वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

414 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 20-21. ADH. 9.] COMPARISON Śaṃkara He takes sūtras 19–27 as laying down the prima facie view. Literal interpretation same. SŪTRA 20 “AND (THERE IS POSSIBILITY) OF THE SUBSEQUENT TWO (VIZ. GOING AND RETURNING) THROUGH ONE’S SELF.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Sometimes departing may be possible on the part of even one who is not moving, as in the case of the cessation of the rulership of a village ¹ But, since there is possibility “of the subsequent two through one’s self” alone, the individual soul is atomic. Vedānta-kaustubha As in the case of the cessation of the rulership of a village, departing, which consists in the cessation of the rulership of the body, may sometimes be possible on the part of the soul even when it is not moving. But, since there can be the accomplishment “of the subsequent two”, viz. going and returning”, “through one’s self” alone, it is established that the individual soul is atomic. SŪTRA 21 “IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (THE SOUL IS) NOT ATOMIC, BECAUSE OF THE SCRIPTURAL MENTION OF WHAT IS NOT THAT, (WE REPLY :) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE TOPIC BEING SOMETHING ELSE.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If it be objected : In accordance with the text, referring to the individual soul and designating “what is not that”, viz. : ‘He, verily, is the great’ (Bṛh. 4.4.22 ²), the individual soul is “not atomic”,— ¹ I.e. when somebody ceases to be the ruler of a village, he may be said to ‘go out’. ² Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

[sū. 2. 3. 22. adh. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 415 (we reply:) “no”, because in the middle, the topic is the Supreme Soul. Vedānta-kaustubha If it be objected: The individual soul is “not atomic”. Why? “Because of the scriptural mention of what is not that,”—“that” means atomicity, “what is not that” means non-atomicity, on account of the scriptural mention of that,¹—i.e. because in connection with the discourse on the individual soul, viz. ‘He who is made of knowledge among the vital-breaths, who is the light within the soul’ (Bṛh. 4.3.7), there is the mention of greatness in the scriptural text: ‘He, verily, is the great, unborn soul’ (Bṛh. 4.4 25),— (We reply:) “No”. Why? “On account of the topic being something else,” i.e. because the topic is here something other than the individual soul referred to in the beginning, i e the Supreme Soul, who is the topic to be established in the middle of the section, in the text: ‘By whom the soul has been found and realized’ (Bṛh. 4 4.13) SŪTRA 22 “AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE WORD ITSELF AND OF MEASURE.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha “On account of the word itself (viz. ‘atomic’) and of measure,” mentioned (respectively) in the texts: ‘This atomic soul’ (Muṇḍ. 3 1.9²), ‘An individual soul is a part of the hundredth part of the tip of a hair, divided a hundredfold’ (Śvet. 5.9³), the individual soul is atomic. Vedānta-kaustubha The phrase: “the word itself” means the word which is denotative of its own atomicity. The word “measure” means the measure which is separated from⁴ all gross measures, i.e. an intensely minute measure. On account of these two, the individual soul is atomic. The word itself is mentioned in the text: ‘This atomic soul in which the five-fold vital-breath has entered is to be known by means of thought’ (Muṇḍ. ¹ This explains the compound “atacchruteḥ”. ² Ś, R, B, Śk, B. ³ Ś, R, Bh, B. ⁴ Uddhṛtya mānam = Unmānam.

416 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 23-24. ADH. 9.] 3.1.9). The measure is mentioned in the text: ‘An individual soul is a part of the hundredth part of the tip of a hair, divided a hundred- fold’ (Śvet. 5.9) ‘For the lower one is seen to be like the point of the spoke of a wheel only’ (Śvet. 5.8). SŪTRA 23 “NON-CONTRADICTION, AS IN THE CASE OF THE SANDAL-PASTE.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Just as a drop of sandal-paste, though occupying one spot of the body, refreshes the entire body, so exactly does the soul illuminate. Hence, the experience of pleasure and the like over the whole body is not inconsistent. Vedānta-kaustubha If it be objected: If the soul be atomic in size, then how can pleasure and the like be experienced over the whole body?—we reply: There is no such contradiction. Just as one drop of yellow sandal- paste, occupying one spot of the body, produces, through its own quality, a pleasurable sensation extending over the entire body, so the soul too, occupying one spot of the body, experiences, through its own quality, the pleasure and the like extending over the entire body, in accordance with the Smṛti passage: ‘This soul, though only atomic, abides pervading its own body, as does a drop of yellow sandal-paste, pervading the body’. For this very reason it has been said by the Lord too: ‘“Just as one sun illuminates this entire world, so the field-owner (i.e. the soul) illuminates the entire field (i.e. the body), O Bhārata!”’ (Gītā 13.33). SŪTRA 24 “IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (THE TWO CASES ARE NOT PARALLEL) ON ACCOUNT OF THE SPECIALITY OF ABODE, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE ADMISSION (OF AN ABODE, VIZ.) IN THE HEART CERTAINLY.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If it be objected: The example of the sandal-paste is not appropriate, “on account of the speciality of abode”,—it is directly

[sū. 2. 3 25. ADH. 9 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 417 observed that the drop of sandal-paste occupies one spot of the body; but it is not known that the individual soul occupies one part of the body, since consciousness is experienced everywhere,—on account of such a difference of abode between the two,— (We reply :) “No”. Why ? “On account of the admission,” viz. that the soul, atomic in size, abides in one part of the body, i.e. “in the heart”, by the scriptural text: ‘He who is made of knowledge among the vital-breaths, who is the light within the heart’ (Bṛh. 4.4.22). The meaning of the term “certainly” is that it is the attribute of knowledge (and not the atomic soul itself) which abides in the whole body. SŪTRA 25 “OR THROUGH ATTRIBUTE, LIKE LIGHT.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The illumination of the body takes place only through the attribute of the soul, like the light of a lamp and the like in a room. Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz. the doctrine that there is a relation of attribute and substratum (between knowledge and the soul) is not proper, since our purpose is served by the very nature only (of the soul),—(the author) replies : The term “or” is for disposing of the objection. The sense is that the experience of the pleasure and the like, pertaining to the entire body, by the atomic soul, occupying one part of the body, is possible through its attribute of knowledge which is all-pervading “As in ordinary life.” In ordinary life, a gem, the sun, a light and so on, though occupying one place, illuminate many places, as the case may be, through their attribute alone. Or else, (the combination) may be disjoined as: “as in the case of light”, i.e. like the light of gems and the rest. The doctrine of an attributeless soul, as admitted by the Sāṁkhyas, has been disposed of above.¹ COMPARISON Śaṁkara reads “lokavat”, all others “ālokavat”. ¹ Vide V.K. 1.3.18. 27

418 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 26-27. ADH. 9.] SŪTRA 26 "THE EXTENDING BEYOND (OF KNOWLEDGE) IS AS IN THE CASE OF SMELL, FOR THIS (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha But the "extending beyond" of the attribute of knowledge fits in "as in the case of smell". The scriptural text: 'He has entered here up to the body-hairs and finger nails' (Kauṣ. 4.20 1) "shows" the individual soul to be the substratum of such an attribute. Vedānta-kaustubha "The extending" of the attribute of knowledge beyond the soul, its substratum which is situated within the heart, i.e. its occupying a larger space, is "as in the case of smell", i.e. is just like smell occupying a larger space than the flower which occupies a smaller space. The scriptural text: 'He has entered here up to the body- hairs and finger-nails' (Kauṣ. 4.2.0) "shows" the soul's pervasion over the entire body by means of its attribute of knowledge, extending over a larger space. COMPARISON Śaṁkara and Bhāskara They break this sūtra into two different ones, viz. "Vyatireko gandhavat" and "Tathā ca darśayati".² Rāmānuja He too reads "ca" in place of "hi", but does not break it into two sūtras. —————— SŪTRA 27 "ON ACCOUNT OF THE SEPARATE TEACHING." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Although there is no distinction between the soul and its knowledge in respect of being knowledge, yet a relation of substratum and 1 Not quoted by others. For correct quotation vide Kauṣ., p. 141. 2 Ś.B., pp. 615-16, Bh. B., p. 136.

[sū. 2. 3. 28. ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 419 attribute (between them) is indeed proper. Why? "On account of the separate teaching," viz : "Having mounted the body by means of intelligence" (Kauṣ. 3.6 ¹). Vedānta-kaustubha Apprehending the objection, viz. Let knowledge be the essence of the soul. Hence here the distinction,—viz. the substratum is atomic, the attribute all-pervading,—is not proper,—(the author) replies here. "On account of the separate teaching" of the attribute from the substratum, the soul, in the passages: 'Having mounted the body by means of intelligence' (Kauṣ. 3.6), 'Having taken by his intelligence the intelligence of these senses' (Bṛh. 2.1.17). That is, in spite of there being no distinction between the two in respect of being know- ledge, there can very well be a relation of substratum and attribute between them, since it is mentioned in Scripture. Equality of nature does not necessarily mean identity, since it is found that in spite of there being no distinction between light and its substratum,—both being equally light,—there is still a difference between them. COMPARISON Baladeva This is sūtra 26 in his commentary, interpretation different. It answers to the objection that intelligence is not a permanent attribute of the soul. Hence the sūtra: "Intelligence is a permanent attribute of the soul) since there is a separate (i.e. distinct) statement (in Scripture to that effect)".² SŪTRA 28 "BUT THERE IS THAT DESIGNATION ON ACCOUNT OF (THE SOUL'S) HAVING THAT ATTRIBUTE AS ITS ESSENCE, AS IN THE CASE OF THE INTELLIGENT BEING." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha "As in the case of the intelligent one," i.e. (just as Brahman is said to be great, because He is possessed of great attributes, on the 1 Ś. 2 G.B. 2.3.26, p. 197, Chap. 2.

420 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 28. ADH. 9 ] ground of etymology thus) ‘Brahman’ is one in whom there are great qualities,¹ so the soul has been designated as “Eternal, all-pervading” (Muṇḍ. 1.1.6 ²), because of possessing great attributes. In the first case, the Intelligent Being, great by Himself, is great by reason of His attributes too. In the second case, on the other hand, the individual soul, atomic in size, is great by reason of its attribute only,—this is the distinction Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz. If the individual soul be atomic by nature, then the texts which establish its all-pervasiveness must be con- tradicted, such as. ‘Eternal, all-pervasive, omnipresent, extremely subtle’ (Muṇḍ. 1 1.6), ‘Eternal, all-pervasive, immobile’ (Gītā 2.24) and so on,—the author replies· No. The term “but” is for disposing of the objection. On account of having an all-pervasive attribute as its very essence, “that designa- tion”, viz. the designation of the all-pervasiveness of the soul, such as: ‘Eternal, all-pervasive’ (Muṇḍ. 1.1.6), fits in. “As in the case of the intelligent being.” Greatness is said to belong to the Intelligent Being through His connection with great attributes as well, in accord- ance with the saying: ‘Brahman’ is one in whom there are great attributes. The Intelligent Being being great by nature as well, the example holds good only partially.³ Similarly, there is this designation of the all-pervasiveness (of the soul) on the ground of its all-pervasive attribute only, and not by nature. This should be understood here: Vāsudeva, the Highest Person, is without an equal and a superior and all-pervasive, in accordance with the scriptural text: ‘Nothing is observed to be either equal to Him or higher than Him’ (Śvet. 6.8). The all-pervasiveness of others, such as, prakṛti, time, and the attribute of the individual soul (viz. knowledge), is relative (and not absolute). There are contraction and expansion of even such an attribute which is peculiar to the individual soul, and eternal, in accordance with the declarations by the Lord Himself: “ ‘Knowledge is enveloped by ¹ Bṛh+man. ² Not quoted by others. ³ I.e. the case of Brahman and the individual soul are not parallel in all respects, but in some respects only. The former is great by nature, as well as great by attributes; while the latter is atomic by nature yet great by attributes. Hence the two cases are parallel only in respect of the second point, and not of the first as evident.

[sū 2. 3. 28. ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 421 nescience. Thereby beings are deluded ’ ’ ’ (Gītā 5.15), ‘ “ In whom that nescience has been destroyed by knowledge, in them knowledge shines forth like the sun, O Bhārata ! ’ ’ ’ (Gītā 5.16 ¹). COMPARISON Śaṃkara This is sūtra 29 in his commentary. Interpretation absolutely different. He takes this and the following three sūtras as laying down the correct conclusion, viz. that the soul is all-pervasive, in answer to the prima facie view set forth in ten sūtras above Thus, this sūtra means, according to him: “But there is that designation (of the atomicity of the soul) on account of its having that attribute (viz buddhi) as its essence, as in the case of the intelligent being”. That is, just as Brahman, though all-pervading, is designated to be atomic for the purpose of meditation, so the individual soul, though all- pervading, is designated to be atomic through its limiting adjunct of buddhi.² Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva This is sūtra 29 in the commentaries of the first two, and sūtra 27 in the commentary of the last. Baladeva leaves out “tu”. Inter- pretation different—viz “But there is that designation (i e the designation of the soul as knowledge) on account of its having that attribute as its essence, as in the case of the intelligent one” That is, just as the Lord, though a knower, is sometimes designated as know- ledge, so the individual soul too, though a knower, is sometimes designated as knowledge, since it possesses knowledge as its essential attribute.³ They continue the same topic in the following four sūtras, although literal interpretation is the same. Bhāskara This is sūtra 29 in his commentary. Interpretation absolutely different. Here he points out that the atomicity of the soul, considered so long, is not the real form of the soul, but only its transmigratory

¹ Correct quotation: “Prakāśayati tatparam”. Vide Gītā, 5.16, p. 303. ² Ś.B. 2.3.29, pp. 616 ff. ³ Śrī. B. 2.3.29, p. 144, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.29, p. 147. Parts 7 and 8, G.B. 2.3.27, p. 198, Chap. 2.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 29. 422 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 9.] form. Here he follows Śaṃkara, and points out that just as the all- pervading Brahman is said to be atomic in reference to His abode, viz. the heart, so the all-pervading soul is said to be atomic through its attributes of passion and the rest.¹ SŪTRA 29 "ALSO BECAUSE OF LASTING AS LONG AS THE SOUL DOES, THERE IS NO FAULT, BECAUSE IT IS SEEN." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The designation of the soul's all-pervasiveness, due to its attri- bute, is not inconsistent. "Also because of" the attribute lasting as long as the soul does, there is no fault, because it is seen";² i.e. because it is found in the passage: "‘For there is no cessation of the knowledge of the knower, because of his imperishability. Imperish- able, indeed. O! is this soul’" (Bṛh. 4 3 30 ³). Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz. The attribute of the soul being sometimes present and sometimes not, its all-pervasiveness due thereto vanishes, and as such the designation of its all-pervasiveness is open to objections —(the author) replies: The term "also" is meant for disposing of the objection. The soul is indeed eternal. As its attribute too "lasts as long as the soul does", i.e. is an eternal attribute accompanying the soul, so the designation of the soul's all-pervasiveness is not open to objections, because we find that there are texts designating the attribute as lasting as long as the soul does, such as: "‘For there is no cessation of the knowledge of the knower, because of his imperishability. Imperish- able, verily, O! is this soul’" (Bṛh. 4.3.30).

¹ Bh. B. 2.3.29, p. 137. ² C.S.S. ed., p. 440, omits the whole sentence which is but a repetition of the sūtra itself. The other edition retains it. ³ Not quoted by others.

[sū. 2. 3. 30. ADH. 9 ] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 423 COMPARISON Śaṃkara This is sūtra 30 in his commentary. Interpretation different. Śaṃkara continues the same theme, and points out that the soul's connection with buddhi lasts so long as the transmigratory state does.¹ Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha This is sūtra 30 in their commentaries as well. The interpretation of the word "tad-darśanāt" different, viz. because it is seen that all cows, hornless and so on, are called 'cow' (since they all possess the generic character of cowness).² Bhāskara This is sūtra 30 in his commentary too. Interpretation different, viz. like Śaṃkara's.³ Baladeva This is sūtra 28 in his commentary. Interpretation of the word "tad-darśanāt" different, viz. because it is seen that the sun and its light are co-eternal, and that the sun is both light and the illuminator.⁴ SŪTRA 30 "BUT ON ACCOUNT OF THE APPROPRIATENESS OF MANIFESTATION OF THAT WHICH IS EXISTENT, AS IN THE CASE OF VIRILITY AND SO ON." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha During the waking state there is the "manifestation" "of this", i.e. of knowledge, which is "existent" indeed during the states of deep sleep and so on. Hence, the attribute of knowledge does last so long as the soul itself does; just as in youth there is the manifestation of virility and so on, which are existent indeed during childhood. 1 Ś.B. 2.3.30, pp. 619 ff. 2 Śrī. B. 2.3.30, p. 144, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.30, p. 147, Parts 7 and 8. 3 Bh. B. 2.3.30, pp. 137-38. 4 G.B. 2.3.28.

424 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 31. ADH. 9.] Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz. if knowledge, the attribute of the soul, be eternal, then why should there be no perception of it during the states of deep sleep and the rest?—(the author) replies. The term "but" implies emphasis. Knowledge, the attribute of the soul, does last as long as the soul itself does. Why? "On account of the appropriateness of the manifestation of that which is existent." That is, the attribute of knowledge, which is "existent indced", i.e. is present indeed, in a non-manifest form during the states of deep sleep and the rest is manifested during the waking state,— just as in youth there is the manifestation of "virility and so on" which are existent indeed during childhood. By the phrase "and so on" the natural qualities of magnanimity, good conduct and the like are to be understood. COMPARISON Śaṁkara and Bhāskara This is sūtra 31 in their commentaries. Interpretation different, they continue the same theme—viz. the soul's connection with buddhi exists potentially in the state of deep sleep, etc. and is manifested in the state of waking.¹ SŪTRA 31 "OTHERWISE THERE (WILL BE) THE CONSEQUENCE OF ETERNAL PERCEPTION AND NON-PERCEPTION, OR A RESTRICTION WITH REGARD TO THE ONE OR THE OTHER." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha On the doctrine of an all-pervasive soul, the perception and the non-perception, the bondage and the release of the soul must all become eternal. The soul will be either eternally fettored or eternally free,—thus there must be "a restriction with regard to the one or the other". Vedānta-kaustubha This aphorism is meant for indicating the defects in the view of those who maintain the all-pervasiveness of the soul which is 1 Ś.B. 2.3.31, p. 621; Bh. B. 2.3.31, p. 138.

[SŪ. 2. 3 31. ADH. 9.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 425 consciousness. “Otherwise,” i.e on any view other than our view, viz. that the soul is possessed of the essential attributes of being a knower, knowledge by nature and atomic in size, i.e. on the doctrine that the soul is consciousness merely and all-pervading, there must be the “consequence of eternal perception and non-perception” On account of the all-pervading soul being ever unenveloped, there will be perception; on account of the existence of mundane existence, non- perception. In this way, there will result simultaneous bondage and release, “or a restriction with regard to the one or the other”. On our view, on the other hand, the individual soul being of the size of an atom, going and returning, being enveloped and being unenveloped, the object to be approached and the one approaching, are all possible, and hence the respective difference between bondage and release, too, is possible. But on your view, there will result one or the other only of bondage and release, having the stated marks There must be eternal bondage alone on the part of the soul which is consciousness merely and immobile, or there must be salvation alone,—such a restriction will result. Hence, it is established that the individual soul is possessed of the attribute of being a knower, is knowledge by nature and atomic in size. Here ends the section entitled “Departure” (9). COMPARISON Śaṁkara and Bhāskara This is sutra 32 in their commentaries. Interpretation different as before. They adduce here an argument for the existence of buddhi, being connected with which the all-pervading soul becomes atomic. Thus: (The existence of buddhi must be admitted) otherwise there will be the consequence of eternal perception and non-perception . . .¹ ¹ Ś.B. 2.3.32, p. 622, Bh. B. 2.3.32, p. 138.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 32. 426 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 10.] Adhikaraṇa 10: The section entitled "The agent". (Sūtras 32-39) SŪTRA 32 "(THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IS) AN AGENT, BECAUSE OF SCRIPTURE HAVING A SENSE." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The soul indeed is "an agent", because the scriptural texts, informing us about the means to enjoyment and salvation, such as 'One desiring heaven should perform a sacrifice' (Tait. Saṃ. 2.5.5 ¹), 'One desiring salvation should worship Brahman' ² and so on, have a sense. Vedānta-kaustubha Now incidentally, the problem whether the soul is an agent is being discussed. On the doubt, viz. whether the individual soul is an agent or not,—if the prima facie view be as follows: In the Kaṭha-vallī it is denied that the individual soul is an agent, thus: 'If the killer thinks to kill, if the killed thinks himself killed, both these do not know. This one does not kill, nor is killed' (Kaṭha. 2.19); and it has been declared by the Lord too: '"All actions are done by the guṇas of prakṛti. The soul, deluded by egoism, thinks: 'I am the agent' "' (Gītā 3.27). Hence, the guṇas alone are agents, but never the soul,— We reply: The soul alone is the agent. Why? "Because of Scripture having a sense", i.e. because the scriptural texts, teaching the means which are dependent on sentient beings, subject to enjoyment and salvation, viz. 'Only doing works here, let one desire to live a hundred years' (Īśā. 2), 'One desiring heaven should perform sacrifices' (Tait. Saṃ. 2.5.5), 'One desiring salvation should worship Brahman', 'Let one worship calmly' (Chānd. 3.14.1) and so on, have a sense. If those non-sentient objects (viz. the guṇas) be the agent, the scriptural texts teaching the means must be senseless. The (above-quoted) scriptural text, on the other hand, shows that the soul being eternal cannot be killed; but it is not by any means ¹ R, B, p. 208, line 27, vol. 2. ² R. B.

[sū. 2. 3 33. ADH. 10.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 427 concerned with denying that the soul is an agent. The Smṛti passage, too, shows only that the soul, which is deluded by the guṇas of prakṛti, is an agent of mundane activities through those guṇas And, this has been stated by the Lord Himself thus ‘ “Those deluded by the guṇas of prakṛti are attached to the activities of the guṇas”’ (Gītā 3 2.9). If the guṇas be the agent and not the soul, then the following statements will be nullified: viz. ‘“But if you will not carry on this righteous warfare”’ (Gītā 2.33), ‘“For through action alone Janaka and the rest have attained to perfection. Having an eye to the good of the world also, you should perform action”’ (Gītā 3 20), ‘“Whatever you do, whatever you eat, whatever you offer, whatever you give, whatever you practise as penance,—make that an offering to me”’ (Gītā 9.27), ‘“I am firm, with my doubts removed. I will do according to your word”’ (Gītā 18.73) and so on. COMPARISON Śaṁkara and Bhāskara This is sūtra 33 in their commentaries. Literal interpretation same, but they hold that the soul’s state of being an agent is not natural, but due to limiting adjuncts ¹ The same remarks apply to the following three sūtras also, which will not be noted separately. SŪTRA 33 “ON ACCOUNT OF THE TEACHING OF (THE SOUL’S) MOVING ABOUT.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha “On account of the teaching of (the soul’s) moving about,” in the passage: ‘He moves around in his own body as desired’ (Bṛh. 2.1.18 ²), it is an agent. Vedānta-kaustubha “On account of the teaching” of the soul’s “moving about”, i.e. of its roaming around, in the passages: ‘He, the immortal, goes ¹ Ś.B. 2 3.32, p. 623; Bh. B. 2.3 32, p. 138. For the different senses of the word ‘upādhi’ in the systems of Śaṁkara and Bhāskara. see Bh. B., etc. ² Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

428 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 34-35 ADH. 10.] wherever he wishes' (Bṛh. 4 3 12), 'He moves around in his own body as desired' (Bṛh. 2.1.18), the individual soul is an agent,—this is the sense. COMPARISON Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha They take this sūtra and the next as one sūtra by reversing the order and adding a "ca" thus "Upādānāt vihāropadeśāc ca".¹ SŪTRA 34 "ON ACCOUNT OF TAKING." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Because of the scriptural mention of the taking (by the soul) thus: 'So exactly he, having taken the senses' (Bṛh. 2.1.18). Vedānta-kaustubha On account of the scriptural mention of the taking (by the soul) in the passage which introduces the topic thus: 'Just as a king', and continues: 'So exactly does he, having taken these senses' (Bṛh 2.1.18), 'Having taken by his intelligence of these senses' (Bṛh. 2.1.17), the individual soul is an agent. SŪTRA 35 "ALSO ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION (OF THE SOUL AS AN AGENT) WITH REGARD TO ACTIONS, OTHERWISE, (THERE WILL BE) REVERSAL OF DESCRIPTION." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha "Also on account of the designation (of the soul) as an agent" thus: 'Understanding performs a sacrifice' (Tait. 2 5 ²), the soul is an agent. If by the word 'understanding' buddhi be understood and not the individual soul, the instrumental case would have been used ³ 1 Śrī. B., p. 152, Part 2; Śk. B, p. 153, Parts 7 and 8. 2 Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B. 3 I.e. the instrumental case 'vijñānena' would have been used.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 36. ADH. 10.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 429 Vedānta-kaustubha “Also on account of the designation” of the individual soul, denoted by the term ‘knowledge’, as an agent of ordinary and Vedic “actions” thus: ‘Understanding performs a sacrifice, performs actions as well’ (Tait. 2.5), the individual soul is an agent If it be objected: By the term ‘understanding’ buddhi is to be understood and not the individual soul,—(the author) replies: “Other- wise, i.e if by the term ‘understanding’ the individual soul be not understood, but buddhi is understood, then there must be “reversal of the description”, i.e. buddhi being the instrument, there must have been the designation of an instrument thus: ‘by understanding’. But there is no such designation. Hence, here is a designation of an agent by the stated case-ending, viz ‘Understanding’ Hence the individual soul is an agent. —————— SŪTRA 36 “THERE IS NO RESTRICTION AS IN THE CASE OF PERCEPTION.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha “There is no restriction” with regard to the actions based on the perception of their fruits. Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz. if the individual soul be the agent, then having taken into consideration the good and the evil which are the fruits of good and evil works, and being disgusted with the evil, it, with a view to obtaining the good, ought to do what is conducive to the latter,—(the author) replies. “As in the case of perception.” Just as there is the perception of the good and the evil which are the fruits of good and evil works performed previously, so there is “no restriction” with regard to works, since we find that people are by chance sometimes inclined to what is beneficial and sometimes to what is not beneficial.¹ ―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― ¹ I.e. although a man perceives the good and evil results of his past acts, yet there is no fixed rule that he always afterwards does what is good and avoids what is bad. As he is ruled by external circumstances, he may sometimes be inclined to what is bad, though knowing from his past experiences that such acts lead to harmful consequences.

[SŪ. 2. 3. 37. 430 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 10.] COMPARISON Śaṃkara This is sūtra 37 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz. “As in the case of perception, there is non-restriction (with regard to actions)”. That is, just as the soul, though free with regard to perceptions, sometimes perceives what is good, and sometimes what is bad, so the soul, though free to act, sometimes does what is good, and sometimes what is bad.¹ Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva This is sūtra 36 in the commentaries of the first two, but sūtra 35 in the commentary of the last. They interpret it as following. (If prakṛti were the agent and not the individual soul, then there would be) non-restriction (of actions) as in the case of perception”. That is, just as it has been shown ² that if the soul be all-pervading no definite perception will be possible, so if prakṛti be the agent, no definte activity will be possible, since prakṛti being all-pervading and common to all, all activities would produce results in the case of all souls, or produce no results in the case of any one.³ SŪTRA 37 “ON ACCOUNT OF THE REVERSAL OF POWER.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If buddhi be the agent, then its instrumental power will cease, and it must come to have the power of an agent. Hence the individual soul is the agent. Vedānta-kaustubha To the objection, viz. in the text ‘Understanding performs a sacrifice’ (Tait. 2.5), by the word ‘understanding’ buddhi alone is to be understood, and it is the agent. Hence there instrumental case has not been used ⁴—(the author) replies : ¹ Ś, B, 2.3.37, p. 625. ² Under Śrī. B. 2.3.32, Śk B. 2.3.32, G B. 2.3.30. ³ Śrī. B. 2.3.36, p. 153, Part 2; Śk. B 2.3.36, p. 153, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.3.35, p. 208, Chap. 2. ⁴ Vide V.P S. 2.3.35 above.

[sū. 2. 3. 38. ADH. 10.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 431 The individual soul alone is the agent. If buddhi be admitted to be the agent, then "on account of the reversal of power", its instru- mental power will cease, and it must come to have the power of an agent. Moreover, if buddhi be the agent, then the power of enjoyment, too, must pertain to it alone. This being so, bondage and release must result on the part of buddhi alone. COMPARISON Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva This is sūtra 37 in the commentaries of the first two, but sūtra 36 in the commentary of the last. Their interpretation is similar to the last portion of Śrīnivāsa's interpretation, viz. that if buddhi or prakṛti be the agent, the power of enjoyment too must belong to it.¹ SŪTRA 38 "AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF DEEP CONCENTRATION." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If the soul be not an agent, then "the absence of deep concentration", due to something which is absolutely different from the non-sentient,² will result, and hence the soul is the agent. Vedānta-kaustubha "Deep concentration" means abiding as having Brahman for one's soul, after meditating on one's own form,—distinct from the body, sense-organs, mind and intelligence,—preceded by the stopping of the functions of the mind. As the "absence of such a deep concentration", the means to salvation, will result, if the individual soul be not an agent,—it is known that the individual soul alone is the agent. ¹ Śrī. B. 2.3.37, p. 153, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3 37, p. 154, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.3.36, pp. 208-9, Chap. 2. ² Acetana-mātrāt, i.e. from even the slightest portion of the non-sentient.

432 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 3. 39. ADH. 10.] SŪTRA 39 "AND LIKE A CARPENTER, IN BOTH WAYS " Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The soul acts or does not act according to its own wish, "like a carpenter", and as such a situation is possible "in both ways". If buddhi be the agent, then there being the absence of desire and the like on its part, there will be the absence of such a situation. Vedānta-kaustubha The soul,—the nature of which is to act or abstain from acting, and which is possessed of the attributes of 'being an agent' and so on, lasting so long as it itself does,—though connected with a group of instruments like speech and the like, performs action or does not perform action according to its wish, and thus if the soul be an agent a situation is possible "in both ways",—just as a carpenter, though provided with instruments like axe and the rest, constructs chariots, etc., according to his wish. But acting or refraining from action is not possible on the part of buddhi, which is an instrument like the axe, by reason of its non-sentience. On account of the eternity of its proximity to a sentient being, as well as on account of the absence, on its part,—of any desire—the cause of action or inaction,—there must be either eternal activity or eternal non-activity, on its part. Hence, it is established that the soul alone is the agent. Here ends the section entitled "The agent" (10). COMPARISON Śaṃkara and Bhāskara This is sūtra 40 in their commentaries. Interpretation absolutely different. They take it to be forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, con- cerned with the question whether the individual soul is an agent by nature or as connected with limiting adjuncts, and accept the second alternative. Hence the parallel instance: "i e. yathā ca takṣā" is interpreted differently by them thus: In ordinary life a carpenter is miserable and so long as he is an agent, i.e. works with his tools,

[sū. 2. 3. 40. ADH 11.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 433 etc But when he returns home, lays aside his tools and is no longer an agent, he becomes happy In the very same manner the soul suffers so long as it is an agent through nescience, but when it returns home, i e. realizes its real state, frees itself from sense-organs and so on, and ceases to be an agent, it becomes happy ¹ Baladeva This is sūtra 38 in his commentary. He takes it to be an adhikaraṇa by itself. Interpretation different, viz. "And like the carpenter (the soul is active) in two ways". That is, the carpenter is an indirect agent through the medium of its instruments, and also a direct agent in handling those instruments themselves. Similarly, the soul is an indirect agent through its sense-organs, and is also a direct agent in the act of controlling those sense-organs.² Adhikaraṇa 11. The section entitled "Under the control of the Highest". (Sūtras 40-41) SŪTRA 40 "BUT (THE AGENTSHIP OF THE SOUL PROCEEDS) FROM THE HIGHEST, BECAUSE THAT IS TAUGHT BY SCRIPTURE" Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The agentship of that individual soul proceeds "from the Highest" as its cause, in accordance with the scriptural text "Entered within, the ruler of men" (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1, 2 ³). Vedānta-kaustubha Now the problem is being discussed whether the individual soul is an agent as controlled by the Highest Soul, or independently. On the doubt, viz. whether the stated agentship of the individual soul is under its own control or under the control of the Highest Soul, if the prima facie view be: Under its own control alone. In ordinary ¹ Ś.B. 2.3.40, pp 628-29; Bh. B. 2.3.40, p. 139. ² G B. 2.3.38, p. 120, Chap. 2. ³ R., p. 181. 28