वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

[SŪ. 2 2. 25-26. 360 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 3] mind, and all the sense-organs, the ether, the air, the light, water and the earth, the supporter of all” (Muṇḍ. 2.1 3) The substantiality of the ether was approved by the Buddha as well, who said out of compassion: ‘As long as there is the existence of the ether, and as long as there is the existence of the world, so long may there be the existence of me, the destroyer of the sufferings of the world’. COMPARISON Bhāskara This is sūtra 23 in Bhāskara ¹ Interpretation of the word “aviśeṣāt” different; viz. “from the same (scriptural text, viz. Tait. 2 1)” it is known that the ether like the air and the rest, arises from the soul.² SŪTRA 25 “AND ON ACCOUNT OF REMEMBRANCE.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha And on account of the recognition, viz ‘This is that’, this doctrine is untrue. Vedānta-kaustubha For this too the doctrine of momentariness is not reasonable. Why? “On account of remembrance”, i.e on account of the remem- brance of an entity, perceived by one. Hence an eternal soul, the experiencer, must of necessity be acknowledged, otherwise the cessation of all practical activities will result. —————— SŪTRA 26 “(THERE CAN BE NO ORIGINATION) FROM THE NON-EXISTENT, BECAUSE OF NON-OBSERVATION.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha An entity does not arise from a non-entity, “on account of non- observation”. ¹ Written as sūtra 2.2.24 in conformity with Śaṃkara’s number. ² Bh. B. 2.2.23, p. 121.

[sū. 2. 2. 27. ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 361 Vedānta-kaustubha It is assumed by the Buddhists that there is the origin of an entity from a non-entity. This is not reasonable. Why? Because the origin of pots and the rest from non-existent clay, etc is never observed,—on the contrary, their origin from existent clay and the rest alone is observed. COMPARISON Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva This is sūtra 25 in the commentary of Śrīkaṇṭha. He begins a new adhikarana here, ending with the next sūtra, concerned with the refutation of the Sautrāntika school of the realist Buddhists. According to him, the preceding sūtras are concerned with the refutation of the Vaibhāṣika school only But Nimbārka refutes these two schools together. Baladeva also takes this sūtra as concerned specially with the refutation of the Sautrāntika school, though he does not begin a new adhikarana since he takes the next sūtra to be referring to both the schools equally. They interpret the sūtra in the same manner, viz. ("There is no origin of things from) the non-existent, on account of non-perception". That is, the Sautrāntika view that an object is inferred from the impressions left on our mind by it is absurd, for a momentary, and as such a non-existent, something cannot produce any impressions.¹ SŪTRA 27 "AND THUS (THERE WILL BE) ACCOMPLISHMENT ON THE PART OF THE INACTIVE AS WELL." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Otherwise, there may be the "accomplishment" of ends like knowledge and the rest on the part of one who has not resorted to any means. ¹ ŚK. B. 2.2.25, p. 92, Parts 7 and 8, G.B. 2.2.26. p. 122, Chap. 2.

362 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 2. 2. 28. ADH. 4. Vedānta-kaustubha Moreover, just as it is admitted by you that there is the origin of entity from non-entity, so there will result the "accomplishment" of the desired-for effects, through the mere non-existence of implements, even "on the part of the inactive", i.e. on the part of those who have discarded the implements leading to their desired ends. But there is never any attainment of knowledge and the rest by one who is inactive, and a perpetual religious student, leading a life of chastity ¹ and unmarried, never gets a son. Hence, it is established that the demonstrated conclusion of Scripture is not contradicted by the views of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, based on a mere semblance of (and not real) reason Here ends the section entitled "The aggregate" (3). Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled "Percep- tion". (Sūtras 28-31) SŪTRA 28 “(THERE IS) NO NON-EXISTENCE (OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS), ON ACCOUNT OF PERCEPTION.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha There is "no non-existence" of external objects as held by the maintainers of the reality of consciousness alone; but they are, indeed, existent. Why? "On account of perception" Vedānta-kaustubha Now, the view of the Yogācāra is being disposed of. The Yogācāra Buddhist, the maintainer of the reality of consciousness alone, holds that those objects which are other than consciousness are all non-existent. Thus, to think that manifold external objects exist is an error. There are only manifold cognitions which are momentary, variegated, perceptible and have definite forms. Only cognitions like 'blue', 'yellow', which have definite forms, are revealed (directly to the mind). It must be admitted certainly even by the maintainers of the reality of external objects that the cognitions arising from the contact of sense-organs with those particular objects ¹ Naiṣṭhika.

[sū. 2. 2. 28. ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 363 have forms of those objects respectively If this be so, then all practical transactions being possible through those forms alone, what is the use of imagining external objects ? It (viz a cognition) being self-manifesting like a lamp, is directly perceived If what is non- perceived be cognized, then there will be non-distinction between one’s own cognitions and the cognitions of others But there is indeed a distinction (between them). A man acts or refrains from acting on the basis of his own cognitions. This has been declared by Viprabhikṣu as well thus: 'There is no understanding of the meaning of what is non-perceived The cognitive self, though non-divided, is yet looked upon by men of perverted understanding to be possessed of the differences of object perceived, the perceiver and consciousness'. Thus, the object-form is the object to be known, the perceiver-form is the act of knowledge, and his consciousness is the result, and thus these three are imagined in one and the same process of consciousness Hence there are no external objects For this reason also (there are no external objects—viz.). On account of being uniformly perceived together, there is no difference between 'blue' and its cognition. Whenever there is the cognition of blue, blue, too, is cognized at the very same moment Hence, there is no difference between these two For this reason, too, (there are no external objects, viz ) : The cognitions in our waking state are devoid of (i.e. do not correspond to) external objects, because they are mere cognitions, like the dream- cognitions and the rest If it be asked: How can there be a variety of cognitions in the absence of external objects ? We reply: owing to the variety of the past impressions The variety (of cognitions) is explicable by reason of the fact that the cognitions and the past impressions stand in the relation of mutual causes and effects, like the seed and the shoot. (Correct conclusion ) On this suggestion, we reply The non- existence of external objects is not possible. Why ? “On account of perception,” i e. because of the direct perception of external objects, other than cognitions. Although the individual soul, having the stated marks, is eternal knowledge by nature and its attribute of knowledge, too, is indeed eternal like the ray of the sun, yet since it has its knowledge veiled by nescience due to the beginningless māyā,¹ 1 I e. prakṛti or matter.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 29. 364 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 4 ] it errs in cognizing objects in birth after birth, as well as in one birth even. And it knows once more the sun and the rest, installed by the Highest Self, as well as the objects collected by its father and fore- fathers, which are all already existent, from the surrounding company of people. The sense is that, hence, there is no non-existence of the objects which are different from knowledge, the sun and the moon, fire, mountain, the earth, water, cow, horse and the rest being established on the ground of direct perception. The argument,—viz. It is to be admitted certainly even by the maintainers of the reality of external objects that cognitions arising from the contact of sense-organs with those particular objects have the forms of those objects respectively. If this be so, then all practical transactions being possible through those forms alone, what is the use of imagining external objects?—is not tenable, since in the absence of objects, the cognitions of the objects cannot have forms similar to them. Thus, an external object is other than knowledge and its knowledge is other than it. The argument—viz. that owing to their being uniformly perceived together, there is no difference between blue and its perception,—too, is not tenable, for there is an admission of difference through this very admission of a simultaneous perception.¹ SŪTRA 29 "AND ON ACCOUNT OF DISSIMILARITY, (THE WAKING COGNITIONS ARE) NOT LIKE DREAMS AND THE REST." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The baselessness of the cognitions of the waking state cannot be established on the analogy of the dream-cognitions and the rest, on account of there being no parallelism between the two cases; as well as on account of dream-consciousness too, having a basis. 1 That is, to say that A and B are perceived together is to say that there is a difference between them. Otherwise there is no sense in saying that A and B are perceived together.

[sū. 2. 2. 30. ADH. 4 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 365 Vedānta-kaustubha To the argument, viz. The cognitions in the waking state do not correspond to external objects, because they are mere cognitions, like the dream-cognitions and the rest, we reply. It cannot be said that the cognitions in the waking state are without a basis "like dreams and the rest", i.e. like the dream- cognitions and the illusory cognitions. Why? "On account of dissimilarity," i. e. because there is dissimilarity between the cognitions in the waking state and the dream-cognitions, as the former are due to attentive sense-organs, while the latter to inattentive sense-organs; also because—as indicated by the particle "and" (in the sūtra)— even the dream-cognitions have bases. ————— SŪTRA 30 "THE EXISTENCE (OF PAST IMPRESSIONS) NOT (POSSIBLE), ON ACCOUNT OF NON-PERCEPTION" Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Moreover, the "existence" of past impressions is admitted by you in order that there may be variety in knowledge; this is not possible, since according to your view, external objects are not perceived. Vedānta-kaustubha Moreover, if knowledge be without a basis, then its varieties, such as the knowledge of a pot, the knowledge of blue, the knowledge of yellow and so on, are not possible. If it be said that past impressions are the cause of the variety of knowledge,—(we reply). "the existence" of past impressions is not possible on your view. Why? "On account of non-perception", i.e. because of the non-perception of the cause of past impressions, or, because no such cause is possible on your view. The direct perception of external objects is the cause of past impressions, and that is not possible in your case, owing to your non-admission of external objects

366 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 31. ADH. 4.] COMPARISON Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha This is sūtra 29 in their commentaries. Interpretation slightly different, viz. “The existence (of cognition devoid of corresponding things) is not (possible), because of non-perception”.¹ SŪTRA 31 “ON ACCOUNT OF MOMENTARINESS ” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha There is no existence of past impressions, “on account of the momentariness” of their substratum on your view. Vedanta-kaustubha For this reason, too, the existence of past impressions is not possible. Why? “On account of the momentariness” of their sub- stratum, the receptacle-consciousness,² viz. the ‘I’, as well as of the single members of the uninterrupted series. Hence, the variety of knowledge is due to the variety of objects. Therefore, it is established that the settled conclusion of Scripture is not contradicted by the Yogācāra view which is but a childish prattle. Here ends the section entitled “Perception” (4) COMPARISON Śaṁkara and Baladeva They add a “ca” at the end ³ 1 Śrī. B. 2.2.29, p. 102, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.2.29, pp. 97-98, Parts 7 and 8. 2 Ālaya-vijñāna. The Vijñāna-skandha consists of vijñānas or cognitions of two kinds, ālaya-vijñāna and pravṛtti-vijñāna. The former consists of cogni- tions which refer to the ‘I’, the ego, while the latter those that refer to the so- called external objects. 3 Ś.B. 2.2.31, p. 557, G.B. 2.2.31.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 32. ADH 5 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 367 Rāmānuja, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha This sūtra is not found in their commentaries Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled "Incon- sistency in every way". (Sūtra 32) SŪTRA 32 “AND BECAUSE OF THE INCONSISTENCY (OF THE DOCTRINE OF A UNIVERSAL VOID) IN EVERY WAY.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The doctrine of void, too, is erroneous, because it is inconsistent “in every way”, being opposed to the evidence of direct perception and the rest. Vedānta-kaustubha Now the doctrine of universal void, as held by the Mādhyamikas, is being disposed of (The view is as follows·) All the objects mentioned in the sacred works composed by the omniscient one (viz the Buddha), are simply for the sake of suiting the intellectual capacities of his disciples, but are not really existent, owing to the impossibility of the origin and destruction (of things). The origin of entity from non-entity is inappropriate (And if an entity arises from another entity, the question is.) Is the entity which arises from another entity dissimilar to the latter or similar ? If the first, then there will be the origin of everything everywhere. If the second, then fruitlessness would result like the grinding of what has already been ground ¹ Owing to such inexplicability of origin, destruction, too, is inexplicable Hence, the doctrine of void is to be accepted. Thus, salvation consists in attaining a state of void,—such is the view of the Buddha. And this is perfectly reasonable, since void is not proved by anything else, (but is self- proved). The conventional distinctions of perceiver and the object perceived and so on are mere errors. 1 I e. on the first alternative a gold ring may arise from clay; on the second, there is no sense in producing something already existent, gold (ring) from gold.

368 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 32. ADH. 5.] With regard to it we reply The doctrine of universal void does not stand to reason. Why? Because if the maintainer of the doctrine of universal void be unreal, then there will result the reality of all; if real, then there will result the abandonment of the initial proposition. "And on account of the inconsistency, in every way," of the doctrine of universal void, the view that everything is void is unreasonable,— because the entire world is perceived to be true both by the disputant and the respondent, because there is no proof of void, and because it is in conflict with the Buddha's doctrine, establishing the existence of momentary objects. The sense is that the view of the Mādhyamikas who maintain that everything is void, who are unacquainted with the process of origination and destruction, and who are just like an owl not perceiving the sun by reason of defective eyesight, is erroneous in every way. It is established, thus, that there is not even an odour of contradiction in the view of Scripture. Here ends the section entitled "Inconsistency in every way" (5). COMPARISON Śaṁkara Interpretation different. He takes it as a refutation of the Buddhist doctrine in general, not particularly of the doctrine of universal void. He points out at the end of sūtra 31 that the third school of Buddhism, viz. the doctrine of universal void, is set aside by all evidence, and as such requires no special and separate refutation.¹ Bhāskara This sūtra too is not found in his commentary. He points out at the end of sūtra 29 (sūtra 30 according to Nimbārka) that the doctrine of universal void is refuted through the refutation of the doctrine of the sole reality of cognitions.² ¹ Vide Ś.B. 2.2.31, p. 558. ² Bh. B. 2.2.29 (written as 2.2.30 in conformity with Śaṁkara's number), p. 125.

[sū. 2. 2. 33. ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 369 Adhikarana 6 The section entitled "Impossible in one". (Sūtras 33-36) SŪTRA 33 "(THE JAINA DOCTRINE IS) NOT (TENABLE), ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY (OF CONTRADICTORY ATTRIBUTES) IN ONE (AND THE SAME THING)." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The Jainas ascribe contradictory attributes like existence and non-existence and so on to all things. This does not stand to reason, because the co-existence of contradictory attributes, like existence and non-existence and the rest, is impossible, like that of shadow and light. Vedānta-kaustubha The view of the Buddhists, who leave the hem of their lower garment loose and untucked, has been disposed of. Now the view of the Jainas, the naked, are being disposed of They hold that the universe comprises souls and non-souls, and is without a Lord. They maintain also that atoms are the causes of the world. They imagine couples of contradictory attributes, like existence and non-existence, in all the categories. Thus, according to them, there are seven categories, summing up all scriptural teachings, viz. soul, non-soul, influx (of foreign matter into the soul), (its) stoppage, freedom from decay, bondage and release.1 Among these, the souls are sentient, and endowed with the attributes of knowledge, perception, happiness and strength. Thus, knowledge means the apprehension of the real nature of objects through the right discrimination between the soul and the non-soul. Perception means cognizing objects, being free from attachment and detachment The souls in bondage have worldly happiness, while the freed souls have the happiness which inheres in themselves. Likewise strength means proper endurance. These souls are possessed of parts, and are of the size of the body. Among them, some are souls in bondage, some are freed souls, some are ever-perfect The freed souls are omniscient and possessed of unsurpassed happiness. 1 Jīva, ajīva, āsrava, saṁvara, nirjara, bandha and mokṣa. 24

[SŪ. 2. 2. 33. 370 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 6.] The non-soul is the group of objects to be enjoyed by the souls. It is divided into merit, demerit, matter, time and space.¹ Thus, merit is a special kind of substance, inferrible from proper actions. Demerit is the cause of the existence of the non-freed Matter is a substance possessed of colour, smell, taste and touch. It is of two kinds, viz. atoms, and their aggregates. The atoms are the causes of the earth and the rest; and they are not of four kinds, as held by the logicians, but are identical in nature. The distinctions of the earth and the rest are due to the modifications of these atoms. The four-fold elements beginning with the earth, as well as the body, the worlds and so on, are their aggregates Time, on the other hand, is a special kind of substance which is the cause of the conventional distinctions of long, quick and fast and so on, and is atomic in form Space is the absence of covering. It is of two kinds, viz. worldly- space which is mundane, and non-worldly-space,² which is the abode of the freed souls. Influx means the activity of the sense-organs which causes a person to know ³ sense-objects. Or else, influx means karma which complies to,⁴ i.e. follows after, pervading the agent (i.e. pertains to him). Stoppage means that which stops ⁵ the activities of the sense- organs, i.e. the stoppage of the sense-organs, consisting in a deep meditation. Freedom from decay means that which destroys ⁶ the prior- accumulated sins, i.e. austerities known from the teaching of the Arhatas, consisting in not bathing, not speaking, squatting on the thighs with the lower legs crossed over each other,⁷ eating what is spit out from the mouth, mounting on heated stone, plucking out the hairs on the head and so on. Bondage means karma, and is of eight kinds. Among these, there are four destructive-karmas,⁸---viz. relating to the obscuration of knowledge, relating to the mental blindness of perception, relating to delusion, and relating to what hinders ⁹---which obstruct the attributes of the souls, viz. knowledge, perception, happiness and strength. ¹ Dharma, adharma, pudgala, kāla and ākāśa. ² Lokākāśa and alokākāśa. ³ Āsrāvayati iti āsrava. ⁴ Āsravati iti āsrava. ⁵ Saṁvṛṇoti iti saṁvara. ⁶ Nirjarayati iti Nirjara. ⁷ Vīrāsana. ⁸ Ghāti-karma. ⁹ Jñānāvaraṇīya, darśanāvaraṇīya, mohanīya and antarīya.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 33. ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 371 And, there are four non-destructive karmas,¹—viz. relating to the knowable, relating to the name, relating to family descent and relating to life,²—which are the causes of the body, its sense of egoity, regard and disregard for the happiness and the rest due thereto On the cessation of bondage, there is salvation, or the manifestation of the natural and real nature of the soul through the grace of the ever- perfect Arhatas. They have also a set of different categories, consisting in five ontological categories,³ viz. the category of the soul, the category of matter, the category of merit, the category of demerit and the category of space ⁴ The term ontological category (astikāya) is denotative of conventional objects occupying many places. (The compound ‘jīvāstikāya’ is to be explained as) a Karma-dhāraya thus. The soul is the category,⁵ and so on in all other cases too To all these, they apply the system of seven paralogisms,⁶ viz. May be it is, may be it is not, may be it is not predicable, may be it is and is not, may be it is and is not predicable, may be it is not and is not predicable, may be it is, it is not, and is not predicable.⁷ (The compound ‘Sapta-bhaṅgī- naya’ is to be explained thus:) The aggregate of the seven dialectical formulæ is ‘sapta-bhaṅgī,⁸ its reasoning’ (sapta-bhaṅgī-naya). The word ‘may’ (syāt) is an indeclinable represented by a verbal ending, and should be understood to have the meaning of ‘littleness’. Thus, it is to be construed as—It exists partly and does not exist partly, and so on. The sense is this: The whole mass of object, consisting of substances and modifications ⁹ is variable. The form of the substance being one, permanent and conceivable as existent, existence, oneness, permanence and the rest are justifiable in reference to it. The modifica- tions are the particular states of the substance, having the forms of pots, pieces of cloth and the rest. And they being many, ¹ Aghāti-karma. ² Vedanīya, nāmika, gotrika, āyuska. ³ Astikāya. ⁴ Jīvāstikāya, pudgalāstikāya, adharmāstikāya, ākāśāstikāya. ⁵ Jīvaś cāsau astikāyaś ca. ⁶ Sapta-bhaṅgī-naya. ⁷ Syād asti, syān nāsti, syād avyaktavya, syād asti ca nāsti ca, syād asti cāvyaktavyaś ca, syān nāsti cāvyaktavyaś ca, syād asti ca nāsti cāvyaktavyaś ca. ⁸ Here the ending ‘ī’ is in accordance with Pāṇ. 2.4.17; SD. K. 821, as modified by the Vārttika-sūtra of Kātyāyana 1556, “Akārāntottarapado dviguḥ striyāṁ iṣṭaḥ”. Vide B.M., p 548, vol. 1. ⁹ Dravya and paryyāya.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 33. 372 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH 6.] non-permanent and conceivable as non-existent, non-existence, non- permanence and the rest are justifiable in reference to them. With regard to it we reply. This cannot be said Why ? Because the seven-fold reasoning, like partly existent, partly non-existent and the rest, is not possible "in one object". The simultaneous co-existence of darkness and light is never seen or heard. In the same manner, couples of contradictory attributes like existence and non-existence and so on are indeed impossible in the same place. If it be objected: Your own view, too, admits couples of contradictory attibutes in one and the same substratum, e.g. in the text "All this, verily, is Brahman" (Chānd. 3.14.1), Unity is established, while in the texts: "The Lord of matter and soul, the Controller of the gunas" (Śvet 6.16), "Two birds" (Muṇḍ 3.1.1; Śvet. 4.6), plurality is established,—(we reply.) No, because this view is not based on reasoning,¹ since the real view can be determined, as mutually non-contradictory, through Scripture alone. Thus, it being impossible for the entire universe, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, to be non-different from Brahman by nature, it is non- different from Him only as having its existence and activity under His control (and not by nature), as indicated by the phrase 'emanating from Him' and so on.² But there is indeed a difference of nature between the categories, viz. the sentient, the non-sentient and Brahman, because the texts designating duality, too, are no less authoritative,— just as leaves, flowers and the rest are different by nature from the tree and are non-different from it on account of having no separate existence; and just as in spite of the difference of the sense-organs from the vital-breath by nature, their non-difference from it, as being under its control, is not incompatible. In the same manner, the difference and non-difference between the Universe and Brahman are natural and established in Scripture and Smṛti. What contradiction is there? In the very same manner, the complementary passage confirms the relation of difference-non-difference between the Universe and Brahman. The phrase 'emanating from Him' (tajjātān) is denotative of the reason, (meaning) because it emanates from that ¹ So that it might be controverted by reason. ² The text is: "All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from Him, dis- appearing into Him and breathing in Him" (Chānd. 3.14.1).

[SŪ. 2. 2. 34. ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 373 Supreme Cause (tajja), disappears in Him (talla) and breathes, i.e. acts in Him (tadana) The elision of the parts is in accordance with Vedic use. Moreover, a single cause of the world being established by correct evidence, the causality of a plurality of atoms does not stand to reason, because that would involve unnecessary cumbrousness and also because causality is impossible on their parts, owing to their non-sentience. Further, the one reality, knowable from the Veda, being the giver of salvation, it is difficult for salvation to result from the grace of the perfect souls,¹ that being impossible Does the grace of the perfect souls depend on meditation or not ? If the first, then, salvation cannot arise through the meditation on one perfect soul among many perfect souls of the same nature, for there will be the fault of dis- regarding many other equally perfect souls. If there be meditation on all, that would involve unnecessary complication. If it be said that there is one great (soul higher than the others), then you fall in with a theistic view. On the second alternative, the consequence would be a universal release Moreover, there being no evidence of direct perception and the rest for the existence of perfect souls, it is impossible that salvation can result from their grace. SŪTRA 34 "AND THUS (IF) THE SOUL (BE OF THE SIZE OF THE BODY) THERE IS NON-ENTIRETY.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha "Thus", there must be incompleteness on the part of the soul, assumed to be of the size of the body, when it attains a large body Vedānta-kaustubha Just as their view is open to the objection that contradictory attributes are impossible on the part of one and the same substratum, so their view that the soul is of the size of the body, too, is open to 1 Siddhas or semi-divine beings, supposed to be of great purity and holiness and characterized by the eight supernatural attributes.

374 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 35-36. ADH. 6.] serious objections. What objection? Listen! When the soul, which is of the size of the body, having left the body of an ant, attains the body of an elephant through the influence of its karmas, then there must be “non-entirety” on its part, i.e. it would not be able to fill up the whole of the elephant’s body. And when the soul comes out of the body of the elephant, and enters into a small body, it would fail to be small like it. SŪTRA 35 “NOR ALSO IS THERE NON-CONTRADICTION ON ACCOUNT OF MODIFICATION, ON ACCOUNT OF CHANGE AND THE REST.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha It cannot be said also that the soul is possessed of parts which are subject to increase and decrease and hence there is no contradiction, —for then there will result the faults of change and the rest (on the part of the soul). Vedānta-kaustubha If it be said: The soul, according to us, is possessed of parts. There is an increment of its parts in the body of an elephant, and decrement in a small body. Thus “on account of modification”, there is no contradiction”,—(we reply·) This cannot be said Why? “On account of change and the rest,” i.e. because there will then result faults like change and the rest. If the soul be possessed of parts, on your view, then it must be mutable like the body and the rest and also non-eternal,—such and other faults would arise. SŪTRA 36 “AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE PERMANENCY OF THE TWO (PRECEDING SIZES OF THE SOUL) OWING TO THE FINAL (SIZE), THERE IS NON- DISTINCTION (OF THE SIZE).” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If it be said: We admit that the “final” size of the soul is constant, and hence the initial and the intervening sizes too must be so,—(we reply:) then, there must be “non-distinction” everywhere, (and

[SŪ. 2. 2. 36. ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 375 hence) the doctrine (that the soul is of the) size of the body is set aside. Vedānta-kaustubha The size as well as the real nature (which the soul attains) during its state of salvation, after the destruction of the final body, are eternal. At that time there is no assumption of a subtle or gross body (by the soul), so there is no contraction or expansion of it. Thus, “on account of the permanency of the final” size, as well as of the real nature (of the soul), the permanency of both the initial and intervening (sizes) too is meant by the Arhatas; and hence there must be “non- distinction” everywhere,—this is the sense. In short, the soul must have a permanent and constant size in a gross body as well as in a subtle body, in its state of bondage as well as in its state of release; and the doctrine that it is of the size of the body must be but a childish prattle Hence, it is established that our conclusion is not contradicted by the view of the naked (i.e. the Jainas), based on error. Here ends the section entitled “Impossible in one” (6). COMPARISON Baladeva Interpretation different, viz. “On account of the non-distinction of the final state, (viz. salvation) (from the mundane state), both being permanent”. That is, on the Jaina view, there is no difference between the state of release and the mundane state, because the former is, according to them, a constant progress upward, or remaining in the alokākāśa. Now, motion, whether in the world or upward is always mundane; and no one can possibly feel any pleasure in the state of constant motion, or in standing still in a place without any support. Hence there is no difference between release and bondage on this view ¹ ¹ G.B. 2.2.36, pp. 145-146, Chap. 2.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 37. 376 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH 7.] Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled "Paśupati". (Sūtras 37-41) SŪTRA 37 "(THE DOCTRINE) OF THE LORD (IS UNTENABLE), ON ACCOUNT OF INCONSISTENCY." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The Pāśupata doctrine is to be rejected, because it is opposed to the Veda, which establishes a non-distinct efficient and material cause; and because it initiates a false faith. Vedānta-kaustubha Now, the Pāśupata doctrine is being disposed of. The maintainers of doctrines opposed to the Veda have been refuted above. The Māheśvaras, too, are such. They are of four kinds, viz. Kāpālas, Kālāmukhas, Pāśupatas and Śaivas. The basis of their doctrines is the treatise composed by Paśupati. The 'Pañcādhyāyī' ¹ is celebrated to be composed by the great Lord Paśupati Himself. Five categories are mentioned there, viz. cause, effect, concentrated meditation, injunction, and end of suffering.² The cause is pradhāna and the Lord. Among them, pradhāna is supposed to be the material cause, the Lord the efficient cause. The effect is mahat and the rest. Concentrated meditation is stated in the passage; "Through the meditation on the Oṃ-kāra once, one should hold (one's self)". Injunction consists in secret rituals like three ablutions and the rest The end of suffering is salvation. Among these, the Pāśupatas and the Kāpālas hold that during its state of bondage, the soul becomes (non-sentient) like a stone. And the Śaivas hold that the freed soul is consciousness. They have minor treatises of their own, designating their mutual differences. Those Māheśvaras, with their intelligence deluded by the Māyā of the Lord, maintain and practise, just as they like—as the means to the highest end—what is "opposed" to the Veda and not practised by the wise. As the Kāpālas say: "He who knows the six mudrās, he who is versed in the supreme mudrā, he attains nirvāṇa by ¹ Or having five chapters. ² Kāraṇa, Kāryya, Yoga, Vidhi, Duḥkhānta.

[sū. 2. 2. 37. ADH. 7.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 377 meditating on himself as in the posture of bhagāsana. The necklace, the gold ornament, the ear-ring, head-jewel, ashes, and the holy thread are said to be the six mudrās He whose body is marked with (mudrās) is not re-born on earth" and so on. Likewise, the Kālamukhas hold · "Using a skull (as the drinking vessel), besmearing one's self with the ashes of a dead body, eating the flesh of such a body, carrying a heavy stick, setting up a liquor-jar, worshipping the gods placed on it, and the rest, are means to obtaining all desired results in this world, as well as in the next". In the treatise of the Śaivas, too, it is said · "A bracelet made of the Rudrākṣa-beads on the arm, matted hair on the head, a skull, besmearing one's self with ashes", and so on. Moreover, it is clearly demonstrated in the Mahābhārata in the story of the Mātaṅga, distressed by the sharp words of a she-ass ¹ and so on, that it is very difficult for a man of another caste to obtain Brāhmaṇa-hood even by means of penance accumulated through thousands of years. But they hold that it is easily obtainable by a man of a different caste thus: "By merely entering in the initiatory ceremony, one becomes a Brāhmaṇa at once. By understanding the Kāpāla rite, a man becomes an ascetic". (Correct conclusion:) With regard to this, we reply. "Of the Lord" and so on The term 'no' is to be supplied "Of the ¹ The story of Mātaṅga and the she-ass is as follows: Once Mātaṅga, who was endowed with all qualities and equal to a Brāhmaṇa by all means, while travelling on a swift chariot drawn by a young ass and its mother, mercilessly pierced the young ass in the nose again and again Thereupon its mother, being much grieved, said to him that such an act certainly behoved a person who was born of a Brāhmaṇa mother and a Caṇḍāla father, but had he been the son of a Brāhmaṇa father his act would have been otherwise. Much aggrieved at this painful information, Mātaṅga determined to attain Brāhmaṇa-hood, left home immediately and engaged himself in a severe penance Therefore Indra being pleased personally appeared before him to offer him a boon. Mātaṅga asked for Brāhmaṇa-hood, which however, Indra declined to grant by reason of the fact that he was the son of a Caṇḍāla. In spite of Indra's straight denial, Mātaṅga went on performing austereties for a hundred years, standing on one leg only. Very much pleased, Indra appeared once again only to go back after saying that it was nnpossible for a Caṇḍāla to acquire Brāhmaṇa-hood, and that Mātaṅga was most unwise to undergo penance for it. This time Mātaṅga went on performing penance for a thousand years in the same way. Disappointed once more, he performed the severest penance by standing on one finger only. But in spite of this he was never able to attain his heart's desire, simply because he was a Caṇḍāla by birth Vide Mahā. 13.1870 ff., pp. 85 ff., vol. 4.

[SŪ. 2. 2 38. 378 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 7.] Lord," i.e. the view of Paśupati is not justifiable. Why? "On account of inconsistency," i.e because of the inconsistency in their view by reason of establishing two causes ¹ in direct contradiction to the scriptural texts like "He thought: 'May I be many'" (Chānd. 6 2 3), 'He became existent and that' (Tait. 2.6), 'All this has that for its soul' (Chānd 6.8.7, etc.). Moreover, since the practices like meditation preceded by the pranava, besmearing one's self with the ashes of a corpse and so on, are mutually contradictory, their view is indeed inconsistent COMPARISON Śaṃkara and Bhāskara This is sūtra 34 in Bhāskara's Commentary. They do not take this adhikarana as a refutation of the Pāśupata doctrine only, but of the Sāṃkhya-yoga as well, in fact of all the doctrines generally, which maintain the Lord to be the efficient cause only and not the material cause of the world.² Śrīkaṇṭha He takes this adhikarana to be concerned with the refutation of the doctrine of the Ekadeśī Tāntrikas only or of those Śaivas according to whom the Lord is the efficient cause only, while Māyā is the material cause, śakti the instrument ³ SŪTRA 38 "AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELATION." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha "And on account of the impossibility of relation" between Paśupati, the instigator who is without a body, and pradhāna and the rest, to be instigated, Paśupati is not the cause of the world. ¹ I.e. two causes of the world material and efficient, different from each other. ² Ś.B. 2.2.37, p. 566; Bh. B. 2.2.34 (written as 2.2.37 in conformity with Śaṃkara's number), p. 127. ³ ŚK. B 2 3.37.

[sū. 2. 2. 39. ADH. 7.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 379 Vedānta-kaustubha For this reason, too, the doctrine of Paśupati is not justifiable. Why? A relation between Paśupati, the efficient cause, the instigator and pradhāna and the rest, to be instigated, must be admitted,— and this is impossible. Thus, the Māheśvaras are to be asked the following. Do you, sirs, follow Scripture or follow what is observed ? If the first, then the stated conclusion, being opposed to Scripture, must be rejected. If the second, then it is observed that there is a relation between potters and the rest only who are possessed of bodies, and clay and so on. Hence no relation can be established between Paśupati who is without a body and pradhāna and the rest, by you, following what is observed. Hence it being not possible for a bodiless being to have any relation with pradhāna and the rest, to be their instigator and so on, he is not the cause of the world. COMPARISON Rāmānuja, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha This sūtra is not found in their commentaries. SŪTRA 39 “AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A SUBSTRATUM (I E A BODY) (ON THE PART OF THE LORD) ” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha “On account of the impossibility” of an eternal body—since it is opposed to what is observed,—as well as of a non-eternal one—since it arises later—Paśupati is not the cause of the world Vedānta-kaustubha If it be argued: Let him then have a body, and hence the above objection cannot be raised—(the author) replies:— “The substratum” of all practical transactions is the body— on account of the impossibility of that, their view is not justifiable. Thus, the body of Paśupati cannot be eternal, because that is opposed to what is observed. Otherwise the bodies of potters and the rest, too, must become eternal. Again, his body cannot be non-eternal,