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434 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2 3. 41. ADH. 11.] life, a man engages himself to tilling and the like by himself out of desire for crops, but does not wait for the Highest,— We reply: The agentship of the individual soul proceeds "from the Highest" as its cause. Why? On the ground of the following scriptural texts: 'For he alone makes one, whom he wishes to raise up from these worlds, do good deeds. He alone makes one, whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do bad deeds' (Kauṣ. 3.8), 'Entered within, the ruler of men' (Tait. Ār 3.11.1, 2), 'Who rules the soul within' (Śat. Br. 14.6.7, 30 ¹) and so on; as well as on the ground of the Smṛti passages, viz. . ' "And I am situated within the heart of all. From me proceed memory, knowledge and their absence" ' (Gītā 15.15). COMPARISON Śaṃkara and Bhāskara Literal interpretation same, although as before they are speaking of the soul's agentship being due to limiting adjuncts. The same remarks apply to their interpretation of the next sūtra. SŪTRA 41 "BUT (THE LORD MAKES THE SOUL ACT) HAVING REGARD TO THE EFFORTS MADE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE FUTILITY OF WHAT IS ENJOINED AND WHAT IS PROHIBITED AND SO ON." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The term "but" is meant for disposing of the fault of inequality. The Highest Being, who has "regard" for the works done by the individual soul, makes it do good deeds and the rest in another birth too, "on account of the futility of what is enjoined and what is pro- hibited". Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz. if the Supreme Soul be the instigator, then He must be open to the charge of inequality and rest,—the author, replies: 1 P. 1074, line 18.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 41. ADH. 11.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 435 The term “but” is meant for disposing of the above objection. The Supreme Soul, who has “regard” for, i.e. takes into account, the efforts made by the individual soul, i e for its good and bad deeds, makes it do good deeds and the rest in another birth too, and gives it pleasure and the like accordingly. Hence, He cannot be charged with partiality, etc. If it be asked: Why should the Supreme Being take into account the efforts made by the individual soul?—the author replies: “On account of the futility of what is enjoined and what is prohibited”. If the Highest Person takes into account the efforts made by the soul, then alone, injunctions and prohibitions, such as, ‘One who desires for heaven should perform the Jyotistoma sacrifice’ (Āp. Ś S. 10.2 1 ¹), “A Brāhmaṇa must not be killed” and so on, do not become futile. The meaning of the phrase, “and so on” is that faults like: suffering arising from good deeds, and happiness arising from bad deeds, and so on, result. Since the Supreme Soul takes into account the works done by souls, He cannot, by any means, be charged with inequality, etc., though He is the instigator of what is enjoined and what is pro- hibited, and is, thereby, the bestower of favour and disfavour Under the aphorism: “(There are) no inequality and cruelty (on the part of the Lord), because of (His) having regard (for the works of souls)” (Br. Sū. 2.1.33), it has been said that no inequality and the rest pertain to the Highest in His creation of the variegated world—this is the distinction.² Hence, the Highest Person, omnipotent and the Lord of all, is the instigator of good deeds and the rest in accordance with the good and bad deeds performed before, and is the giver of fruits accord- ingly to them. Thus, it is established that the individual soul is an agent as controlled by the Highest. Here ends the section entitled “The Highest” (11). ¹ P. 209, vol. 2. ² I.e. there is no repetition here, since under Br. Sū. 2.1.33 it has been shown that the Lord is not partial as a creator, whereas it is being shown here that He is not partial as an instigator to action.

436 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 42 ADH. 12.] Adhikarana 12: The section entitled "A part". (Sūtras 42–52) SŪTRA 42 "(THE INDIVIDUAL IS) A PART (OF BRAHMAN), ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF VARIETY, AND OTHERWISE, ALSO SOME READ (THAT BRAHMAN IS OF) THE NATURE OF FISHERMEN, GAMBLERS AND THE REST." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The individual soul is a part of the Supreme Soul, in accordance with the designation of difference in texts like: 'The two unborn ones, the knower and the non-knower, the lord and the non-lord' (Śvet. 1 9) and so on ¹, and on account of the designation of non- difference in texts like 'Thou art that' (Chānd 6.8.6, etc.). And "also" the Ātharvaṇikas "read" that Brahman is of "the nature of fishermen, gamblers and the rest", thus: "Brahman are the fishermen, Brahman are the slaves, Brahman are these gamblers".² Vedānta-kaustubha It has been pointed out that the agentship of the individual soul is under the control of Brahman. Now, the author is pointing out the relation between the two, consistently with the scriptural texts designating both difference and non-difference. On the doubt, viz. whether the individual soul is different from Brahman or non-different from Him, or a part of Brahman and as such both different and non-different from Him,—if it be suggested: The individual soul must be different from Brahman, as a man is from the king, because the texts designating non-difference are figura- tive and because a non-difference between the non-knowing and the all-knowing is impossible. Or, it must be non-different only (from Brahman), because the scriptural texts designating difference are figurative. There being a mutual opposition between difference and non-difference, of either the texts about difference or the texts about non-difference must certainly be metaphorical,— ¹ R. ² Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 42. ADH. 12.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 437 We reply: The individual soul is neither absolutely different from the Highest Person, nor absolutely non-different from Him, but is a part of the Highest Self, in accordance with the scriptural text: “For he is a part of the Highest”. A ‘part’ means a ‘power’, in accordance with the scriptural text: “This individual soul, a power of the Highest, is small in power and not independent”. A ‘part’ should not be understood here as a portion, actually severed like a portion of wealth and the rest; for if the individual soul be a portion cut off from Brahman, then texts like ‘Without part’ (Śvet. 6.19) and the like, will be contradicted; and because if it be like a portion of wealth, there will result an absolute difference (between Brahman and the soul) and hence the texts like: ‘Thou art that’ (Chānd. 6.8.6, etc.) will be set aside. (The true view is:) The individual soul is, by nature, different from the Supreme Person, predicated to be the whole, and the ocean of a mass of attributes like omniscience and the rest,—since it is predicated to be a part, and is subject to bondage and release. But it is yet non-different from Him, as its existence and activity are under the control of the whole. Why ? “On account of the designation of variety”, i. e. on account of the designation of difference; “and otherwise”, i. e. and on account of the designation of non-difference. The sense is that the two kinds of texts being of equal force, there is a natural difference—non-difference between the individual soul and the Supreme Soul. The following are designations of difference: ‘Who rules the soul within’ (Śat. Br. 14 6.7, 30 ¹), ‘Entered within, the ruler of men’ (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1, 2 ²), ‘The soul, verily, is supreme, self-dependent, possessed of superior qualities’, ‘The individual soul is possessed of little power, not self-dependent, lowly’, ‘The two unborn ones, the knower and the non-knower, the lord and the non-lord’ (Śvet. 1.9) and so on. The following are designations of non-difference: ‘Thou art that’ (Chānd. 6.8.6, etc.), ‘This soul is Brahman’ (Bṛh. 2.5.19; 4.4.5), ‘I am Brahman’ (Bṛh. 1.4.10) and so on. And “also” the followers of one branch, viz. the Ātharvaṇikas, “read” that Brahman is of the “nature of fishermen, gamblers and the like” thus: “Brahman are these fishermen, Brahman are the slaves, Brahman are these gamblers”. ¹ P. 1074, line 18. ² P. 181.

438 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 43-44. ADH. 12.] COMPARISON Śaṃkara Literal interpretation same, although as usual Śaṃkara holds that the soul is not a real part of Brahman, but a part as it were.¹ The same remarks apply to the following two sūtras. SŪTRA 43 “ON ACCOUNT OF THE WORDING OF A SACRED TEXT.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha “On account of the wording of the sacred text,” viz. ‘A foot of him are all beings’ (Ṛg. V. 10 90.3 ²; Chānd. 3.12.6), the individual soul is a part of Brahman. Vedānta-kaustubha The individual soul is nothing but a part of the Supreme Soul. Why? Also “on account of the wording of the sacred text”: ‘A foot of him are all beings, three feet of him are immortal in the heaven’ (Ṛg. V 10.90.3, Chānd. 3.12.6) A ‘feet’ means a ‘part’. SŪTRA 44 “AND, MOREOVER, (IT IS) DECLARED BY SMṚTI.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha It is declared by Smṛti also that the individual soul is a part of Brahman thus: ‘“A part of my own self, in the world of men, has become the individual soul, the eternal’”’ (Gītā 15.7 ³).

¹ Ś.B. 2.3.43, p. 636. ² P. 349, line 19. Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B. ³ Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

[sū. 2. 3. 45. ADH. 12 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 439 Vedānta-kaustubha It has been declared in a Smṛti passage by the Highest Person Himself that the individual soul is a part of Brahman, thus: “ ‘A part of my own self, in the world of men, has become the individual soul, the eternal’ ’ (Gītā 15.7). COMPARISON Rāmānuja He omits the “ca”.¹ ――――― SŪTRA 45 “BUT LIKE LIGHT AND THE REST, NOT SO THE HIGHEST.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Though the individual soul is a part of the Supreme Person, yet the whole (i.e. the Lord) does not experience pleasure and pain, just as “light and the rest” are devoid of the virtue or vice inhering in their parts. Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz. then the virtue or vice pertaining to the individual soul may belong to the Supreme Soul too, seeing that a part has no separate existence from the whole,—the author replies here. “The Highest,” i.e. the Supreme Soul, does “not” become “so”, i.e. does not come to share the virtue and vice pertaining to the individual soul. The author states a parallel instance: “Like light and the rest”, i.e. just as “light”, i e. the sun and the rest, are not touched by the attributes of their rays which are their parts, i.e by their contact and the rest with pure and impure objects. By the phrase: “and the rest”, the ether and the like are understood; i.e. just as the ether and the like are not touched by the good qualities found in the sound of conch-shell, cuckoos and so on, nor by the bad qualities found in the sound of crows and the like. The term “but” is suggestive of the absence of an intermixture of the attributes of the part and the whole. The objections, resulting from the apprehension ―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― ¹ Śrī. B. 2.3.44, p. 161, Part 2.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 45. 440 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 12.] that the Highest Being is subject to karmas by reason of His connec- tion with the hearts of individual souls which are subject to karmas, have been disposed of, on the ground that the Lord is not subject to karmas, under the aphorism: "Enjoyment results" (Br. Sū. 1.2.8). Under the aphorism: "Not even on account of place" (Br. Sū 3 2.1), we shall dispose of (the objection based on Brahman's being connected with 'places', viz. the hearts) on the ground that the Lord, having the 'places' by nature, is yet not subject to karmas. Here, on the other hand, it should be known that the objections raised on the ground of His own parts are disposed of.¹ COMPARISON Śaṃkara This is sūtra 46 in his commentary. The general import of the sūtra, as well as the interpretation of the phrase: i e. "prakāśādivat" different. He develops his doctrine of upādhi here. Thus, the sūtra means, according to him: Just as the light of the sun and the moon, pervading the entire expanse of the other, appears to be straight or bent accordingly as the limiting adjunct with which it is in contact, viz. finger, etc. are straight or bent, but does not become so really; or just as the ether, though imagined to move when jars are moving, does not really move; or just as the sun does not really tremble when its images on water tremble, so although the individual soul undergoes pleasure and pain, Brahman does not, since the soul is but a fictitious part of Brahman, due to limiting adjuncts, and not a real part.² Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha They too develop here their peculiar theory of Viśiṣṭādvaita. Thus, the sūtra means, according to them: "(The individual soul is a part of Brahman) as light and the rest (of the sun, etc. is of the sun and so on), not so the highest (i.e. Brahman is not of the same nature ¹ I.e. there is no repetition here. Under Br. Sū. 1.2.8, it has been shown that Brahman, though connected with the hearts of individual souls is not subject to their pleasures and pain. In this sūtra it is shown that Brahman, though connected with the individual souls as their whole, is not yet subject to their pleasure and pain. And under Br. Sū. 3.2.1, it will be shown that Brahman, though the inner controller, is not subject to the states and faults of souls. ² Ś.B. 2.3.46, pp. 638-639.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 46. ADH. 12.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 441 as the soul)”. That is, the soul is a part of Brahman in the sense of being an attribute (viśeṣaṇa) of Brahman; and just as the attribute and its substratum are not identical, so the soul and Brahman are not ¹ They continue the same topic in the following two sūtras. Baladeva This is sūtra 44 in his commentary. Interpretation absolutely different He begins a new adhikarana here (five sūtras) concerned with the question of the Lord’s incarnations. Thus, this sūtra means, according to him: “But supreme (incarnations of the Lord are) not so; (i.e parts of the Lord as the individual souls are), as in the case of light”. That is, just as though the sun and the fire-fly are both called ‘light’, yet the word has a different meaning when applied to the sun, so though the incarnations and ordinary individual souls are both called ‘parts’ of the Lord, yet the word has a different meaning when applied to the incarnations, i.e. it means then the entire Lord.² SŪTRA 46 “AND SMṚTIS DECLARE” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha “And Smṛtis declare”: ‘Of these, He who is the Supreme Soul is declared to be eternal and free from the properties of matter, and He is not touched by the fruits too, just as a lotus-leaf is not touched by water.³ The active self, on the other hand, is something different, who is subject to bondage and release’ (Mahā. 12.13754-13755 ⁴). Vedānta-kaustubha The sages also declare that the part alone is subject to the fruits of action done by itself, but not the whole, thus: ‘Of these, He who is the Supreme Soul is declared to be eternal and free from the properties of matter, and He is not touched by the fruits too, just as a lotus- leaf is not touched by water.—The active self, on the other hand, 1 Śrī. B. 2.3.45, pp. 161-62, Part 2; Śk B. 2.3.45, pp. 161-62, Parts 7 and 8. 2 G.B. 2.3.44, pp. 223-24, Chap. 2. 3 One line omitted. 4 P. 852, lines 9-10, vol. 3.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 47. 442 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 12] is something different, who is subject to bondage and release. He is subject to seventeen rāśis (Mahā. 12.13754–56a). It has been declared by Scripture, too, thus ‘Of the two, one eats the sweet berry, the other, without eating looks on’ (Śvet. 4.6, Muṇḍ. 3.1.1). COMPARISON Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha They quote from Smṛti to show that the soul is the attribute of the Lord.¹ Baladeva He quotes from Smṛti to show that the incarnations are not parts of the Lord in the same sense the individual souls are.² SŪTRA 47 “INJUNCTION AND PROHIBITION (FIT IN) ON ACCOUNT OF (THE SOULS’) CONNECTION WITH BODIES, AS IN THE CASE OF FIRE AND SO ON.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha “Injunction and prohibition” like ‘One who is desirous of heaven should perform sacrifices’ (Tait Sam. 2 5 5³), ‘A Śūdra is not to be initiated to a sacrifice’ (Tait Sam. 7.1.1⁴) and so on do indeed fit in, on account of the connection of the individual souls with different bodies, in spite of their being an equality among them as parts of Brahman; just as fire is brought from the house of a Śrotriya,⁵ but not from the crematory; or just as water and the like, touched by clean persons, pots and so on are accepted and not others. Vedānta-kaustubha If the individual souls be all equal as parts and the rest of Brahman, then to whom can the injunctions and prohibitions refer? Listen! In spite of their sameness, injunctions and prohibitions like: ‘One ¹ Śrī. B. 2.3.46, p. 162, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.46, p. 160, Parts 7 and 8. ² G.B. 2.3.45. ³ P. 208, line 27, vol. 2. Not quoted by others. ⁴ P. 241, line 21, vol. 2. Not quoted by others ⁵ A Brāhmaṇa versed in the Veda.

[sŪ. 2. 3. 48. ADH. 12.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 443 desirous of heaven should perform sacrifices’ (Tait. Sam 2 5.5), ‘Hence a Śūdra is not to be initiated to a sacrifice’ (Tait Sam. 7.1.1) fit in on account of their connection with different bodies, “as in the case of fire and so on”, i.e just as in spite of being the same, fire is brought from the house of a Śrotriya, but one from crematory and the like is rejected; and just as the urine and excrement of cows and the like are enjoined as holy, but those very things of different animals are rejected. COMPARISON Śaṃkara and Bhāskara He develops in this connection his doctrine of Adhyāsa.¹ Bhāskara too speaks of his peculiar doctrine of Upādhi. Baladeva This is sūtra 46 in his commentary. He continues the same theme,—viz. the distinction between incarnations and ordinary individuals. He interprets the sūtra thus: (In the case of individual souls there are) injunctions and prohibitions, on account of (their) connection with bodies, as in the case of light (i e. the eye).² That is, the individual soul, though a part of the Lord, is yet connected with nescience and a body, and is as such under the control of the Lord for its activity and inactivity and so on. But an incarnation, though a part of the Lord, is not under His control; just as the eye or the power of vision, though a part of the sun, depends upon the per- mission, i.e. the presence, of the sun for its activity or otherwise, but a ray of the sun, as a part of the sun, is identical with it, and does not depend upon any permission and the like of the sun. SŪTRA 48 “AND ON ACCOUNT OF NON-EXTENSION THERE IS NO EXTENSION.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha In spite of the fact that the individual souls are parts of the all-pervasive Being, and in spite of the fact that they themselves are 1 Ś.B. 2.3.48, pp. 640 ff , Bh. B. 2.3.48. p. 142. 2 G B. 2.3.46. pp. 226-27, Chap 2.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 49 444 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 12.] all-pervasive by reason of their (all-pervasive) attribute (of knowledge),¹ the individual souls, being atomic by nature, are not all-pervasive; and as such there is no confusion among karmas Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz. On your view, too, on account of being parts of the all-pervasive Being, as well as on account of possessing an all-pervasive attribute, all the souls come to experience the pleasures and the like in all the bodies; and as such a confusion among karmas, as well as a confusion among the enjoyments of their fruits will result. Hence, as the view that the soul is a part of the all- pervading Brahman, is atomic by itself and is all-pervasive by reason of its attribute, involves unnecessary complications, so Kapila's doctrine of the soul, viz. that the soul is all-pervasive by itself, is more acceptable,—the author replies here. "On account of the non-extension," i.e non-all-pervasiveness of the souls,—mutually distinct by reason of being atomic, and distinct also from the Whole (i.e. the Lord) by being predicated as parts,— "there is no confusion". The term "and" indicates the contraction of the soul's knowledge during its state of bondage. COMPARISON Baladeva This is sūtra 47 in his commentary. The same topic continued: "And on account of the non-extension (i.e. incompleteness of the individual soul, there is) no (possibility of) a confusion (between it and an incarnation)". That is, the soul is atomic and not full and perfect like an incarnation, hence different from him ² SŪTRA 49 "AND (THE DOCTRINES OF THE ALL-PERVASIVENESS OF THE SOUL) ARE FALLACIES MERELY." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha And the doctrines of an all-pervasive soul and the rest of the opponents like Kapila and others are "fallacious merely", since, 1 Vide V.P.S. 2.3.28 2 G.B. 2.3 47, p. 227, Chap. 2.

[sū. 2. 3. 49. ADH 12.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 445 on those views, there results a confusion (among karmas and so on of the souls). Vedānta-kaustubha But the doctrines of an all-pervasive soul and the rest of Kapila, Kaṇāda and so on are "fallacious merely", as they have no (scriptural) basis, and as, on these views, there a confusion among all practical transactions will result. By the term "and" it is indicated that such teachers simply delude people. COMPARISON Śaṃkara This is sūtra 50 in his commentary. He reads "ābhāsaḥ" in place of "ābhāsāḥ". Interpretation absolutely different, viz. "(The indivi- dual soul is) only a reflection (of Brahman)". Thus, here he develops his doctrine of Pratibimba.¹ Rāmānuja He reads "ābhāsaḥ", and interprets the sūtra thus: "(The view that Brahman is obscured by limiting adjunct or nescience) is simply a fallacy". He accepts the alternative reading "ābhāsāḥ" too and points out that in that case the sūtra will mean: "(The various reasons advanced by the supporters of the above doctrine) are simply fallacies".² Bhāskara This is sūtra 50 in his commentary He substitutes "vā" in place of "ca". He, also, like Rāmānuja, directs this sūtra against the Śaṃkarite view, thus: "(Nesciences are) simply fallacies".³ Śrīkaṇṭha He too directs this sūtra against the Śaṃkarite view, interpreting it like Rāmānuja's second interpretation.⁴ Baladeva This is sūtra 48 in his commentary He reads "ābhāsaḥ". The same topic continued, viz. "(The reason adduced by the prima facie ¹ Ś.B. 2.3.50, pp. 642. ² Śrī. B. 2.3.49, p. 163, Part 2. ³ Bh. B. 2.3.50, p. 142. ⁴ Śk. B. 2.3.49, p. 101, Parts 7 and 8.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 50. 446 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 12 ] objector to prove the similarity of the soul with the incarnation) is a mere fallacy". That is, the argument: The soul is a part of the Lord. The incarnation is a part of the Lord ∴ the soul is equal to the incarnation, evidently involves the logical fallacy of undistributed middle.¹ SŪTRA 50 "BECAUSE OF THE NON-RESTRICTION WITH REGARD TO THE UNSEEN PRINCIPLE." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha On the doctrine of an all-pervasive soul, confusion is unavoidable even if recourse be taken to the unseen principle, "because of the non-restriction with regard to the unseen principle". Vedānta-kaustubha To the argument, viz. there is no confusion among all practical transactions on our view too, since the unseen principle is the regulator, —the author replies: Confusion results indeed on the view of the opponents, "because of the non-restriction with regard to the unseen principle", viz. to whom may the unforeseen principle, generated in the vicinity of all the all-pervasive souls, belong and to whom not. COMPARISON Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha Interpretation same, only they direct this and the remaining sūtras to the refutation of the Śaṁkarite view, and not to the view of Kapila and others. Baladeva This is sūtra 50 in his commentary He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (three sūtras), concerned with proving the mutual difference among the individual souls. Thus, this sūtra means, according to ¹ G.B. 2.3.48, p. 228, Chap. 2.

[sū. 2. 3 51. ADH 12.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 447 him "(The individual souls, though similar in their essential nature, are yet different from one another) on account of the non-determinate- ness (i e. non-similarity) of (their) destinies".¹ SŪTRA 51 “AND IT IS SO EVEN WITH REGARD TO DETERMINATION AND THE LIKE ” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha There is no restriction "even with regard to determinations and the like", such as: 'I shall do this and not that'. Vedānta-kaustubha To the argument, viz. A restriction is possible, viz. the unseen principle belongs to one who has the determination: 'I shall do this and not that',—the author replies here: “Determination” means resolution. By the phrase “and the like” reverence and so on are understood. There is, indeed, no restriction with regard to the unseen principle even in the case of resolution, reverence and the rest COMPARISON Baladeva This is sūtra 51 in his commentary. He continues the same theme, viz. “And thus (the individual souls are different) with regard to (their) desire and the rest also”. That is, adṛṣṭa or the unseen principle is the ultimate cause which determines the difference between the souls, and not their desires, inclinations and the like, which are only the secondary causes.² 1 G.B. 2.3.49, p. 229, Chap. 2. 2 G.B. 2.3.50, p. 230, Chap. 2.

448 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 52. ADH. 12.] SŪTRA 52 "IF IT BE OBJECTED: ON ACCOUNT OF PLACE, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF INCLUSION." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If it be argued that "on account of the place" of the self, situated within its own body, everything is consistent,—(we reply:) "no". "On account of the inclusion" therein of the places of all the souls. Here ends the third quarter in the second chapter of the Vedānta- pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṁsā texts, and composed by the reverend Nimbārka. Vedānta-kaustubha If it be objected: A definite restriction is possible with regard to determinations and the rest, "on account of place", i.e. it is in the region of the soul, situated within its own body alone, that the conjunction of the mind (with the soul) takes place,—on account of such a place of the soul,—(we reply:) "no", "on account of the inclusion" therein of the places of other souls too. The sense is this: Since all the souls are connected with one and the same mind, the determinations and the rest, due to the conjunction of the mind (with the soul), must be common to all; and hence the unseen principle, due to them, must indeed be common to all. This being so, the confusion among all practical transactions remains as before. Hence, it is established that the individual soul is a part of Brahman, Lord Vāsudeva, is atomic in size, knowledge by nature, possessed of the attributes of 'being an agent', 'being a knower' and so on and different in every body. Here ends the section entitled "A part" (12). Here ends the third quarter of the second chapter in the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṁsā and composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the lotus- feet of the holy Nimbārka.

[sū. 2. 3 52. ADH. 12.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 449 COMPARISON Baladeva This is sūtra 51 in his commentary. The same topic continued : "If it be objected (that the difference among the individual souls is) due to the difference of (their) environments, (we reply :) no, because (the difference of environments, such as heaven, hell, and different lots in the world) are included under (i.e. due to) adṛṣṭa". That is, finally, adṛṣṭa or the unseen principle is the cause of the difference among the souls.¹ Résumé The third quarter of the second chapter contains—

1. 52 sūtras and 12 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka ;
2. 53 sūtras and 17 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṃkara ;
3. 52 sūtras and 7 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja ;
4. 53 sūtras and 17 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara ;
5. 52 sūtras and 12 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha,
6. 51 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva. Śaṃkara and Bhāskara break each of the sūtras 3 and 26 in Nimbārka's commentary into two different ones, and omit sūtra 11. Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha break sūtra 5 in Nimbārka's com- mentary into two different sūtras, and take sūtras 33 and 34 in it as one sūtra, reversing the order. Baladeva omits sūtra 11 in Nimbārka's commentary.

¹ G.B. 2.3.51, p. 230, Chap. 2. 29

SECOND CHAPTER (Adhyāya) FOURTH QUARTER (Pāda) Adhikarana 1: The section entitled “The origin of the sense-organs”. (Sūtras 1–4) SŪTRA 1 “LIKEWISE THE SENSE-ORGANS.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The origin of the organs is being considered. The sense-organs originate like the ether and the rest. Vedānta-kaustubha In the preceding quarter, the absence of any contradiction among the scriptural texts regarding the ether and the rest has been shown. Now, the author is showing the non-contradictory nature of the scriptural texts regarding the organs of the individual soul. On the doubt, viz. whether the sense-organs originate or not, the prima facie view is as follows: In the discussions about origin, e.g. in the scriptural text: ‘From this soul the ether has originated’ (Tait. 2.1), there is no mention of the origin of the sense-organs; and in the scriptural text: ‘“The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning”. Then they said: “What was that non-existent”? “The sages, verily, were the non-existent in the beginning.” Then they said: “Who were those sages”. “The sense-organs, verily, were the sages”’ (Śat. Br. 6.1.1, 1¹), the sense-organs are declared to exist prior to creation; hence they do not originate. With regard to it, we reply: Just as the elements like the ether and the rest, mentioned in the passage: ‘From him arise the vital- breath, the mind and all the sense-organs, the ether, the air, fire’ (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), originate, “so the sense-organs”, too, originate.

¹ P. 499, lines 1-2.

[SŪ 2. 4. 2. ADH 1.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 451 COMPARISON Śrīkaṇṭha Interpretation different, viz. he takes it to be setting down the prima facie view thus: ‘(Just as the individual soul is eternal) so are the sense-organs ¹ (as declared by Scripture ²)’. SŪTRA 2 "ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A SECONDARY (ORIGIN)" Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha It cannot be said also that in the section concerned with creation, e.g. in the passage: "From the self the ether has originated" (Tait 2 1), there being no mention of the origin of the organs, the text regarding the origin of the organs is secondary,—"on account of the impossibility of a secondary" (origin). That is, the sense-organs must have origin, as the majority of scriptural texts designate such an origin, and as, otherwise, the initial proposition that there is the knowledge of all through the knowledge of one will come to be con- tradicted Vedānta-kaustubha Having rejected the doubt,—viz. by reason of its opposition to the scriptural text: ‘“The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning”’ (Tait. 2.7), the scriptural text about the origin of the sense-organs is secondary,—the author states the reason for the view that the sense-organs, too, originate. The compound "gauṇyāsambhava" is to be explained as ‘impos- sibility of a secondary (origin)’, i.e. the scriptural text about the origin of the sense-organs cannot be secondary. Hence the sense- organs do originate. If it be asked: Why impossible?—(we reply:) Because the scriptural text about origin can be understood literally, because there are numerous scriptural texts regarding such an origin, and because otherwise the initial proposition will come to be con- tradicted, i.e. because there are numerous scriptural texts designat- ing origination, such as: ‘From him arise the vital-breath, the ¹ Śk. B. 2.4.1, p. 168 ² I.e. Śat. Br. 6.1.1, 1—quoted by Śrīnivāsa.

452 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 4. 2. ADH. 1.] mind and all the sense-organs' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), 'Just as small sparks come forth from fire, so exactly do all the sense-organs from this soul' (Bṛh. 2.1.20), 'Seven sense-organs arise' (Muṇḍ 2.1.7). Having made the initial assertion, viz that there is the knowledge of one through the knowledge of all thus: '"What being known, sir, all this comes to be known?"' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), the text goes on to declare, in order to prove it, that 'From him arise the vital-breath, the mind and all the sense-organs' (Mund 2 1 3) and so on. This initial proposition is proved only if all the effects, like the sense-organs and the rest, are admitted to have Him as their material cause. The scriptural text: 'The non-existent alone was this in the beginning' (Śat. Br. 6.1.1, 1), on the other hand, is to be explained as referring to the cause. Hence there is no contradiction. COMPARISON Rāmānuja He takes this and the next sūtra as one sūtra Interpretation different, viz. "(The plural number in the text ¹) is secondary, be- cause of impossibility", i.e. because prior to creation Brahman alone exists.² Śrīkaṇṭha He regards this sūtra as answering the prima facie objection. He too like Rāmānuja takes this and the next sūtra as forming a single sūtra, and interprets it just like Rāmānuja Baladeva Interpretation just like Rāmānuja's. ¹ Viz. Śat. Br. 6.1.1, 1. See Śrīnivāsa above. It has been stated under the previous sūtra that the words 'sense-organs' and 'sages' in that passage denote Brahman. But how then to account for the plural number?—to this question the present sūtra replies. ² Śrī. B. 2.4.2, p. 170, Part 2.

[SŪ. 2. 4. 3-4. ADH. 1.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 453 SŪTRA 3 "AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIRECT MENTION (IN) THAT OF WHAT IS PRIOR." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha "On account of the direct mention," in that text, of the verb,— used in its primary sense in connection with the ether and the rest,— in reference to the sense-organs as well, the origin of the sense-organs is primary. Vedānta-kaustubha For this reason, too, the origin of the sense-organs is primary,— so says the author. "On account of the direct mention," in "that", i.e in the text: 'From him arise the vital-breath, the mind and all the sense-organs, the ether, the air' (Muṇḍ. 2 1 3), of the word 'arises',—used in its primary sense with reference to the ether and so on,—with reference to the sense-organs, mentioned even prior to the ether and the rest,— the scriptural text designating the origin of the sense-organs is, indeed, primary. It is not possible that one and the same word 'arises' is used in a secondary sense with reference to the sense-organs, and in a primary sense with reference to the ether and the rest. For this reason too, it is used in a primary sense alone in both the cases. COMPARISON Baladeva Interpretation exactly like Rāmānuja's second half of the preced- ing sūtra.¹ SŪTRA 4 "ON ACCOUNT OF SPEECH BEING PRECEDED BY THAT." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The sense-organs originate like the ether and the rest because of the mention of speech, the vital-breath and the mind as preceded by light, water and food in the passage: " 'The mind, my dear, is ¹ G.B. 2.4.3, p. 234. Chap. 2.