वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

[sū 2. 3. 28. ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 421 nescience. Thereby beings are deluded ’ ’ ’ (Gītā 5.15), ‘ “ In whom that nescience has been destroyed by knowledge, in them knowledge shines forth like the sun, O Bhārata ! ’ ’ ’ (Gītā 5.16 ¹). COMPARISON Śaṃkara This is sūtra 29 in his commentary. Interpretation absolutely different. He takes this and the following three sūtras as laying down the correct conclusion, viz. that the soul is all-pervasive, in answer to the prima facie view set forth in ten sūtras above Thus, this sūtra means, according to him: “But there is that designation (of the atomicity of the soul) on account of its having that attribute (viz buddhi) as its essence, as in the case of the intelligent being”. That is, just as Brahman, though all-pervading, is designated to be atomic for the purpose of meditation, so the individual soul, though all- pervading, is designated to be atomic through its limiting adjunct of buddhi.² Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva This is sūtra 29 in the commentaries of the first two, and sūtra 27 in the commentary of the last. Baladeva leaves out “tu”. Inter- pretation different—viz “But there is that designation (i e the designation of the soul as knowledge) on account of its having that attribute as its essence, as in the case of the intelligent one” That is, just as the Lord, though a knower, is sometimes designated as know- ledge, so the individual soul too, though a knower, is sometimes designated as knowledge, since it possesses knowledge as its essential attribute.³ They continue the same topic in the following four sūtras, although literal interpretation is the same. Bhāskara This is sūtra 29 in his commentary. Interpretation absolutely different. Here he points out that the atomicity of the soul, considered so long, is not the real form of the soul, but only its transmigratory

¹ Correct quotation: “Prakāśayati tatparam”. Vide Gītā, 5.16, p. 303. ² Ś.B. 2.3.29, pp. 616 ff. ³ Śrī. B. 2.3.29, p. 144, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.29, p. 147. Parts 7 and 8, G.B. 2.3.27, p. 198, Chap. 2.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 29. 422 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 9.] form. Here he follows Śaṃkara, and points out that just as the all- pervading Brahman is said to be atomic in reference to His abode, viz. the heart, so the all-pervading soul is said to be atomic through its attributes of passion and the rest.¹ SŪTRA 29 "ALSO BECAUSE OF LASTING AS LONG AS THE SOUL DOES, THERE IS NO FAULT, BECAUSE IT IS SEEN." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The designation of the soul's all-pervasiveness, due to its attri- bute, is not inconsistent. "Also because of" the attribute lasting as long as the soul does, there is no fault, because it is seen";² i.e. because it is found in the passage: "‘For there is no cessation of the knowledge of the knower, because of his imperishability. Imperish- able, indeed. O! is this soul’" (Bṛh. 4 3 30 ³). Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz. The attribute of the soul being sometimes present and sometimes not, its all-pervasiveness due thereto vanishes, and as such the designation of its all-pervasiveness is open to objections —(the author) replies: The term "also" is meant for disposing of the objection. The soul is indeed eternal. As its attribute too "lasts as long as the soul does", i.e. is an eternal attribute accompanying the soul, so the designation of the soul's all-pervasiveness is not open to objections, because we find that there are texts designating the attribute as lasting as long as the soul does, such as: "‘For there is no cessation of the knowledge of the knower, because of his imperishability. Imperish- able, verily, O! is this soul’" (Bṛh. 4.3.30).

¹ Bh. B. 2.3.29, p. 137. ² C.S.S. ed., p. 440, omits the whole sentence which is but a repetition of the sūtra itself. The other edition retains it. ³ Not quoted by others.

[sū. 2. 3. 30. ADH. 9 ] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 423 COMPARISON Śaṃkara This is sūtra 30 in his commentary. Interpretation different. Śaṃkara continues the same theme, and points out that the soul's connection with buddhi lasts so long as the transmigratory state does.¹ Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha This is sūtra 30 in their commentaries as well. The interpretation of the word "tad-darśanāt" different, viz. because it is seen that all cows, hornless and so on, are called 'cow' (since they all possess the generic character of cowness).² Bhāskara This is sūtra 30 in his commentary too. Interpretation different, viz. like Śaṃkara's.³ Baladeva This is sūtra 28 in his commentary. Interpretation of the word "tad-darśanāt" different, viz. because it is seen that the sun and its light are co-eternal, and that the sun is both light and the illuminator.⁴ SŪTRA 30 "BUT ON ACCOUNT OF THE APPROPRIATENESS OF MANIFESTATION OF THAT WHICH IS EXISTENT, AS IN THE CASE OF VIRILITY AND SO ON." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha During the waking state there is the "manifestation" "of this", i.e. of knowledge, which is "existent" indeed during the states of deep sleep and so on. Hence, the attribute of knowledge does last so long as the soul itself does; just as in youth there is the manifestation of virility and so on, which are existent indeed during childhood. 1 Ś.B. 2.3.30, pp. 619 ff. 2 Śrī. B. 2.3.30, p. 144, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.30, p. 147, Parts 7 and 8. 3 Bh. B. 2.3.30, pp. 137-38. 4 G.B. 2.3.28.

424 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 31. ADH. 9.] Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz. if knowledge, the attribute of the soul, be eternal, then why should there be no perception of it during the states of deep sleep and the rest?—(the author) replies. The term "but" implies emphasis. Knowledge, the attribute of the soul, does last as long as the soul itself does. Why? "On account of the appropriateness of the manifestation of that which is existent." That is, the attribute of knowledge, which is "existent indced", i.e. is present indeed, in a non-manifest form during the states of deep sleep and the rest is manifested during the waking state,— just as in youth there is the manifestation of "virility and so on" which are existent indeed during childhood. By the phrase "and so on" the natural qualities of magnanimity, good conduct and the like are to be understood. COMPARISON Śaṁkara and Bhāskara This is sūtra 31 in their commentaries. Interpretation different, they continue the same theme—viz. the soul's connection with buddhi exists potentially in the state of deep sleep, etc. and is manifested in the state of waking.¹ SŪTRA 31 "OTHERWISE THERE (WILL BE) THE CONSEQUENCE OF ETERNAL PERCEPTION AND NON-PERCEPTION, OR A RESTRICTION WITH REGARD TO THE ONE OR THE OTHER." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha On the doctrine of an all-pervasive soul, the perception and the non-perception, the bondage and the release of the soul must all become eternal. The soul will be either eternally fettored or eternally free,—thus there must be "a restriction with regard to the one or the other". Vedānta-kaustubha This aphorism is meant for indicating the defects in the view of those who maintain the all-pervasiveness of the soul which is 1 Ś.B. 2.3.31, p. 621; Bh. B. 2.3.31, p. 138.

[SŪ. 2. 3 31. ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 425 consciousness. “Otherwise,” i.e on any view other than our view, viz. that the soul is possessed of the essential attributes of being a knower, knowledge by nature and atomic in size, i.e. on the doctrine that the soul is consciousness merely and all-pervading, there must be the “consequence of eternal perception and non-perception” On account of the all-pervading soul being ever unenveloped, there will be perception; on account of the existence of mundane existence, non- perception. In this way, there will result simultaneous bondage and release, “or a restriction with regard to the one or the other”. On our view, on the other hand, the individual soul being of the size of an atom, going and returning, being enveloped and being unenveloped, the object to be approached and the one approaching, are all possible, and hence the respective difference between bondage and release, too, is possible. But on your view, there will result one or the other only of bondage and release, having the stated marks There must be eternal bondage alone on the part of the soul which is consciousness merely and immobile, or there must be salvation alone,—such a restriction will result. Hence, it is established that the individual soul is possessed of the attribute of being a knower, is knowledge by nature and atomic in size. Here ends the section entitled “Departure” (9). COMPARISON Śaṁkara and Bhāskara This is sutra 32 in their commentaries. Interpretation different as before. They adduce here an argument for the existence of buddhi, being connected with which the all-pervading soul becomes atomic. Thus: (The existence of buddhi must be admitted) otherwise there will be the consequence of eternal perception and non-perception . . .¹ ¹ Ś.B. 2.3.32, p. 622, Bh. B. 2.3.32, p. 138.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 32. 426 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 10.] Adhikaraṇa 10: The section entitled "The agent". (Sūtras 32-39) SŪTRA 32 "(THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IS) AN AGENT, BECAUSE OF SCRIPTURE HAVING A SENSE." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The soul indeed is "an agent", because the scriptural texts, informing us about the means to enjoyment and salvation, such as 'One desiring heaven should perform a sacrifice' (Tait. Saṃ. 2.5.5 ¹), 'One desiring salvation should worship Brahman' ² and so on, have a sense. Vedānta-kaustubha Now incidentally, the problem whether the soul is an agent is being discussed. On the doubt, viz. whether the individual soul is an agent or not,—if the prima facie view be as follows: In the Kaṭha-vallī it is denied that the individual soul is an agent, thus: 'If the killer thinks to kill, if the killed thinks himself killed, both these do not know. This one does not kill, nor is killed' (Kaṭha. 2.19); and it has been declared by the Lord too: '"All actions are done by the guṇas of prakṛti. The soul, deluded by egoism, thinks: 'I am the agent' "' (Gītā 3.27). Hence, the guṇas alone are agents, but never the soul,— We reply: The soul alone is the agent. Why? "Because of Scripture having a sense", i.e. because the scriptural texts, teaching the means which are dependent on sentient beings, subject to enjoyment and salvation, viz. 'Only doing works here, let one desire to live a hundred years' (Īśā. 2), 'One desiring heaven should perform sacrifices' (Tait. Saṃ. 2.5.5), 'One desiring salvation should worship Brahman', 'Let one worship calmly' (Chānd. 3.14.1) and so on, have a sense. If those non-sentient objects (viz. the guṇas) be the agent, the scriptural texts teaching the means must be senseless. The (above-quoted) scriptural text, on the other hand, shows that the soul being eternal cannot be killed; but it is not by any means ¹ R, B, p. 208, line 27, vol. 2. ² R. B.

[sū. 2. 3 33. ADH. 10.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 427 concerned with denying that the soul is an agent. The Smṛti passage, too, shows only that the soul, which is deluded by the guṇas of prakṛti, is an agent of mundane activities through those guṇas And, this has been stated by the Lord Himself thus ‘ “Those deluded by the guṇas of prakṛti are attached to the activities of the guṇas”’ (Gītā 3 2.9). If the guṇas be the agent and not the soul, then the following statements will be nullified: viz. ‘“But if you will not carry on this righteous warfare”’ (Gītā 2.33), ‘“For through action alone Janaka and the rest have attained to perfection. Having an eye to the good of the world also, you should perform action”’ (Gītā 3 20), ‘“Whatever you do, whatever you eat, whatever you offer, whatever you give, whatever you practise as penance,—make that an offering to me”’ (Gītā 9.27), ‘“I am firm, with my doubts removed. I will do according to your word”’ (Gītā 18.73) and so on. COMPARISON Śaṁkara and Bhāskara This is sūtra 33 in their commentaries. Literal interpretation same, but they hold that the soul’s state of being an agent is not natural, but due to limiting adjuncts ¹ The same remarks apply to the following three sūtras also, which will not be noted separately. SŪTRA 33 “ON ACCOUNT OF THE TEACHING OF (THE SOUL’S) MOVING ABOUT.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha “On account of the teaching of (the soul’s) moving about,” in the passage: ‘He moves around in his own body as desired’ (Bṛh. 2.1.18 ²), it is an agent. Vedānta-kaustubha “On account of the teaching” of the soul’s “moving about”, i.e. of its roaming around, in the passages: ‘He, the immortal, goes ¹ Ś.B. 2 3.32, p. 623; Bh. B. 2.3 32, p. 138. For the different senses of the word ‘upādhi’ in the systems of Śaṁkara and Bhāskara. see Bh. B., etc. ² Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

428 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 34-35 ADH. 10.] wherever he wishes' (Bṛh. 4 3 12), 'He moves around in his own body as desired' (Bṛh. 2.1.18), the individual soul is an agent,—this is the sense. COMPARISON Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha They take this sūtra and the next as one sūtra by reversing the order and adding a "ca" thus "Upādānāt vihāropadeśāc ca".¹ SŪTRA 34 "ON ACCOUNT OF TAKING." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Because of the scriptural mention of the taking (by the soul) thus: 'So exactly he, having taken the senses' (Bṛh. 2.1.18). Vedānta-kaustubha On account of the scriptural mention of the taking (by the soul) in the passage which introduces the topic thus: 'Just as a king', and continues: 'So exactly does he, having taken these senses' (Bṛh 2.1.18), 'Having taken by his intelligence of these senses' (Bṛh. 2.1.17), the individual soul is an agent. SŪTRA 35 "ALSO ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION (OF THE SOUL AS AN AGENT) WITH REGARD TO ACTIONS, OTHERWISE, (THERE WILL BE) REVERSAL OF DESCRIPTION." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha "Also on account of the designation (of the soul) as an agent" thus: 'Understanding performs a sacrifice' (Tait. 2 5 ²), the soul is an agent. If by the word 'understanding' buddhi be understood and not the individual soul, the instrumental case would have been used ³ 1 Śrī. B., p. 152, Part 2; Śk. B, p. 153, Parts 7 and 8. 2 Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B. 3 I.e. the instrumental case 'vijñānena' would have been used.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 36. ADH. 10.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 429 Vedānta-kaustubha “Also on account of the designation” of the individual soul, denoted by the term ‘knowledge’, as an agent of ordinary and Vedic “actions” thus: ‘Understanding performs a sacrifice, performs actions as well’ (Tait. 2.5), the individual soul is an agent If it be objected: By the term ‘understanding’ buddhi is to be understood and not the individual soul,—(the author) replies: “Other- wise, i.e if by the term ‘understanding’ the individual soul be not understood, but buddhi is understood, then there must be “reversal of the description”, i.e. buddhi being the instrument, there must have been the designation of an instrument thus: ‘by understanding’. But there is no such designation. Hence, here is a designation of an agent by the stated case-ending, viz ‘Understanding’ Hence the individual soul is an agent. —————— SŪTRA 36 “THERE IS NO RESTRICTION AS IN THE CASE OF PERCEPTION.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha “There is no restriction” with regard to the actions based on the perception of their fruits. Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz. if the individual soul be the agent, then having taken into consideration the good and the evil which are the fruits of good and evil works, and being disgusted with the evil, it, with a view to obtaining the good, ought to do what is conducive to the latter,—(the author) replies. “As in the case of perception.” Just as there is the perception of the good and the evil which are the fruits of good and evil works performed previously, so there is “no restriction” with regard to works, since we find that people are by chance sometimes inclined to what is beneficial and sometimes to what is not beneficial.¹ ―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― ¹ I.e. although a man perceives the good and evil results of his past acts, yet there is no fixed rule that he always afterwards does what is good and avoids what is bad. As he is ruled by external circumstances, he may sometimes be inclined to what is bad, though knowing from his past experiences that such acts lead to harmful consequences.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 37. 430 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 10.] COMPARISON Śaṃkara This is sūtra 37 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz. “As in the case of perception, there is non-restriction (with regard to actions)”. That is, just as the soul, though free with regard to perceptions, sometimes perceives what is good, and sometimes what is bad, so the soul, though free to act, sometimes does what is good, and sometimes what is bad.¹ Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva This is sūtra 36 in the commentaries of the first two, but sūtra 35 in the commentary of the last. They interpret it as following. (If prakṛti were the agent and not the individual soul, then there would be) non-restriction (of actions) as in the case of perception”. That is, just as it has been shown ² that if the soul be all-pervading no definite perception will be possible, so if prakṛti be the agent, no definte activity will be possible, since prakṛti being all-pervading and common to all, all activities would produce results in the case of all souls, or produce no results in the case of any one.³ SŪTRA 37 “ON ACCOUNT OF THE REVERSAL OF POWER.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If buddhi be the agent, then its instrumental power will cease, and it must come to have the power of an agent. Hence the individual soul is the agent. Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz. in the text ‘Understanding performs a sacrifice’ (Tait. 2.5), by the word ‘understanding’ buddhi alone is to be understood, and it is the agent. Hence there instrumental case has not been used ⁴—(the author) replies : ¹ Ś, B, 2.3.37, p. 625. ² Under Śrī. B. 2.3.32, Śk B. 2.3.32, G B. 2.3.30. ³ Śrī. B. 2.3.36, p. 153, Part 2; Śk. B 2.3.36, p. 153, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.3.35, p. 208, Chap. 2. ⁴ Vide V.P S. 2.3.35 above.

[sū. 2. 3. 38. ADH. 10.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 431 The individual soul alone is the agent. If buddhi be admitted to be the agent, then "on account of the reversal of power", its instru- mental power will cease, and it must come to have the power of an agent. Moreover, if buddhi be the agent, then the power of enjoyment, too, must pertain to it alone. This being so, bondage and release must result on the part of buddhi alone. COMPARISON Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva This is sūtra 37 in the commentaries of the first two, but sūtra 36 in the commentary of the last. Their interpretation is similar to the last portion of Śrīnivāsa's interpretation, viz. that if buddhi or prakṛti be the agent, the power of enjoyment too must belong to it.¹ SŪTRA 38 "AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF DEEP CONCENTRATION." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If the soul be not an agent, then "the absence of deep concentration", due to something which is absolutely different from the non-sentient,² will result, and hence the soul is the agent. Vedānta-kaustubha "Deep concentration" means abiding as having Brahman for one's soul, after meditating on one's own form,—distinct from the body, sense-organs, mind and intelligence,—preceded by the stopping of the functions of the mind. As the "absence of such a deep concentration", the means to salvation, will result, if the individual soul be not an agent,—it is known that the individual soul alone is the agent. ¹ Śrī. B. 2.3.37, p. 153, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3 37, p. 154, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.3.36, pp. 208-9, Chap. 2. ² Acetana-mātrāt, i.e. from even the slightest portion of the non-sentient.

432 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 39. ADH. 10.] SŪTRA 39 "AND LIKE A CARPENTER, IN BOTH WAYS " Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The soul acts or does not act according to its own wish, "like a carpenter", and as such a situation is possible "in both ways". If buddhi be the agent, then there being the absence of desire and the like on its part, there will be the absence of such a situation. Vedānta-kaustubha The soul,—the nature of which is to act or abstain from acting, and which is possessed of the attributes of 'being an agent' and so on, lasting so long as it itself does,—though connected with a group of instruments like speech and the like, performs action or does not perform action according to its wish, and thus if the soul be an agent a situation is possible "in both ways",—just as a carpenter, though provided with instruments like axe and the rest, constructs chariots, etc., according to his wish. But acting or refraining from action is not possible on the part of buddhi, which is an instrument like the axe, by reason of its non-sentience. On account of the eternity of its proximity to a sentient being, as well as on account of the absence, on its part,—of any desire—the cause of action or inaction,—there must be either eternal activity or eternal non-activity, on its part. Hence, it is established that the soul alone is the agent. Here ends the section entitled "The agent" (10). COMPARISON Śaṃkara and Bhāskara This is sūtra 40 in their commentaries. Interpretation absolutely different. They take it to be forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, con- cerned with the question whether the individual soul is an agent by nature or as connected with limiting adjuncts, and accept the second alternative. Hence the parallel instance: "i e. yathā ca takṣā" is interpreted differently by them thus: In ordinary life a carpenter is miserable and so long as he is an agent, i.e. works with his tools,

[sū. 2. 3. 40. ADH 11.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 433 etc But when he returns home, lays aside his tools and is no longer an agent, he becomes happy In the very same manner the soul suffers so long as it is an agent through nescience, but when it returns home, i e. realizes its real state, frees itself from sense-organs and so on, and ceases to be an agent, it becomes happy ¹ Baladeva This is sūtra 38 in his commentary. He takes it to be an adhikaraṇa by itself. Interpretation different, viz. "And like the carpenter (the soul is active) in two ways". That is, the carpenter is an indirect agent through the medium of its instruments, and also a direct agent in handling those instruments themselves. Similarly, the soul is an indirect agent through its sense-organs, and is also a direct agent in the act of controlling those sense-organs.² Adhikaraṇa 11. The section entitled "Under the control of the Highest". (Sūtras 40-41) SŪTRA 40 "BUT (THE AGENTSHIP OF THE SOUL PROCEEDS) FROM THE HIGHEST, BECAUSE THAT IS TAUGHT BY SCRIPTURE" Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The agentship of that individual soul proceeds "from the Highest" as its cause, in accordance with the scriptural text "Entered within, the ruler of men" (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1, 2 ³). Vedānta-kaustubha Now the problem is being discussed whether the individual soul is an agent as controlled by the Highest Soul, or independently. On the doubt, viz. whether the stated agentship of the individual soul is under its own control or under the control of the Highest Soul, if the prima facie view be: Under its own control alone. In ordinary ¹ Ś.B. 2.3.40, pp 628-29; Bh. B. 2.3.40, p. 139. ² G B. 2.3.38, p. 120, Chap. 2. ³ R., p. 181. 28

434 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2 3. 41. ADH. 11.] life, a man engages himself to tilling and the like by himself out of desire for crops, but does not wait for the Highest,— We reply: The agentship of the individual soul proceeds "from the Highest" as its cause. Why? On the ground of the following scriptural texts: 'For he alone makes one, whom he wishes to raise up from these worlds, do good deeds. He alone makes one, whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do bad deeds' (Kauṣ. 3.8), 'Entered within, the ruler of men' (Tait. Ār 3.11.1, 2), 'Who rules the soul within' (Śat. Br. 14.6.7, 30 ¹) and so on; as well as on the ground of the Smṛti passages, viz. . ' "And I am situated within the heart of all. From me proceed memory, knowledge and their absence" ' (Gītā 15.15). COMPARISON Śaṃkara and Bhāskara Literal interpretation same, although as before they are speaking of the soul's agentship being due to limiting adjuncts. The same remarks apply to their interpretation of the next sūtra. SŪTRA 41 "BUT (THE LORD MAKES THE SOUL ACT) HAVING REGARD TO THE EFFORTS MADE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE FUTILITY OF WHAT IS ENJOINED AND WHAT IS PROHIBITED AND SO ON." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The term "but" is meant for disposing of the fault of inequality. The Highest Being, who has "regard" for the works done by the individual soul, makes it do good deeds and the rest in another birth too, "on account of the futility of what is enjoined and what is pro- hibited". Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz. if the Supreme Soul be the instigator, then He must be open to the charge of inequality and rest,—the author, replies: 1 P. 1074, line 18.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 41. ADH. 11.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 435 The term “but” is meant for disposing of the above objection. The Supreme Soul, who has “regard” for, i.e. takes into account, the efforts made by the individual soul, i e for its good and bad deeds, makes it do good deeds and the rest in another birth too, and gives it pleasure and the like accordingly. Hence, He cannot be charged with partiality, etc. If it be asked: Why should the Supreme Being take into account the efforts made by the individual soul?—the author replies: “On account of the futility of what is enjoined and what is prohibited”. If the Highest Person takes into account the efforts made by the soul, then alone, injunctions and prohibitions, such as, ‘One who desires for heaven should perform the Jyotistoma sacrifice’ (Āp. Ś S. 10.2 1 ¹), “A Brāhmaṇa must not be killed” and so on, do not become futile. The meaning of the phrase, “and so on” is that faults like: suffering arising from good deeds, and happiness arising from bad deeds, and so on, result. Since the Supreme Soul takes into account the works done by souls, He cannot, by any means, be charged with inequality, etc., though He is the instigator of what is enjoined and what is pro- hibited, and is, thereby, the bestower of favour and disfavour Under the aphorism: “(There are) no inequality and cruelty (on the part of the Lord), because of (His) having regard (for the works of souls)” (Br. Sū. 2.1.33), it has been said that no inequality and the rest pertain to the Highest in His creation of the variegated world—this is the distinction.² Hence, the Highest Person, omnipotent and the Lord of all, is the instigator of good deeds and the rest in accordance with the good and bad deeds performed before, and is the giver of fruits accord- ingly to them. Thus, it is established that the individual soul is an agent as controlled by the Highest. Here ends the section entitled “The Highest” (11). ¹ P. 209, vol. 2. ² I.e. there is no repetition here, since under Br. Sū. 2.1.33 it has been shown that the Lord is not partial as a creator, whereas it is being shown here that He is not partial as an instigator to action.

436 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 42 ADH. 12.] Adhikarana 12: The section entitled "A part". (Sūtras 42–52) SŪTRA 42 "(THE INDIVIDUAL IS) A PART (OF BRAHMAN), ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF VARIETY, AND OTHERWISE, ALSO SOME READ (THAT BRAHMAN IS OF) THE NATURE OF FISHERMEN, GAMBLERS AND THE REST." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The individual soul is a part of the Supreme Soul, in accordance with the designation of difference in texts like: 'The two unborn ones, the knower and the non-knower, the lord and the non-lord' (Śvet. 1 9) and so on ¹, and on account of the designation of non- difference in texts like 'Thou art that' (Chānd 6.8.6, etc.). And "also" the Ātharvaṇikas "read" that Brahman is of "the nature of fishermen, gamblers and the rest", thus: "Brahman are the fishermen, Brahman are the slaves, Brahman are these gamblers".² Vedānta-kaustubha It has been pointed out that the agentship of the individual soul is under the control of Brahman. Now, the author is pointing out the relation between the two, consistently with the scriptural texts designating both difference and non-difference. On the doubt, viz. whether the individual soul is different from Brahman or non-different from Him, or a part of Brahman and as such both different and non-different from Him,—if it be suggested: The individual soul must be different from Brahman, as a man is from the king, because the texts designating non-difference are figura- tive and because a non-difference between the non-knowing and the all-knowing is impossible. Or, it must be non-different only (from Brahman), because the scriptural texts designating difference are figurative. There being a mutual opposition between difference and non-difference, of either the texts about difference or the texts about non-difference must certainly be metaphorical,— ¹ R. ² Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 42. ADH. 12.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 437 We reply: The individual soul is neither absolutely different from the Highest Person, nor absolutely non-different from Him, but is a part of the Highest Self, in accordance with the scriptural text: “For he is a part of the Highest”. A ‘part’ means a ‘power’, in accordance with the scriptural text: “This individual soul, a power of the Highest, is small in power and not independent”. A ‘part’ should not be understood here as a portion, actually severed like a portion of wealth and the rest; for if the individual soul be a portion cut off from Brahman, then texts like ‘Without part’ (Śvet. 6.19) and the like, will be contradicted; and because if it be like a portion of wealth, there will result an absolute difference (between Brahman and the soul) and hence the texts like: ‘Thou art that’ (Chānd. 6.8.6, etc.) will be set aside. (The true view is:) The individual soul is, by nature, different from the Supreme Person, predicated to be the whole, and the ocean of a mass of attributes like omniscience and the rest,—since it is predicated to be a part, and is subject to bondage and release. But it is yet non-different from Him, as its existence and activity are under the control of the whole. Why ? “On account of the designation of variety”, i. e. on account of the designation of difference; “and otherwise”, i. e. and on account of the designation of non-difference. The sense is that the two kinds of texts being of equal force, there is a natural difference—non-difference between the individual soul and the Supreme Soul. The following are designations of difference: ‘Who rules the soul within’ (Śat. Br. 14 6.7, 30 ¹), ‘Entered within, the ruler of men’ (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1, 2 ²), ‘The soul, verily, is supreme, self-dependent, possessed of superior qualities’, ‘The individual soul is possessed of little power, not self-dependent, lowly’, ‘The two unborn ones, the knower and the non-knower, the lord and the non-lord’ (Śvet. 1.9) and so on. The following are designations of non-difference: ‘Thou art that’ (Chānd. 6.8.6, etc.), ‘This soul is Brahman’ (Bṛh. 2.5.19; 4.4.5), ‘I am Brahman’ (Bṛh. 1.4.10) and so on. And “also” the followers of one branch, viz. the Ātharvaṇikas, “read” that Brahman is of the “nature of fishermen, gamblers and the like” thus: “Brahman are these fishermen, Brahman are the slaves, Brahman are these gamblers”. ¹ P. 1074, line 18. ² P. 181.

438 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 43-44. ADH. 12.] COMPARISON Śaṃkara Literal interpretation same, although as usual Śaṃkara holds that the soul is not a real part of Brahman, but a part as it were.¹ The same remarks apply to the following two sūtras. SŪTRA 43 “ON ACCOUNT OF THE WORDING OF A SACRED TEXT.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha “On account of the wording of the sacred text,” viz. ‘A foot of him are all beings’ (Ṛg. V. 10 90.3 ²; Chānd. 3.12.6), the individual soul is a part of Brahman. Vedānta-kaustubha The individual soul is nothing but a part of the Supreme Soul. Why? Also “on account of the wording of the sacred text”: ‘A foot of him are all beings, three feet of him are immortal in the heaven’ (Ṛg. V 10.90.3, Chānd. 3.12.6) A ‘feet’ means a ‘part’. SŪTRA 44 “AND, MOREOVER, (IT IS) DECLARED BY SMṚTI.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha It is declared by Smṛti also that the individual soul is a part of Brahman thus: ‘“A part of my own self, in the world of men, has become the individual soul, the eternal’”’ (Gītā 15.7 ³).

¹ Ś.B. 2.3.43, p. 636. ² P. 349, line 19. Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B. ³ Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

[sū. 2. 3. 45. ADH. 12 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 439 Vedānta-kaustubha It has been declared in a Smṛti passage by the Highest Person Himself that the individual soul is a part of Brahman, thus: “ ‘A part of my own self, in the world of men, has become the individual soul, the eternal’ ’ (Gītā 15.7). COMPARISON Rāmānuja He omits the “ca”.¹ ――――― SŪTRA 45 “BUT LIKE LIGHT AND THE REST, NOT SO THE HIGHEST.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Though the individual soul is a part of the Supreme Person, yet the whole (i.e. the Lord) does not experience pleasure and pain, just as “light and the rest” are devoid of the virtue or vice inhering in their parts. Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz. then the virtue or vice pertaining to the individual soul may belong to the Supreme Soul too, seeing that a part has no separate existence from the whole,—the author replies here. “The Highest,” i.e. the Supreme Soul, does “not” become “so”, i.e. does not come to share the virtue and vice pertaining to the individual soul. The author states a parallel instance: “Like light and the rest”, i.e. just as “light”, i e. the sun and the rest, are not touched by the attributes of their rays which are their parts, i.e by their contact and the rest with pure and impure objects. By the phrase: “and the rest”, the ether and the like are understood; i.e. just as the ether and the like are not touched by the good qualities found in the sound of conch-shell, cuckoos and so on, nor by the bad qualities found in the sound of crows and the like. The term “but” is suggestive of the absence of an intermixture of the attributes of the part and the whole. The objections, resulting from the apprehension ―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― ¹ Śrī. B. 2.3.44, p. 161, Part 2.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 45. 440 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 12.] that the Highest Being is subject to karmas by reason of His connec- tion with the hearts of individual souls which are subject to karmas, have been disposed of, on the ground that the Lord is not subject to karmas, under the aphorism: "Enjoyment results" (Br. Sū. 1.2.8). Under the aphorism: "Not even on account of place" (Br. Sū 3 2.1), we shall dispose of (the objection based on Brahman's being connected with 'places', viz. the hearts) on the ground that the Lord, having the 'places' by nature, is yet not subject to karmas. Here, on the other hand, it should be known that the objections raised on the ground of His own parts are disposed of.¹ COMPARISON Śaṃkara This is sūtra 46 in his commentary. The general import of the sūtra, as well as the interpretation of the phrase: i e. "prakāśādivat" different. He develops his doctrine of upādhi here. Thus, the sūtra means, according to him: Just as the light of the sun and the moon, pervading the entire expanse of the other, appears to be straight or bent accordingly as the limiting adjunct with which it is in contact, viz. finger, etc. are straight or bent, but does not become so really; or just as the ether, though imagined to move when jars are moving, does not really move; or just as the sun does not really tremble when its images on water tremble, so although the individual soul undergoes pleasure and pain, Brahman does not, since the soul is but a fictitious part of Brahman, due to limiting adjuncts, and not a real part.² Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha They too develop here their peculiar theory of Viśiṣṭādvaita. Thus, the sūtra means, according to them: "(The individual soul is a part of Brahman) as light and the rest (of the sun, etc. is of the sun and so on), not so the highest (i.e. Brahman is not of the same nature ¹ I.e. there is no repetition here. Under Br. Sū. 1.2.8, it has been shown that Brahman, though connected with the hearts of individual souls is not subject to their pleasures and pain. In this sūtra it is shown that Brahman, though connected with the individual souls as their whole, is not yet subject to their pleasure and pain. And under Br. Sū. 3.2.1, it will be shown that Brahman, though the inner controller, is not subject to the states and faults of souls. ² Ś.B. 2.3.46, pp. 638-639.