वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

344 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2 2. 13 ADH. 2 ] absolutely different therefrom, so the relation of inherence itself, too, is to be connected with the two related objects by another relation of inherence, its absolute difference (from the two related objects) being the same, that, too, by another relation, and so on—thus there will be an infinite regress Vedānta-kaustubha The phrase: 'on account of the absence of that' is to be supplied For this reason also, the origin and the rest of the world in the successive order of the creation of binary compounds and the rest, due to the conjunction of the atoms is not possible Why? "On account of the admission of the relation of inherence." Among separable objects, there is a relation of conjunction,¹ as between a rope and a pot. Among inseparable objects, on the other hand, there is a relation of inherence,² just as a piece of cloth exists in the threads by the relation of inherence, a pot in the two pot-sherds, cowness in a cow and whiteness and the rest in a piece of cloth. The relation between objects which are causes and effects is just this relation of inherence, and this relation is proclaimed to be one, eternal, and all-pervading like the ether,—on account of the admission of such a relation of inherence—this is the sense If it be asked. What objection is there if such a relation of in- herence be admitted?—(the author) replies: "On account of an infinite regress because of sameness". That is, just as a binary compound, absolutely different from its inherent cause (viz. the two simple atoms), necessarily awaits a relation of inherence (for being connected with them), so the relation of inherence itself, being absolutely different from the two related objects, is to be connected with them by meaus of another relation of inherence,—"because of the sameness" of absolute difference (i.e because there is absolute difference equally in both the cases, also because what is itself unrelated is never observed to be a relation)—that, too, by another relation of inherence, and that, too, and so on; thus "on account of infinite regress", the atomic theory defeats itself ¹ Saṁyoga. ² Samavāya.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 14-15. ADH. 2.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 345 SŪTRA 14 "AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE EXISTENCE (OF) ETERNAL (ACTIVITY AND INACTIVITY) ALONE." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If the atoms be active by nature, there being the existence of (eternal) activity, there will result eternal creation; otherwise there will result eternal dissolution, and hence there is the absence of that (viz. creation). Vedānta-kaustubha For this, too, the atomic theory is untenable. Why? If the atoms be admitted to be active by nature, then there being eternal activity alone, there cannot be dissolution. If, they be admitted to be inactive by nature, there being eternal inactivity alone, the absence of creation will necessarily result—this is the sense. COMPARISON Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva This is sūtra 13 in the commentaries of the first two Interpre- tation different, viz. "(If the samavāya be admitted to be eternal, the terms related by it, viz ternary compounds, etc , i.e. the world too must be) eternal indeed, on account of the existence (i.e. eternity of the samavāya)".¹ SŪTRA 15 "AND ON ACCOUNT OF (THE ATOMS) HAVING COLOUR AND SO ON, THE REVERSE (VIEW WOULD FOLLOW), BECAUSE OF OBSERVA- TION." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha And on account of the atoms having colour and the rest in accord- ance with the respective effects, there must be non-eternity, which is the "reverse" of eternity, (on their part), since pots and the rest, possessed of colour and so on, are observed to be non-eternal. Other- wise, the effects must be devoid of colour, etc. ¹ Śrī. B. 2.2.13, p. 86, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.2 13, p 75, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.2.14, p. 107, Chap 2

[SŪ. 2. 2. 16. 346 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 2 ] Vedānta-kaustubha Since the effects are possessed of colour, etc., the atoms, too, are admitted to be possessed of colour and so on ¹ Thus, since the four kinds of atoms are possessed of colour and so on, i e possessed of colour, taste, smell and touch,—non-eternity, the “reverse” of eternity, results, as pots and the rest, possessed of colour and so on, are found to be non-eternal. If they be not admitted to be possessed of colour and the like, then the fact that the effects are possessed of colour and so on will come to be contradicted, and the initial proposition ‘Pos- sessed of parts and eternal’ too will come to be contradicted. For this reason too, there is the absence of that (viz. creation),—this is the meaning of the particle “and”. The sense is that an unseen object cannot be determined in accordance with what is seen Hence the cause of the world is to be understood in accordance with Scrip- ture. SŪTRA 16 “AND ON ACCOUNT OF FAULT IN BOTH WAYS ” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If the atoms be possessed of more numerous qualities,² then the earth, water, fire and air will become similar. If they be possessed of less numerous qualities,³ then, too, all the different kinds of atoms being connected with one quality each, the earth and the rest too, having qualities corresponding to their causes, must be connected with one quality each,—this “on account of fault in both ways”, there is indeed the absence of that (viz. creation). Vedānta-kaustubha For this reason also, the procedure admitted by the atomists is not possible. Why? Because whether the atoms be admitted to be possessed of more numerous qualities, or to be possessed of less numerous qualities, “in both ways”, too, there is fault. Since the 1 An effect can have no qualities which the cause has not. 2 I.e. every kind of atoms are possessed of the five qualities of colour and the rest. 3 I.e. each be possessed of its peculiar qualities

[sū. 2. 2. 16. ADH. 2 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 347 qualities of the effect are due to the qualities of the cause, all the qualities of the cause, such as colour, taste and the rest, must attach to all the effects As a result, there must be smell and taste in fire; colour, taste and smell in air; and the grossness on the part of the atoms, since the earth, which has the most numerous qualities, is observed to be gross. If they be possessed of less numerous qualities, then all must have one quality each. If this be so, then there must be touch in fire, colour and touch in water; colour, touch and taste in earth, because, those particular qualities are absent from those particular atoms. Otherwise, there will result everything every- where. If it be argued : that the earth is observed to be possessed of colour, taste, smell and touch; water to be endowed with the attributes of colour, taste and touch; the fire to be possessed of colour and touch; and the air is to be possessed of touch. Corresponding to these qua- lities, some atoms are supposed to be possessed of more numerous qualities, others less numerous Hence the above objection cannot be raised,— (We reply :) No; for in that case, too, those that have more numerous qualities will be deprived of their atomicity.¹ In the case in hand, on the other hand, there is no fault whatsoever, since the world has the omniscient and omnipotent Lord of all as its material cause. COMPARISON Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva This is sūtra 15 in the commentaries of the first two. Interpretation different—viz. an elucidation of the previous sūtra, viz. “Because there is fault in both ways”, i.e. either if the atoms be possessed of colour, etc , or if they be not. On the first, they cannot be eternal; on the second, their effects cannot be pos- sessed of colour and the rest.² ¹ Since increase in qualities cannot take place unless there is a simultaneous increase in size. ² Śrī. B. 2 2.15, pp. 86-87, Part 2, ŚK. B. 2 2.15, p. 77, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.2.16, p. 107, Chap. 2

[sū. 2. 2. 17-18. 348 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 3.] SŪTRA 17 "AND BECAUSE OF NON-ACCEPTANCE, (THERE MUST BE AN) ABSOLUTE DISREGARD (FOR THE ATOMIC THEORY)." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Because of the rejection of atomism by the wise, "an absolute disregard" for it is to be shown by those who are desirous of salvation. Vedānta-kaustubha Certain portions,—such as the doctrine of a pre-existent cause and the rest,—of the doctrine of the causality of pradhāna, though rejected on the ground of its opposition to Scripture and reasoning, has been accepted by those who are versed in the Veda. But "because of the non-acceptance", i.e. rejection, by the wise, in toto, of the doctrine of the causality of the atoms, imagined by the Vaiśeṣikas; because of its opposition to reasoning; and because of its opposition to the Veda, "there is an absolute disregard",—i.e. the doctrine of the causality of atoms is to be disregarded by those who wish for the highest. Hence it is established that there is no contradiction of the doctrine of the causality of Brahman by the doctrine of the causality of atoms which is to be rejected from a distance Here ends the section entitled "The great and the long" (2). Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled "The aggregate". (Sūtras 18-27) SŪTRA 18 "EVEN IF THE AGGREGATE HAVING TWO CAUSES (BE ADMITTED), (THERE IS) THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF THAT (VIZ. OF THE AGGREGATES)." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The author is refuting the view of Sugata.¹ Even if the aggregates of the element and the elemental, the mind and the mental be admitted, still then, on account of the non- ¹ I.e. of the Buddhists.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 18. ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 349 sentience of the objects aggregated, as well as on account of non- admission of another cause of the aggregation, the aggregates are not possible Vedānta-kaustubha Kapila, the maintainer of the doctrine of pre-existing effects, holds that pradhāna, not having Brahman for its soul, is the cause of the world He has been refuted by reason of maintaining what is opposed to the doctrine of the causality of Brahman and the Vedic doctrine Kaṇāda, inferior even to him in intelligence and the maintainer of the doctrine of non-existing effects, holds the cause of the world to be of various kinds ¹, and hence he has been refuted by reason of maintaining what is opposed to the ‘great’.² Now, the doctrine of the Buddhists, inferior to that even, is being refuted, on account of its similarity to that.³ The doctrine taught by the Buddha being interpreted differently, four views were propounded by his four classes of disciples. These followers are called, (1) Vaibhāṣika, (2) Sautrāntika, (3) Yogācāra, and (4) Mādhyamika. Among these, the first two maintain the reality of external objects Among them, again, the first maintains that external objects are directly perceivable. According to him, external objects, like pots and the rest, are knowable by the evidence of direct perception. The other maintains that external objects are inferrible through cognitions. According to him, external objects like pots and rest, which are not directly perceived, are inferred through cognitions, produced in the forms of pots and so on and directly perceived. The third maintains the reality of cognitions alone without any substratum. He holds that external objects are like dreams. All of them maintain that the objects admitted by them are momen- tary. The view of the fourth is that everything is void. He holds that the continuous stream of cognitions, freed from object and subject-forms, persists from moment to moment of the basis of past impressions, like a lamp in a place sheltered from wind. But when past impressions are destroyed, it attains a complete extinction like the lamp itself, this attainment of non-existence is salvation. The others, on the other hand, hold that there is no interruption in the ¹ Viz. the four kinds of atoms. ² Vide Br Sū 2.2 17. ³ The Buddhists too admit the aggregation of atoms like the Vaiśeṣikas.

[sū. 2. 2. 18. 350 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 3.] continuous stream of cognitions Among them, the views of the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika will be refuted later But in this section, the views of the realists, viz the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, are being refuted together Thus, they speak of five groups,¹ viz colour, cognition, feeling, name and impression.² Among these, the colour-group consists in the four elements, like the earth and the rest, and the elemental in the form of the body, sense-organs, and sense-objects. Among these, the earth-atoms, possessed of colour, taste, smell and touch, and hard by nature, are aggregated into the form of the earth, the water-atoms, possessed of colour, taste and smell, and viscid by nature, are aggregated into the form of water; the fire-atoms, possessed of colour and touch, and hot by nature, are aggregated into the form of fire, likewise the air-atoms, possessed of touch and mobile by nature, are aggregated into the form of air; and the four elements, like the earth and the rest, are aggregated into the form of body, sense-organs and sense-objects In this way, these four kinds of momentary atoms are held to be the cause of the aggregation of the elements and the elemental The colour-group, consisting of the elements and the elemental and due to the atoms, is the external aggregate. The cognition-group consists in a stream of cognitions like the cognition of a pot, cognition of a piece of cloth, and so on, based on the internal cognition of the 'I', and subsisting uninterruptedly. This alone is the agent, the enjoyer and the soul, and from it alone all ordinary practical transactions proceed The feeling-group consists in pleasur- able or painful experiences. The name-group consists in the cognition of secondary marks, e.g. (in the cognition.) 'a cow possessed of auspiciousness', the cow is distinguished by the secondary mark of auspiciousness. The impression-group consists in the mental qualities of attachment, aversion, delusion, pride, malice, fear, grief, depression and so on. These last four kinds of groups are said to be the mind and the mental. Among these, the cognition-group is said to be the mind or the soul, others mental; and thus they are internally aggregated in such a way as to be the substratum of ordinary practical transactions This is the internal aggregate, due to the four groups, beginning with the cognition-group. The soul and the ether, other than the 1 Skandha. 2 Rūpa, vyñāna, vedanā, samjñā and samskāra.

[SŪ. 2. 2 19 ADH 3.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 351 two aggregates, are non-existent by nature. These two aggregates make the course of mundane existence possible, and practical life being thus made possible, there is no need, it is thought, of an eternal soul (Correct conclusion.) With regard to it we reply: Even if there be the admission, in the above way, of aggregates, i.e. of groups having two causes, still then "there is the non-establishment of that",—i e establishment "of that", viz. of that which has two causes, too, is indeed impossible. The sense is : because the spontaneous aggregation of non-sentient objects, mutually independent, is not possible, and also because of their momentariness, the aggregate of the elements and the elemental, as well as the aggregate of the mind and the mental, are not possible. Further, because of the non-admission of a permanent enjoyer, of a sentient controller—one who brings about the aggregation, of an omniscient and universal Lord, as well as because of the consequence of the world becoming super-sensible by reason of the super-sensibleness of the atoms themselves, the course of mundane existence must disappear The sense is that this view is faulty, since it rejects Brahman, taught by the beginningless Veda; since it admits the aggregates of atoms, unseen and unheard, and since a cause for the aggregation is impossible SŪTRA 19 "IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (ON ACCOUNT OF THE MUTUAL CAUSALITY (OF NESCIENCE AND THE REST), (THE AGGREGATION) IS POSSIBLE, (WE REPLY:) NO, BECAUSE OF (THEIR) NOT BEING THE CAUSE OF AGGREGATION." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha It cannot also be that no account of the mutual causality of nescience, past impressions, cognition, name and form, six supports ¹ and the rest, the aggregation and the rest, are possible,—for they, too, are not the causes of aggregation. ¹ Avidyā, saṃskāra, vijñāna, nāma-rūpa, ṣaḍāyatana, etc. For explanation, see below V.K.

352 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū 2. 2 19 ADH. 3.] Vedānta-kaustubha If it be objected In spite of the non-admission of a sentient and omniscient being as bringing about the aggregation, no harm is done, since our view admits the mutual causality of nescience and the rest That which goes towards the effect as its cause is 'pratyaya', i e the cause; the state of that, no account of that,¹ all aggregation and the rest become possible. Thus, nescience and the rest, functioning from all eternity, are admitted to be the causes of the continuous stream of cognitions. Among these, the word 'nescience' is denotative of error, such as, taking the non-permanent as permanent, taking what is not the way (to salvation) as the way and so on Through it past impressions, consisting in attachment and so on to sense-objects like colour and the like, arises. It is through this that activity springs forth when occasion arises. Activity consists in good and bad deeds, in accordance with the declaration by the Buddha 'There is action, there is result'. Through this alone cognition arises. Thence the four (elements like) the earth and the rest, the cause of the aggregate, viz the body, arise, and that very thing is said to be name because of being the substratum of name From them arises the body, from it the six supports, viz. the five organs of knowledge and the mind, from them touch; from it feeling, viz pleasure, pain and the rest; from it nescience and the rest once more. Thus, the objects revolving unceasingly like water-wheels, aggregation is possible therefrom. Hence, everything in our doctrine is indeed consistent,— (We reply.) "no". Why? "Because of (their) not being the cause of aggregation," i e. because nescience and the rest are not the causes of aggregation; for it can by no means be said that nescience, consisting in the error of taking a person at a distance to be a post, is the cause of the aggregation of the already existing person. Likewise, attachment and the rest too, caused by it (viz. nescience), are not the cause of aggregation. COMPARISON Śaṁkara and Baladeva Reading different, viz. "Itaretara-pratyayatvād iti cen notpatti mātra-nimittatvāt". Interpretation different accordingly: viz. "If it be said that because of the mutual causality (of nescience and the 1 This explains the compound "pratyayatvāt".

[sū. 2. 2. 20. ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 353 rest), (aggregation is possible), (we reply:) no, because of (their) being the causes of the origin only (of the immediately subsequent effects, and not of aggregation)”.¹ Bhāskara Reading slightly different, viz.: “Itaretara-pratyaya-manyat- vāt . . . .” ² ————— SŪTRA 20 “AND BECAUSE OF THE CESSATION OF THE PRIOR ON THE PRODUCTION OF THE SUBSEQUENT.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha For this reason, too, this doctrine is not reasonable,—since “on the production of the subsequent”, there results the destruction of the prior, it being momentary. Vedānta-kaustubha If it be argued that as the prior is the cause of the production of the later, so our doctrine is consistent,—(we reply:) no “Because of the cessation of the prior on the production of the subsequent.” In ordinary life, causality is observed to belong only to an existent lump of clay, the prior, at the time of the production of a pot, the subsequent. But on your view, on account of the momentariness of all existing objects, the prior moment is destroyed and cannot, there- fore, be the cause of the subsequent moment. Here a momentary existence is said to be ‘moment’. Now, to begin with, does the prior moment of the pot ³ give rise to the subsequent effect which exists at the same time, or as itself unoriginated, or as itself destroyed ? The first alternative is not tenable, because that (viz the effect) also (will give rise to) another effect existing at the same time, that, too, to another and so on, and thus everything will last only for a moment simultaneously; and because the conventional distinction between the prior and the subsequent will come to an end. The

¹ S.B. 2.2.19, p. 537; G.B. 2.2.19, pp. 113-114, Chap. 2 ² Bh. B. 2.2.19, p. 117. ³ I.e. the prior momentary existence pot. 23

[SŪ 2. 2. 21. 354 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 3.] second alternative, too, is not tenable, that being impossible More- over, to say that (the cause) is unoriginated is to imply nothing but its non-existence, and if it (viz non-existence) be a cause, then by reason of the absence of obstructions, there may be the origin of everything everywhere. The third alternative, too, is not tenable because the prior being destroyed, there will be again the origin of everything everywhere. It cannot be said that the prior momentary existence persists up to the origin of the subsequent momentary existence, for then, its momentariness will come to be abandoned. SŪTRA 21 "(IF IT BE ADMITTED THAT THE EFFECT ORIGINATES) WHEN (THE CAUSE IS) NOT EXISTENT, (THEN THERE IS) THE CONTRADICTION OF THE INITIAL PROPOSITION, OTHERWISE THERE IS SIMULTANEOUS- NESS." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha On the admission of the origin of the effect when the cause is non- existent, there must result the "contradiction of the initial proposi- tion", viz. that there is the origin of cognitions from four causes, viz. sense-organs, light, direction of the mind and sense-objects. On the admission of the origin of the effect when the cause is existent, there must be the origin of another momentary existence when the prior momentary existence is still present, and thus there must be "simultaneousness" according to your view, the maintainers of the doctrine of momentariness! Vedānta-kaustubha The author condemns the causeless origin of effects. If it be argued that let there be the production of the subsequent (effect) without a cause, and this being so, the above objection cannot be raised—then we reply: If it be admitted that there is the origin of the effect even when the cause is non-existent, then there must be the "contradiction of the initial proposition". Thus, there must be the "contradiction", i.e abandonment, of your initial proposition that in the production of cognitions, there are four causes, the main cause, viz. the sense-organs like the eyes and the rest, the auxiliary cause, viz. light; the immediate cause, viz. the direction of the mind;

[sū. 2. 2. 22. ADH 3.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 355 and the supporting cause, viz the sense-objects ¹ Moreover, even if the causeless origin of effect be admitted, the above-mentioned fault, viz. the origin of everything everywhere, remains unavoidable. If, again, to avoid this difficulty, the case be admitted to be "otherwise", i e if it be admitted that the effect originates when the cause is existent, then there must be "simultaneousness", i e. there must be simulta- neous existence of the cause and the effect. That is, the above- mentioned objection remains in force. Thus, does the prior momentary existence pot come to be the cause of another momentary existence pot at the time when it (the prior) itself exists, or does it become the cause of the subsequent moment,—which is being generated,—by lasting till the time of its production ? In either case, there is simul- taneousness. On the first alternative, all the momentary existences will come to be perceived at the same time, and the conventional distinction between the prior and the subsequent will come to an end. On the second alternative, their momentariness will be abolished, and owing to the persistence of two momentary existences, there must follow a simultaneous perception of two momentary existences in the same place. COMPARISON Baladeva The meaning of the phrase "pratijñoparodhaḥ" different, viz. contradiction of the initial proposition (viz. that the world originates from the skandhas) ² —————— SŪTRA 22 "(THERE IS) THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS DESTRUCTION ³ ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-INTERRUP- TION (OF THE STREAM OF COGNITIONS) " Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha There is no possibility for the causal or causeless destruction,⁴ because there is no possibility of an interruption of the continuous series and because there is a recognition of the members of the series. ———————————————————————————————————————————— ¹ Adhipati, sahakārin, samanantara, ālambana. ² G.B. 2.2.21, pp 115-16, Chap 2. ³ Prati-saṁkhyā and aprati-saṁkhyā. ⁴ For explanation, see below V.K.

356 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 22. ADH. 3.] Vedānta-kaustubha Thus, first the (doctrine of) origin, admitted by the opponents, has been disposed of. Now the (doctrine of) destruction too, admitted by them, is being disposed of The destruction which is preceded by an act of thought is "conscious destruction"; destruction not so preceded is "unconscious destruction". These two kinds of destruction are admitted by them. Among these, the destruction of existing objects,—which is caused by the blow of a hammer and the rest, which consists of the termination of a series of similar momentary existences, and which is perceivable and gross,—is said to be preceded by an act of thought. The destruc- tion of existent objects,—which is not perceivable, subtle, causeless and takes place in a series of similar momentary existences at every moment,—is said to be non-preceded by an act of thought. There is the "non-establishment", i.e. impossibility, of these two kinds of destruction with regard to the continuous series and the single members of the series. Why? "On account of the non-interruption of the series." First, no causal destruction of the series is possible. Thus, it being admitted by you that there is the destruction, at every moment of existing objects with regard to a prior member of the series, it is admitted that in spite of being destroyed, there is the origin from it of a subsequent (member) which is caused by it and is non-existent indeed. The sense is that in spite of a momentary member of the series being destroyed, at that moment, by the blow of a hammer and the rest, the origin of a subsequent member is possible, no account of the absence of impediments, and thereby a subsequent series being possible, the causal destruction of the series is not possible. In the case under discussion, on the other hand, origination and destruction are said to be the different states of clay and the rest that are indeed existent. But, on your view, the interruption of the continuous series is not possible even by the blow of a hundred hammers at all times— this is the sense. Moreover, if there be the destruction of the last member of the series through a cause, then there cannot be properly the destruction of others, too, without causes, and hence there must result the percep- tion of many pots in the place of one pot. It cannot be said also that they are subject to a causeless destruction, taking place at every moment in a series of similar momentary existences, and as such the

[sū. 2. 2. 23. ADH. 3] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 357 above objection cannot be raised,—for then such a destruction being possible on the part of the last member of the series, a causal destruction becomes meaningless. It cannot be said also that there is the origin of a series of dissimilar momentary existences through (the blow of) a hammer and the rest too, and as such the above objection cannot be raised,—because when the prior member is destroyed by a hammer and so on, too, there resulting the origin of a subsequent one, similar to it, by reason of the absence of contrary circumstances, there is no possibility for a series of dissimilar existences; and because of the absence of any reason for the origination of a series of dissimilar existences. A causeless destruction of the series, too, is not possible, for then the disappearance of the entire universe will result In the same manner, these two (viz. the causeless and causal destructions) are not possible with regard to the single members of the series,—for if here the causeless destruction of particular members be admitted, then the destruction once more of the momentary members by the hammer and the rest will be impossible. A causeless destruction, too, cannot become the annihilator of existent objects, since single members of the series, like pots and the rest, are recognized ¹ COMPARISON Bhāskara Reading different, viz "asambhavāḥ" in place of "avicchedāt".² SŪTRA 23 “AND ON ACCOUNT OF FAULT IN BOTH WAYS.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Because the series has no existence beyond the single members of the series, and because single members themselves are momentary, ¹ I.e. there can be no complete destruction of that which is, e.g. when a vessel of clay is smashed to pieces, we still perceive and recognize the material, viz. clay, which continues to exist. ² Bh. B. 2.2.22, p. 120.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 23 358 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 3.] their view, viz. that salvation is the cessation of nescience, too, is inconsistent Vedānta-kaustubha For this reason also, the Buddhistic view is inconsistent. Why? Because there is "fault" in their view of salvation even "in both ways". Thus, salvation is held by them to be the cessation of nescience and the rest Is this (a cessation) of the series or of the single members of the series? Not the first, because as the series has no existence beyond the single members, it (viz the cessation of the series) is incapable of (bringing about) salvation. Not the second, because the single members are momentary Moreover, is salvation, consisting in the cessation of nescience and the rest, due to a cause or not? If the first, i.e. on the view : Salvation arises from the repeated practice of four-fold truths, viz the truth that there is a cause, the truth that there is cessation, the truth that there is suffering and the truth that there is a path ¹ The truth that there is a cause means the knowledge, i e. ascertainment, that everything has an origin. The truth that there is cessation means that everything is momentary. The truth that there is suffering means that everything is full of suffering. The truth that there is a path means that everything is void, everything is soulless,--on this view, the cessation of attachment and the rest being admitted to arise from these, the initial proposition, viz that there is a causeless destruc- tion, is set aside. If the second, the teaching of the means will become futile. And thus there is fault in both the ways COMPARISON Rāmānuja This is sūtra 22 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz.. "Because there is fault in both ways", i.e. the Buddhistic views of origination from nothing and passing away into nothing are both open to objections.² Bhāskara This sūtra is not found in the commentary of Bhāskara

¹ Samudāya, nirodha, duḥkha, mārga. ² Śrī. B. 2.2.22, p. 93.

[sū. 2. 2. 24. ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 359 Śrīkaṇṭha This is sūtra 22 in his commentary too His interpretation is also very similar to that of Rāmānuja, viz on the Buddhist view, the originated effect is unreal, (since it passes away as soon as it arises); also the effect arises from non-existent cause (since the cause which is momentary is no more, when the effect comes to be) Hence the Buddhist view is untenable ¹ SŪTRA 24 “AND IN THE ETHER TOO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-DISTINCTION.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha And the initial proposition enunciated by them was that there is non-existence “in the ether”; ² and this is not reasonable, “on account of (its) non-distinction” from the earth and the rest. Vedānta-kaustubha They maintain that the destruction of existing objects which is preceded by an act of thought, the destruction which is not preceded by an act of thought, and the ether,—these three are non-entities, and as such, non-definable, causeless and unreal. Among these, the two kinds of destruction have been disposed of Incidentally, salva- tion, consisting in the cessation of nescience, has been condemned. Now, the reverend author of the aphorisms, maintaining the demon- strated conclusion of Scripture, is condemning the (doctrine of) the non-definableness of the ether, the remaining one. The initial proposition of the non-substantiality of the ether is not reasonable, “on account of the non-distinction” of the ether, in point of substantiality, from the earth and the rest,—and just as terrestrial animals move on the earth, and the acquatic animals in water, so do the flying animals in the sky,—and also on account of the scriptural declaration of the producibleness of the ether, like other positive entities,—this is indicated by the particle “and” (in the sūtra),—in the passage: “From him arise the vital-breath, the ¹ ŚK. B. 2 2.22, p. 86, Parts 7 and 8. ² I.e. the ether is a non-entity.

[SŪ. 2 2. 25-26. 360 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 3] mind, and all the sense-organs, the ether, the air, the light, water and the earth, the supporter of all” (Muṇḍ. 2.1 3) The substantiality of the ether was approved by the Buddha as well, who said out of compassion: ‘As long as there is the existence of the ether, and as long as there is the existence of the world, so long may there be the existence of me, the destroyer of the sufferings of the world’. COMPARISON Bhāskara This is sūtra 23 in Bhāskara ¹ Interpretation of the word “aviśeṣāt” different; viz. “from the same (scriptural text, viz. Tait. 2 1)” it is known that the ether like the air and the rest, arises from the soul.² SŪTRA 25 “AND ON ACCOUNT OF REMEMBRANCE.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha And on account of the recognition, viz ‘This is that’, this doctrine is untrue. Vedānta-kaustubha For this too the doctrine of momentariness is not reasonable. Why? “On account of remembrance”, i.e on account of the remem- brance of an entity, perceived by one. Hence an eternal soul, the experiencer, must of necessity be acknowledged, otherwise the cessation of all practical activities will result. —————— SŪTRA 26 “(THERE CAN BE NO ORIGINATION) FROM THE NON-EXISTENT, BECAUSE OF NON-OBSERVATION.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha An entity does not arise from a non-entity, “on account of non- observation”. ¹ Written as sūtra 2.2.24 in conformity with Śaṃkara’s number. ² Bh. B. 2.2.23, p. 121.

[sū. 2. 2. 27. ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 361 Vedānta-kaustubha It is assumed by the Buddhists that there is the origin of an entity from a non-entity. This is not reasonable. Why? Because the origin of pots and the rest from non-existent clay, etc is never observed,—on the contrary, their origin from existent clay and the rest alone is observed. COMPARISON Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva This is sūtra 25 in the commentary of Śrīkaṇṭha. He begins a new adhikarana here, ending with the next sūtra, concerned with the refutation of the Sautrāntika school of the realist Buddhists. According to him, the preceding sūtras are concerned with the refutation of the Vaibhāṣika school only But Nimbārka refutes these two schools together. Baladeva also takes this sūtra as concerned specially with the refutation of the Sautrāntika school, though he does not begin a new adhikarana since he takes the next sūtra to be referring to both the schools equally. They interpret the sūtra in the same manner, viz. ("There is no origin of things from) the non-existent, on account of non-perception". That is, the Sautrāntika view that an object is inferred from the impressions left on our mind by it is absurd, for a momentary, and as such a non-existent, something cannot produce any impressions.¹ SŪTRA 27 "AND THUS (THERE WILL BE) ACCOMPLISHMENT ON THE PART OF THE INACTIVE AS WELL." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Otherwise, there may be the "accomplishment" of ends like knowledge and the rest on the part of one who has not resorted to any means. ¹ ŚK. B. 2.2.25, p. 92, Parts 7 and 8, G.B. 2.2.26. p. 122, Chap. 2.

362 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 2. 2. 28. ADH. 4. Vedānta-kaustubha Moreover, just as it is admitted by you that there is the origin of entity from non-entity, so there will result the "accomplishment" of the desired-for effects, through the mere non-existence of implements, even "on the part of the inactive", i.e. on the part of those who have discarded the implements leading to their desired ends. But there is never any attainment of knowledge and the rest by one who is inactive, and a perpetual religious student, leading a life of chastity ¹ and unmarried, never gets a son. Hence, it is established that the demonstrated conclusion of Scripture is not contradicted by the views of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, based on a mere semblance of (and not real) reason Here ends the section entitled "The aggregate" (3). Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled "Percep- tion". (Sūtras 28-31) SŪTRA 28 “(THERE IS) NO NON-EXISTENCE (OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS), ON ACCOUNT OF PERCEPTION.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha There is "no non-existence" of external objects as held by the maintainers of the reality of consciousness alone; but they are, indeed, existent. Why? "On account of perception" Vedānta-kaustubha Now, the view of the Yogācāra is being disposed of. The Yogācāra Buddhist, the maintainer of the reality of consciousness alone, holds that those objects which are other than consciousness are all non-existent. Thus, to think that manifold external objects exist is an error. There are only manifold cognitions which are momentary, variegated, perceptible and have definite forms. Only cognitions like 'blue', 'yellow', which have definite forms, are revealed (directly to the mind). It must be admitted certainly even by the maintainers of the reality of external objects that the cognitions arising from the contact of sense-organs with those particular objects ¹ Naiṣṭhika.

[sū. 2. 2. 28. ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 363 have forms of those objects respectively If this be so, then all practical transactions being possible through those forms alone, what is the use of imagining external objects ? It (viz a cognition) being self-manifesting like a lamp, is directly perceived If what is non- perceived be cognized, then there will be non-distinction between one’s own cognitions and the cognitions of others But there is indeed a distinction (between them). A man acts or refrains from acting on the basis of his own cognitions. This has been declared by Viprabhikṣu as well thus: 'There is no understanding of the meaning of what is non-perceived The cognitive self, though non-divided, is yet looked upon by men of perverted understanding to be possessed of the differences of object perceived, the perceiver and consciousness'. Thus, the object-form is the object to be known, the perceiver-form is the act of knowledge, and his consciousness is the result, and thus these three are imagined in one and the same process of consciousness Hence there are no external objects For this reason also (there are no external objects—viz.). On account of being uniformly perceived together, there is no difference between 'blue' and its cognition. Whenever there is the cognition of blue, blue, too, is cognized at the very same moment Hence, there is no difference between these two For this reason, too, (there are no external objects, viz ) : The cognitions in our waking state are devoid of (i.e. do not correspond to) external objects, because they are mere cognitions, like the dream- cognitions and the rest If it be asked: How can there be a variety of cognitions in the absence of external objects ? We reply: owing to the variety of the past impressions The variety (of cognitions) is explicable by reason of the fact that the cognitions and the past impressions stand in the relation of mutual causes and effects, like the seed and the shoot. (Correct conclusion ) On this suggestion, we reply The non- existence of external objects is not possible. Why ? “On account of perception,” i e. because of the direct perception of external objects, other than cognitions. Although the individual soul, having the stated marks, is eternal knowledge by nature and its attribute of knowledge, too, is indeed eternal like the ray of the sun, yet since it has its knowledge veiled by nescience due to the beginningless māyā,¹ 1 I e. prakṛti or matter.