महाराणा सांगा: द हिन्दूपत (हरविलास सारदा - मेवाड़ साम्राज्य एवं खानवा महायुद्ध इतिहास)

Maharana Sāngā. enjoyed the wealth of kingdoms, neither spoke bravely nor was their counsel or deportment such as became men of firmness." "At length," continues Bābur, "observing the universal discouragement of my troops and their total want of spirit I came to a resolution. Having called a general assembly of my Amirs and officers, I addressed them : ‘Noblemen and soldiers! Every man that cometh into this world is subject to dissolu- tion. When we are passed away and gone God survives, One and Unchangeable. Who- ever sits down to the feast of life must, before it is over, drink of the cup of death. He who arrives at the inn of mortality, the world, must one day, without fail, take his departure from that mansion of sorrow. How much better then is it to die with honour than to live with infamy. ‘Give me but fame, and if I die I am contented, ‘If fame be mine, let death claim my body.’ ‘The most High God has been propi- tious to us. He has now placed us in such a crisis that if we fall in the field we die the death of martyrs; if we survive, we rise victorious, the avengers of His sacred cause. 136

Maharana Sāngā. Let us, therefore, with one accord swear on God’s holy word, that none of us will for a moment think of turning his face from this warfare; or shrink from the battle and slaughter that ensue, till his soul is separat- ed from his body.’ Master and servant, small and great, all with emulation seizing the blessed Qoran in their hands, swore in the form that I had given.” Though twenty thousand soldiers of Bābur swore on the Qoran to win or die in the battle but not to leave the field alive, yet Bābur was not assured of success, and conscious of the grave consequences of a defeat at this juncture, he renewed¹ the negotiations with the Maharana through Silhiddi, the Chief of Raisen. He offered to make Peela khal near Byana the boundary of their respective dominions and give an annual tribute to the Maharana on condition of being left Delhi and its dependencies.”² ¹ The Tabqati Akbari says that at this Council the grandees advised Bābur to retire to the Panjab. ² Tod’s Rajasthan, Vol. I., p. 305: “We can well believe,” says he, “that in the position Bābur then was, he would not scruple to promise anything”—p. 306. 137

Maharana Sāngā. The advisers of the Maharana, with whom Silhidi was not at all popular, dissuaded Sāngā from accepting these terms, and the negotiations finally came to an end. Colonel Tod says that though the arrangement was negatived, treason had effected the salvation of Bābur. Silhidi, seeing that though the Maharana had been offered more than what he had started from Chitor to fight for, the overtures were rejected only because he was the medium. He took it to heart and deter- mined to stand in the way of victory. This ill-advised inactivity of the Maha- rana while Bābur was cooped up in his encampment, though partly explained by the protracted negotiations for peace made by Bābur, was most deplorable. If he supposed that Bābur was in the toils and that every day’s delay brought with it increased danger to him, he should also have considered that delay is always fatal to the cohesion of a heterogenous mass like that by which he was surround- ed, all parts of which owned neither the same patriotic feelings by which he 138

Maharana Sāngā. was actuated, nor were bound by the same common interest. For the success of the operations of a leader of such a coalition, swift action is a sine qua non! Delay gives scope to the play of disruptive forces which bring certain ruin on the whole body. Such forces inhere in com- posite masess and are only held in check by concentrating the attention of all on one definite aim, by means the most direct and easily understood by all. The Maha- rana was surrounded by a number of chiefs whose interests never coincided, who came from different provinces, who belonged to different and often hostile communities who even differed in faith, whose aims in life were different and in several instances conflicting ; whose only common tie was admiration for and confidence in the heroic personality of the Maharana. In such a situation, the leader to achieve success, must possess energy and courage more than caution and patience; bold aggressiveness more than humanity and forbearance. He must keep the various elements of his army fully employed, and their energies directed 139

Mahārāṇa Sāngā. to achieving as speedily as possible the common aim. Halting action, faltering attitude, waiting upon time to do the work of the sword are fatal, and entail certain defeat. If the Maharana had possessed the restless energy of his elder brother, the ever-memorable, the "winged" Prithviraj, or if he did possess it, had shown it in a speedy attack on the entrenched camp of Bābur; or if, with Rana Hammir’s energy, he had fallen on the dejected, panic- stricken followers of the brave adventurer from Samarkand, the Turk (Moghul) dy- nasty would probably never have occupied the throne of Delhi,¹ and the history of India would have run a different course from what it has done. The Maharana’s delay in coming to an action gave time to Bābur to instil some of his own courage of despair, some of his own heroic ardour into his dejected followers, as well as ¹ Mr. Elphinstone in his History of India, page 373, says: "Bābur’s advanced guard was immediately attacked; and though reinforced from the main body, was defeated with heavy loss. If the Raja had pressed on during the first panic, he would have obtained an easy victory. 140

Maharana Sāngā. to give a start to the disruptive forces in the Maharana's army and set treason to work. Losing finally all hope of a peaceful settlement with the Maharana, Bābur determined to make the most of his resources and give battle. Taking advant- age of the excitement and the exhilara- tion produced by his appeal to the religion of his followers, and their practical response to it, and in order to keep up their newly- acquired spirit, he broke up the camp to which he had been confined for nearly a month and marched in order of battle to a position two miles in advance. And he had no time to lose. The dangers were thickening around him. “Insurrec- tion and revolt had appeared on every hand. The towns and forts, of which he had gained possession with so much labour, were fast slipping out of his hands. Rābera and Chandwar on the Jumna, Koel (Aligarh) in the Doab, and Sambhal beyond the Ganges, but all of them near Agra, had been retaken by the Afghans. 141

Maharana Sāngā. His troops had been obliged to abandon Kanauj. Gwalior was blockaded by the Rajputs of the vicinity. Alam Khan, who was sent to relieve it, instead of excuting his orders, had marched off to his own country. Many Hindu chiefs had deserted the cause of the emperor. Indeed the previous conquests and present success of Rana Sāngā, had inspired all his countrymen with hopes that a change of dynasty was about to take place."¹ On the 12th of March, Bābur drew forward his guns and a kind of defensive cover that moved on wheels, and which served as a breast work, supporting them by his matchlocks and all his army. He himself galloped along the line animating his troops and officers and giving them instructions. He threw up other trenches further in advance, near the spot which he fixed upon as favourable for a general action, and when they were finished, advanced ¹ Erskine's History of India, Vol. I, p. 469. 142

Maharana Sāngā. to occupy them, dragging forward his guns. As soon as they reached the ground the Rajputs were seen advancing. All were ordered to their posts. Bābur mounted, and drew up his troops, riding cheerfully along the ranks and assuring them of victory. He took the centre to himself, assisted by Chin Timur Sultan. The right wing he committed to Humayun, who had under him Kasim Husain Sultan, Hindu Beg, and Khusrau Kokil- tash; the left he entrusted to his son-in-law, Sayad Mehdi Khwaja, and Muhammad Sultan Mirza, Abdul Aziz and Muhammad Ali Jeng-jeng. He appointed strong reserves to carry succour wherever it was required, and on the right and left placed two flanking columns composed of Moghul troops to wheel round the flank and rear of the Rajputs in the heat of the battle on a signal given. This arrange- ment he had learned in his wars with the Uzbeks. His artillery, under Ustad Ali Kuli, was placed in the centre, in front, connected by chains and protected by movable defences, behind which were 143

Maharana Sāngā. placed matchlock men, and in the rear a body of chosen troops ready to repel any attack from behind or to rush for- ward and charge whenever possible. The Maharana's army consisted of his own and that of the great chieftains who acknow- ledged his supremacy or followed his lead. Raja Silhidi, the Rajput Chief of Bhilsa and Raisen, commanded 35,000 horse; Rawal Udai Singh of Dungarpur and Hasan Khan Mewati, 12,000 each; Raja Medni Rai of Chanderi, 10,000 horse; Narbad Hada of Boondi, 7,000; Khinchi Shatru- deva of Gagrone, 6,000; Bhar Mal of Idar, Rao Viramdeva of Merta and Chauhan Narsinghdeva, 4,000 each. Sultan Mahmud Lodi, a son of Sikandar Lodi, commanded 10,000 adventurers; various other chiefs had each from 4,000 to 7,000 men. Rai Mal Rāthor, Commander-in-chief of Jodhpur, and Kanwar Kalyan Mal, heir of Bikaner, com- manded 3,000 each. Prithviraj of Amber,¹ Rawat Bagh Singh of Deolia (Pratapgarh), ¹ Many historical records do not mention his presence at the battle. 144

Maharana Sāngā.

Chandra Bhan, Manik Chand Chauhan, Rai Dalip and others commanded large divisions.

The battle began about half-past nine in the morning by violent charges made by the Rajputs on Bābur’s right and centre, which began to give way. Bodies of the reserve were pushed on to their assistance, and Mustafa Rumi, who commanded one portion of the artillery, opened fire on the masses of Rajput cavalry rushing forward and falling on the Turks like falcons on their prey. This fire made large gaps amongst them; still new bodies of Rajputs pushed on un- dauntedly. The battle was equally desperate on the left. Just as the Turks began to show signs of wavering, the traitor Silhiddi, who commanded the van (herole) of the Maharana’s army, went over to Bābur with his 35,000 cavalry. This did not make much difference, but just at that time an arrow discharged by some one struck with such force on the forehead of the Maharana, who was seated on an elephant, as to make him lose consciousness. The chieftains around him considered it advisable to send him out

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Maharana Sāngā. of the battlefield, and appoint a person as his representative, to continue the battle. They placed him in a palanquin and sent him with an escort towards Mewat. They asked Rao Ratan Singh, the chief of Salumbar, to take the Maharana’s place and continue the battle. Ratan Singh replied that his ancestor had relinquished the throne of Mewar, which was by right his, and that he would not now accept it even temporarily. He added that he deemed it his duty to serve with zeal whosoever should occupy the royal elephant as the Maharana’s representative, and so long as a drop of blood was left in his body, never to allow the enemy to pierce the army under him. Then, Raj Rana Ajjaji, who held the first rank among the nobles of Mewar, and who had, like the great Chonda, out of chivalrous regard for his father’s wishes, relinquished his right to the throne of Halvad in Kathia- war in S. 1520 (A.D. 1463), but was adorned with all the ensigns of royalty (of Halvad), was unanimously voted to take the place of the Maharana. And Ajjaji, assuming all the ensigns of the sovereign of Mewar, occu- 146

Maharana Sanga. pied the vacant seat¹ on the royal elephant. A chattra (canopy) was held over him and the chanwar was waved over his head. For a little while the Rajputs continued fighting; but the rumour soon spread like wildfire, that the Maharana had been wounded and removed from the field. The bond which had tied the different sections of his forces together was thus broken, and various sec- tions of the Maharana's army, not finding their leader present, left the field.² Rawal Udai Singh of Dungarpur, Hasan Khan Mewati, Raja Manik Chand and Chandra Bhan the Chauhan chiefs of Mewar, Rawat Ratan Singh Chondawat of Salumbar, Raj Rana Ajja, Rao Ramdas Sonagarah, Gokal- ¹ A poet says:— रघु सुराजन राण, सिरधारे गजसिर चढे। काढे खल तुरकाण, ईस फत्ते किधीअजा॥ (Assuming on his head the ensigns of the family of Raghu (the great ancestor of Rana, the chief of the Solar dynasty of kings) ascends the elephant : cuts down the wicked Turks, such was the triumph achieved by Ajja). ² A bardic song says that the Turks lost 50,000 men in this battle, and that Ajja went to heaven with 9,000 brave Rajputs. पड़ धर सहस पचास मेघ घण मार न मंडे। नव सहस समट लेकर मडर सुरपुर दिसा सिधाबियो॥ 147

Maharana Sāngā. das Parmar, whose descandants hold Bijolian (Mewar), Rai Mal Rathor, heir-apparent of Marwar; the brave Mertia leaders Ratan Singh (the father of the celebrated Miranbai) and Rai Mal, and others were killed after performing deeds of valour.¹ The Rajputs lost the battle, not because they were inferior to the enemy, but because of one of those chances that have often decided the fate of kingdoms in India, irrespective of the intellectual and material resources of the parties engaged.. It was so with the powerful Raja Anandpal of the Panjab who, in spite of his unquestioned superiority over Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni, lost the famous battle near Peshawar in 1008 A.D. owing to his elephant becoming unruly and turning back in the midst of the battle. It was so again in the case of Dara Shikoh, who was chiefly supported by the Rajputs and who lost the battle of Samugarh in A.D. 1658, owing to his transferring his seat in the ¹ Tod says that Mahmud Lodi was killed in this battle, but Mr. Erskine says that he fled to Gujarāt. Mehta Nainsi's Chronicles give the date of the battle as Katik Sud 5th, S. 1584. 148

Maharana Sāngā. midst of the battle from the elephant's howda to the back of a horse, on the treacherous advice of the traitor, Khalilullah Khan. That accidents could have such decisive influence on matters of such transcending national importance was due chiefly to the political consciousness of the people having become dormant. Swadharma, the duty of the individual to the State, to the nation, to the country in its broadest aspects, had come to mean devotion to the person of the sovereign for the time being and nothing more. This contraction of the meaning of the term Swadharma, this restrictive appli- cation of it accorded with the facts of life in the country, where the rights of the individuals comprising the nation became merged, not in the right of the State as with the military nations of the European conti- nent, but into the will of the person occupy- ing the throne for the time being. The king being the sole arbiter of the des- tinies of a nation, the only source of power, his personality counted for all even in a battle. He being the head—real and not a figure- 149

Maharana Sāngā. head only—he won or lost : the nation only because of him. If the arrow had struck Bābur's forehead instead of Sāngā's, the result would have been the same—a complete defeat of the Turks. In fact, in their case, it would have meant annihilation, because of their being foreign interlopers in the country. The present European War instinctively brings before the mind the great advance the Western nations have achieved in politics during the last four centuries. In Europe every man, woman and child understands his duty to the State, which, he knows, is nothing more than his own individual interest in the higher sense of the term. He or she understands that he or she loses or gains as his or her nation loses or gains, that his or her interests are identical with those of the nation or the State. This spirit animating all, the resources of the whole nation are fully organised and are unhesitatingly employed to protect as well as to promote the cause of the nation or even of individuals, whenever occasion requires. A war in modern times is therefore a war 150

Maharana Sāngā. of one nation or a combination of nations against another nation or two or more nations combined. The entire intellectual, moral and material resources of nations are mobilized and used in the struggle. The result is that that belligerent wins whose organisation is superior and whose resources, taken as a whole, are greater than those of the enemy. As a neces- sary consequence, wars now are immeasurably more devastating, and though both sides are in the end exhausted, the vanquished is the party clearly proved to be the weaker. This also explains the vast difference that we find between the nature and importance of a battle in those days and a battle in the twen- tieth century. The battle of Khānua, in which the opposing armies numbered about three lakhs, lasted a few hours, and what momentous issues hung on the result of that battle! It decided the fate of a country inhabited by a fifth part of the human race. It threw back for ever the advancing tide of the triumph- ant Rajput race, and placed India, with a civilization and culture as old as history and as high as the highest in the world, under the 151

Maharana Sāngā. domination of the less civilized Afghans and the highlanders of Central Asia. Compare this with the battles fought in Europe in the great war raging there now. The battle of the Marne lasted four months, and the loss of life in this one battle far exceeded the entire armies engaged in the battle between Bābur and Sāngā ; but what is the net result of the victory over the enemy ? A few thousand yards of "No Man’s Land," with hardly any effect on the final issue of the war. Victory remained with Bābur, who assumed the title of Ghazi. He advanced to Byana, where he arrived after three days, and held a council of his nobles as to the advisability of following up the victory by an invasion of the Rana’s dominions. Bābur’s resources, however, were so crippled and the dread of meeting Sāngā in the field a second time was so great, that the approach of the hot season was pleaded as an excuse and the enterprise was given up.¹ ¹ "That Bābur respected and dreaded his foe, we have the best proof in his not risking another battle with him."—Tod's Rajasthan, Vol. I, p. 307. 152

CHAPTER XIV. “LAST DAYS OF SĀNGĀ.” WHEN the party carrying the unconscious Maharana reached Baswa, now the northern boundary of the Jaipur State, the Maharana regained consciousness and at once enquired how the battle had ended. When the whole story was related to him, he became sorrowful, and scolded the people about him for removing him from the field of battle, as that exposed him to the reproach of fleeing from the field. He refused to move towards Chitor, and vowed that he would never enter it alive without van- quishing Bābur. In consequence of his removal from the battlefield, Sāngā shut himself up for a time in his palace in Ranthambhore. A charan named Todar Mal Chanchlia, who was with the greatest difficulty allowed 153

look like 'ह'? No, it has a vertical bar on the right! 'ह' does not have a vertical bar on the right! Letters with a vertical bar on the right: च, थ, ध, य, प, ष, क, etc. Between च, थ, ध, प: Wait, could it be "धिया"? Could it be "थिया"? "थिया" (thiyā) is extremely common in Dingal/Rajasthani: "थिया पडंता हाथ" = हाथों से पड़ते हुए हुए / हाथ से गिरते हुए (when falling from hands). Wait, but look at the letter: is the top of the vertical bar broken/open? In 'थ', the top bar does not cover the loop. Here, the top bar goes all the way across! Wait, in some old fonts, the top bar of 'थ' or 'ध' was covered, or is it 'च'? Wait, look at 'च': 'च' has a full top bar! If it's 'चिया' or 'थिया': let's look at the image again very carefully. Wait, look at the loop: Is it a loop, or is it a curve? It is a flat horizontal line extending left from the vertical bar, then curving down and up! That is the EXACT definition of 'च'! Wait, compare it to 'थ' in 'हाथ' (end of same line): In 'हाथ', 'थ' has a

Maharana Sāngā. Though the Western Afghan confederacy was crushed by the victory of Khānua, the Eastern confederacy continued to gather strength. The Rajputs though defeated in a great battle, had not been vanquished. Bābur had thus two powerful foes still to overcome before he could consider his throne firmly established. His experience taught him that he had more to fear from the इकरां राम तकी तिय रावण, मंद हरेगो दडकमल ॥ टीकम सोझि जपथर तारिया, जगनायक ऊपरा जलु ॥ ३ ॥ एक राड़ भवमांच खवटंथो, बोरस खाणै केम ऊर ॥ मानतणा केवा कज सांगा, सांगा तू सालै असुर ॥ ४ ॥ (Why this dejection? Sri Krishna had to leave the field a hundred times against Jarasandha: finally after saving himself, he vanquished the enemy. Once Arjuna fell back when Duryodhana cast his hand on Draupadi :