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[SŪ. 2. 1. 34. ADH. 10.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 321 Vedānta-kaustubha If it be objected: The reason, viz 'on account of dependence', does not fit in. Why? "On account of the non-distinction of works." That is, the non-distinction of the entire world prior to creation being ascertained from the text: '"The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), the non-distinction of the works of the individual souls, too, is ascertained. Hence, prior to creation, there are no works as the cause of the diver- sities of the objects to be created, on which Brahman might depend,— (We reply:) "no". Why? "On account of the beginningless" of all. That is, the works, good and bad, done by the individual souls in a previous creation, become the cause of the diversities in a subsequent creation. "And" the continuity of creation "fits in" in accordance with the maxim of 'the seed and the shoot',1 and in accordance with the above-mentioned difference between the manifest and unmanifest effect,2 as well as because a sudden subsequent creation without a prior creation is inexplicable, this last reason being indicated by the particle "and" (in the sūtra). This is "observed also" in Scripture. That is, since the text: 'The creator fashioned the sun and the moon as he did before' (Ṛg.V. 10.190.3), teaches the existence of a prior creation, the eternity of the flow of creation is established. And in the scriptural and Smṛti texts like: 'With roots above, branches below is this eternal fig-tree' (Kaṭha 6 1), 'With roots above, branches below, the fig-tree is indestructible, they say' (Gītā 15.1), the reality as well of mundane existence, as having the Existent as its root, and as having the form of a continuous stream, is established. Previously, the effect has indeed been deter- mined to be real 3 In the texts: 'Without beginning and without end' (Cūl. 5 4), 'A wise man is not born, nor dies' (Kaṭha 2.18 5), 'Know prakṛti (matter) and puruṣa (soul) to be both beginningless' (Gītā 13.19), the eternity, too, of the sentient and the non-sentient sub- stances, which are the powers of the Supreme Cause, is established.

1 I.e. just as it is impossible to say whether the seed is earlier or the shoot, so it is impossible to say whether karmas are the earlier or the saṁsāra. Hence they are taken to be beginningless. 2 Vide V.K. 2 1 17-18. 3 Vide V.K. 2.1.14 ff. 4 Correct quotation: "Anādavatī" Vide p. 230. 5 Cf. a very similar passage in Gītā 2.20. 21

322 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 1. 35, ADH. 10.] COMPARISON Śaṃkara He breaks this sūtra into two different sūtras—thus: "Na . . . . . anāditvāt", and "upapadyate . . . . ca".¹ Bhāskara He also breaks it into two different sūtras. Further he reads the first portion differently, thus: "Asmād vibhāgād iti cen nānāditvāt", (sūtra 35), "upapadyate . . . ca" (sūtra 36).² Baladeva He also breaks it into two different sūtras exactly after Śaṃkara. But he takes the first portion only, viz "Na . . anāditvāt" as indicated within the previous adhikarana beginning a new adhikarana with the second portion: "upapadyate . . . . ca", concerned with showing that the grace of the Lord is not partial Hence it means, according to him: And (the special grace shown by the Lord to his devotees) fits in (since it is not arbitrary, but depends on the devotion of the souls themselves), and it is observed also (in Scripture).³ CORRECT CONCLUSION (end) SŪTRA 35 "AND BECAUSE OF THE FITTING IN OF ALL ATTRIBUTES." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha "And because of the fitting in of all the attributes" of a cause on the part of Brahman alone, it is established that our view is free from all contradictions. Here ends the first quarter of the second chapter of the Vedānta- pārijāta-saurabha, composed by the reverend Nimbārka. ¹ Ś.B., pp. 498-499. ² Bh. B., p. 107. ³ G.B. 2.1.36, pp. 76-77, Chap. 2.

[sū. 2. 1. 35. ADH. 10.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 323 Vedānta-kaustubha "And on account of the fitting in." That is, all the attributes, mentioned or not mentioned, befitting the cause of the world and inappropriate on the part of pradhāna and the rest,—fit in on the part of Brahman alone. Hence, it is established that the concordance of Scriptures with regard to Brahman is not contradicted by any means whatsoever. Here ends the section entitled "Having a need" (10). Here ends the first quarter of the second chapter in the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā, and composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa. COMPARISON Śaṁkara and Bhāskara This is sūtra 37 in both the commentaries. They take this sūtra to be a new adhikaraṇa by itself. Baladeva This is sūtra 37 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz. the same theme continued thus: And on account of the fitting in of all attributes (harmonious in themselves or not) (on the part of the Lord). That is, the Lord is possessed of paradoxical and myste- rious powers, and hence it is possible for Him to possess, along with the attributes of perfect justice and impartiality, the attribute of showing special favour and partiality for his devotees as well.¹ Résumé The first section of the second chapter contains—

1. 35 sūtras and 10 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka;
2. 37 sūtras and 13 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṁkara;
3. 36 sūtras and 10 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja;
4. 37 sūtras and 12 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
5. 36 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha;
6. 37 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva. ¹ G.B. 2.1.37, p. 78, Chap 2.

324 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 2. 1. 35. ADH. 10.] Śamkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva divide each of the sūtras 17 and 35 in Nimbārka’s commentary into two separate sūtras; while Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha divide sūtra 11 in Nimbārka’s commentary into two separate sūtras.

SECOND CHAPTER (Adhyāya) SECOND QUARTER (Pāda) Adhikarana 1: The section entitled "the im- possibility of arrangement". (Sūtras 1–10) SŪTRA 1 "AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ARRANGEMENT ALSO, NOT THE INFERENCE." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Pradhāna, knowable through inference ¹ is not the cause of the world. Why? "On account also of the impossibility" of a varied "arrangement" from it, not acquainted with the arrangement of the objects to be created. Vedānta-kaustubha Thus, with a view to inducing those who desire for salvation to the hearing, thinking and the like of the nature, attributes and the rest of the Supreme Person, it has been firmly established above by the reverend author of the aphorisms that Lord Vāsudeva, the Highest Person, omnipotent, the Lord of all, and the Supreme Person, is the cause of the origin and the rest of the world; and that the views of the opponents arise not supported by Scripture has been shown under the aphorism: "Because (the creator of the world) sees, (pradhāna is) not (the creator), (it is) non-scriptural" (Br. Sū. 1.1.5). Now, with a view to establishing the acceptability of the conclusion of the Vedān- tins, the reverend author of the aphorisms is exposing, in this section, the fallaciousness of the arguments put forward by the opponents. It is not to be said that those who desire for release being benefitted through a mere exposition of the conclusion of the Vedāntins, what is the use of villifying the views of the opponents? Since just as when a man, giving up the most beneficial food, is about to take injurious poison and the like, people try to induce him to food and to 1 See footnote 1, p. 42 of the book.

326 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 1. ADH. 1.] dissuade him from poison, etc. by pointing out the unwholesomeness of the latter, so the villification of the view of the opponents is justifiable for the purpose of preventing people from accepting the views which are opposed to the Veda, and for inducing those desiring for emanci- pation to our own view. Now, the Sāṃkhyas, discarding the Highest Person, omnipotent and omniscient, as the cause of the origin and the rest of the world, hold prakṛti, devoid of any connection with Him, non-sentient and the equilibrium of the three guṇas, to be the cause of the world. This has been said in the treatise treating of the sixty (categories) ¹: "The primary prakṛti (i.e. matter) is not an effect. There are seven, beginning with mahat, which are (both) causes and effects There are sixteen which are effects (only). ‘Puruṣa (i e. soul) is neither a cause, nor an effect’ (Sāṃ. Kā. 3 ²). They state the five reasons for the existence of prakṛti thus: The cause is pradhāna, ‘(1) on account of the transformation of the divisions ³; (2) on account of concordance ⁴; (3) on account of the activity preceding from power ⁵; (4) on account of the distinction between the cause and the effect ⁶; (5) on account of the non-distinction of what is possessed of all form’ (Sāṃ. Kā. 15 ⁷). The word ‘Vaiśva-rūpa’ means the same as ‘Viśva-rūpa’ or what is possessed of all forms, i.e. the universe of varied configurations. Whatever is limited is due to a common cause, like pots and the rest.

¹ Peculiar to the Sāṃkhyas. ² P. 4. ³ I.e. on account of the limitedness (pariṇāma) of the effects (bheda) like mahat and the rest. Thus: Whatever is limited has a cause, like the pot. The effects are limited. ∴ they have a cause, viz. pradhāna. I.e. all the effects possess the common qualities of pleasure (sattva), pain (rajas) and delusion (tamas). Hence they must have a common cause which possesses all these qualities, viz. pradhāna. ⁴ I.e. the cause can give rise to the effect only if it has the requisite power. Now pradhāna alone has the power to give rise to mahat and the rest. ⁵ The difference of the effect from the cause proves the existence of the cause Thus, the difference of the pot from a lump of clay, viz. the first can fetch water, the second not—proves that the pot has clay for its common cause. Similarly, from the mahat and the rest we argue to pradhāna, different from them ⁶ I.e. the whole universe merges in a common cause during dissolution, and such a cause is pradhāna. Vide Candrikā-vyākhyā of Sāṃ. Kā., pp. 18-19; also Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya on same, pp. 13-14. ⁷ P. 18.

[sū. 2. 2. 1. ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 327 Similarly, a mahat and ahaṁkāra, the five pure essences, the eleven sense-organs, and the five great elements which are limited are 'divi- sions'; they are due to one cause which is unlimited in space and time and the common substratum of three guṇas.¹ Whatever is observed to be connected with something else, is due to that one cause; as dishes and the rest, connected with the clay, are due to it. Similarly, the external and internal divisions, connected with pleasures (sattva), pain (rajas) and delusion (tamas) should properly be due to a common cause consisting in pleasure, pain and delusion.² Similarly, just as there is the origin of pots and the like from the power of the cause, so the origin of the effects like mahat and the rest, too, must be held to be due to the power of the cause. This being so, the cause, possessed of such a power, is pradhāna.³ Moreover, it is observed that there is a distinction between the effects, like ear-rings and the rest, and the cause, similar to them, such as gold and the rest, as well as a non- distinction Similarly, there is both distinction and non-distinction on the part of the manifold universe. Through these two, a cause, viz. the unmanifest which is the substratum of all beings and consists of the three guṇas in a state of equilibrium, is inferred.⁴ On this suggestion, the author replies: "The inference", i.e. what is inferred, viz. pradhāna, not having Brahman as its common cause, is not the cause of the world. Why? "On account of the impossibility of arrangement," i.e. because it is impossible that the arrangement of the world,—variegated by the aggregate of manifold objects of enjoyment, conforming to the diverse works of the souls,— can arise from pradhāna, not having Brahman for its cause, an object of inference, non-sentient and devoid of any knowledge of the ob- jects to be created; as we see in ordinary life that the arrangement of manifold and variegated palaces, chariots, ornaments and the rest is due to one who is possessed of the knowledge of the objects to be created. The particle "and" (in the sūtra) indicates that the reasons, intended for proving the existence of pradhāna, can very well be set aside by valid opposite arguments, since the following inference ¹ This explains the first reason. ² This explains the second reason. ³ This explains the third reason. ⁴ This explains the fourth and the fifth reasons.

[sū. 2. 2. 2. 328 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 1.] establishes the non-validity of the object established (by the Sāṁkhya, viz. pradhāna):— Pradhāna as admitted by the Sāṁkhyas and not having Brah- man for its soul, is non-existent; because it is not perceived. Whatever is this (i.e. not perceived) is that (i.e. non-existent); like the sky-flower Whatever is not this (i.e. not non-perceived) is not that (i.e. not non-existent); like the sun. COMPARISON Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha They take this and the next sūtra as one sūtra. SŪTRA 2 “AND ON ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITY ” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha And on account of the impossibility of spontaneous activity (on its part), not the inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna). Vedānta-kaustubha The phrase beginning with ‘on account of impossibility’ is to be supplied here. And because activity,—viz. spontaneous falling away from the state of the equilibrium of the three guṇas,—is impossible on the part of pradhāna which is non-sentient and an object of inference. Thus, pradhāna, knowable through inference, is not the cause of the world, since it is observed in ordinary life that non-sentient objects like chariots and the rest, are moved to action only when superintended by conscious beings.

[sū. 2. 2. 3. ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 329 SŪTRA 3 "AND IF IT BE ARGUED THAT (PRADHĀNA ACTS SPONTANEOUSLY) LIKE MILK AND WATER, (WE REPLY.) THERE TOO (LORD IS THE INCITER)." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If it be argued that like milk, etc pradhāna acts for the origin and the rest of the world by itself, (we reply ) that "there too" the Supreme Being is the inciter is learnt from the scriptural text: "Who abiding within water" (Bṛh 3.7.4 ¹) Vedānta-kaustubha If it be argued: How can it be said that on account of the im- possibility of spontaneous activity on its part the non-sentient pra- dhāna is not the cause of the world? Just as milk, though non- sentient, is by itself transformed into the form of sour milk, and flows spontaneously for the nourishment of the calf, and just as water discharged from the cloud is transformed into the form of various saps of the earth, as well as into the forms of ice, bubble and the rest, and pours down spontaneously for the growth of plants and the rest, as well as flows on, so exactly pradhāna too, independent of a sen- tient being, having entered into a state of mutual inequality of the guṇas, is transformed into many forms,— We reply: "There too". That is, in the case of milk and the rest too, no activity is possible independently of a sentient being. On the contrary, milk and the rest attain the form of sour milk and so on only when superintended by a sentient being. It is the cow herself, fond of her calf, that makes the milk flow out of filial affection, and being liquid the milk oozes out. If it be argued that even when the calf is dead, the presence of the milk is observed, and hence to say that it is the cow that makes the milk flow out of filial affection does not stand to reason,—(we reply.) there is the flow of the milk then by reason of her remembrance of the calf, or else it is explicable on the ground of her love for her master.² ――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― ¹ Ś, R, Bh. ² I.e. the cow gives milk even when the calf is dead because she still remem- bers the calf, or because she loves her master and wants to be of benefit to him.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 4. 330 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 1.] Water, too, comes to have the form of ice, bubble and the rest only when superintended by a conscious being; appears to be of the form of various saps through its contact with the earth; and flows on as dependent on a low ground ¹ and on account of being liquid. Every- thing being superintended by a sentient being, the above examples all fit in, in accordance with the scriptural texts. 'Who abiding within water' (Bṛh 3.7.4), '"At the command of this Imperishable, Gārgī, some rivers flow to the east"' (Brh. 3.8 9) and so on. Hence the in- ference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna) is not the cause of the world SŪTRA 4 "AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-EXISTENCE OF A SEPARATE (AC- CESSORY), (PRADHĀNA IS NOT THE CAUSE), ON ACCOUNT OF NON- DEPENDENCE." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Pradhāna, not superintended by an intelligent principle, is not the cause of the world. Why? "On account of the non-existence" of an accessory other than it, since according to you it does not de- pend on anything else. Vedānta-kaustubha For this reason, too, the cause of the world is not the inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna). Why? "On account of the non- existence of what is different" That is, if pradhāna,—which is not superintended by an intelligent principle, but is independent, non- sentient and an object of inference,—be the cause of the world, there will be activity on its part at all times, and this being so, there would not be, at any time, what is different from activity, i.e. inactivity on its part.² Or (an alternative explanation), the sense is: On account of the absence of an object to be instigated or of an instigator other than pradhāna. The reason for this, again, is: "on account of non-depen- dence", i.e. according to your view, as the creator of the world, 1 I.e. the flowing of the water depends on its being on a sloping ground 2 I.e. there would be eternal creation and no dissolution.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 5. ADH 1.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 331 pradhāna does not depend on an accessory. It cannot be said also that the variegated works are the instigator of pradhāna,—because works will then become the cause of the world, because the inde- pendence of pradhāna in creating the world will be set aside, and, finally, because this is impossible. Works, on the other hand, are not able to give even fruits like merit or demerit, pleasure or pain; their agent, too, does not obtain the fruit by himself. Hence, how can those works, performed by the individual souls who are vitiated by their contact with prakṛti or matter, be able to instigate pradhāna? The fact is that the works bear fruits through the wish of the Lord, and thus their agent obtains fruits, as declared by the Lord Himself: '"Pleasure, pain, existence, non-existence, fear and absence of fear, non-violence, equanimity, contentment, penance, charity, fame and absence of fame,—the various states of beings arise from me alone"' (Gītā 10. 4a-5b). It is not to be said that pradhāna acts through its proximity to puruṣa,—for its proximity to puruṣa being eternal, its activity, too, must be eternal. This will be made clear in details under the aphorism: "As in the case of a man and stone" (Br. Sū. 2.2.7) COMPARISON Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha This is sūtra 3 in their commentaries. Their explanation is similar to the first explanation given by Śrīnivāsa, viz.: "Because of the non-existence of what is different (from creation, viz. dis- solution), on account of (its) non-dependence (to anything else), (pradhāna is not the cause of the world)".¹ SŪTRA 5 "AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-EXISTENCE ELSEWHERE, NOT LIKE GRASS AND THE REST." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Since there is no transformation of the grass and the rest, eaten by an ox, into the form of milk, it cannot be said that just as the grass ¹ Śrī. B. 2.2.3, p. 74, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.2.3, pp. 57-58, Parts 7 and 8

332 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 6 ADH. 1.] and the rest, eaten by cows, etc. become milk by themselves, so the unmanifest, too, is transformed into the form of mahat and the rest. Vedānta-kaustubha If it be objected Just as grass, water, etc. are transformed into the form of milk, so the unmanifest is transformed into the form of mahat and the rest, independently indeed of another efficient cause, —the author replies: “No”. This cannot be said Why? “On ac- count of the non-existence elsewhere,” i.e. because “elsewhere”, or in the case of oxen and the rest, other than that of cows, etc. there is no transformation of the grass, water and so on, eaten by them, into the form of milk The particle “and” implies that since the transformation of the grass, etc , eaten by cows, into the form of milk is admitted to be due to an intelligent principle, likewise pradhāna, too, is transformed into the form of mahat and the rest as superintended by an intelligent principle alone, and not by itself. COMPARISON Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha They change the order of the sūtras 5–9 which will be noticed at the end of sūtra 9. Interpretation same SŪTRA 6 “EVEN IF THERE BE THE ADMISSION (OF ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF PRADHĀNA, STILL THEN IT CANNOT BE THE CAUSE), ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF A PURPOSE.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha “Even if there be the admission” of activity on the part of pradhāna somehow or other, still pradhāna cannot be the cause, since a purpose for such an activity is impossible on its part, it being non-sentient. Vedānta-kaustubha It has been said under the aphorism: “And on account of acti- vity” (Br. Sū. 2 2.2) that pradhāna has no power of independent activity, and hence is not the cause of the world. Now the author

[sū. 2. 2. 7. ADH 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 333 points out here that "even if there be the admission of activity on its part per force ¹, still then pradhāna is not capable of being the cause. Why? "On account of the absence of a purpose," that is, because there is no purpose for the creation of the world, seeing that the souls, merged in their own bliss, prior to creation, have no regard for en- joyment or emancipation, while pradhāna, being non-sentient, is not capable of having enjoyment and the rest. It cannot be said: What purpose can the Highest Person, who has all His desires ful- filled, have in creating the world?—since that has already been pointed out under the aphorism. "But as in ordinary life, a mere sport" (Br. Sū. 2 1.32). Or (an alternative explanation of the phrase: "arthābhāvāt") the sense is On account of the absurdity of the statement, made per force (and not on the ground of reason), viz. 'Pradhāna acts by itself', just like the statement 'The ether is running'. COMPARISON Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha They change the order of sūtras, which will be noticed at the end of sūtra 9. SŪTRA 7 "IF IT BE ARGUED: AS IN THE CASE OF A MAN AND STONE, (WE REPLY:) THEN ALSO." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If it be argued that just as a blind man makes a lame man move, or the stone (i.e. the magnet) the iron, so does puruṣa move pradhāna, ---(we reply:) in that case, the assumption of the non-activity (of puruṣa) will be contradicted, and pradhāna being something to be instigated by another will cease to be the primary cause of the world. Vedānta-kaustubha If it be argued: just as a lame man,—who has the power of vision, but is devoid of the power of motion,—lost accidentally from his caravan ¹ I.e. somehow or other.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 7. 334 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 1.] and wishing to go to a desired place, on finding a blind man,—who has the power of motion, but is devoid of the power of vision,—makes him move by mounting on him; and just as the magnet makes the iron move, so exactly, though devoid of the power of action, the soul, possessed of the power of vision, makes pradhāna, devoid of the power of vision, move by its mere proximity. Hence, in spite of the non- sentience of pradhāna, the activities of creation and the rest, are possible on its part,—the answer is : "Then also", i. e. even on the ground of such examples, no activity is possible on the part of the object exemplified, viz. pradhāna. Thus, if puruṣa be admitted to be the mover of pradhāna, then the initial proposition, viz. that puruṣa is not an agent, will come to be contradicted. If pradhāna be an object to be moved by puruṣa, then the initial proposition, viz. that pradhāna is by itself the cause of the world, will come to be contradicted. Although the power of motion is not manifest in a lame man, he being without legs, yet he directs the man, who has the power of motion, by means of speech. And the so-directed man, though not having the power of vision manifest because of his blindness, yet being a sentient being, moves in accordance with his (viz. the lame man's) words. The stone (viz. the magnet), on the other hand, moves the iron (only) when brought into connection with it by a man, and the iron does not move by nature. Moreover, it has been said under the aphorism: "If it be argued: like milk and water, there too" (Br. Sū. 2.2.3), that everywhere and at all times the Omnipotent and Omniscient Being abides as the mover of all. Further, the proximity of puruṣa and prakṛti being eternal, there was no absence of such a proximity before. Hence the order of creation and dissolution, as well as the respective difference between bondage and release,—due to the proximity of prakṛti and puruṣa—, are not possible; and there must result eternal activity and absence of dissolution. In the case in hand, on the contrary, there is no defect whatsoever, since it has been said that: "And that (divinity) is endowed with all (powers)" (Br. Sū. 2.1.29).

[SŪ. 2. 2. 8. ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 335 SŪTRA 8 “AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF BEING PREPON- DERANT.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha As it is impossible for the guṇas, which are in a state of equi- librium at the time of dissolution, to enter in a relation of mutual subordination and preponderance, so the inference (i e. the infer- rible pradhāna) is not the cause of the world. Vedānta-kaustubha For this reason also the inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna) is not the cause of the world Why? “On account of the impossi- bility of being preponderant.” Thus, is pradhāna,—consisting of the three guṇas in a state of equilibrium, not regulated by an intelligent principle and established by inference as admitted by you,—trans- formed into the form of the world by means of entering into a state of mutual subordination and preponderance (of the guṇas), or inde- pendently of any such state? If the first, then the preponderance of one among (these three guṇas) sattva, rajas and tamas, which are in a state of equilibrium prior to creation and are mutually inde- pendent, being impossible, it is not possible for pradhāna to be the cause of the world. If the second, then pradhāna, consisting of the three guṇas in a state of equilibrium and immutable, is not trans- formed into the form of the world all the more,—there being no state of inequality consisting in a mutual subordination and preponder- ance (of the guṇas). It cannot be said also that at the time of creation there is a lapse from the state of equilibrium and the guṇas entering into a state of mutual subordination and preponderance, thereby the world arises,— for this leads to the horns of a dilemma. Thus, is it admitted by you that the lapse from the state of equilibrium, at that time, is sponta- neous; or that it is due to the Omniscient Being? The first alter- native is not valid because of the impossibility of a spontaneous lapse without a cause, and also because of the following inference: Whatever has a cause has lapse, like seeds and the rest. Whatever has no cause has no lapse, like the soul.

336 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 9. ADH. 1.] The second alternative, too, is not valid, because that is not admitted and because that will be falling in with the view of your opponents ————— SŪTRA 9 “AND IF THERE BE AN INFERENCE IN ANOTHER WAY, (PRADHĀNA CANNOT STILL BE THE CAUSE) ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF THE POWER OF BEING A KNOWER.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha “And if there be an inference” with regard to pradhāna “in another way”, still then “on account of the absence of the power of being a knower” on the part of pradhāna, the world is not due to it. Vedānta-kaustubha Just as there may be the origin of effects, preceded by (pradhāna’s) entering into a state of mutual subordination and preponderance in a way other than the stated, so if an inference be made with regard to pradhāna, still then “on account of the absence of the power of being a knower”, i.e on account of pradhāna being devoid of the power of being a knower, the objections, viz. impossibility of arrangement and the rest, mentioned above, must remain in force. Hence the inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna) is not the cause of the world. COMPARISON Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha Interpretation same, but they read sūtras 5–9 in a different order. Thus:— Nimbārka, etc. Rāmānuja, etc. “Anyatra-bhāvāc ca . .” (Sū. 5). “Anyatra-bhāvāc ca . .” (Sū. 4). “Abhyupagame . .” (Sū. 6). “Puruṣāśmavat . .” (Sū. 5) “Puruṣāśmavat . .” (Sū. 7). “Aṅgitva . .” (Sū. 6). “Aṅgitva . .” (Sū. 8). “Anyathānumitau . .” (Sū. 7) “Anyathānumitau . .” (Sū. 9). “Abhyupagame . .” (Sū. 8).

[sū. 2. 2. 10. ADH. 1 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 337 SŪTRA 10 "AND ON ACCOUNT OF CONTRADICTION, (THE SĀṂKHYA DOCTRINE IS) INCONSISTENT." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The view of Kapila is "inconsistent", because of the opposition between its prior and subsequent (statements) Vedānta-kaustubha The view of Kapila is "inconsistent" in every way. Why? Because of its opposition to the Vedānta,—that is, the Vedāntas, independent of all proofs, authoritative by themselves and eternally established, establish the omniscient and omnipotent Lord of all as the cause of the origin and the rest of the world, and the admission of the doctrine of a non-sentient cause is opposed to this,—because of that;—because of the rejection of a doctrine based on mere reasoning in the passage: 'This knowledge is not attainable through reasoning' (Kaṭha 2.9); and because of the opposition between its prior and subsequent (statements). Thus, they hold that puruṣa (or the soul) is all-pervading, devoid of attributes, mere consciousness, isolated (from prakṛti) by nature, non-attached like a lotus leaf ¹ and inactive Then again, they maintain also that prakṛti is an agent through its mere proximity to puruṣa; and that through the super-imposition of nescience that very same (puruṣa) comes to have the attributes of 'being an agent', 'being an enjoyer' and so on, to be afflicted by the three kinds of miseries,² and to be subject to transmigratory existence Again, they teach that the salvation of puruṣa proceeds from the knowledge of prakṛti and puruṣa Thus, a multitude of inconsistencies between prior and subsequent (statements) may be found there. In the case under discussion, on the other hand, since in accordance with the Smṛti passages: ' "The evil-doers, the deluded, and the vilest men do not attain me,—they whose wisdom is destroyed by nescience and who have resorted to demoniacal nature" ' (Gītā 7 15), 'Know- ledge is enveloped by non-knowledge; thereby beings are deluded' ¹ I e just as a lotus leaf is not wetted by water, so the soul is not attached to anything. ² Viz. physical, mental and elemental 22

[sū. 2. 2. 11. 338 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 2.] (Gītā 5.15.), ‘ ‘ ‘At the end of many births, one who is possessed of knowledge attains me’ ’ ’ (Gītā 7 19), ‘ ‘ ‘Those who attain me cross over this māyā’ ’ ’ (Gītā 7 14), ‘ ‘ ‘Many, purified by the penance of knowledge come to attain my nature’ ’ ’ (Gītā 4.10), the causes of bondage, as well as of salvation,—liberating the bound soul from its bondage, unprecedented, and characterized by the attainment of His nature,—is well-established, there is not even a shadow of any contradiction among prior and subsequent (statements) Hence it is established that there is no contradiction of the concordance of the scriptural texts (with regard to Brahman) by the view of Kapila, which is opposed to the Veda and is set forward by means of fallacious reasoning Here ends the section entitled “The impossibility of arrange- ment ” (1). COMPARISON While Nimbārka adduces two reasons as to why the Sāṁkhya doctrine is ‘inconsistent’, viz. (1) oppositon to the Vedānta, (2) internal contradictions,—others adduce only one, viz. Śaṁkara, Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva adduce the second,¹ Bhāskara adduces the first.² Hence they do not attach any special meaning to the particle “ca” in the sūtra Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled “The great and the long”. (Sūtras 11–17) SŪTRA 11 “FOR, JUST AS THE (ORIGIN) OF THE GREAT AND THE LONG FROM THE SHORT AND THE SPHERICAL (IS UNTENABLE) (SO EVERYTHING IS UNTENABLE IN THE VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY).” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Since if they bo possessed of parts, then there will result an infinite regress; and if without parts, then it will be impossible for them ¹ Ś.B. 2 2.10, p 513; Śrī. B 2.2 9, pp. 78 ff., Part 2; ŚK B. 2.2 9, p. 61, Parts 7 and 8; G B. 2 2.10, p. 96, Chap. 2 ² Bh. B., 2.2 10, p. 112.

[sū. 2. 2. 11 ADH. 2.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 339 to be the producer of other evolutes ¹,—there is inconsistency in the origin of the binary compounds from the atoms, and there is all the more inconsistency in the origin of ternary compounds from these (binary compounds) Like this, everything admitted by the main- tainers of the atomic view is inconsistent. Vedānta-kaustubha Apprehending the objection, viz . Let pradhāna, not superin- tended by an intelligent principle, be not the cause of the world; but let the groups of atoms, under the control of the wish of the Supreme Lord, be the cause of the world,—the author is now pointing out the inconsistencies in the atomic doctrine as well The procedure of the atomists is the following: A substance produces another substance, a quality another quality; and the pro- duction of the effect proceeds from three causes, viz. the inherent, the non-inherent and efficient ²; just as an effect, viz. a piece of cloth, is produced by the threads which are the inherent cause, by their mutual conjunction which is the non-inherent cause, and by the shuttle, the loom, the weaver and the rest, which are the efficient cause. Like- wise, there are four kinds of atoms, distinguished as earth-atoms, water-atoms, fire-atoms and air-atoms; and they are eternal, without parts, possessed of colour and the rest, and spherical in extension, and remain without producing effects at the time of dissolution. At the time of creation, the atoms become the inherent cause for the production of the effect (viz. the world), their conjunction, the non- inherent cause, and the unseen principle ³ the efficient cause. Thus, through the wish of the Lord, first motion arises in the air-atoms, then a conjunction (between them) and thereby an effect, viz. a binary compound, arises from two atoms; a ternary compound arises from three binary compounds; a quaternary compound arises from four ternary compounds, and so on, and through this process, finally, the great air arises and remains trembling in space. In the very same manner, fire arises from the fire-atoms and remains shining in the form of earthly fire and so on. In the very same manner, the great ¹ C.S.S. ed. reads “parimāṇa” instead of “pariṇāma”, p. 31. ² Samavāyin, asamavāyin, nimitta. ³ I.e. the merit or demerit attaching to a man's conduct in one state of existence and the corresponding reward or punishment with which he is visited in another.

[SŪ. 2 2 11. 340 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 2 ] ocean arises from the water-atoms and remains flowing. In the very same manner, the great earth arises from the earth-atoms and remains immobile in the form of clay, stones and the rest. Again, the qualities of the effects arise from the qualities of the cause. Just as the qualities of a piece of cloth arise from the qualities of the thread,—a red cloth being found to arise from red threads,—so the qualities of whiteness and the like, inhering in the binary compounds and the rest, arise from the qualities of whiteness, etc. inhering in the atoms. But the combination of two simple atoms, producing a binary compound, produces different measures, viz. minuteness and shortness, in the binary compound, but do not produce sphericity, the measure of the simple atoms themselves,—because, then, there will result an intense fineness (on the part of the binary compound which it has not). Similarly, at the time of dissolution, too, through the wish of the Lord, there is motion in the atoms, thereby the dissolution of their conjunction, thereby the dissolution of the binary compounds and so on, and in this manner, finally, there is the dissolution of the earth and the rest. This view is being refuted here. The particle "or" in the aphorism is meant for implying the aggregate (of defects in the atomic doctrine) left unsaid. The word 'inconsistent' is to be supplied from above. The phrase: "from the short and the spherical" is to be applied by dividing it in a compatible manner. This being so, like the doctrine of the origin of a short binary compound from two simple spherical atoms, and like the doctrine of the origin of the great and long ternary compounds from the short (binary compounds), everything else too, maintained by them (viz. the atomists), is inconsistent—this is the construction of the words of the aphorism. The sense is this: The origin of binary compounds from atoms is impossible. That being impossible, the origin of the ternary com- pounds from the binary compounds is all the more impossible. In exactly the same manner, whatever is maintained by the atomists is simply inconsistent. Thus, it is observed that the parts, viz. the threads and the rest, produce a whole, viz. a piece of cloth, only by being conjoined (with one another) by means of their six sides which are their own parts. An atom, too, is established to have six parts through its connection with the six quarters. As has been said: 'An atom has six parts because of its simultaneous connection with the six (quarters)'. Hence, even the atoms must be productive of effects