पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

114 PANIPAT 1761 the Poona Court nobody’s reputation was safe, are true not only as far as Govindpant himself was concerned, but are applicable to one and all The whole trouble had arisen from the precedent of the Peshwa’s own doings A state servant (albeit the first minister) who had risen by flouting the orders of his master could not hope to secure the willing obedience of his servants The Peshwa had broken the unity of the state by concentrating power in his own hands by all kinds of machinations and subterfuge, by relegating his co-minis- ters in the state to a corner Now the same game was tried upon him by his servants What is clearly seen by studying all the material and taking a com prehensive view of the whole affair is that, both military as well as civil serv ants in the Maratha State thought themselves in spirit more as partners in the state than as servants who could be dismissed at will The trouble had been growing for a long time, but seemed to be coming to a head just at this awkward time when the state was engaged in a life and death struggle with a first class enemy All the sins of commission and omission committed by the Peshwa knowingly or unknowingly before, now came to visit him like the ghost at the table of Macbeth Panipat thus proved to be the culmination of all previous defects in the Maratha system, and was not the result of one man's misbe haviour or default That Sadashivrao Bhau was already prejudiced against Govindpant, we have seen The Peshwa was conscious of this fact and so had written to Govindpant, early in May 1760, to go to Sadashivrao Bhau per- sonally and satisfy him about the accounts, so as to get into his favour,¹⁸ but it was too late Govindpant was now acting on the defensive Sadashivrao Bhau might have tried to assure him that there was no fear of dismissal in store for him but his words had then exactly the opposite effect on Govind- pant’s mind ¹⁹ Even after this Govindpant did not turn a traitor He tried his best, but perhaps he could not put as much heart and energy into the af- fair as he otherwise might have done To sum up, RAJWADE’S charge against Govindpant is proved as far as his keeping of accounts goes, but not on any other count That the Peshwa should have kept a man of Govindpant’s type in such an important border region as the Doab, was wrong and injudicious A far better and younger sardar was necessary at such a key post A clerk grown into a mamlatdar and exaggerated into a sardar was not a fit man for the post But it seems that no better men were available to the Peshwa, which means he had neither trained nor had engaged better men for the post, showing a defective system of recruitment for filling in various posts To appoint men simply because they are near at hand somehow, is not a proper mode for running an empire Those who think of the rise of obscure and ill educated men into imperial diplomats, governors and generals as an achievement of the Peshwas should bear this point in mind The machinery devised by the Peshwa was not fit and sufficient for carrying on an empire, even the constitution and machinery of a trading com- pany like that of the English East India Company was found better adapted to cope with the times and emergencies, but the Maratha system proved in- ¹⁷ RAJ 11’3 ¹⁸ RAJWADE, 1 182 ¹⁹ Ibid 1.242

THE JUDGMENT 115 effectual in the end Individuals, however great and towering, do not make a nation It is the level of the whole populace that ultimately tells SADASHIVRAO'S PERSONAL FACTORS In the treatment of the Panipat campaign, Sadashivrao has been shown as proud, capricious, self willed, harsh and offensive in his dealings with others In this, both Kashiraj and the Marathi chronicles have combined in the condemnation of Bhau, because both write after the event keeping their eye on the final disaster But this seems incorrect The personal letters of Bhau in the Purandare Daftar¹ bear testimony to the quite different mould of his mind He seems to be a straightforward shy and guileless man in his cor respondence with his equals in the first half of his life before he became the Diwan of the Peshwa in 1752 He is found referring every matter to Dhondo- pant Purandare² who seems to be his guru in the beginning Dhondopant advised him on the points referred to for some time, but later on became weary and stopped giving advice A man who can write in the way he has written to Dhondopant cannot be taken as proud or self willed He fears social ob loquy³ and is found currying favour with the Peshwa his cousin and his wife Gopikabai as well as Sakharam Bapu, Baburao Phadnis and Mahadoba Purandare These secretaries would not initiate Bhau into the state affairs for fear of being ousted from their positions as well as from their unwillingness to interfere in the family squabbles of the Peshwa Sakharam Bapu, the wisest among them, clearly writes to Dhondopant that Bhau is neither proud nor easily led by anybody⁴ Whatever wrong he does he does through ignorance Of course Bhau naturally felt that he belonged to the Peshwa family and was thus to some extent a master and not a servant like the other ministers, though the Peshwa seems to have treated Bhau at first as only one of the secretaries Only after Bhau had shown his capacity for administration and had played a trick with the advice of Ramchandra Bawa the Peshwa was brought to un derstand the real situation and consented to appoint him as the sole Diwan lest Bhau would go to Kolhapur and become a rival Peshwa there As a Diwan, Bhau is found to be an expert in financial matters and strict in admin istration He antagonised most of the sardars and mamlatdars by his strict ness, since they were loose and undisciplined in their dealings Nevertheless the various Kamavisdars trembled before Bhau and would not get his con fidence This had a disastrous consequence in the Panipat campaign One and all had to obey his orders but none did it willingly All would have liked to run away from him at the first opportunity A general must inspire not only awe and respect, but should also be loved by his followers, a thing which was not possible, it seems, in the case of Bhau Bajirao with all his weaknesses was loved by his followers, Sadashivrao was not This was the result not of his ¹ Purandare I 168 169 180 181 182 ² Ibid I 171-3 I 8 180-1 ³ Ibid I 10 1 6-8 197, 211 ⁴ Ibid. I 182 184 Ibid 3 196.

116 PANIPAT: 1761 behaviour during the ten months of the Panipat campaign, but of the im- pression he had created during the previous ten years. It was singularly un- fortunate for the Marathas that such should have been the case at this most critical juncture. The respect and awe with which Shivaji seems to have been looked upon by his contemporaries was not felt in the case of Bajirao and Bhau. Bhau was not strict in his sex-life, as was wrongly assumed by SARDESAI in his Panipat Campaign.⁵ The Purandare Daftar, Part I, bears ample testimony⁶ to Bhau's extra-marital sex life. Perhaps this fact had affected the contem- porary opinion about Bhau in an adverse manner to a certain extent. We do not know whether Kashiraj's statement⁷ that "one of the Bhau's wives escaped" from Panipat on horseback was made under this misapprehension. SADASHIVRAO BHAU AS A GENERAL Sadashivrao Bhau has become the scape-goat of both the sides. He is criticised not only by the opponents but also by his compatriots. The ma- jority of the Marathas thought that the strategy he followed at Panipat was wrong. The Marathas till then had never encamped behind the trenches and arranged their fight on the basis of infantry tactics. The critics on the opposite side think that the whole Maratha system was loose, insubordination being in- grained in the Maratha ranks; there was no proper gradation, no link between the commander-in-chief and the common soldier. But if we compare Bhau with another renowned general of his times in Europe, there does not seem to be any great difference in their ideas about the strategy and tactics of those days. In the battle of Panipat, Abdali had definitely a superiority in the Ruhela infantry under such a consummate captain as Najib Khan. His infantry it was that decided the day by its last tactics. Bhau's infantry under Ibrahim Khan had been used decisively in the beginning of the battle. But it was not followed with advantage by the cavalry at the back. Bhau's per- sonal effort was mainly based on his devoted cavalry, in the use of which he seems to have followed the innovation attributed to Fredric the Great. "Fredric had learnt its value, against the musket of those days, by experience; and he believed that Seydlitz in the open, at the head of 70 squadrons, was a thing which no infantry could resist."¹ But unfortunately for Bhau he first came across the Afghan cavalry under Shah Wali Khan and not against the infantry under Najib Khan, due to his formation of the oblique order in the march out of Panipat. Had the cavalry divisions kept behind the infantry of Ibrahim Khan to support it and take advantage of its invincible attack acted in a valiant and correct manner, there would have been no occasion for Bhau to deliver his side-attack on the Afghan front. Damaji Gaikwad, Vitthal Shivdeo and Yashwantrao Pawar had been placed behind Ibrahim Khan to do their duty. They inadvertantly rushed forward, before the full effect of Ibrahim Khan's grand effort had reached its culmination and created a wide 5 SARDESAI, Marathi Riyasat, Panipat Prakarana, p. 253 6 Purandare 1.212, 241, 289, 293, 311, 345, 364. 7 KASHIRAJ, p. 50. 1 ACTON p. 293.

THE JUDGMENT 117 gap in the weak infantry under the trans Ganges Ruhelas. Their duty was silently to wait for some two hours, though keeping themselves ready on horse- back for any eventuality. Had this order been properly carried out, Bhau and the magnificent Hujrat cavalry which was behind them would have had no occasion to offer a front battle to the Durrani Wazir. They would themselves have followed the rushing cavalry of these three sardars into the gap created by the Gardi fire. Bhau's generalship failed not because his strategy was in- correct, but the tactics were not properly understood by his captains and they seem to have acted as if it was only a cavalry battle. Bhau had till then fol- lowed "the school which taught that actual fighting must not be resorted to until the use of brains has been exhausted, that the battle comes in when the manœuvre has failed, the seizure of the strategic position is the first defence of the armies, so that a force which is tactically inferior may be strategically superior."² Now when all these alternatives had been tried and failed, Bhau was following Fredric in his new doctrine "to act on the principle that noth- ing can destroy the enemy except a pitched battle, and the destruction of the enemy, not the weakning of the enemy, is the right object of war,' knowing that 'even a successful defence weakens the victor." Unfortunately for Bhau he was possibly the only person in the Maratha camp who had understood this principle and the overwhelming majority of his lieutenants were trained in different tactics. They thought Bhau almost a madman to follow this method, their heart was not in it and they deviated from the order of the bat- tle at the first shock and followed their own mind in the later half of the day. Those who were loyal and devoted died with the Commander in Chief, while the rest fled back from the field as soon as it was possible for them to quit the field unnoticed by Bhau. NOT INDIVIDUALS BUT THE SYSTEM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PANIPAT DISASTER Pānipat was a national disaster. A national disaster exhibits all the weak points together with some of the good points of a nation. A national war fought for the prestige of a nation is like an examination for a student. Though the examination lasts for less than a week it is supposed to show the preparation of a year. The physical, the intellectual and the moral capacities all have their play in an examination. Weakness on any of these sides is likely to prove fatal. There are good students who fail in the nick of time or are too weak to complete a paper. There are clever students whose intellect often fails them at the proper time. There are nervous students who have shown their capacity throughout the year but still are found leaving the examination hall all of a sudden. War is a similar test for a state. All the weak points ex- hibited in the Panipat campaign had not cropped up all of a sudden, but were inherent in the Maratha system under the best of the Peshwas. These inherent defects have been very convincingly pointed out by a deep student of Maratha history, Vasudev Vamanshastri KHARE in his invaluable introduction to the 2 Ibid, p. 293.

118 PANIPAT 1761 book Marathe va Ingraj by N C KELKAR, in 1918 The Marathas in the 18th century had nothing original to contribute for the benefit of the Indian people They were imitators and not inventors They tried to imitate the foreign model in war, but never made it their own in all its details The Maratha Constitution was very loose Their military system was no better The policy of nurturing strength by consolidation had given place to wayward wandering on the basis of the line of least resistance The result was as KHARE has tellingly put it "In peace times the Maratha empire was everywhere, but during times of turmoil it was nowhere" (Page 15) Sadashivrao Bhau and the Peshwa were depending upon the sympathy and help of the various states which had paid them tributes, but not one amongst them actually helped the Marathas during the critical Panipat campaign, exemplifying the truth of KHARE'S indictment The Marathas tried to imitate the European war- machine by engaging Bussy's pupils Ibrahim Khan and Muzaffar Khan, but the danger to the Maratha State of this procedure has been clearly exhibited in history Muzaffar Khan was all along a self-willed, arrogant and treacherous person Once he left the Peshwa's service and joined the Nawab of Savnur and was, after his defeat there, on the point of joining the Portuguese at Goa or any one else who would engage him In 1759 he tried to assassinate Sa dashivrao Bhau for personal or political reasons and was beheaded for the at- tempt Ibrahim Khan was personally loyal, faithful and expert, but all along he remained unassimilated in the Maratha mode of warfare The various Maratha officers never felt any comradeship with him and treated him as a foreigner Instead of co operating with him and supporting him in his dif- ficulties, they would sit on the fence and see his effort wasted, all this because he was paid punctually in cash after the European manner, because Bhau treated him with special favour and tried to depend upon him to the heart- burning of others! Because he was treated only as an adjunct to the Maratha cavalry, his system was never understood, much less made their own, by the Maratha Shiledars The result was seen in the battle of Panipat where his superb effort was wasted because the other Maratha sardars never tried to de- fend the square formation nor would they reap the harvest by taking the proper advantage of his initial effort The Marathas did not try to assimilate the foreign system then, nor have they done it subsequently Their political effort and initiative were then, just as they are even now, individual and not collective. The end to be secured was personal rise, prosperity and aggrandise ment The leader is the sole loser in the effort, his followers having no con cern with it except temporary loss of employment The Europeans have perfected their system in such a manner that their united effort does not depend on individual caprice Even amongst them incompetent and selfish individuals occasionally come to the top, but they have little power to play mischief in the perfected system With us the reverse is the case Occasionally good peo- ple come to the top amongst us, but still they have no power to change the system or rather the absence of system existing amongst us Amongst us the individual effort of the best of men is only temporarily and partially effectual for some time and ultimately wasted, the nation never deriving permanent bene- fits therefrom Viewed in this philosophical light, it seems idle either to boom

THE JUDGMENT 119 up or condemn downright an individual, however great personally The final result must be attributed to the static system and cannot be attributed to any one actor in history. DEATH OF NANASAHEB PESHWA The Peshwa's death six months after the battle of Panipat, on 23rd June, 1761, is treated as the last event of the Panipat campaign It is almost thought as a consequence of it That the unexpected disaster unhinged his mind by that tremendous shock, by the loss of all that was dear and valuable, was natural enough, but it is utterly wrong to say that his death was due to it As a matter of fact there seems to have been some hereditary defect in the Peshwa family which made its members prone to sudden collapse of health and wasting diseases The uneven life of camp and war had something to do with it Nor were they free from vices Peshwa Nanasaheb particularly seems to have been inordinately fond of the company of women He loved ease and pleasure Beautiful young girls¹ from northern India were always requisitioned by him This trait of his life had become known throughout India and even the distant Kashiraj, living far away in the north at the Lucknow Court, knew of it and thought it necessary to mention it at the beginning of his account of the battle of Panipat The Peshwa had started from Poona in November and had made known his plan of proceeding to the north to set the matters right at the Delhi court in the company of Nizam Ali, the younger brother of the Nizam Salabat Jang But his march was delayed on account of the "wait and see" tactics of the Nizam brothers Though it was a condition of the peace treaty after the battle of Udgir in the previous year, that the Nizam should join the Peshwa whenever there was any urgent need² and now definitely such a need arose due to the beleagurement of Bhau at Panipat, the Nizam brothers would not move from their cantonments even after the cessation of rains The need for taking Nizam Ali with him to the north arose in a double sense Firstly, his Gardi troops with their fine park of artillery would have been in- valuable in a fight against Abdali and the Ruhelas, next it was dangerous to keep such a mischievous man behind, with power to do what he liked when the Peshwa had moved north with all his troops But this was a political ex- cuse The Peshwa was entangled in other domestic matters also For some time, it seems, he was not keeping on good terms with his wife and had taken it into his head to marry a second time, though three sons from the first mar- riage were available as heirs Match makers had been dispatched far and wide from the one end of Maharashtra to the other He was prepared to marry a girl from any of the three³ sub-castes of Maharashtra Brahmins, Karhada, Deshasthas or Chitpavans, to which last caste he himself belonged The Peshwa's diary shows expenditure incurred in this search for suitable girls where half a dozen girls have been noted The Peshwa had become so weak, irritable and listless that his memory was failing and he could not devote him- ¹ RAJ 1.214, 3 158 ² SPD 40 128. ³ SPD 2 133

120 PANIPAT: 1761 self to any business with full attention. This was natural when we take into account the decline in his health which is noted in many places. In 1755, he was suffering from toothache⁴ which is a sure sign of declining health. In 1758 Sadashivrao Bhau⁵ notes that the Peshwa's health is not what it should be. When at the end of 1759, Bhau started for the Udgir campaign, the Peshwa's health had already become a state problem. He was not in a position to fol- low the campaign himself⁶ with its daily marches. Bhau's one anxiety through- out the Panipat campaign was for the Peshwa's health. He writes⁷ from Delhi on 16th September, 1760, that all problems would be best solved when the Peshwa's health improved. We are at a loss to know why, when things had come to such a pass, the Peshwa was thinking of marriage. It could not have been for mere sex satisfaction, because he had any number of concubines and dancing girls at his service. Three things are suggested as probable causes for marriage. (1) The advice of the Hindu Vaidyas who prescribed young girls as a cure for venereal diseases. A Sanskrit verse states that a tender girl below sixteen adds to the strength of the husband; a youthful one makes her husband youthful like herself,—an elderly woman drains away the strength of her partner; and an old woman leads her partner on his way to death. (Bala tu balada prokta taruni tarunajate, praudha s'aktihara prokta vrddha mrtyuva- sam nayet.) It is not unlikely that some such advice might have been of- fered to the Peshwa, though we do not know whether it falls under the category of medicine or sexual science (Kamasastra). But we have already suggested that this remedy could have been followed even by having extra-marital rela- tions with girls, and so we reject this cause. (2) The second cause which is more probable comes from astrological advice. It is thought that the stars of certain girls so ordain that a person marrying them cannot possibly die, as it is written that these girls have no widowhood ordained for them in their horo- scopes. Of course there is the possibility of the girl herself dying before her husband so as to justify the stars. We presume that the inquiry for girls was possibly based on this point. Though this cause seems more probable, even this is not completely satisfactory, because had the inquiry been only based on horoscopes, it would not have been found necessary to bring all these young girls from distant places, and there was no particular necessity for seeing them unless men who judge horoscopes from bodily features wished to view and ex- amine them. We would have believed such to have been the case, but the Peshwa is found in a somewhat playful mood in marrying, as he not only marries, but makes two of his bosom associates, Aba Purandare and Vireshwar Dikshit Manohar,⁸ marry, side by side. (3) The third cause is equally likely, namely, his quarrel with his first wife, Gopikabai. For one reason or another, they had not been on good terms for some time. The difference of opinion had arisen on account of domestic causes as well as state policy. The episode at Patdur, described in the Bhau Bakhar and Kaifiyat before Sadashivrao's ap- pointment for the Panipat campaign, illustrates one phase of this difference. ⁴ Purandare 3.206 ⁵ Ibid. 3 193. ⁶ SPD 1 10. ⁷ Purandare, 1 389. ⁸ SPD 2.149, pp 162, 171

THE JUDGMENT 121 Nana Phadnis, than whom no veracious and correct writer can be found, writes definitely about this difference in his autobiography.⁹ The irritability of temper and in general the loss of balance of mind, which is ascribed to the Peshwa during his last illness, was not a sudden growth after Panipat, but was a gradual development. Govindpant Bundele¹⁰ notes this change in the Peshwa's temper even from the north. It will be seen from this detailed discussion that the death of the Peshwa had little to do with the shock of Panipat. He would not have survived it long, even if it had ended in a victory. We have thought it necessary to enter into this detailed treatment of the problem as all historians have fallen into the trap by treating it as a result of Panipat We agree with Sir Jadunath¹¹ in thinking that the Peshwa's marriage at Hiradpuri had nothing to do with the issue in the north, because we do not think that the Peshwa was at this time in a fit physical or mental condition to help Bhau by proceeding post haste to the north. It was a national misfortune of the Marathas that the supreme head of the state should, in these critical years not be in a fit condition to direct the affairs of the state with a single minded devotion to the cause of the nation. A Shivaji or Santaji Ghorpade or Baji rao would have possibly relieved Bhau by marching to Delhi in the rear of Abdali in about a month with all the spare troops. Such an exploit was be- yond the capacity of Balaji Bajirao (alias Nanasaheb), to judge from his whole life. HISTORICAL OPINIONS ABOUT THE BATTLE OF PANIPAT That the disaster of Panipat ultimately led to the destruction of the Maratha power, was understood by Rajwade more than forty five years ago.¹ Even before him, other historians had also said the same thing. But while the foreigners were conscious of this result the Marathas were not, which only means that they had no proper understanding of the situation and were thus living in a fool's paradise. On the other hand, the English writers after Plassey seemed to be perfectly conscious of the things shaping in those times. Their knowledge and their self-consciousness ultimately made them the masters of India. A national disaster of the type of Panipat has naturally resulted in cast- 'ing a shadow of gloom over the Maratha nation. But the defeat has been treated differently by various students of history, who have given quite a dif- ferent turn to the whole discussion. Evans BELL wrote long ago that 'even the battle of Panipat was a triumph and a glory for the Marathas. They fought in the cause of 'India for the Indians,' while the great Muhammedan princes of Delhi, of Oude and the Deccan, stood as de, intriguing and trimming. And though the Marathas were defeated, the victorious Afghans retired and never again interfered in the affairs of India." Prof. RAWLINSON writes,² 'A defeat is 9 Ait Patre Yadi 192, RAJ 6 415 10 RAJ 1.143 11 Fall, 2.364 1 RAJWADE I Introduction, p. 46. 2 KASHIRAJ Introduction, p. xiii.

THE JUDGMENT 125 none can say that they were inferior to any in India of those days With all their internal quarrels, no other state in India could muster so many troops for war under a unitary command. No other nation was less bigoted or more tolerant in religious and social matters, as is proved by their behaviour towards their Muslim neighbours or their rule over Muslim subjects. There is no in- stance of their having fabricated a document like Clive, none where they tried to gain a point by assassination or intimidation. They did not hire mercenaries for slaughtering their opponent in an unguarded moment. They would not murder persons by calling them for an interview. They would not kill foreign emissaries at their Court. No other war-like nation is known to be milder in their peace-time actions. There are no instances where the Marathas entered into the slaughter of civilians after a victory, or during conquest to have created terror. It is nowhere noted that they slaughtered disarmed prisoners, like the Durranis after Panipat, or uselessly cut off the head of a fallen soldier as in the case of Dattaji Shinde at Buradi. They did not apply torture to ex- tract hidden wealth like the Afghans at Delhi in 1757. In fact, one feels many a time that their comparative mildness their humane behaviour, their civil man- ners, their unwillingness to gain their ends by back-door machinations or solve their problems, internal or external, by swift unscrupulous actions such as mur- dering an opponent, or doing away with their unwanted brethren like the Mughals, has had the effect of their not succeeding in history. Be that as it may, none can charge them as being morally condemnable in comparison with many other military nations in the world. When a responsible historian of India like Sir Jadunath SARKAR charges the Marathas with being "lesser breeds beyond the law,"³ one does not know how to characterize such a statement and what standard of conduct and morality he wants to apply. He seems to belong to that category of historians-cum moralists "who justify Providence by the event and hold nothing so deserving as success. To them there can be no vic- tory in a bad cause, prescription and duration legitimate, and whatever exists is right and reasonable, and God manifests His will by that which He tolerates. Men must confirm to the divine decree by living to shape the future after the ratified image of the past."⁴ These writers should learn to know that there are many Marathas—perhaps the majority—who think it better to have lost the Empire than to have followed a line of conduct after the manner of a Clive or Najib or Abdali. GENERAL THOUGHTS ON WAR Mankind since it began to think and take a retrospective view of human affairs, has been sharply divided on the moral basis of war, and it will prob- ably remain so divided for all time. Indian civilisation, at least after the Aryan imposition, has not only sanctioned war but has consecrated a particular class for that work and given it the second rank in society. This is in sharp contrast with the neighbouring Chinese civilisation which had relegated the soldier to the last place in society and only tolerated him as an unavoidable ³ Fall II.291 ⁴ Lord Acton, Lectures on Modern History (1907) (Inaugural Lecture) p 25 ,

122 PANIPAT 1761 under some circumstances as honourable as a victory, and never, in all their annals, did the Maratha armies cover themselves with greater glory than when the flower of the chivalry of the Deccan perished on the stricken field of Pani- pat, fighting against the enemies of their creed and country But, after all, the general who wins a campaign is the one who makes the fewest mistakes The Bhausaheb did not commit a tithe of the blunders of both Wellington and Napoleon in the Waterloo campaign He lost not because he was a bad gen- eral, but because his opponent was a better one We have shown above that these opinions are correct as far as they go But that is beside the point The wisdom for the Marathas lay in not coming to grips with such an awkward enemy as Ahmad Shah Abdali Had Panipat resulted in a defeat of the Afghans it would not have meant the same thing to them or to others Nobody was going to invade barren Afghanistan and try to rule over it Instead of consolidating and making sure of what they had got, the Marathas had no business to march forward, lengthen their lines of communication and multiply their responsibilities This wrong policy had begun already with Bajirao s invasion of Delhi in 1736 Geographic fac- tors were completely ignored, because they were completely misunderstood by the Marathas The Marathas boasted all along that the Deccan was as good as theirs," but had never once understood the implications underlying that state ment Even in their hey day before Panipat, others had coolly stolen a march on them The implication of the destruction of the Angre s naval power seems to have been understood by Alivardi Khan³ in Bengal just before his death, but not by the Peshwa The short sighted policy pursued by the Peshwa even after his experience in the Vijayadurg affair resulted in his directly playing into the hands of his enemy and assured Clive's success in Bengal A similar thing occurred at Mysore and made the line clear for Haidar Ali It should never be forgotten that Surat and Janjira never came into the hands of the Peshwa, much less could he have hoped to touch the European citadels on his coast, Bombay and Goa While the Marathas were exhilarated by their march be- yond the Indus, the English were silently entering Surat by the back door of the sea A big army of the Marathas was encamping outside Surat and their navy had also entered the Tapti estuary Diplomats were coming and going and taking sides in the civil struggle at Surat, but still the English could carry on independent correspondence with the Wazir Ghazi ud-din (a so-called crea- ture of the Marathas) and get a Firman from the Mughal Emperor (who thought himself a protege of the Peshwa) appointing them the keepers of the Surat fort and admirals of the Mughal fleet This neglected Surat episode throws a flood of light on Marathi politics during its most triumphant days. Sadashivrao's defects have been well pointed out by the English envoy John

122 PANIPAT 1761 under some circumstances as honourable as a victory, and never, in all their annals, did the Maratha armies cover themselves with greater glory than when the flower of the chivalry of the Deccan perished on the stricken field of Pani- pat, fighting against the enemies of their creed and country But, after all, the general who wins a campaign is the one who makes the fewest mistakes The Bhausaheb did not commit a tithe of the blunders of both Wellington and Napoleon in the Waterloo campaign He lost not because he was a bad gen- eral, but because his opponent was a better one ' We have shown above that these opinions are correct as far as they go But that is beside the point The wisdom for the Marathas lay in not coming to grips with such an awkward enemy as Ahmad Shah Abdali Had Panipat resulted in a defeat of the Afghans, it would not have meant the same thing to them or to others Nobody was going to invade barren Afghanistan and try to rule over it Instead of consolidating and making sure of what they had got the Marathas had no business to march forward, lengthen their lines of communication and multiply their responsibilities This wrong policy had begun already with Bajirao's invasion of Delhi in 1736 Geographic fac- tors were completely ignored, because they were completely misunderstood by the Marathas The Marathas boasted all along that "the Deccan was as good as theirs," but had never once understood the implications underlying that state- ment Even in their hey day before Panipat, others had coolly stolen a march on them The implication of the destruction of the Angre's naval power seems to have been understood by Alivardi Khan³ in Bengal just before his death, but not by the Peshwa The short sighted policy pursued by the Peshwa even after his experience in the Vijayadurg affair resulted in his directly playing into the hands of his enemy and assured Clive's success in Bengal A similar thing occurred at Mysore and made the line clear for Haidar Ali It should never be forgotten that Surat and Janjira never came into the hands of the Peshwa, much less could he have hoped to touch the European citadels on his coast, Bombay and Goa While the Marathas were exhilarated by their march be- yond the Indus, the English were silently entering Surat by the back door of the sea A big army of the Marathas was encamping outside Surat and their navy had also entered the Tapti estuary Diplomats were coming and going and taking sides in the civil struggle at Surat, but still the English could carry on independent correspondence with the Wazir Ghazi ud din (a so called crea- ture of the Marathas) and get a Firman from the Mughal Emperor (wh thought himself a protege of the Peshwa) appointing them the keepers of th Surat fort and admirals of the Mughal fleet This neglected Surat episode throws a flood of light on Maratha politics during its most triumphant days Sadashivrao's defects have been well pointed out by the English envoy John Spencer⁴ four years before Panipat He knew him to be a man with great capacity for business, but as hasty and avaricious, too The impatience men- tioned by the English Vakil was born of ignorance The ignorance was due to the defective educational system or rather absence of a progressive system marching with the times and adequate for making its votaries able to cope with ³ S C HILL, Bengal in 1756-57 (1905), Vol II, pp 16, 65, & ⁴ C H F

THE JUDGMENT 123 any situation arising around them. Balaji Bajirao's studies in Sanskrit were advanced to the extent of writing verses in that language, but there is no evi- dence to prove that the Peshwa had enough geographical information to cope with that of the contemporary Europeans. RAJWADE'S statement⁵ that the Peshwas possessed maps of the various provinces in India is not borne out by any positive proof till after the First Maratha War. What knowledge they pos- sessed was gained from gossipy news or orally from visitors to their Court, but it was not sufficient to make these aspiring conquerors of India visualise either the shape of their country or correctly point to the directions of the various parts of the continent, nor an understanding of its correct extent. This had a disastrous effect on the policy of the Marathas. Their avarice made them grab everything which their hands could reach, but the political repercussions of that grabbing and the pressure it would exert on their military machine they were unable to comprehend. The non comprehension of political and military facts surrounding them is the chief defect which made the Peshwas act as way- wardly as they did. No other reason can explain their actions otherwise. The contrast can be best understood by studying the English documents and publi- cations of those times. All their military campaigns, naval fights, political ag- grandisements, are found fully reported, discussed threadbare and lines of policy deduced therefrom for future guidance. Not an iota of knowledge once gained, not a point of vantage once secured, not an inch of ground once oc- cupied was wasted or lost by them. The Marathas in their career had to go through many a campaign, to enter into diplomatic talks, to carry on political controversies and to devise various ways and means for securing their end, but scarcely any of these things are found published for public edification, for the use of the younger students in various walks of life. A nation which carried on wars in all directions over a wide continent for more than a century, has not produced a single treatise on warfare. That is the basic defect in the nation. Its want could not be supplied by any other means. When one finds such a book published in English in the very year of the Panipat disaster with de- tailed maps, plans of battles, illustrations of the positions of forts giving a visual demonstration of their military situation, naval manœuvres with drawings of the anchored ships, together with their full political and diplomatic back- ground, one is forced to exclaim that want of such training led to the Panipat disaster (Vide R. O. Cambridge's War in India, etc., 1761). THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE PANIPAT CAMPAIGN The Panipat campaign takes away the charge against the Marathas that they were not the rulers of India, but only robbers in the dominions of other rulers. This one campaign bears evidence not only to the military organiza- tion developed under the Peshwas, but also to the fact that they were waging war not for aggrandisement but for the defence of a principle, India for the Indians, governed by Indians. The Peshwa had accepted the responsibility of defending the Mughal Empire from its internal and external foes through his ⁵ RAJWADE, op. cit., p. 99

THE JUDGMENT 123 any situation arising around them. Balaji Bajirao's studies in Sanskrit were advanced to the extent of writing verses in that language, but there is no evi- dence to prove that the Peshwa had enough geographical information to cope with that of the contemporary Europeans. RAJWADE'S statement⁵ that the Peshwas possessed maps of the various provinces in India is not borne out by any positive proof till after the First Maratha War. What knowledge they pos- sessed was gained from gossipy news or orally from visitors to their Court, but it was not sufficient to make these aspiring conquerors of India visualise either the shape of their country or correctly point to the directions of the various parts of the continent, nor an understanding of its correct extent. This had a disastrous effect on the policy of the Marathas. Their avarice made them grab everything which their hands could reach, but the political repercussions of that grabbing and the pressure it would exert on their military machine they were unable to comprehend. The non-comprehension of political and military facts surrounding them is the chief defect which made the Peshwas act as way- wardly as they did. No other reason can explain their actions otherwise. The contrast can be best understood by studying the English documents and publi- cations of those times. All their military campaigns, naval fights, political ag- grandisements, are found fully reported, discussed threadbare and lines of policy deduced therefrom for future guidance. Not an iota of knowledge once gained, not a point of vantage once secured, not an inch of ground once oc- cupied was wasted or lost by them. The Marathas in their career had to go through many a campaign, to enter into diplomatic talks, to carry on political controversies and to devise various ways and means for securing their end, but scarcely any of these things are found published for public edification, for the use of the younger students in various walks of life. A nation which carried on wars in all directions over a wide continent for more than a century, has not produced a single treatise on warfare. That is the basic defect in the nation. Its want could not be supplied by any other means. When one finds such a book published in English in the very year of the Panipat disaster with de- tailed maps, plans of battles, illustrations of the positions of forts, giving a visual demonstration of their military situation, naval manœuvres with drawings of the anchored ships, together with their full political and diplomatic back- ground, one is forced to exclaim that want of such training led to the Panipat disaster (Vide R. O. Cambridge's War in India, etc., 1761).

THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE PANIPAT CAMPAIGN

The Panipat campaign takes away the charge against the Marathas that they were not the rulers of India, but only robbers in the dominions of other rulers. This one campaign bears evidence not only to the military organiza- tion developed under the Peshwas, but also to the fact that they were waging war not for aggrandisement but for the defence of a principle, India for the Indians, governed by Indians. The Peshwa had accepted the responsibility of defending the Mughal Empire from its internal and external foes through his

⁵ RAJWADE, op. cit., p. 99.

124 PANIPAT 1761 agents in 1752. From that date they had waged war against practically all the potentates in India, great and small. Jayapa Shinde had waged war unto death against Bijesingh of Marwar as a Mughal Subahdar of Ajmer and Mal- harrao Holkar had fought against Madhosingh of Jaipur and Surajmal Jat, as a Subahdar of Agra, in order to bring these recalcitrant chiefs under the rule of the Mughal Empire. In the campaign against the Nizam in 1760, Bhau had actually talked with him on the same basis. Bhau had received the Imperial Fir- man¹ from Alamgir II through his confidential secretary Kamyar Khan sent in August 1759 three months before that Emperor's assassination. In it, the Emperor had besought Bhau's help against his unprincipled and unscrupulous Wazir Ghazi ud din whose behaviour had become unbearable to the Emperor. The Emperor had given a carte blanche to Bhau to take over the sole charge of the Mughal Empire, with power to appoint his own Wazir and Mir Bakshi or any other official. The Emperor wished Bhau to arrange matters in such a way as to leave him in the position of the Maratha Chhatrapati at Satara. Those who are ticklish about the constitutional procedure cannot criticize the Marathas with high handedness in their dealings with the various Indian chiefs if they bear in mind this important fact often overlooked by the historians. There was no need for the Marathas to take upon themselves the onerous burden of running the Mughal Empire, had they wished only for self aggrandisement. As a matter of fact, matters became difficult for the Marathas by the acceptance of this burden, because they had to become enemies of all and sundry by this procedure. But they wished to preserve the grand fabric of the Mughal Em- pire in so far as it was possible. They had no wish to sweep away all trace of old rule and begin their rule anew. They did not wish to create anarchy throughout the length and breadth of India. But they were counting against the time. None of the chiefs and potentates who had risen in India during the 18th century, had a wish to lose what they had grabbed or usurped. The selfishness and machinations of these rulers foiled the attempts of the Marathas to run the empire on its Mughal basis. It looks as if it would have been far better for the Maratha state to have run its own course without getting into this entanglement with the Mughal Empire. But this is by the way. The critics of the Marathas cannot charge them with not knowing the constitu- tional ways or want of principles. They tried to follow the constitutional way, they fought for a principle. They understood the responsibility devolving on them by the acceptance of a treaty, which they did not treat as a scrap of paper, to be torn when it did not suit them. They would not sign away the rights of the Mughal Empire even when these had been usurped by such a potentate as Ahmad Shah Abdali. Raghunathrao would not part with Kabul and Kandahar² in 1758, Bhau would not accept the boundary of Sirhind in 1760. In these instances, the Marathas were fighting for regions and rights already lost by the Mughal Empire. Can any one say with this history be- fore him that the Marathas had no idea of a state, that they did not know the constitutional ways, that they had no respect for treaties or had no regard for principles? They certainly aspired to be the Regents of the Indian Empire and ¹ BISMQ 11 p. 44. ² Itihasa Sangraha— Ait. Sphuta Lekha, 1.11.

THE JUDGMENT 125 none can say that they were inferior to any in India of those days With all their internal quarrels, no other state in India could muster so many troops for war under a unitary command No other nation was less bigoted or more tolerant in religious and social matters, as is proved by the r behaviour towards their Muslim neighbours or their rule over Muslim subjects There is no in stance of their having fabricated a document like Clive, none where they tried to gain a point by assassination or intimidation They did not hire mercenaries for slaughtering their opponent in an unguarded moment They would not murder persons by calling them for an interview They would not kill foreign emissaries at their Court. No other war like nation is known to be milder in their peace time actions There are no instances where the Marathas entered into the slaughter of civilians after a victory, or during conquest to have created terror It is nowhere noted that they slaughtered disarmed prisoners, like the Durranis after Panipat, or uselessly cut off the head of a fallen soldier as in the case of Dattaji Shinde at Buradi They did not apply torture to ex tract hidden wealth like the Afghans at Delhi in 1757 In fact, one feels many a time that their comparative mildness, their humane behaviour their civil man ners, their unwillingness to gain their ends by back door machinations or solve their problems, internal or external, by swift unscrupulous actions such as mur- dering an opponent, or doing away with their unwanted brethren like the Mughals, has had the effect of their not succeeding in history Be that as it may, none can charge them as being morally condemnable in comparison with many other military nations in the world When a responsible historian of India like Sir Jadunath SARKAR charges the Marathas with being 'lesser breeds beyond the law,' ³ one does not know how to characterize such a statement and what standard of conduct and morality he wants to apply He seems to belong to that category of historians-cum moralists "who justify Providence by the event and hold nothing so deserving as success To them there can be no vic- tory in a bad cause, prescription and duration legitimate, and whatever exists is right and reasonable, and God manifests His will by that wh ch He tolerates Men must confirm to the divine decree by living to shape the future after the ratified image of the past "⁴ These writers should learn to know that there are many Marathas—perhaps the majority—who think it better to have lost the Empire than to have followed a line of conduct after the manner of a Clive or Najib or Abdali GENERAL THOUGHTS ON WAR Mankind since it began to think and take a retrospective view of human affairs, has been sharply divided on the moral basis of war, and it will prob- ably remain so divided for all time Indian civilisation, at least after the Aryan imposition, has not only sanctioned war but has consecrated a particular class for that work and given it the second rank in society This is in sharp contrast with the neighbouring Chinese civilisation which had relegated the soldier to the last place in society and only tolerated him as an unavoidable ³ Fall II.291 ⁴ Lord Action, Lectures on Modern History (1907) (Inaugural Lecture) p 25 ,

126 PANIPAT 1761 evil Turks who conquered India and held their sway over it for half a mil lennium were a moving nation in arms In addition, the Islamic teachings which they followed had charged them with waging an incessant war upon the infidels till they were converted to Islam When the Marathas rose upon the horizon of history they had perforce to take to the military profession for solving the Indian riddle It was a necessity imposed on them by the Epoch and they had no choice of refusing it How mild and inoffensive the Marathas otherwise are has been proved after the extinction of their sovereign power, for by the end of the 19th century they were relegated to the rank of non martial races in India in the Indo British political phraseology It means that the Marathas as a race take to arms only when they are insulted or forced to as the Chinese monk Yu an Chwang remarked long ago in his itinerary Spilling of blood never became a pastime with them as with the Afghans On the whole, the battles fought by the Marathas were the least bloody, the casualties on both sides being as few as possible Their so called guerilla mode of warfare was nothing more than seeking to gain their ends by manoeuvring and strategy more than by actual crossing of swords face to face Having acted throughout their career in this spirit, they naturally felt intensely such a disaster as Panipat on account of the heavy massacres following it When estimating the effects of Panipat on the Marathas, this fact should not be lost sight of The best of political thinkers have allowed war as a human necessity in solving uncompromising questions Some go so far as to call it a moral neces sity Taking the historic view, certainly the recorded history of mankind is mostly a history of wars waged by the various races of mankind between and amongst themselves as Sir John FORTESCUE says, but all would not agree with him in thinking the military force of a nation as a manifestation of its moral force At the same time it is certain that in history the military force has stood as the test of material civilisation if not of moral The best soldier has always manifested the highest human virtues personally, but collectively it is difficult to characterise war as a school for virtues If sometimes the best qualities of a nation are called forth and mobilised by war, it is also true and much more often true that the worst side of human nature is exhibited and given a licence as a result of war Whether a state lapses into degeneracy as a result of long peace is also a debatable point, because for counteracting such a possibility some- one else has to suffer The cruelty and the futility of war for final settlement of human world problems has become more and more manifest with the progress of modern civilisation and coming together of mankind Be that as it may, speaking about Panipat, it is very correct to say that the inferiority of the Marathas, in the material sense, became very manifest But on the moral side their record is very clean They had not fought for the three primary (and also primitive) aims of war as given by HOBBES, viz (1) material gain, (2) fear, or (3) glory It means they fought for a fourth cause unknown to that political philosopher, viz principle, the sanctity of the contract they had entered into with the Delhi Emperor for the guarding of his Empire On the other hand Ahmad Shah Abdali individually was also fighting for a cause he thought right, viz the cause of Islam in India He triumphed by his superior power, won glory, freed himself from the fear of the Marathas once for all,

THE JUDGMENT 127

but did not gain anything, materially speaking, thus proving the futility of war in the material sense to any party, long before Sir Norman ANGEL wrote his Great Illusion. Incidentally it also proved the correctness of the Maratha stand in the political sense. The Marathas lost the Panjab no doubt, but it was gained not by Abdali a foreigner, but by the Sikhs in the long run. The treacherous Najib-ud-daulah, the arch-villain of the piece, outwardly succeeded in warding off the Marathas, but found himself thrown between two mill- stones—the Sikhs from the north and the Jats from the south—never getting a moment's rest till his death a decade later. The hated Marathas again ruled in Delhi and uprooted Najib's family together with his buried bones in the grave at Najibabad. The trans-Ganges Ruhelas under Hafiz who had joined Abdali as Afghans, also experienced the scourge of the Marathas after Najib's death. Shuja-ud-daulah who had been enticed away into joining the side of Abdali by cajoling and threatening, not only left the Afghan side just after Panipat, but became the annihilator of the Ruhelas with the help of Warren Hastings, thus historically proving that he had acted under "duress" the wrong party. He himself had escaped falling under the suzerainty of the Marathas, only to find himself obliged to fall a victim to the utterly foreign English. In fact, the ultimate result of Panipat was to make the way smooth and clear for the English, a result which could have been avoided only by a victory for the Marathas. History thus vindicates the correctness of the Maratha stand and exposes the basic hollowness of their critics. Further, it also proves the com- plexity of the Afghan border problem, which has not been satisfactorily solved by the British even after a rule of 150 years. The irony of history can have no better illustration than Panipat.

a superior official, but thought him to be an ordinary munshi Kashiraj is self-contradictory in his account of Bhau's behaviour On the one hand, he condemns Bhau on his pride and obstinacy, on the other he depicts Bhau as ready to submit to any conditions mediated through the agency of such persons as Kashiraj himself Now to judge Bhau from his own letters, one thing is certain about him and that is that he was never proud, though his tone was often harsh and his manner peremptory Bhau should be the last person to assume a cringing role before a man of Kashiraj's position or to be over confi- dent about him There seems to be some discrepancy in the account of Kashiraj, as is acknowledged by Sir Jadunath Sarkar who has carefully studied the original manuscript. He thinks it due to lapse of memory or loose narrative of events ⁶ We cannot treat it so lightly Kashiraj tells us of Bhau's writing his last chit just before the battle of Panipat, a thing which no thoughtful person will be ready to believe A commander in chief intimating in his autograph the last desperate movement of his army, just before the commencement of the fatal battle, is a thing which cannot be inserted or allowed in fiction or poetry, much less can it be believed in a primary source of history Was Bhau such a fool as to believe and hope that his last note would bear any good and immediate results, after his experience in diplomacy for six months? Would he not rather fear the fatal consequence of pre-intimating his movement to such a consummate general as Ahmad Shah Abdali? It was a matter of astonishment to us when we tried to study this point deeply and found none of the previous writers even suspecting the full import of this, to us, a cock and bull story We call it such because fortunately for the historian there is the clear evidence of a con- temporary letter directly falsifying Kashiraj's narrative Sir Jadunath in his new translation of Kashiraj's narrative has given the name of Bhau's valet who took the last chit to Kashiraj as Balakram, who is styled as Bhau's betel-bearer, and is taken as the most confidential servant of his master ⁷ Anybody with an acquaintance with the Maratha names knows that Balakram is not a common Maratha name On the other hand, a letter from the Purandare Archives pub- lished by Rajwade in his sixth volume clearly gives the name of Bhau's valet as Balaram, a common name amongst the Marathas ⁸ Anupgir Gosawi writes in this post-Panipat letter to Nana Purandare that the Peshwa's valet, Balaram Vaghoji Naik, and some others also had gone to Shuja-ud-daulah's camp on some errand on the Sunday prior to the battle of Panipat, fought on Wednesday, 14th January, 1761 This proves that the chit Kashiraj is talking of as hav- ing been dramatically sent three hours prior to the battle had been actually sent (if at all) three days previous to it We suggest from this small but vital point that Kashiraj had not only forgotten the days and their proper order, but was narrating the whole story with a dramatic touch, as the battle of Panipat is a good theme for such treatment. 6 Fall 2.369 7 Ibid 2 320 8 Rajwade 6 No 407, p 472. P. F—9

A CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SOURCES (PUBLISHED AND UNPUBLISHED) 1 Kashiraj • Persian account of the battle of Panipat and the events leading to it (Oxford University Press, 1926) Corrected by the translation of Sir JADUNATH SARKAR, published in Indian Historical Quarterly, 1934 and 1935 Kashiraj Shivdev was a Deshastha Brahmin (native of the Nizam's Dominions) at the court of Shuja ud daulah of Oudh, who was present through out the campaign in the camp of his master His narrative is taken as the best authority on the battle of Panipat He seems to have been working in the north for some twenty five years before Panipat since the time of Safdar Jang He had occasional correspondence with the Peshwas¹ for more than twenty years His exact status at the court of Shuja-ud daulah is not quite clear He is called a Vakil or a diplomat, but is scarcely sent anywhere as an emissary with full powers In his account he is found assuming superior airs, standing tightly on his dignity But there is no mention of him in the whole range of Marathi political correspondence,² an omission which seems to us rather significant His account was written nineteen years after the battle of Panipat, and from memory It appears to have been purposely written for some one inquisitive on the point, possibly a British official at the Oudh Court In 1780 when this account was written, the British power in India was already combating with that of the Maratha power The glory of the Maratha power was on the wane Kashiraj, though racially a Maratha, had culturally, by this time, become by his long sojourn in northern India, almost a U P Kayasth with all that it means When he wrote his account he was almost seventy, an age when the mental faculties are on the decline He seems to have been, at first, a disappointed candidate for service under the Peshwa,³ and later on moved to the north in search of employment, which he secured on account of his profi- ciency in the Persian language That there was no particular love lost between him and the Maratha nation or their Empire is evident from the tone of his ac- count. According to him, Sadashivrao Bhau was defeated on account of his arrogance and pride⁴ Throughout his narrative, he seems to have been con- vinced that fate had ordained the miscarriage of the Maratha enterprise⁵ On the other hand, whenever he had occasion to write about Ahmad Shah Abdali, he is found completely over awed by his superior prowess and his divine role of punishing the Marathas for their wicked pride, for in the eyes of Kashiraj, pride is sin This much for the mental make up of the man Bhau's munshi once wrote a letter to Kashiraj at which Kashiraj was offended on account of some deficiency in the proper form of address due to his station It means that the Maratha Court did not think Kashiraj to be 1 SPD 40.25 dated Feb 1741 2 KASHIRAJ 14 3 SPD 30.329 4 KASHIRAJ 52 5 Ibid. 8 IHQ 11.552, 10.266. [128]

CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 129 a superior official, but thought him to be an ordinary munshi Kashiraj is self contradictory in his account of Bhau's behaviour On the one hand, he condemns Bhau on his pride and obstinacy, on the other he depicts Bhau as ready to submit to any conditions mediated through the agency of such persons as Kashiraj himself Now to judge Bhau from his own letters, one thing is certain about him and that is that he was never proud, though his tone was often harsh and his manner peremptory Bhau should be the last person to assume a cringing role before a man of Kashiraj's position or to be over confi dent about him There seems to be some discrepancy in the account of Kashiraj, as is acknowledged by Sir Jadunath SARKAR who has carefully studied the original manuscript. He thinks it due to lapse of memory or loose narrative of events ⁶ We cannot treat it so lightly Kashiraj tells us of Bhau's writing his last chit just before the battle of Panipat, a thing which no thoughtful person will be ready to believe A commander in chief intimating in his autograph the last desperate movement of his army, just before the commencement of the fatal battle, is a thing which cannot be inserted or allowed in fiction or poetry, much less can it be believed in a primary source of history Was Bhau such a fool as to believe and hope that his last note would bear any good and immediate results, after his experience in diplomacy for six months? Would he not rather fear the fatal consequence of pre-intimating his movement to such a consummate general as Ahmad Shah Abdali? It was a matter of astonishment to us when we tried to study this point deeply and found none of the previous writers even suspecting the full import of this, to us, a cock and bull story We call it such because fortunately for the historian there is the clear evidence of a con- temporary letter directly falsifying Kashiraj's narrative Sir Jadunath in his new translation of Kashiraj's narrative has given the name of Bhau's valet who took the last chit to Kashiraj as Balakram, who is styled as Bhau's betel bearer, and is taken as the most confidential servant of his master ⁷ Anybody with an acquaintance with the Maratha names knows that Balakram is not a common Maratha name On the other hand, a letter from the Purandare Archives pub- lished by RAJWADE in his sixth volume clearly gives the name of Bhau's valet as Balaram, a common name amongst the Marathas ⁸ Anupgir Gosawi writes in this post Panipat letter to Nana Purandare that the Peshwa's valet, Balaram Vaghoji Naik, and some others also had gone to Shuja ud daulah's camp on some errand on the Sunday prior to the battle of Panipat, fought on Wednesday, 14th January, 1761 This proves that the chit Kashiraj is talking of as hav ing been dramatically sent three hours prior to the battle had been actually sent (if at all) three days previous to it We suggest from this small but vital point that Kashiraj had not only forgotten the days and their proper order, but was narrating the whole story with a dramatic touch, as the battle of Panipat is a good theme for such treatment. 6 Fall, 2.369 7 Ibid 2 320 8 RAJWADE 6 No 407, p 472 P. F-9