the Ordinances which had been promulgated in January by the Viceroy and had been renewed in June as Special Powers Ordinance, 1932. As the Ordinance was to lapse in December, it had either to be renewed again or permanently placed on the Statute Book. In connection with this Bill, as in connection with the Ottawa Agreement, the absence of the Nationalist members, who had resigned in 1930, was keenly felt. The Bill was passed into Law in November. In August a delegation of the India League of London, consisting of Miss Wilkinson, ex-M.P., Miss Monica Whately, Mr. Leonard Matters and Mr. Krishna Menon (Secretary), arrived in India to study the political situation in the country. During their stay in India they did not make public speeches, nor did they give interviews to the Press. Only once on the occasion of the fast of Mahatma Gandhi—were they moved to breaking their silence and they declared: ‘The removal of Mahatma Gandhi means the disappearance of the greatest force working for moderation, peace and friendship towards Britain.’ Reviewing the year 1932 as a whole, one may say that it opened in the midst of excitement and enthusiasm. But as had happened before with Mahatma Gandhi’s movement, it ended in an anti-climax. The ‘epic fast’ of the Mahatma was the turning-point and from that moment onwards, the Government definitely got the better of the Congress. As the year came to a close, the thought that was uppermost in the minds of most Congressmen was how to push on the anti-untouchability campaign and resolutions were being passed from many a platform at the instance of the Congress leaders, asking the Viceroy to accord sanction to the Temple Entry Bills in the Madras Legislative Council and the Indian Legislative Assembly. Civil disobedience indeed!

CHAPTER XIV DEFEAT AND SURRENDER (1933-34) WITH the dawn of the new year, Congressmen who were more politically-minded, began to realise that the civil-disobedience movement was in danger of fizzling out. The Independence Day celebrations on January 26th, 1933, were therefore organised with much enthusiasm with a view to rousing the people again. The response everywhere was encouraging. In Calcutta alone, the police had to make 300 arrests besides using force to break up the demonstrations. In Badanganj in Arambagh Sub-division of Hooghly District in Bengal, the police resorted to shooting for dispersing the Congress procession. 'Following the Independence Day celebrations, Mrs. Gandhi was arrested at Borsad in Gujerat and sentenced to six months' imprisonment on February 7th, for leading a procession of women. As soon as the White Paper embodying the Government proposals regarding the Indian Con- stitutional Reforms was announced on March 17th, the annual session of the India National Congress was convened at Calcutta with Pandit Madan Mohon Malaviya as the President- elect. The Congress session was at once banned like the Delhi session of 1932—nevertheless, delegates and leaders assembled in Calcutta from all parts of the country on April 11th, for the occasion. The important leaders who could be easily spotted out were all arrested—including Pandit Mala- viya, Mrs. Motilal Nehru, Mr. M. S. Aney (Central Pro- vinces), Dr. Alam (Punjab), Dr. Syed Mahmud (Bihar), all of them being members of the Congress Working Committee with the exception of Mrs. Nehru. Thereafter, Mrs. J. M. Sengupta proceeded to the appointed place at the head of 2,500 Congressmen for holding the meeting and under her presidentship the meeting was held. Resolutions were passed reaffirming (1) the goal of independence; (2) the efficacy of the method of civil disobedience for attaining that goal, and 291

292 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE (3) the boycott of foreign cloth and of British goods of all kinds. The most important resolution was one emphatically condemning the White Paper proposals. Before the meeting ended, large contingents of police arrived on the scene, arrested Mrs. Sengupta and 250 others, including 40 ladies and dispersed the meeting by force. The following extract from the speech of the President-elect, the venerable Pandit Malaviya, reflects the feeling of the country at the time: 'It is estimated that nearly 120,000 persons including several thousand women and quite a number of children have been arrested and imprisoned during the last fifteen months. It is an open secret that when the Government started repression, the official expectation was that they would crush the Congress in six weeks' time. Fifteen months have not enabled the Government to achieve that object. Twice fifteen months will not enable it to do so.' This was not the review made by a young hot-head but by one of the oldest and most moderate leaders of the Congress. Consequently, the response made by the country to the Congress appeal in 1932 and 1933, in spite of lack of prepara- tion, in spite of the sudden arrest of the organisers and financiers of the Party early in January 1932, and in spite of the diversion caused by the Mahatma's fast in September 1932 and the anti-untouchability campaign thereafter—can by no means be regarded as unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, the country was startled one fine morning in May to hear that the Mahatma had suspended the civil-disobedience campaign. While in prison the Mahatma had decided to go on a three weeks' fast¹ as a penance, because his followers outside had not made sufficient progress with the anti-untouchability campaign. The object of the fast was to bring about a change of heart—not in the bureaucracy but in his countrymen— who were responsible for the sad plight of the untouchables. The Government had no objection to a fast of that kind and ¹ After the famous September fast, the Mahatma had fasted once again in December, but that fast had been a short one. The present fast was described by him as a 'heart-prayer for purification of myself and my associates for greater vigilance and watchfulness in connection with the Harijan cause.'

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 293 as a matter of fact, thanks to British news-agencies, the fast was given wide publicity in the European Press,¹ because it helped to advertise the internal differences of the Indian people. However, the Government considered it prudent to set him free. The day after his release he made the announce- ment referred to above.² At first the civil-disobedience cam- paign was suspended for six weeks, but the suspension was subsequently extended for six weeks more, i.e., till the end of July. The sudden suspension of the campaign without rhyme or reason, would under ordinary circumstances have produced a widespread revolt in the Congress organi- sation, but since he was in the middle of a fast which could end fatally, all judgment was suspended for the time being. While suspending the civil-disobedience campaign, the Mahatma made an appeal to the Government of India to withdraw the Ordinances and release the civil-disobedience prisoners. But, unfortunately, a settled Government pre- serves a continuity of policy and cannot alter its policy over- night as an individual can. The Government’s reply was therefore a refusal. While responsible Congressmen in India were unwilling or afraid to speak out against the Mahatma after his surrender of May 1933, a manifesto was issued by the late Mr. Vithalbhai J. Patel³ and the writer from Vienna, condemning the Mahatma’s decision. The manifesto stated that the decision virtually undid the work and the sacrifice of the last thirteen years. It signified a failure of the civil- ¹ The writer was in Vienna when the news regarding the fast appeared in the Continental Press. After 14 months' incarceration when his health was in an alarming condition, Lt.-Col. Buckley, I.M.S. of Lucknow who had been treating him, recommended his transfer to Europe for treatment. Thereupon the Government of India permitted him to leave for Europe on his own financial responsibility. He was released at Bombay when he sailed and arrived in Vienna in March, 1933. ² It is a matter for conjecture if the Government knew that the Mahatma would suspend the civil-disobedience campaign if he were set free. On May 8th, 1933, when the Mahatma started his fast the Government issued a communiqué stating that in view of the nature of the object of the fast and the attitude of mind which it disclosed, the Government had decided that the Mahatma should be set at liberty. After his release, the sus- pension of civil disobedience was ordered by the Acting President of the Congress, Mr. Aney, on the 'recommendation' of the Mahatma. ³ The late Mr. V. J. Patel had returned from the United States after three months' strenuous propaganda on behalf of India which ultimately cost him his life. He, as well as the writer, were undergoing treatment in Vienna at the time.

294 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE disobedience campaign, as also of Mahatma Gandhi's leader- ship. It was therefore time to turn to a more radical policy and leadership. Owing to the preoccupation of the public over Mahatma Gandhi's health, the manifesto did not, how- ever, produce the effect which it would otherwise have. Even friends thought that it was an outrageous act to criticise the Mahatma when his life was in jeopardy because of the fast. In July, a Conference of important Congressmen, then out of prison, was held at Poona. It could be regarded as an unofficial meeting of the All-India Congress Committee. Two groups were represented at the Conference—one in favour of calling off the movement altogether and the other in favour of resuming it with full vigour. The former group had probably a majority and most of the members of this group were in favour of reviving the Swarajist policy of carrying the fight inside the Legislatures which had been abandoned at the Lahore Congress in December 1929. Never- theless, at the end, the Conference decided to give in to the, Mahatma. At his instance it was decided that the Mahatma should make a further attempt to see the Viceroy and come to an understanding with him. If this failed, the Congress should resume 'individual' civil disobedience, but that 'mass' civil disobedience should be given up altogether. The purpose of this was that the Congress should not organise any cam- paign on a mass scale but should leave it to individuals to break any laws that they felt called upon to on their personal responsibility. Soon after the Poona Conference the Mahatma approached the Viceroy for an interview—but all that he got was a humiliating rebuff. He and some of his closest fol- lowers, thereupon, proceeded to start civil disobedience individually and by August 1933, they found themselves in prison once again. This time even the Mahatma's incarcera- tion did not create a great stir. 'Individual' civil disobedience was offered all over India by the loyal adherents of the Mahatma and a few hundred persons were thereby thrust back into prison. But it was a foregone conclusion that where mass civil disobedience had failed, individual civil disobedience would not produce any appreciable effect. On reaching prison, the Mahatma found

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 295 that the facilities afforded him since September 1932, during his last incarceration, for conducting the anti-untouchability campaign from behind the prison walls—would not be given *him this time.*¹ He thereupon gave notice to the Government that if he did not get those facilities, he would feel called upon to resort to fasting. It is difficult for a layman to reconcile this attitude of the Mahatma with his lifelong principle that a Satyagrahi prisoner should voluntarily submit to jail dis- cipline. However, the Government once again found them- selves in an uncomfortable position. By that time they had realised that individual civil disobedience was going to fizzle out and consequently there would be no risk in setting the Mahatma at liberty. So once more the Mahatma found himself a free man. On coming out from prison, the Mahatma announced that since he had been sentenced to one year's imprisonment in August 1933, and since he had been released by the Government before the expiry of his term, he would consider himself as a prisoner till August 1934, and would not offer civil disobedience during that period. Before offering civil disobedience, the Mahatma had issued a statement in July to the effect that there was too much secrecy in the affairs of the Congress and in the management of the civil-disobedience campaign and this secrecy was largely responsible for the failure that had overtaken the Congress. In the Mahatma's opinion, the Congress organisa- tions had become corrupt bodies. Soon after this, at the instance of the Mahatma, the Acting-President of the Congress, Mr. M. S. Aney, issued orders, dissolving all Congress organisations in the country. Confusion worse confounded! What were the people to do? Normal human reason could not follow the logic of the Mahatma and those who could be expected to speak out 'the plain truth, were not available. At this juncture, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was released from prison after serving his term of two years' imprisonment. All eyes were turned on him. He was the one man who could influence the Mahatma—who could drag the Congress out of ¹ The reason given by the Government was that on the former occasion he had been incarcerated without trial, whereas on this occasion he was convicted after trial.

296 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE the mess into which it had fallen. Pandit Nehru had long talks with the Mahatma and following that, an interchange of letters. The correspondence was duly published, but on perusal it was found to be more doctrinaire than practical. What the public wanted to know urgently was not whether and wherein Pandit J. L. Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi agreed or disagreed fundamentally—but how the Congress could be restored to life and vigour. During his four months of comparative freedom, Pandit Nehru wrote and spoke freely and gave expression to his socialistic—or communistic —ideas, but the Congress did not show any signs of resus- citation. In an exceedingly interesting and able article under the caption 'Whither India?'—he pleaded for social and economic equality—for the ending of all special class-privi- leges and vested interests—but that did not help the Congress one jot or tittle. With a popularity only second to that of the Mahatma, with unbounded prestige among his countrymen, with a clear brain possessing the finest ideas, with an up-to- date knowledge of modern world movements—that he should be found wanting in the essential quality of leadership, namely the capacity to make decisions and face unpopularity if need be,¹ was a great disappointment. But there was no help for it. What had been expected of him had to be accom- plished by lesser men. After Pandit Nehru, Mr. K. F. Nariman the Bombay leader, was released and without delay he began to give public expression to his views² on the decisions of the Poona Conference in July 1933. Referring to the Mahatma's decision to start civil disobedience in August 1933, because the Viceroy did not grant him an unconditional interview, he said, ' "Inter- view or Death" is the national slogan for the present. : . . The renewed fight in August last is not for Swaraj, nor even for political constitutional advance, but for the assertion of a supposed "national right" of an unconditional interview. If ¹ This defect in Pandit J. L. Nehru was manifest on other occasions as well, when the Congress was passing through a crisis—e.g., in the crisis of 1923-24 and subsequently in the crisis of 1928-29. ² For a full statement of his views one should refer to his book, Whither Congress? Bombay Book Depot, Girgaon, Bombay, November 1933. Mr. Nariman has been a member of the Congress Working Committee since January 1930.

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 297 that right was conceded, even the modified individual fight would be called off and peace between Government' and the people restored, though the Congress political goal is not satisfied.' Speaking of the Mahatma's condemnation of secrecy, he remarked: 'By what rule of modern warfare or sport are we bound to disclose our plans and schemes before- hand to the enemy? But I forget, it is a religious fight and not political; so neither the rules of sport nor the canons of modern warfare apply! Secrecy of one's plans and future actions is the very essence of all modern national movements and struggles.' On the decision to call off 'mass,' but retain 'individual' civil disobedience, he stated: 'Does it need an Indian National Congress to tell an individual to break laws on his own responsibility and take the consequences? . . . That eternal liberty to act as he likes and take the consequences is given to man since the days of Adam.' Then he dealt with the Mahatma's assertion that 'continuance by even one person (of civil disobedience) ensures revival into such an irrepressible mass movement as no amount of repression will suppress.' And Mr. Nariman asserted on the contrary: 'If this "one man" theory were true, India as well as Ireland should have been transformed after this most inspiring, unforgettable, blood-curdling, patriotic, heroic example (referring to the self-immolation of Terence MacSwiney and Jatin Das).... The whole misconception is again based on the same unsustainable theory and slippery foundation—the "change of heart" theory exploded above, that the Britisher would pine at the suffering and yield.' Criticising the decision to dissolve or suspend all Congress organisations, he main- tained: 'None can dissolve the National Assemblies that have come into existence by popular vote.' Then finally he asked: 'How can we induce Gandhiji to rid himself of this almost incorrigible habit . . . this perpetual blundering, blending of religion and politics?' Mr. Nariman opined that the remedy lay in securing for Gandhiji, in place of the late Pandit Motilal Nehru, another political taskmaster—'a plain-speaking outspoken giant and not lip-sealed mummies who always shake their heads like spring dolls, perpendicularly or horizontally, accord- ing as the Mahatma pulls the strings straight or sideways.'

298 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE It was refreshing and heartening to find in the Working Committee, at least one man who could think boldly and have the courage to call a spade a spade. But though Mr. Nariman was brilliant in his analysis, he was weak in action. His suggestion for summoning the All-India Congress Committee to end the existing stalemate was not taken seriously by the General Secretary, Pandit Nehru and when the latter was clapped in prison in January 1934, for making an alleged seditious speech in Calcutta, no silver lining was visible in the dark horizon. It was left to Dr. M. A. Ansari, the Moslem leader of Delhi, to tackle the situation. During his visit to England in 1933 he had been pained and humiliated by the arrogance of the Conservative politicians and their assertion that the Congress was down and out. That feeling was heightened on finding on his return to India that the Congress was in a state of suspended animation. After appealing to the Mahatma to bring the Congress back to life once again, he along with Dr. B. C. Roy of Calcutta, summoned a con- ference of Congressmen of their way of thinking at Delhi in March 1934. By that time, civil disobedience was as dead as a door-nail, but the Congress could not function because of the Ordinances and the Ordinances would not be withdrawn by the Government till civil disobedience was unconditionally withdrawn. The only way out of the mess was for the Congress leaders to eat the humble pie, call off the civil- disobedience campaign and thereby secure the withdrawal or suspension of the Ordinances. The Delhi Conference pre- pared the ground for that by resolving to revive the All-India Swaraj Party to contest the elections to the Legislatures.¹ The next month a larger Conference was summoned to pursue the same topic and Ranchi (in Bihar) was chosen as the venue, because the Mahatma would be there at the time. The Conference confirmed the decision arrived at at Delhi to revive the All-India Swaraj Party and the prime-movers, Drs. Ansari and Roy, were able to secure the support of the ¹ Before the Delhi Conference, another Conference, called the Democratic Swarajya Party Conference, had been held at Bombay at the instance of Mr. N. C. Kelkar of Poona and Mr. Jamnadas Mehta of Bombay for popularising the idea of fighting the next elections. This Conference had large support from all parts of Maharashtra.

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 299 Mahatma. The next month in May—a meeting of the All- India Congress Committee was summoned at Patna after an interval of about three years. This meeting offered a surprise to the public in as much as Mahatma Gandhi himself spon- sored the idea that Congressmen should enter the Legislatures. This decision had added importance in view of the fact that meanwhile the Government had decided to dissolve the Indian Legislative Assembly and hold a General Election in November. The All-India Congress Committee decided that instead of permitting the Swaraj Party to function, the Con- gress should itself undertake the responsibility and a Parlia- mentary Board was therefore set up for running the elections. The Committee further decided to call off the civil-dis- obedience campaign, the Mahatma, however, retaining the right to offer civil disobedience.¹ Once again the Government came to know in advance what the decision of the All-India Congress Committee would be and no obstacles were there- fore placed in the way of the Committee meeting openly, though it was still an unlawful body. After the meeting, when the Government felt that the defeat and humiliation of the Congress were complete—they withdrew the ban on most of the Congress organisations in the country and allowed them to function. The decision of the All-India Congress Committee to contest the coming elections did not pass unchallenged. There was a solid group opposed to it—but this time it was not the old ‘No-Change’ Party that was opposing, because the leader of that Party, the Mahatma, was himself the sponsor of the council-entry proposal—but the newly-formed Congress Socialist Party. While the All-India Congress Committee was deliberating, the oppositionists held an All-India Con- ference of their Party. This Party had strong support from the United Provinces and Bombay, besides a fair measure of support from all parts of India. From such information as is ¹ As early as April 7th, 1934, the Mahatma issued a statement advising all Congressmen to suspend civil disobedience as a means of obtaining Swaraj and asserting that in the existing circumstances, only one person, and that himself, should bear the responsibility of civil disobedience. This curious reservation was accepted by the All-India Congress Committee in May and the Bombay Congress in October 1934.

300 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE available, it appears that the Congress Socialist Party has offered a platform not only to those who are Socialists by conviction, but also to those who are dissatisfied with the Congress policy of council-entry. It is unfortunate that the opposition to council-entry came from the Socialist Party, because there is nothing anti-Socialist in fighting within the Legislatures, if such a policy is otherwise deemed expedient. But it may be that the Socialist Party, representing some of the radical forces in the Congress, instinctively felt called upon to oppose a party that had rallied all the moderate elements. And there is no doubt that those who have taken a leading part in the Swarajist revival of 1934, are of a different calibre from that militant group which formed the backbone of the Swaraj Party in 1923. It is interesting to note here that as in 1928, the erstwhile Swarajists and 'No-Changers' made common cause against the Independence-wallahs—so also in 1934, these two groups seem to have closed up their ranks against the common enemy. Though the Congress Socialist Party has, in some respects, been harking back to the ideas and shibboleths that were popular forty or fifty years ago, it does stand for a radical tendency in the Nationalist movement and the formation of such a party is a very hopeful feature of the times. The latest reports go to show that the organisation of the party is making headway in most of the provinces and in the recent elections to the Bombay Congress Committee, the Socialists claimed to have captured half the seats. In spite of the menace of the Socialists, the official bloc in the Congress have not been a happy family. At the meetings of the Working Committee held at Bombay and Benares, after the Patna meeting in May, differences appeared over the attitude that should be adopted towards the so-called 'Com- munal Award' of the British Government. Pandit M. M. Malaviya and Mr. M. S. Aney held that the Communal Award, like the White Paper, should be strongly condemned. The rest of the Working Committee under the influence of the Moslem members, maintained that the Congress should 'neither accept nor reject' the Communal Award, though they admitted that the Award was thoroughly obnoxious.

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 301 Why the Moslem leaders in the Congress have taken up this attitude, it is difficult to say—especially when one remembers that after the Karachi Congress, it was they, who by their firm attitude, prevented the Mahatma from yielding to the demand of the communalist Moslems for separate electorate. Whatever the reason may be, the fact remains that to-day they are holding a pistol at the Working Committee—and because of their insistence, the Committee has been forced to take up this ridiculous attitude of neither accepting nor rejecting the Award. The argument ordinarily urged in favour of not rejecting the Award is a twofold one. Firstly, the Congress should represent all parties in the country, including the Communalist Moslems, and secondly, that until the parties arrive at an agreed solution, the present solution should stand. Both the arguments are fallacious. The Congress does not represent all the parties in the land—for instance, it certainly does not represent the loyalists, whether Hindus or Moslems. Secondly, it is the rejection of a bad solution that will force us to arrive at a good solution. Like the White Paper, the Communal Award should be straight away rejected—no matter whether an alternative solution is immediately available or not. Moreover, this ‘all parties’ idea is a false and dangerous idea. The party that is fighting for freedom is the party that is solely responsible for producing the Constitution. And so far as the Communal question is concerned, the Congress solution is already there. Be that as it may, in the present circumstances one is reluctantly driven to the conclusion that the Nationalist Moslems have been gradually—may be unconsciously—coming into line with their Communalist co-religionists. All attempts at a compromise having failed, Pandit Malaviya and Mr. Aney resigned from the Congress Working Committee and the Parliamentary Board and proceeded to form a separate party—under the name of the Congress Nationalist Party— with the object of fighting the Communal Award and the White Paper. This Party held an All-India Conference in Calcutta on August 19th, under the Presidentship of Pandit M. M. Malaviya—the Chairman of the Reception Com- mittee being Sir P. C. Roy, the well-known chemist and

302 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE philanthropist. The Conference was a successful one and it was evident that public opinion in Bengal—especially of the Hindu community—was behind the Party. Bengal Hindus have been suffering from a just grievance because the Communal Award has allotted them only 80 seats out of 250 in the new Legislature, while Moslems have been given 119 seats.¹ To add to this, the Poona Agreement concluded at the time of the Mahatma's fast, has allotted 30 seats to the depressed classes, out of these 80 seats, as against the pro- vision for 10 in the Communal Award, though the depressed classes issue hardly exists in Bengal. Bengal Hindus² have therefore been greatly offended by the decision of the Work- ing Committee not to reject the Communal Award. It is difficult to say at this stage what will be the result of the elections. It may, however, be a safe forecast to say that the majority of the elected seats for Hindus will be captured by the official Congress Party. But though the Congress Nationalist Party will have a smaller number of seats, they will have the solid support of the Hindu community in their propaganda as also in their work in the Assembly. In non- communal matters, the two Congress groups will be found in the same lobby. So far as the Nationalist Moslems are concerned, they hope to capture a fair percentage of the seats. The last meeting of the Congress Working Committee and of the Congress Parliamentary Board was held at Wardha (Central Provinces) on September 8th, 9th and 10th. An eleventh-hour attempt was made to bring about a com- promise between the two Congress groups, but the effort failed. At this meeting it transpired that the Mahatma had been thinking seriously of retiring from active politics. It was first surmised that the split among the Congress leaders over the Communal Award had upset him seriously. But one of his trusted lieutenants, Mr. Rajagopalachariar of Madras, issued a statement on September 7th, saying: 'The cause of ¹ Under the existing Constitution, Hindus have 60 per cent. of the elected seats in the Bengal Legislative Council. This is in accordance with the Lucknow Pact of 1916—the agreement arrived at between the Indian National Congress and the All-India Moslem League. ² This is also the case with the Punjab Hindus. Many of the Hindu constituencies in Bengal and Punjab have therefore returned members of the Congress Nationalist Party to the Assembly.

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 303 the rumour that Gandhiji is giving up the leadership of the Congress is to be traced to the fact that Gandhiji has been thinking of introducing reforms in the Constitution of the Congress in order to make it more definitely purged of all forms of violence. . . . If the Congress does not adopt his reforms, he may even be prepared after the ensuing Congress session to start an independent organisation to have a body of strictly non-violent workers.' About ten days later, the Mahatma himself issued a statement confirming the rumour that `he had the intention of retiring, but saying that at the request of friends, he had postponed his decision until after the session of the Congress at Bombay. He referred to corruption in the ranks of the Congress and declared that he ' proposed to move the following three amendments to the constitution of the Congress:

1. Replacing the words 'legitimate and peaceful' by 'truthful and non-violent' means to achieve the aims of the Congress.
2. Replacing the four-anna (anna is one-sixteenth of a rupee; Rs. 13½ = £1 approximately) franchise¹ by the delivery by every member to the Congress Depot of 8,000 feet of well-tested even yarn of not less than fifteen counts spun by himself.
3. No one to be entitled to vote in a Congress election unless he has been on the Congress register for six months and has been a habitual wearer of Khaddar only during the same period. The Mahatma concluded by saying that he apprehended that his suggestions would not be acceptable to the majority, but there was room for compromise, and if they wanted him as leader, they would have to give due consideration to his proposals. The annual session of the Indian National Congress is to be held at Bombay on October 26th, 27th and 28th, 1934, and the elections to the Indian Legislative Assembly under the ¹ According to the present constitution of the Congress, every member has to pay a minimum annual subscription of four annas. The Mahatma's idea is to make spinning obligatory on the members instead of merely paying a subscription.

304 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE existing Constitution are due in November. The withdrawal of the Congress Party from the Assembly in January 1930, made it possible for the Government to get the Ottawa Agreement ratified by the Assembly for three years and to have the Ordinances for suppressing the civil-disobedience movement placed on the Statute Book. The presence of Congressmen in the Assembly once again will cause embar- rassment to the Government, but the Government will then have no law-breaking campaign in the country to keep them pre-occupied. So far as the ensuing Congress session is concerned, a lively fight is expected on two issues. Firstly, the Congress Nationalist Party will appeal to the All-India Congress Committee and to the plenary session of the Con- gress to reject the Communal Award. Secondly, the Congress Socialist Party will press for the adoption of a Socialist programme. Both these attempts are sure to be defeated. On both these questions the Mahatma will get the support of the majority of his erstwhile opponents—the Swarajists. If they were to oppose him to a man, then he would run the risk of being defeated on either of the above two issues. But by sponsoring their proposal of entering the Legislatures, the Mahatma has won the majority of them over to his side and has thereby ensured his position within the Congress. The present intention of the Mahatma to retire¹ from active politics and strengthen his own Satyagrahi organisation, or in the alternative to alter the Congress constitution accord- ing to his own ideas, will not come as a surprise to those who know him well. It is reminiscent of his attitude after his release from prison in 1924 and at the Belgaum Congress that year, when he left the field to his opponents, allowing them to stew in their own juice. The ultimate challenge to his leader- ship will, however, arise from the side of the Congress Socialist Party but not from that of the Congress Nationalist Party.² ¹ After the above was written, the Mahatma announced his retirement to the plenary session of the Congress which met in Bombay on October 26th, 1934. This so-called retirement has been referred to in Chapter XVIII. ² A message from India dated the 1st October, 1934, said that a Con- ference of the Congress Socialist Party was recently held at Benares. It was decided not to assist in the election campaign of the Congress nor to accept office in any Congress organisation which did not carry out the economic policy of the Party. Both the official Congress Party and the Congress Nationalist Party were condemned by the Socialist Party.

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 305 During the period of 1933-34 while the Congress proceeded from step to step in the direction of surrender, the Govern- ment was able to strengthen its position in other directions as well. In January 1933, judgment was finally delivered in the long-drawn Meerut Conspiracy Case, and out of thirty-one accused, twenty-seven were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. About this time the leader of the Chittagong revolutionaries, Mr. Surjya Sen, who had successfully evaded arrest for three years, was captured, and after a trial before a special tribunal, was hanged together with another comrade. In February and March, there was trouble with some of the independent frontier tribes. But with the assistance of the friendly Afghan Government of King Nadir Shah and with the help of aerial bombing, the Government were able to cope successfully with the menace. After the publication of the White Paper in March, the Assembly passed the following resolution moved by Sir Abdur Rahim, the leader of the opposition: 'Unless the proposals for constitutional reform are substantially amended in the direction of conceding greater responsibility and freedom of action to the people's representatives in the central and provincial spheres of government, it will not be possible to ensure peace, content- ment and progress of the country.' The Government, it is hardly necessary to add, had no need to feel embarrassed at this milk-and-water resolution. There was some amount of public agitation over the ill- treatment of political prisoners. For instance, in the Nasik Jail on October 27th, 1932, Mr. Amritlal Morarji, a political prisoner who had been given bar-fetters, was taken to a cell, beaten by five jail-officials with batons and lifted up and dashed down till he became unconscious. There was intense indignation, when the news saw the light of day and Govern- ment had to order the prosecution of the jail-officials respon- sible for the incident. Likewise, in the Amraoti Jail in the Central Provinces some political prisoners had been severely assaulted on April 22nd, 1932. Agitation and inquiry went on for about a year. Ultimately, on March 1st, 1933, the U

306 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE Government issued a white-washing report, which, however, admitted the use of physical force on the occasion and pro- mised a modification of the rules applying to civil-disobedience prisoners. Following the publication of the White Paper in March 1933, early in April, the British Parliament appointed a Joint Select Committee consisting of sixteen members from each House. There were debates in both Houses on the occasion. In the House of Commons, the Opposition was led by Mr. Winston Churchill and Sir Henry Page-Croft and in the Lords by Lord Lloyd and Lord Halsbury. The Committee on April 12th, elected Lord Linlithgow as Chairman and approved of a list of 'assessors' from India who would sit with them, but would not be entitled to vote on any issue nor submit any report to Parliament. The sittings of the Joint Select Committee, with the collaboration of the Indian assessors, commenced on May 10th, and continued for an unusually long period. The Secretary of State for India took the unusual step of appearing as a witness with a view to acquainting the Committee and the Indian assessors with the intentions of Government. His examination lasted several weeks and he answered about 16,000 questions. In view of the agitation against constitutional advance in India carried on by the diehards in England led by Mr. Winston Churchill since 1929, and especially since the publication of the White Paper, in March 1933, it is likely that the Joint Parliamentary Committee will further whittle down the provisions of the White Paper.¹ The report of the Committee is expected to be out in November 1934. During the year 1933, the country suffered a serious loss through the death of two of her worthiest sons. Mr. J. M. Sengupta, who had been the Mayor of Calcutta for five years and had been a member of the Congress Working Committee since 1925, suddenly died of apoplexy on July 26th, while he was in internment in Ranchi under Regulation III of 1818. On October 22nd, Mr. Vithalbhai J. Patel, ¹ Since the above was written, the Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee has been published and the apprehensions of the writer have proved to be true.

DEFEAT AND SURRENDER 307 former President of the Indian Assembly, and one of the outstanding leaders of the Congress, died of heart trouble in a Swiss clinic near Geneva. In accordance with his last wishes his mortal remains were brought to Bombay for crema- tion, where they were received by a procession of 200,000 people. He left all his assets (more than Rs. 100,000) for national work. Towards the end of 1933, the second Burma Round Table Conference was held in London. The first Conference had been held in November 1931, and the representatives from Burma were not therefore invited to the second and third session of the Indian Round Table Conference. As the composition of the first Burma Round Table Conference had been strongly criticised on the ground that the anti-separa- tionists had been poorly represented, the Government had agreed to a General Election in Burma on the issue of separa- tion from India. This election held in November 1932, gave a majority to the anti-separationists but taking advantage of the fact that the Burma Legislative Council did not vote for unconditional federation with India, the Government pro- ceeded with their pet scheme of separation from India. The second Burma Round Table Conference was therefore called in 1933 and the anti-separationists, though in a majority in Burma, were given less seats than the separationists. It is now certain that Burma will be separated from India¹ and will be given a bi-cameral legislature for dealing with both 'pro- vincial' and 'central' subjects. In December, important conferences were held as usual. The Liberal Federation met at Madras with Mr. J. N. Basu in the chair and condemned the White Paper. The All- India's Women Conference had a successful session in Cal- cutta and great enthusiasm was evinced by women represen- tatives from all parts of India in the matter of educational and social reform as well as in the matter of representation in International Committees in Geneva. The Trade Union Congress met at Cawnpore and among the resolutions passed ¹ The Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee published on November 22nd, 1934, has provided 'for the separation of Burma from India.

308 THE INDIAN STRUGGLE was one dealing with the grievances of the textile workers in Bombay Presidency and the necessity of a general strike of textile workers for enforcing their demands. Following this decision, in the early part of 1934, a strike of textile workers was declared in Bombay. There was enthusiastic response to the strike-call in Bombay and there were sympathetic strikes in other parts of the country as well. To break the strike, the bogey of Communism was raised once again and on that pretext, a large number of influential labour leaders in Bombay were thrown into prison. Following Bombay, other provinces like Punjab also saw the spectre of Communism stalking over the land and the Kirti (Workers), Kishan (Peasant) Party of Punjab was therefore declared illegal as being a Communist body. While strengthening the grip over the radical wing of the Worker's movement, the Government also took further measures in Bengal to crush the terrorist campaign of the revolutionaries. While the year before, mere attempt to murder had been made punishable with death, in 1934, possession of arms, explosives, etc., was similarly made punishable with death. The recent attempt to assassinate the Governor of Bengal, Sir John Anderson, which is reminiscent of a similar attempt made two years ago¹ —shows, however, that the terrorist campaign is unfortunately not dead as yet—though public opinion has been expressing itself more and more against it. The favourable situation created for the British Govern- ment through the surrender of the Congress and the official policy of ruthless repression, was utilised for promoting the trade interests of Great Britain in India. Reference has already been made to the ratification of the Ottawa Agree- ment, whereby the principle of Empire Preference was forced on India, in spite of her opposition and to her detriment. During the period under consideration, two other measures were adopted in connection with the textile trade of India ¹ In February 1932, a young woman graduate, Miss Bina Das, attempted to shoot the Governor of Bengal, Sir Stanley Jackson, at the convocation of the University of Calcutta. The Governor had a providential escape and Miss Das was sentenced to nine years' imprisonment. The latest news is to the effect that some of the would-be assassins of Sir John Anderson have been sentenced to death.