पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

self and soon came into contact with Bhau's right wing. As the fire from the camel swivels supported by Persian infantry at its back was both quicker and sharper, they seem to have soon overpowered the Maratha light artillery on that side and silenced it. As there were no infantry battalions to support it, Bhau had himself to swerve to the right to its rescue, and thus the Peshwa's Huzarat came into contact with Shah Wali Khan's troops. The ground where they met was to the south of Ugrakhedi and to the north of Risalu. The troops surrounding Bhau belonged to the select group and were possibly in the best of condition. Working under the eye of the commander in chief himself, and themselves possessing a high sense of duty with patriotic fervour for the name of the Marathas, they came sweeping down and would not stop even in the face of the sharp fire from the swivel guns. Now a cavalry battle fought with lance and sword on the Maratha side and musketry and archery on the other side began in good earnest. It is certain that the Afghan cavalry under Ahmad Shah had more musketeers, match lockmen and archers amongst them than were to be found in the Maratha army.⁴ Each Maratha of note had possibly a hand gun by his side but he had neither love for it nor expertness at its use. He pre- ferred lance and spear at a short distance to the clumsy bow and arrow or heavy, long matchlock of those days. 'The fighting was so violent that earth and sky could not be seen and the eye of heaven became dazzled at beholding this spetacle. (Kashiraj.) The Afghan army was composed of 12,000 horse- men and 8,000 foot soldiers, besides 1,000 camel guns. 'The Marathas drank them up like the water of a river.' Atai Khan, the son of the Wazir's paternal uncle, (who had carried the raid against Govindpant Bundele and slaughtered him) was slain. 3,000 Durranis were put to the sword and the rest fled back at the fury of the Maratha charge. Only 200 troops stood surrounding the Grand Wazir with fifty camel guns in his front. He was clad in full armour from head to foot, still dismounting from his horse he sat down on the ground, saying to his followers, "Comrades! Vilayat is far off, whither are you going?" He asked Kashiraj (who himself reports this) to take a message to Shuja ud- daulah that he was dying and that Shuja should come to his aid. Shuja did nothing of the kind, however, excusing himself with the plea that it was not proper to break the line of battle at that stage and thus allow the Marathas a possible chance to pierce past the Afghan line through the gap. As a mat- ter of fact, though Shuja stood ready with all his troops and guns throughout the day, none moved from the Maratha side against him. This clearly shows that the oblique Maratha line never came by itself into direct contact with the Afghan line at the left throughout the main fight, a distance of more than a mile still intervening between the two armies. But though Shuja would not come to the Durrani Wazir's aid, Ahmad Shah was not unaware of his plight. By this time it was twelve noon, and it seemed for a moment at the centre that the Marathas were triumphing. Ahmad Shah who was some three miles to the back, received intelligence of ⁴ Even in 1795 match-lock seemed to be daily gaining ground of the long spear ac- cord ng to MALET. In 1760 it must have been comparatively rare. (Poona Residency Cor- respondence 4.2 0)

90 PANIPAT 1761 the dispersion of his troops from the right flank to the centre As a precau- tionary measure he asked his zenana to mount on horses and camels so as to be ready to run away in case of emergency At the same time he took the stern measure of beating back his run away troops who had now crowded themselves in the Afghan camp He called in his nasaqchs (military provosts) and ordered 500 of them to go to his camp and striking with their axes all the camp followers great and small, drive them back to the battle field caring for nothing else By this method he brought within an hour 8,000 armed men, mostly foot soldiers to fill in the gap created at the back of the trans Ganges Ruhelas The remaining 1,500 military provosts were sent to the battle field with orders to kill every man who ran away from the battle and refuse to return to the charge This order they executed so effectually that after killing a few they compelled the rest to stand in battle array again behind the Grand Wazir's line Ahmad Shah sent some 4,000 fresh troops to reinforce the Wazir from his retinue Thus, within an hour, by one o'clock, 10,000 horsemen stood ready behind the Wazir to charge again, while on the right hand side of the Afghan line 8,000 soldiers supported the Par Ruhelas in their efforts to stop the march of Ibrahim Khan's successful Gardi troops Let us now take stock of the military position at noon At the very beginning the Maratha cavalry under Vitthal Shivdeo and Yashwantrao Pawar had acted impetuously and gone beyond their orders, attacking the Ruhelas before Ibrahim Khan had created a gap in their ranks by the fire of his artillery and the attack of his musketry The result was they had to run back exhausted and stand behind the chained heavy artillery to escape an attack from the enemy Thus their fighting power was neutralized when it was most necessary to take advantage of the gap created by Ibrahim Khan Gardi two hours later Damaji Gaikawad, on the other hand, had succeeded, for the time being, in warding off the flank attack on Ibrahim Khan's troops by Barkhurdar Khan and Amir Beg, by supporting the two Gardi corps left by Ibrahim Khan on his left side In the centre, Shah Wali Khan's quick advance had obliged Bhau to break the line of the marching square and advance to meet the Wazir, with what result we have already seen Twelve noon to one o'clock was the most crucial period of the battle Had the beaten horsemen under Vitthal Shivdeo, Yashwantrao Pawar and Damaji Gaikawad courageously rushed out and marched past the chained guns in front of them to support Ibrahim Khan, it is very likely they would have succeeded in marching past the Ruhela line with the help of the Gardi troops, and outflanked them But they do not seem to have done anything of the kind Perhaps there was a distance of one mile or so intervening by now between the advanced corps of Ibrahim Khan and the heavy artillery behind which their troops stood, with the result that no correct news of the condition at the front was available to them For the time being they stood safe behind the chained guns, Barkhurdar Khan and Amir Beg finding it impossible to assail them Perhaps these Persian Mughals did not advance from their flanking position, with a view to cut off the ad- vancing Marathas if they tried to create a breach on that side Thus it so happened that the Maratha troops reaped no tactical advantage from the an-

TO FACE PAGE 90

BATTLE OF PĀNIPAT 1761 SECOND STAGE 1 PM

SCALE

1 MALHĀR JĪ HOLKAR 2 SINDHIĀ 3 HUZURĀT & BHĀU'S BANNER 4 DĀMĀJĪ, VITTHAL SHIVDEV & YESHVANT PUĀR, ANTĀJĪ MĀNKESHWAR 5 IBRĀHĪM GĀRDĪ 13 SCATTERED TROOPS OF BHĀU

6 BARKHURDĀR & AMĪR BEG 7 RUHELĀS 8 SHĀH WALĪ 9 SUJĀ 10 NAJĪB 11 SHĀH PASAND 12 ABDALĪ'S RESERVED TROOPS OF SLAVES 14 SCATTERED TROOPS OF ABDĀLĪ

Foot note —Ahmad Shah was viewing the Maratha line, it seems, with a telescope (dur bīn, vide Irvine p 246, note 1)

THE BATTLE 91 nihilation of their five Gardi troops, nor could they succeed in reinforcing Ibrahim Khan in his time of need and distress The right centre under Bhau also could not, or rather would not, reap a tactical advantage, being encumbered with the women folk. There was a distance of about a mile between Ibrahim Khan's vanguard troops at the left of the Maratha line and the centre under Bhau It is not clear from the scanty descriptions of the actual battle whether a line of communication was maintained from the one end of the line to the other, whether Bhau knew the condition of Ibrahim Khan's corps or the behaviour of Vitthal Shivdeo and others Had he with his remaining victorious troops galloped at full speed for one mile to the left and stood behind Ibrahim Khan's hard pressed mus keteers confronting the broken Ruhelas, it is certain that he would have suc ceeded in creating a breach there, and run behind the Ruhela camp Had he cared to save his life together with that of Vishwasrao and his nearest women folk, he would have possibly taken such a line of action, and escaped along the river Jamuna past the Abdali camp But that would have meant a breach of promise he had entered into with Ibrahim Khan The previous night he had told on oath to Ibrahim Khan that he would under no circumstances flee away from the battle field forsaking the Gardi infantry under Ibrahim Khan, but would rather stand as if entrenched behind him and take the risk of being cut to pieces rather than leave the field Secondly, it would have meant a break of the marching square formation, leaving the non combatants, camp followers and the bazar people to the tender mercy of the Afghan troops Looking to the result, however, it seems as if that would have been a better alternative, because, after all, the camp was left to be looted and slaughtered by the Afghans at the end of the day By it the Maratha defeat would have been felt less, as it would have resulted in the survival of politi cally and militarily the most important people in the army The behaviour of the Maratha rear guard under the Shinde and Holkar contingents is not known When, actually, Malharrao Holkar and the cap tains in the Shinde cavalry left the field is not recorded But we take it that they never came in contact with the enemy throughout the main period of the battle from 9 A M to 3 P M Exception must, however be made for the • personal troops under Janakoji, Tukoji and Mahadji Shinde They kept their eye on the movements of the centre under Bhau and after Vishwasrao's accidental death ran to his rescue It was an unfortunate necessity of the plan that these veteran troops practically did nothing in this final battle They merely neutralised the opposite camps under Shah Pasand Khan, and Shuja But many of them escaped the last slaughter by taking to their heels just in time to get their way westwards The main difference in the position of the two armies was created by the necessity of the Marathas They had, if they wished to move from Pani pat, to come out in a body all together, leaving no base with reserves behind Ahmad Shah's position was the reverse He stood on his ground well en- trenched He was not out to carry his bag and baggage with womenfolk past

92 PANIPAT 1761 the enemy line, as the Marathas had to do His defensive position was now as strong as that of the Marathas at Panipat Ahmad Shah took full ad vantage of this situation Only the fighting force was first sent to the front, the rest doing all their duties in the usual manner They could cook their food and have their meals before the Maratha onslaught could reach them The Shah s personal troops had, as usual, been kept as a reserve Ahmad Shah seems to have taken the precaution to keep his main body of troops in tact in all his battles and not only at Panipat He would make the second rate troops face the enemy first and wear them out Later on, at the critical juncture, he would rush in with his fresh, unexhausted troops and complete the victory His methodology was thus quite different from the Indian practice since the days of the Mahabharata battle In all the noted Indian battles in history, the chief general was always at the fore front, and at his fall the bat- tles ended in a rout The battles were fought for the general, and with his fall no motive remained for the troops to fight any longer Ahmad Shah, in fact, was the precursor of the European mode of warfare, wherein a general seldom takes a personal part in the fight In a composite fight he would make his allies face the brunt of the battle and expose them to severe casualties He himself would come in last when the result hung in the balance, thus leaving a preponderating force with him to take charge of the spoils and not leave an upper hand to others in case of a dispute later on The original Hindu prac- tice of fighting with a general at the head of the army had been handed down even to the Muslim rulers of India They also followed the same mode The Marathas revolutionised the old system by their guerilla mode in which a face to face battle was to be avoided But Sadashivrao Bhau had now again brought the original vogue into fashion with the help of the trained infantry and its park of artillery Unfortunately for him he had to practise this mode under very adverse circumstances now Thus the critical hour of the battle, when the Marathas could pos- sibly have given a different turn to it, passed away with the army standing ex- hausted and bewildered by the very first effort Sir Jadunath thinks⁵ that be- cause 'Bhau had no squadron of cavalry in heavy armour and mounted on powerful horses ready to charge in close order and cut its way like a solid wedge through the shaken Durrani ranks," he could not complete his initial success He also thinks that because the Maratha troops did not carry roast , meat and dry bread in their saddle bags and water in leather bottles to refresh and reinvigorate themselves easily in the field on account of their caste suscepti bilities with its dread of its defiling touch, they could not recoup themselves in time so as to follow their initial success with further advantage Though these causes are true so far as they go, we do not think that these decided the line of action taken by Bhau He knew that Ahmad Shah with his entrenched camp was behind the Wazir's line, and the possibility of marching through it was very remote At the same time he was neither prepared to expose his camp to Afghan butchery as long as he lived, nor would he break the square formation decided upon the previous night, and run past Ibrahim Khan's in- ⁵ Fall 233, See the appendix on food arrangements

fantry through the gaps created by it and forsake him, going back on his promise Anyway, the possibility of saving the main centre with the most important personages on the Maratha side, passed away by one o'clock when the Wazir rallied his troops and began the fight again Now the battle entered its most desperate stage The fight was a close combat with sword, spear, lance, dagger and knife, both sides vehemently charging each other This went on for an hour or so, and then 'by Ahmad Sultan's good fortune" an arrow struck Vishwasrao, killing him outright He fell from his horse The news of Vishwasrao's death spread like wild fire throughout the Maratha camp in a very short time, and it had a very dis- astrous effect on the morale of the fighters thenceforward When Bhau heard of it, he also was very much affected He ordered that the corpse should be placed on an elephant so as to keep it safe from being trodden upon, and then ordered a last charge But by this time the news was beginning to have its effect Timid men, it seems, fell back and began to leave the field, saving them- selves as best as they could, and in a short time Bhau's flanks seem to have completely deserted Kashiraj writes that, all of a sudden, the field became clear, the Maratha army having vanished entirely, and none remained in the field except heaps of corpses here and there Besides the news of Vishwasrao's death, another cause which created panic in the Maratha camp was the behaviour of 2,000 Afghans, employed by the Marathas and working under Vitthal Shivdeo The sentiment and aim of the Marathas in this war under discussion is incidentally well illustrated thereby They were not fighting against the Muslims, not even the foreign Afghan Muslims, but against Ahmad Shah Abdali who wished to interfere in Indian politics and bring foreign pressure on the solution of Indian problems This existence of the Afghan troops serving under the Marathas is not men- tioned by Kashiraj at all But it is found in both the Ka fijat and Bakhar of Bhau in Marathi ⁵ᵃ It is also testified by Bhau's correspondence with Govind- pant Bundele ⁶ It is not clear to which of the Afghan tribes these dissatisfied, renegade troops belonged They may even be Indian Ruhelas Be that as it may, these troops, employed without forethought, became a source of great havoc at this critical juncture To distinguish them from the Afghans on Abdali's side, they had been given a badge of an ochre coloured headdress⁷ after the Maratha fashion They were standing behind Vitthal Shivdeo's troops to the left hand side of Bhau As soon as they heard of Vishwasrao's fall, they treacherously threw away their badges and began to loot the Maratha camp adjoining them, circulating the news of the Maratha defeat with exaggerated accounts The non combatants, consisting of two lakhs of persons, naturally thought that the Afghans had now penetrated the Maratha lines, and they took to their heels Vitthal Shivdeo also began to fall back as a result, in- stead of trying to check these Afghans in their nefarious activities Thus it was that Kashiraj found the Maratha side suddenly deserted and the field ⁵ᵃ Pp 23 and 143 respectively ⁶ RAJ 1.237, 242, 244 ⁷ Bhau Bakhar 143, Bhau Kaifiyat 23

94 PANIPAT 1761 cleared. Now only a few hundred troops surrounding Bhau remained at the front in the centre of the line. On the left hand side the Ruhelas now reinforced with fresh troops, began their attack simultaneously with that of the Wazir at the centre. In the consequent battle Damaji Gaikawad, Antaji Manakeshwar and Yashwant rao Pawar fell back defeated unable to stand the heavy slaughter by the con- secutive rounds of match lock fire from the Ruhela side. They could not make a united stand in one place. Ibrahim Khan went forth and mixed his troops amongst the Ruhelas heavily firing his last salvoes but was himself wounded and carried a prisoner by the Ruhelas. His son and brother in-law died in the effort. Practically the whole of his corps seems to have died on the battle field fighting to the last. Yashwantrao Pawar also was cut to pieces. Damaji Gaikawad received three wounds but retreated safely with his im- mediate civil assistants.⁸ Antaji Manakeshwar also with his usual cautious- ness retreated just in time to save himself uncovering the left side of the Marathas. The Ruhelas now closed upon the left flank of Bhau's personal cavalry. On the left hand side of Bhau, Samsher Bahadar was standing. He behaved on that day as a worthy scion of the Peshwa family and fought to the last. To his right were standing the Shindes, Tukoji, Mahadji and Janakoji. Their opposites on the Abdali side were Shuja ud daulah and Najib Khan. At the beginning of the battle at 9 A. M. the distance between the Ruhela front and the Shinde line was more than three miles. Najib was the coolest brain on the Abdali side, never losing his head and never acting impetuously. On this day he seems to have acted with perfect calculation. As the Maratha plan of the battle was to march on to the river side before the evening and not to fight a battle, naturally no one from the Shinde side advanced to at- tack Shuja or Najib. Besides, there was a great distance intervening between them. Najib used this respite to act in a systematic manner. He turned all his troops into infantry, dismounting even his cavalry from their horses. Then with his 15,000 troops he slowly advanced on foot, throwing up earth works in front at each quarter of a mile. That is to say, the sappers and others raised a breast-work of sand and earth a few steps in front of the line, one cubit high, which afforded a shelter to the stooping infantry and prepared trenches where the Ruhela infantry advanced and crouched down. Najib had a vast quantity of rockets with him. He would fire a volley of 2,000 rockets all at once from his advanced trenches. This had the effect of darkening the ground and the sky with their smoke and their noise created a sort of terror very useful for frightening away any advancing force. Kashiraj says that the troops of the Shinde contingent wanted to attack Najib, but they got no chance on account of this fire. We think otherwise. Bhau had wisely kept the Shinde and Holkar contingents with their beaten troops—beaten by Abdali himself in three or four fights during the last two years—to the rear flanks of his advancing square so as not to demoralise other troops by their chicken-hearted behaviour in an *8 SPD 21.200

THE BATTLE 95 emergency. In one sense they were in a position to act better than others, having a first-hand experience of the Abdali tactics. This time they were acting accordingly, never breaking their line and never acting impetuously as in a Maratha charge. It means they obeyed the orders of the Commander- in-Chief and would not offer battle themselves unless attacked. Najib could gain only one and a half kos, i.e., not more than two miles in four hours by this method, according to Kashiraj's measure. By one o'clock, he came within the firing distance of the Shinde contingent and began his attack on it. This had the effect, it seems, of pushing the front ranks of the Shinde line to its left towards the centre and separating them from their rear. The news of Vish- wasrao's fall by this time had created terror in the Shinde contingent also. Janakoji and Tukoji, as the most intimate and loyal servants of the Peshwa, pushed themselves to Bhau's side to see what had happened and rally the cen- tre. Sabaji and Mahadji turned back towards Holkar's contingent and thus created a gap in the line through which Najib's Ruhelas pressed forward. Shah Pasand Khan, who was to the left hand side of Najib and had been ordered to support the flank attack of the Ruhelas on that side, followed close at the heels of Najib so as not to allow the Marathas to run that way. It is not known when the Holkar and Shinde contingents, which fled away from the field of battle, actually left the field. Certainly it was not before the news of Vishwasrao's fall became known, i.e., 2 P.M. But after that they seem to have soon taken to their heels,⁹ and never once came into direct contact with the Afghans or the Ruhelas. We have no faith in the widely expressed belief that Malharrao had an understanding with Najib who allowed him to escape unscathed. He had, perhaps, selected his own position in the rear, or Bhau had wisely and knowingly placed him there. Fortunately for him, the opposite side under Shah Pasand Khan would not leave their original position at the front astride the Mughal Grand Trunk Road near the village of Siwa. Had Shah Pasand Khan left his place he would have allowed a clear passage to the Maratha troops at the rear along the easiest road. Shah Pasand Khan could not break the battle array, and Malharrao would not swerve to the right and break the marching square. But after 1 P.M., when Ahmad Shah ordered simultaneous flank attack on Bhau's centre to aid the frontal attack of the Wazir, Shah Pasand Khan naturally swerved obliquely to the right. As Najib had also by this time advanced systematically on the flank of Shinde, there was no problem for Shah Pasand Khan to break the fighting line and create a gap for the Marathas to escape, though its natural result was to free the Maratha right rear from the watch of Shah Pasand Khan's flank advance. Malharrao's whole life philosophy was based not on honour and prestige but on profit and escape. The Marathi adage which says that 'if the head remains whole, one can have eighty five turbans to wear," seems to have been old Malharrao's guiding principle which he naturally followed at this juncture. Half the Shinde contingent under Sabaji Shinde, Khanaji Jadhav and Janrao Wable, which had separated itself from Janakoji and Tukoji, also joined Holkar in his flight. Unless they had a clear start of two hours, it is difficult to believe that they could have escaped unhurt to the extent they did. Malharrao was ⁹RAJ. 6.409

TO FACE PAGE 96 76° 55' | 77° 0' | 77° 5' | 77° 10' 29° 30' BATTLE OF PANIPAT 1761 THIRD STAGE 4 30PM SCALE

1. MALHARJ HOLKAR
2. SINDHIA
3. HUZURĀT & BHĀU'S BANNER
4. DĀMĀJI VITTHAL SHIVDEV YESHVANT PUĀR & ANTĀJI MĀNKESHWAR.
5. IBRĀHĪM GĀRDI
6. SCATTERED TROOPS OF BHĀU AZ ZULLĀPUR JUMNĀ RIVER PĀNĪPAT CAMPING SITE OF MARĀTHAS CAMP-FOLLOWERS CUT DOWN CAMPING SITE OF ABDĀLI
7. BARKHURDĀR & AMIR BEG
8. RUHELAS
9. SHĀH WALI
10. SUJĀ
11. HĀJI B. SHĀH PASAND
12. RESERVED TROOPS OF ABDĀLI'S SLAVES
13. SCATTERED TROOPS OF ABDĀLI 76° 55' | 77° 0' | 77° 5' | 77° 10' | 29° 15' M. K. BAR. | H. B. SHAH

96 PANIPAT 1761 very old now and had scarcely strength to ride swiftly enough to save his life $^{10}$ It was only because of his early start that he was not overtaken by the pursuing Afghans after the final rout In the meantime at the centre, Bhau tried to rally as many of his troops as he could, and fought to the last Janakoji and Tukoji joined him in this last effort Najib had succeeded in separating half the Shinde contin- gent from the other and closing upon its heels His position at 3 P M was in the gap created by the escape of the Shinde contingent, and Shah Pasand Khan was immediately at his back This position meant that Bhau's escape was now closed The main attack on Bhau came from the personal slaves of Ahmad Shah He had divided his 6,000 slaves into three parties, and placed each of them on the flanks of Bhau Bhau's front was now closed by the Wazir and the rear by Shah Pasand Khan and Barkhurdar Khan On the flanks, the 6,000 fresh troops began to fire incessantly and simultaneously This, combined with the frontal fire of swivel guns, made it impossible for the centre to swerve to any side, and they were turned into a knot which twisted itself this way and that at each attack until completely withered away by death Nana Fadnis reports that Bhau was fighting to the last, till fifty horse- men remained by his side After that Nana Fadnis was separated from Bhau and went back towards Panipat What happened to Bhau afterwards nobody ex- actly knows Tukoji Shinde, Sonaji Bhapkar and many other captains of note lost their lives in the last desperate fight Bhau would not take even a last chance of escape though advised to do so by Tukoji Shinde, and was thus slaughtered by someone somewhere at last We take Kashiraj's account of the finding of Bhau's trunk first and his head afterwards as true, though we do not believe in the story of Bhau's last struggle as reported by a Durrani soldier and put down in writing by Kashiraj, because it would not stand criti- cism Janakoji was wounded and was made a prisoner by Barkhurdar Khan The battle seems to have ended finally by 4 P M, when Nana Fadnis, separated from Bhau, turned his face towards Panipat Already many of the civilians had gathered there after early separating themselves from the centre Thus it was that Ramaji Anant Dabholkar, Bapuji Ballal Phadke and Nana Fadnis met together These three had good horses and therefore they were able to cut their way back to Panipat When Nana Fadnis reached Panipat it was already 5 P M ' Taking the advice of experienced Ramajipant, all of them left their horses and baggage and donned the garbs of ill clad beggars As Ramajipant knew the geography of those parts well, he led the party out, going west After it was dark they started their trek, but before they could cover one kos they were attacked three or four times and searched by the Afghans Each time they could they cut off ten or twenty of the party till they covered a great distance, some twelve or more miles to the south west. Upto this point the three had kept together But again the Afghans came and wounded Ramaji and Bapuji who thus fell behind Weak Nana Fadnis swerved into tall grass and was thus saved, his frail figure probably creating compassion • $^{10}$ Ibid. 3.516, dated 11 3 1760 1

TO FACE PAGE 96 76° 55' | 77° 0' | 77° 5' | 77° 10' (29° 30') BATTLE OF PANIPAT 1761 THIRD STAGE 4 30PM SCALE FURLONGS 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 MILES

1. MALHARJI HOLKAR
2. SINDHIA 3 HUZURAT & BHAU'S BANNER 4 DAMAJI VITTHAL SHIVDEV YESHVANT PUAR & ANTAJI MANKESHWAR 5 IBRAHIM GARDI 3 SCATTERED TROOPS OF BHAU AZTULLIPUR BAPOLI JUMNA RIVER PANIPAT CAMPING SITE OF MARATHAS CAMP-FOLLOWERS CUT TO LOOT CAMPING SITE OF ABDALI 6 BARKHURDAR & AMIR BEG 7 RUHELAS 8 SHAH WALI 9 SUJA 10 NAJIB 11 SHAH PASAND 3 RESERVED TROOPS OF ABDALI'S SLAVES 14 SCATTERED TROOPS OF ABDALI 76° 55' | 77° 0' | 77° 5' | 77° 10' (29° 20')

THE BATTLE 97 amongst the assailants He proceeded still farther when again a party at- tacked him, drawing him out of the tall grass where he was hiding Here again some old soldier took pity on the boy and thus he was finally saved Because it was the eighth day of the bright half of the lunar month, the moon was shining overhead in the evening till she set after midnight This circum stance, while it was useful to some in covering their flight, was also responsible for the long pursuit by the Afghan troops over that plain and the heavy slaughter of non combatants running on foot for their lives But many more were killed by the surrounding villagers who had suffered terribly during the last three months by the constant tramp of soldiers The Karnal Gazetteer has recorded that the villages of Phurlak (twelve miles to the north), Bala (fifteen miles to the north west), and Dahar (six miles to the south west of Panipat) had migrated to other areas forsaking their sites This will give an idea of the devastation wrought in the surrounding area It is not recorded as to when the elephant on which Bhau's wife, Parvatibai, Nana Fadnis's mother and wife were seated, got itself separated from the other troops From the Maratha chronicles it appears that this elephant was not far behind Bhau's line of battle Once her elephant touched the elephant on which Vishwasrao's corpse had been placed covered under some cloth Then only she came to know of Vishwasrao's death and began to weep and wail If this fact is truly reported, it means that she was half a mile behind the fighting line The chronicles report that one captain with 500 shepherds¹¹ had been specially ap pointed for the protection of Parvatibai The name of this captain is given as Visaji Krishna Jogdand, a name which is not found mentioned in any original document He had been ordered to follow the army to Delhi if it success fully cut its passage through the Afghan lines, but if the battle turned into a defeat, as soon as Bhau's fall was reported, he should cut off Parvatibai so as to avoid her falling into the hands of the Afghans But neither this Visaji nor his shepherds seem to have done anything according to order They ran away at the first shock and tried to save their lives! Only a personal servant, Janu Bhintade, never left her for a moment and tactfully brought her back to Panipat out of the turmoil¹² when only half an hour of the day remained She got down from her elephant and followed Janu Bhintade for some time on foot Fortunately they met one Virsingrao Baravkar with his good horse He took her on his horse and fastening her at his back, carried her out of a sea of Afghans with rocks of corpse heaps in the middle Being a skilful horse ¹¹ Why the Marathi chronicles have reported the fact of 500 shepherds (Dhanagar in Marathi) as specially appointed for the protection of Parvatibai is a mystery Many of the followers of Malharrao Holkar were by caste like him Dhanagars (shepherds) Was it is to suggest that Malharrao had a hand in the protection of Parvatibai? If so why is the name of the captain specifically given as Visaji Krishna Jogdand? The mystery of this reference is rendered still more mysterious by the tale of Parvatibai as we found current in the region surrounding Panipat. A septuagenarian Gaud Brahmin told us the same fact of shepherds (Gujars) being specially charged with the protection of Parvatibai We think that Bhau who was prepared for all eventualities had done some such thing for extricating his wife out of the turmoil by some safe comparatively unfrequented path only known to these local Gujars many of whom must have been certainly serving in the Maratha camp during all these months. It is not unlikely that because some of them acted as guides through the jungle to the south west of Panipat that Janu Bhintade and other loyal Marathas were able to cut their way out of the danger zone. ¹² SPD 2 149 (p 171) P F—7

98 PANIPAT. 1761 man, he carried her safely across When his horse was exhausted by its dou˙ weight he got her down, when another cavalryman, Piraji Raoot, got her his horse and thus carried her twelve miles farther on When his horse l came exhausted he also left her behind, but all along Janu Bhintade kept ] company, walking or riding along by her side No Maratha would refuse he place on his horse on the road, and thus she was thirty miles to the south Delhi when she met Malharrao Holkar and Nana Purandare We have relat this event in detail because it falsifies Malharrao Holkar's plea as put do in Holkar's Thaili 13 Malharrao Holkar was neither charged by Bhau w the special defence of Parvatibai nor did he himself of his own accord do an thing to bring her out of the field Only casually and accidentally th met to the south of Delhi, a circumstance of wh ch Malharrao took full ˙ vantage in preparing his apology The description of the actual battle is very scanty in Marathi, th given in the chronicles being more or less personal and not useful for milita study The only eye-witness who speaks of the last effort of Bhau is the trut ful Nana Fadnis who was only nineteen years old at the time His au biography is a document by itself throwing considerable light on the who campaign It clearly sets forth his own prejudices but none can say that is anywhere untruthful From his writing it seems that Bhau was not u aware of the possibility of defeat, and had, therefore, made provision for t special protection of the women folk As a last resort, it had been decided kill them before they should fall into the hands of the Afghans From Na Fadnis's words, it looks as if Bhau had prepared himself for death But th was personal As a general he had taken care that none other should ha any scent of his personal decision except Nana Fadnis and one or two oth persons like Nana Purandare He had made every provision that was humar possible for the ensuing battle with minute care for all eventualities, but all i precautions came to nothing because the plan was not understood, and, if u derstood, not followed by anyone with zest, except by Ibrahim Khan Gar who was the author of it It is clear that the last fight was fought between t Maratha cavalry and the Afghan infantry But the majority of the Marath generals had, it seems, no faith in Ibrahim's plan and its possible success Th were expecting defeat rather than victory, and as such were more prepar for immediate flight, than for a fight to the finish by sticking to their pos At the same time they knew that precipitous flight at the very beginning w quite impossible, the other troops being engaged at the front It is curio to note that of all those who survived the battle, there is an overwhelmi majority of old men amongst the notables Malharrao Holkar, Vitth Shivdeo, Satvoji Jadhav, Damaji Gaikawad, Antaji Manakeshwar, Sabaji Shin Khanaji Jadhav, Janrao Wable and Gangoba Chandrachud were all age

THE BATTLE 99 certain extent, though they were massacred on the way, like Antaji Manakesh- war and Baji Hari Supekar who were killed¹⁴ by the Baluch Zamindars near Farukh nagar to the south west of Delhi Not all who ran away survived rather the majority died as a result of slaughter or by starvation and cold It is certain that some two lakhs of people died during those two or three weeks, but more died from hunger and cold than by wounds in the battle We do not believe that the Maratha camp had five lakhs of people as reported in BROWNE'S translation of Kashiraj, much less can it be ten lakhs as trans lated by Sir Jadunath ¹⁵ Another important thing to note in this affair is the absence of any de tailed account of the campaign or of the final battle from the pen of any of these renegades Malharrao Holkar's supposed confession is only an example of specious pleading specially written to order by some clever scribe Other wise no one else even tries to give the whole account Nana Purandare who was very intimate with Bhau, and was supposed to belong to his party in politics, is ominously silent about the battle, though he had occasion to write of the event From the whole tenor of the various writings about the battle, it is clear that the survivors had come to an understanding among themselves to report it in a particular manner Their additional excuse of doing so was on account of the personal and political necessities of the case The personal necessity arose out of the respect for the feelings of Parvatibai, Bhau's wife who survived and returned in the company of the renegades, as well as anxiety for the health of the Peshwa Though Nana Fadnis, Nana Purandare, Mal harrao Holkar and others seem to have been convinced very early of Bhau's death by the letters they receivd from Kashiraj, Anupgir Gosawi, Purushot tam Hingne, Ganesh Vedanti and others, they were afraid to disclose the fact for its effects on Parvatibai and Nanasaheb The political necessity was still greater The Marathas tried as far as possible to minimise the disaster by starting rumours about the safe running away of Bhau, Janakoji and others, thus trying to keep an atmosphere of expectancy for the sudden emergence of Bhau and Janakoji at any time and from anywhere, as long as they could By this method they did succeed in rallying the survivors and making a bold stand from the base at Gwalior Its definite political effect is seen in the re turn of Ahmad Shah Abdali after waiting for two months at Delhi, and still more by his political arrangement He bestowed the Wazirship of the Mughal Empire-be it noted-not on his ally Shuja ud daulah but on the regicide Ghazi ud din Khan, a protege of the Marathas He tried to conciliate the Peshwa by sending condolence messages couched in an apologetic tone, and also by opening negotiations for a political settlement ¹⁶ In response the Peshwa also tried to look at the matter in a political manner without revengeful feel ings He also sent Mir Anvarulla Khan Trimbakkar to Delhi with dresses of honour for Abdali and his Wazir Shah Wali Khan ¹⁷ But by the time Anvarulla Khan had reached Kota, he got the news of Abdali's sudden return to his own

¹⁴ KHARE 1.71 ¹⁵ IHQ 10.265 ¹⁶ SPD 21.202. ¹⁷ Ibid. 2.168.

100 PANIPAT. 1761 country due to the rebellious attitude of his Durrani troops, and had, there- fore, to come back with the elephant which was being carried as a present to Abdali. 18 Estimate of the Loss of Human Lives in the Battle The last trace of resistance on the battle-field ceased at 4 P. M. on that day, when two hours of day-light still remained. This fact, together with the fact of the day being the eighth of the bright moon on which the moon was over- head in the evening casting no shadow and setting after midnight, gave ample time and scope for the Afghans to pursue the fugitives and kill as many of them as possible. It is difficult to estimate the number of Maratha soldiers and non-combatants slaughtered, but the total was not less than one lakh. Out of the 60,000 soldiers, possibly half the number died on the battle field fighting face to face. Some 10,000 more must have died in the pursuit. Of the re- maining 20,000, 10,000 definitely reached Gwalior in safety after a fortnight. The rest died on the way fighting with the villagers or on account of heavy wounds, exhaustion, starvation and disease. Of the survivors, too, half only had run away with their horses, the rest had slowly trudged back on foot losing their horses to the robbers on the way. Amongst the soldiers who lost their lives, Bhau, Vishwasrao, Samsher Bahadur (who had extricated himself out of the final struggle after receiving heavy wounds and run back upto Deeg in the Jat's dominion to die there), Yashvantrao Pawar, Janakoji Shinde (who was slaughtered in captivity), Ibrahim Khan Gardi with his brother-in law and son, Santaji Wagh, Manaji Paygude, Khanderao Nimbalkar, Sonaji Bhapkar, Tukoji Shinde, Dadji Darekar and Narayan Bapuji Rethrekar were the most notable, though practically all the soldiers who died on the battle-field were ex- perienced men who had fought in more than one battle. In the camp were probably one lakh and a half of non combatants. Of these some 6,000 found their way to the non hostile camp of Shuja-ud-daulah and got a shelter there. They were protected from the fury of the Afghans and safely sent back to Jatwada after the return of Ahmad Shah to Delhi. Some 22,000 persons were captured as slaves by the Afghans the next day. Of these a considerable number were women belonging either to the servant or concu- bine class with perhaps a few hundred of married women, who had accom- panied their husbands for pilgrimage. These were sold by their Afghan cap- tors to Indian soldiers. Of the rest, possibly some 50,000 were slaughtered in cold blood by the Afghans on the day after the battle for religious merit. According to Kashiraj, every Durrani soldier slaughtered a hundred or two in this way, which is obviously a gross exaggeration, because if we take even 10,000 Durranis to have done this, it would bring the total slaughter to 10,00,000! Many persons who had foolishly returned to Panipat in the even- ing of the battle and taken shelter in the walled town, were, the next day, hunted out and put to the sword by the hostile townsmen themselves. The Bhau Bakhar reports a curious permission granted by Ahmad Shah to the sons 18 Raj. 6 472

THE BATTLE 101 of Mian Qutb Shah and Abdus Samad Khan who were beheaded by the Marathas at Kunjpura with ignominy They sought permission to slaughter captured men to avenge their fathers' deaths Ahmad Shah gave them the permit to go upto 20 kos and slaughter for four ghatikas only, but not more Thus permitted, Qutb Shah's son slaughtered 4,000 fugitives near Sonepat and Samad Khan's son killed 5 000 near Bahadurgad to the west of Delhi None of those who were captured alive at Panipat on the next day were slaughtered Their property was looted but they were allowed to get them selves freed by paying a ransom Shuja ud daulah and his Hindu officers, like Anupgir Gosawi and Kashiraj, paid the ransom for many and sent them back with a safe escort Many of the fugitives possibly lost their lives because they would not part with what they possessed on their body Only those who like Nana Fadnis threw away all property and assumed the dress of beggars were able to return unmolested, unless they were caught in the cold massacres related above The loss on the Afghan side can be estimated at some 20,000, practically all dying on the battle field Three fourths of this number were possibly the Indian Ruhelas, the rest being Afghans and other foreign allies THE SPOILS OF THE BATTLE If it is impossible to estimate the total number of men who died at Panipat, it is still more impossible to estimate the spoils which came into the hands of the Afghans and the Ruhelas The definite loss on the Maratha side as stated by Nana Fadnis¹⁹ was 50,000 horses, the number of all the elephants and camels and bullocks is nowhere definitely stated 300 elephants, 3,000 camels and about a lakh of bullocks would be, we believe, a fair estimate All the artillery as well as the weapons possessed by the various soldiers and non- combatants fell into the hands of the victors and brigands The total number of cannon, great and small, heavy and light, should be some 300, 25,000 match locks and muskets of the French pattern wielded by the Gardi troops of Ibrahim Khan must have fallen into the hands of the Ruhelas and the Durranis One lakh of swords, shields and spears in the possession of both combatants and non combatants must have been looted by the victors A similar number of javelins, axes daggers and knives of many varieties also must have been captured from the camp by the victors A few thousand armours, worn by some of the noted Marathas and the Gardis of Ibrahim Khan also must have fallen into the hands of the various captors This is as far as the war material is concerned Of these, most of the horses and bullocks and elephants were in a half starved con- dition, unable to walk even a short distance These were sold by the Afghans to the Indian soldiers at almost nominal prices Many of these must have perished before reaching the homes of their buyers as no fodder was available anywhere in the vicinity of Panipat and Delhi Many of the bullocks must have been slaughtered for food by the victorious Muslims ¹⁹ Purandare 1 417

102 PANIPAT: 1761 How much property fell into the hands of the captors is very difficult to estimate The personal kit of an average Maratha soldier was very meagre It would be one big brass lota and a small vessel for drinking water, an iron pan for baking bread and a brass plate on which to dine A few hundred big vessels for storing water or cooking rice and vegetables in volume would naturally be found in this big camp where occasionally even Brahmins must have been fed on religious occasions, or when on visits to places of pilgrimage on the way The clothing and bedding of an average Maratha soldier and camp follower could not have been worth much, except for some big sardars and officials who were probably well clad, wearing costly apparel The tents, big and small, screens and other material of an official nature, worth some lakhs, also came into the possession of the Afghans What the bazar accompanying the Maratha army possessed on the last day, it is difficult to say But taking into consideration the famine conditions subsisting in the Maratha camp, there could not have been much of corn, grain and other articles of food and drink The only item left worth noting was cash and jewellery A certain amount of accumulated coin should have been found in the possession of the bazar merchants and artisans who had received fabulous returns for their goods But most of the army and camp followers, as well as the state treasury accompanying the army on the march, had possibly exhausted their treasure in buying things at fabulous prices, and many had to sell their jewellery and trinkets in order to subsist, thus leaving comparatively very little in their pockets or on their per- sons Possibly the accumulated sales money of the merchants had been bor- rowed by the starving individuals in the camp and also perhaps by the state If this surmise is true, then even the merchants' money must have disappeared from the camp in buying victuals and fodder or other necessities Only the unsold and unsalable articles must have remained in the camp and fallen into the hands of the Afghan soldiers Some 20,000 slaves, male and female, were also appropriated by the victors Taking into consideration what has been said above, we do not think the estimate of various writers about loot as correct "Every trooper brought away ten or even twenty camels laden with money" is the description of Kashiraj We think it a gross exaggeration It is true that the Marathas lost everything they possessed, but no Maratha soldier would have on his person or in his pocket precious metal worth more than a hundred rupees on an average It is doubtful whether even this much had been left with him after ten months of march through a foreign country, when looting had been forbidden, salaries and wages not paid for the most part, and all subsisted by selling what they possessed We know the aftermath of war Ahmad Shah Abdali found it im- possible to pay the accumulated salaries of his soldiers and hence they mutinied They were, so reports Nur ud din, completely dissatisfied with what they had received as spoils, which they considered very meagre after two years of hard campaigning The conquered territories were bestowed on the Ruhelas The booty had also to be sold to them at nominal prices on account of the want of cash with which to buy the necessaries The captured horses were worth only ten or twenty rupees each¹ As a result, the unruly Durrani troops were on the point of plundering the camp of Shuja ud daulah who decamped from Delhi

THE BATTLE 193 without even taking leave of the Afghan monarch! It will be seen from these descriptions that this great victory had not brought much cash into the coffers of the Afghans, and was thus a financial failure. While the Marathas had lost their all in the immediate as well as distant sense, there was no commensurate gain to the victors Verily it was a Pyrrhic victory! FOOD ARRANGEMENTS DURING THE BATTLE Sir Jadunath's charge (Fall 2.337) that the Marathas did not carry "roast meat and dry bread" in their saddle is due to his ignorance of the Maratha manners. Roasted gram and rice were generally carried by the Marathas when on travel, together with raw sugar (gur) to be eaten before drinking water after a long journey. Flour for baking bread was carried on the person to be used at halt. The Marathas were vegetarians to a great ex- tent, but they also knew the sustaining power of meat in preference to bread. At least one reference mentioning its use is available in RAJWADE 10-59, dur- ing the war between Janoji Bhonsle and Madhavrao Peshwa in 1769. Janoji for one month was continually on the march every day with Madhavrao close at his heels During a march of three or four days in succession, he could not make a halt so as to bake bread. The Bhonsle army subsisted on mutton only and thus gave the slip to the Peshwa. This clearly proves that occasionally, when available, the Marathas made use of roast meat to subsist on. Of course, it is more than we can say whether the Marathas on the field of Panipat were actually carrying ready-made food on their persons, but our surmise is that they did. MARATHA MODE OF WARFARE That the historic Marathas had perfected an individual mode of cavalry movement is clear from its adoption by Col. Skinner in his later famous "Skinner's Horse." General G. C. MUNDY²⁰ who accompanied Lord COMBER- MERE, the Commander-in-Chief in India in 1830, on his tour through northern India, writes of it in the following manner: "The peculiar evolution of the 'Skinner's Horse' and which is most striking to a Eu- ropean eye is the Maratha charge. In this movement the whole corps advances in line, two deep, at a canter or trot, which, like John Gilpin's, becomes 'a gallop soon'; and as they approach their object, the files open out, and every man, uttering a wild, shrill scream, comes thundering on with his sword waving above his head In spite of the apparent disjointed irregularity of the charge, and the amazing speed of their approach, at the word 'halt' every horse is brought upon his haunches within ten paces of the reviewing General. The Maratha charge is certainly well calculated to strike terror into a foe already wavering, but its real physical effect upon staunch troops must be far inferior to the close combined charge of our cavalry" (Page 165) The Marathas were known as superb spearmen and their mode can be judged from the Skinner's Horse trained in the same tradition ²⁰ MUNDY's Pen and Pencil Sketches in India, 3rd ed. (1858).

THE BATTLE 105 housings, the fringe of which reached nearly to the ground, were of velvet embroidered in gold and silver . The Mahratta elephants have a style of gait and carriage peculiar to themselves, and are as superior in appearance to ours, as the English thorough bred racer is to the earth-stopper's hack. The Company's elephants, probably from having been rode too young, and oppressed with burthens, shuffle along with short step , their necks bent, and their heads hanging with the melancholy air of an Oxford street hackney coach horse. The Mahratta elephant strides majestically along, his head elevated far above his shoulder, and his tusks standing out horizontally. The chiefs pride themselves greatly on these ani- mals, and take pleasure in teaching them a variety of tricks." (Pages 213, 4 ) Though these descriptions are dated seventy years after Panipat, they can as well serve for the visualisation of the Maratha army on that fatal field.

CHAPTER VII THE JUDGMENT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PANIPAT DISASTER THE MARATHA survivors from the Panipat disaster seem to have com bined in taking advantage of the death of the commander in chief and ascrib- ing the defeat to his incorrect strategy, wrong tactics and, in general, to his con ceit, arrogance and blindness to the facts of the situation Our narrative should have made it clear by now that most of these grounds of condemnation are flimsy after thoughts As Bhau was not a free man in diplomatic talks, the responsibility is shifted to the shoulders of the Peshwa Sadashivrao Bhau's strategy or planning was not incorrect, but its execution devolved upon per- sons who were not strong enough or wise enough to carry it out Bhau cer- tainly cannot be pronounced a first rate general in history Three fourths of his mental mould was civil in composition, and only one fourth can be treated as military in form Ahmad Shah Abdali, his rival, bore a reverse proportion in his mental make up The sort of expertness in any matter which comes to a man by single minded absorption in one kind of work only, is not possible in a man whose life is divided and shared by various interests Sadashivrao was, no doubt, trained as any other Maratha sardar of the day for war, but that does not seem to be his favourite occupation His mind was diplomatic in formation and his expertness was to be seen in his management of finance and administration Ahmad Shah had led the life of a slave under such a military master as Nadir Shah from his childhood, and spent practically every minute of his life amidst war His expertness was born of this long, all ab- sorbing experience Such an experience and such period of candidateship seldom fall to the lot of an average man Certainly none of the Marathas could boast of such training The historic Marathas were war like no doubt, but when compared to the Afghans, must be judged more as civil than military Civil men can also become good soldiers if they are imbued with high ideals If the cause for which a man fights is after his own heart, he can put all his faculties into the affair and see to it that it ends in success Unfortunately such was not the state of the Maratha army at Panipat as a whole Bhau and others siding with him fought for the name of the Marathas, but there were many others, perhaps the majority, who thought otherwise. Malharrao Holkar