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[sū. 2. 2. 18. 350 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 3.] continuous stream of cognitions Among them, the views of the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika will be refuted later But in this section, the views of the realists, viz the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, are being refuted together Thus, they speak of five groups,¹ viz colour, cognition, feeling, name and impression.² Among these, the colour-group consists in the four elements, like the earth and the rest, and the elemental in the form of the body, sense-organs, and sense-objects. Among these, the earth-atoms, possessed of colour, taste, smell and touch, and hard by nature, are aggregated into the form of the earth, the water-atoms, possessed of colour, taste and smell, and viscid by nature, are aggregated into the form of water; the fire-atoms, possessed of colour and touch, and hot by nature, are aggregated into the form of fire, likewise the air-atoms, possessed of touch and mobile by nature, are aggregated into the form of air; and the four elements, like the earth and the rest, are aggregated into the form of body, sense-organs and sense-objects In this way, these four kinds of momentary atoms are held to be the cause of the aggregation of the elements and the elemental The colour-group, consisting of the elements and the elemental and due to the atoms, is the external aggregate. The cognition-group consists in a stream of cognitions like the cognition of a pot, cognition of a piece of cloth, and so on, based on the internal cognition of the 'I', and subsisting uninterruptedly. This alone is the agent, the enjoyer and the soul, and from it alone all ordinary practical transactions proceed The feeling-group consists in pleasur- able or painful experiences. The name-group consists in the cognition of secondary marks, e.g. (in the cognition.) 'a cow possessed of auspiciousness', the cow is distinguished by the secondary mark of auspiciousness. The impression-group consists in the mental qualities of attachment, aversion, delusion, pride, malice, fear, grief, depression and so on. These last four kinds of groups are said to be the mind and the mental. Among these, the cognition-group is said to be the mind or the soul, others mental; and thus they are internally aggregated in such a way as to be the substratum of ordinary practical transactions This is the internal aggregate, due to the four groups, beginning with the cognition-group. The soul and the ether, other than the 1 Skandha. 2 Rūpa, vyñāna, vedanā, samjñā and samskāra.

[SŪ. 2. 2 19 ADH 3.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 351 two aggregates, are non-existent by nature. These two aggregates make the course of mundane existence possible, and practical life being thus made possible, there is no need, it is thought, of an eternal soul (Correct conclusion.) With regard to it we reply: Even if there be the admission, in the above way, of aggregates, i.e. of groups having two causes, still then "there is the non-establishment of that",—i e establishment "of that", viz. of that which has two causes, too, is indeed impossible. The sense is : because the spontaneous aggregation of non-sentient objects, mutually independent, is not possible, and also because of their momentariness, the aggregate of the elements and the elemental, as well as the aggregate of the mind and the mental, are not possible. Further, because of the non-admission of a permanent enjoyer, of a sentient controller—one who brings about the aggregation, of an omniscient and universal Lord, as well as because of the consequence of the world becoming super-sensible by reason of the super-sensibleness of the atoms themselves, the course of mundane existence must disappear The sense is that this view is faulty, since it rejects Brahman, taught by the beginningless Veda; since it admits the aggregates of atoms, unseen and unheard, and since a cause for the aggregation is impossible SŪTRA 19 "IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (ON ACCOUNT OF THE MUTUAL CAUSALITY (OF NESCIENCE AND THE REST), (THE AGGREGATION) IS POSSIBLE, (WE REPLY:) NO, BECAUSE OF (THEIR) NOT BEING THE CAUSE OF AGGREGATION." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha It cannot also be that no account of the mutual causality of nescience, past impressions, cognition, name and form, six supports ¹ and the rest, the aggregation and the rest, are possible,—for they, too, are not the causes of aggregation. ¹ Avidyā, saṃskāra, vijñāna, nāma-rūpa, ṣaḍāyatana, etc. For explanation, see below V.K.

352 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū 2. 2 19 ADH. 3.] Vedānta-kaustubha If it be objected In spite of the non-admission of a sentient and omniscient being as bringing about the aggregation, no harm is done, since our view admits the mutual causality of nescience and the rest That which goes towards the effect as its cause is 'pratyaya', i e the cause; the state of that, no account of that,¹ all aggregation and the rest become possible. Thus, nescience and the rest, functioning from all eternity, are admitted to be the causes of the continuous stream of cognitions. Among these, the word 'nescience' is denotative of error, such as, taking the non-permanent as permanent, taking what is not the way (to salvation) as the way and so on Through it past impressions, consisting in attachment and so on to sense-objects like colour and the like, arises. It is through this that activity springs forth when occasion arises. Activity consists in good and bad deeds, in accordance with the declaration by the Buddha 'There is action, there is result'. Through this alone cognition arises. Thence the four (elements like) the earth and the rest, the cause of the aggregate, viz the body, arise, and that very thing is said to be name because of being the substratum of name From them arises the body, from it the six supports, viz. the five organs of knowledge and the mind, from them touch; from it feeling, viz pleasure, pain and the rest; from it nescience and the rest once more. Thus, the objects revolving unceasingly like water-wheels, aggregation is possible therefrom. Hence, everything in our doctrine is indeed consistent,— (We reply.) "no". Why? "Because of (their) not being the cause of aggregation," i e. because nescience and the rest are not the causes of aggregation; for it can by no means be said that nescience, consisting in the error of taking a person at a distance to be a post, is the cause of the aggregation of the already existing person. Likewise, attachment and the rest too, caused by it (viz. nescience), are not the cause of aggregation. COMPARISON Śaṁkara and Baladeva Reading different, viz. "Itaretara-pratyayatvād iti cen notpatti mātra-nimittatvāt". Interpretation different accordingly: viz. "If it be said that because of the mutual causality (of nescience and the 1 This explains the compound "pratyayatvāt".

[sū. 2. 2. 20. ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 353 rest), (aggregation is possible), (we reply:) no, because of (their) being the causes of the origin only (of the immediately subsequent effects, and not of aggregation)”.¹ Bhāskara Reading slightly different, viz.: “Itaretara-pratyaya-manyat- vāt . . . .” ² ————— SŪTRA 20 “AND BECAUSE OF THE CESSATION OF THE PRIOR ON THE PRODUCTION OF THE SUBSEQUENT.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha For this reason, too, this doctrine is not reasonable,—since “on the production of the subsequent”, there results the destruction of the prior, it being momentary. Vedānta-kaustubha If it be argued that as the prior is the cause of the production of the later, so our doctrine is consistent,—(we reply:) no “Because of the cessation of the prior on the production of the subsequent.” In ordinary life, causality is observed to belong only to an existent lump of clay, the prior, at the time of the production of a pot, the subsequent. But on your view, on account of the momentariness of all existing objects, the prior moment is destroyed and cannot, there- fore, be the cause of the subsequent moment. Here a momentary existence is said to be ‘moment’. Now, to begin with, does the prior moment of the pot ³ give rise to the subsequent effect which exists at the same time, or as itself unoriginated, or as itself destroyed ? The first alternative is not tenable, because that (viz the effect) also (will give rise to) another effect existing at the same time, that, too, to another and so on, and thus everything will last only for a moment simultaneously; and because the conventional distinction between the prior and the subsequent will come to an end. The

¹ S.B. 2.2.19, p. 537; G.B. 2.2.19, pp. 113-114, Chap. 2 ² Bh. B. 2.2.19, p. 117. ³ I.e. the prior momentary existence pot. 23

[SŪ 2. 2. 21. 354 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 3.] second alternative, too, is not tenable, that being impossible More- over, to say that (the cause) is unoriginated is to imply nothing but its non-existence, and if it (viz non-existence) be a cause, then by reason of the absence of obstructions, there may be the origin of everything everywhere. The third alternative, too, is not tenable because the prior being destroyed, there will be again the origin of everything everywhere. It cannot be said that the prior momentary existence persists up to the origin of the subsequent momentary existence, for then, its momentariness will come to be abandoned. SŪTRA 21 "(IF IT BE ADMITTED THAT THE EFFECT ORIGINATES) WHEN (THE CAUSE IS) NOT EXISTENT, (THEN THERE IS) THE CONTRADICTION OF THE INITIAL PROPOSITION, OTHERWISE THERE IS SIMULTANEOUS- NESS." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha On the admission of the origin of the effect when the cause is non- existent, there must result the "contradiction of the initial proposi- tion", viz. that there is the origin of cognitions from four causes, viz. sense-organs, light, direction of the mind and sense-objects. On the admission of the origin of the effect when the cause is existent, there must be the origin of another momentary existence when the prior momentary existence is still present, and thus there must be "simultaneousness" according to your view, the maintainers of the doctrine of momentariness! Vedānta-kaustubha The author condemns the causeless origin of effects. If it be argued that let there be the production of the subsequent (effect) without a cause, and this being so, the above objection cannot be raised—then we reply: If it be admitted that there is the origin of the effect even when the cause is non-existent, then there must be the "contradiction of the initial proposition". Thus, there must be the "contradiction", i.e abandonment, of your initial proposition that in the production of cognitions, there are four causes, the main cause, viz. the sense-organs like the eyes and the rest, the auxiliary cause, viz. light; the immediate cause, viz. the direction of the mind;

[sū. 2. 2. 22. ADH 3.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 355 and the supporting cause, viz the sense-objects ¹ Moreover, even if the causeless origin of effect be admitted, the above-mentioned fault, viz. the origin of everything everywhere, remains unavoidable. If, again, to avoid this difficulty, the case be admitted to be "otherwise", i e if it be admitted that the effect originates when the cause is existent, then there must be "simultaneousness", i e. there must be simulta- neous existence of the cause and the effect. That is, the above- mentioned objection remains in force. Thus, does the prior momentary existence pot come to be the cause of another momentary existence pot at the time when it (the prior) itself exists, or does it become the cause of the subsequent moment,—which is being generated,—by lasting till the time of its production ? In either case, there is simul- taneousness. On the first alternative, all the momentary existences will come to be perceived at the same time, and the conventional distinction between the prior and the subsequent will come to an end. On the second alternative, their momentariness will be abolished, and owing to the persistence of two momentary existences, there must follow a simultaneous perception of two momentary existences in the same place. COMPARISON Baladeva The meaning of the phrase "pratijñoparodhaḥ" different, viz. contradiction of the initial proposition (viz. that the world originates from the skandhas) ² —————— SŪTRA 22 "(THERE IS) THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS DESTRUCTION ³ ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-INTERRUP- TION (OF THE STREAM OF COGNITIONS) " Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha There is no possibility for the causal or causeless destruction,⁴ because there is no possibility of an interruption of the continuous series and because there is a recognition of the members of the series. ———————————————————————————————————————————— ¹ Adhipati, sahakārin, samanantara, ālambana. ² G.B. 2.2.21, pp 115-16, Chap 2. ³ Prati-saṁkhyā and aprati-saṁkhyā. ⁴ For explanation, see below V.K.

356 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 22. ADH. 3.] Vedānta-kaustubha Thus, first the (doctrine of) origin, admitted by the opponents, has been disposed of. Now the (doctrine of) destruction too, admitted by them, is being disposed of The destruction which is preceded by an act of thought is "conscious destruction"; destruction not so preceded is "unconscious destruction". These two kinds of destruction are admitted by them. Among these, the destruction of existing objects,—which is caused by the blow of a hammer and the rest, which consists of the termination of a series of similar momentary existences, and which is perceivable and gross,—is said to be preceded by an act of thought. The destruc- tion of existent objects,—which is not perceivable, subtle, causeless and takes place in a series of similar momentary existences at every moment,—is said to be non-preceded by an act of thought. There is the "non-establishment", i.e. impossibility, of these two kinds of destruction with regard to the continuous series and the single members of the series. Why? "On account of the non-interruption of the series." First, no causal destruction of the series is possible. Thus, it being admitted by you that there is the destruction, at every moment of existing objects with regard to a prior member of the series, it is admitted that in spite of being destroyed, there is the origin from it of a subsequent (member) which is caused by it and is non-existent indeed. The sense is that in spite of a momentary member of the series being destroyed, at that moment, by the blow of a hammer and the rest, the origin of a subsequent member is possible, no account of the absence of impediments, and thereby a subsequent series being possible, the causal destruction of the series is not possible. In the case under discussion, on the other hand, origination and destruction are said to be the different states of clay and the rest that are indeed existent. But, on your view, the interruption of the continuous series is not possible even by the blow of a hundred hammers at all times— this is the sense. Moreover, if there be the destruction of the last member of the series through a cause, then there cannot be properly the destruction of others, too, without causes, and hence there must result the percep- tion of many pots in the place of one pot. It cannot be said also that they are subject to a causeless destruction, taking place at every moment in a series of similar momentary existences, and as such the

[sū. 2. 2. 23. ADH. 3] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 357 above objection cannot be raised,—for then such a destruction being possible on the part of the last member of the series, a causal destruction becomes meaningless. It cannot be said also that there is the origin of a series of dissimilar momentary existences through (the blow of) a hammer and the rest too, and as such the above objection cannot be raised,—because when the prior member is destroyed by a hammer and so on, too, there resulting the origin of a subsequent one, similar to it, by reason of the absence of contrary circumstances, there is no possibility for a series of dissimilar existences; and because of the absence of any reason for the origination of a series of dissimilar existences. A causeless destruction of the series, too, is not possible, for then the disappearance of the entire universe will result In the same manner, these two (viz. the causeless and causal destructions) are not possible with regard to the single members of the series,—for if here the causeless destruction of particular members be admitted, then the destruction once more of the momentary members by the hammer and the rest will be impossible. A causeless destruction, too, cannot become the annihilator of existent objects, since single members of the series, like pots and the rest, are recognized ¹ COMPARISON Bhāskara Reading different, viz "asambhavāḥ" in place of "avicchedāt".² SŪTRA 23 “AND ON ACCOUNT OF FAULT IN BOTH WAYS.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Because the series has no existence beyond the single members of the series, and because single members themselves are momentary, ¹ I.e. there can be no complete destruction of that which is, e.g. when a vessel of clay is smashed to pieces, we still perceive and recognize the material, viz. clay, which continues to exist. ² Bh. B. 2.2.22, p. 120.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 23 358 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 3.] their view, viz. that salvation is the cessation of nescience, too, is inconsistent Vedānta-kaustubha For this reason also, the Buddhistic view is inconsistent. Why? Because there is "fault" in their view of salvation even "in both ways". Thus, salvation is held by them to be the cessation of nescience and the rest Is this (a cessation) of the series or of the single members of the series? Not the first, because as the series has no existence beyond the single members, it (viz the cessation of the series) is incapable of (bringing about) salvation. Not the second, because the single members are momentary Moreover, is salvation, consisting in the cessation of nescience and the rest, due to a cause or not? If the first, i.e. on the view : Salvation arises from the repeated practice of four-fold truths, viz the truth that there is a cause, the truth that there is cessation, the truth that there is suffering and the truth that there is a path ¹ The truth that there is a cause means the knowledge, i e. ascertainment, that everything has an origin. The truth that there is cessation means that everything is momentary. The truth that there is suffering means that everything is full of suffering. The truth that there is a path means that everything is void, everything is soulless,--on this view, the cessation of attachment and the rest being admitted to arise from these, the initial proposition, viz that there is a causeless destruc- tion, is set aside. If the second, the teaching of the means will become futile. And thus there is fault in both the ways COMPARISON Rāmānuja This is sūtra 22 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz.. "Because there is fault in both ways", i.e. the Buddhistic views of origination from nothing and passing away into nothing are both open to objections.² Bhāskara This sūtra is not found in the commentary of Bhāskara

¹ Samudāya, nirodha, duḥkha, mārga. ² Śrī. B. 2.2.22, p. 93.

[sū. 2. 2. 24. ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 359 Śrīkaṇṭha This is sūtra 22 in his commentary too His interpretation is also very similar to that of Rāmānuja, viz on the Buddhist view, the originated effect is unreal, (since it passes away as soon as it arises); also the effect arises from non-existent cause (since the cause which is momentary is no more, when the effect comes to be) Hence the Buddhist view is untenable ¹ SŪTRA 24 “AND IN THE ETHER TOO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-DISTINCTION.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha And the initial proposition enunciated by them was that there is non-existence “in the ether”; ² and this is not reasonable, “on account of (its) non-distinction” from the earth and the rest. Vedānta-kaustubha They maintain that the destruction of existing objects which is preceded by an act of thought, the destruction which is not preceded by an act of thought, and the ether,—these three are non-entities, and as such, non-definable, causeless and unreal. Among these, the two kinds of destruction have been disposed of Incidentally, salva- tion, consisting in the cessation of nescience, has been condemned. Now, the reverend author of the aphorisms, maintaining the demon- strated conclusion of Scripture, is condemning the (doctrine of) the non-definableness of the ether, the remaining one. The initial proposition of the non-substantiality of the ether is not reasonable, “on account of the non-distinction” of the ether, in point of substantiality, from the earth and the rest,—and just as terrestrial animals move on the earth, and the acquatic animals in water, so do the flying animals in the sky,—and also on account of the scriptural declaration of the producibleness of the ether, like other positive entities,—this is indicated by the particle “and” (in the sūtra),—in the passage: “From him arise the vital-breath, the ¹ ŚK. B. 2 2.22, p. 86, Parts 7 and 8. ² I.e. the ether is a non-entity.

[SŪ. 2 2. 25-26. 360 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 3] mind, and all the sense-organs, the ether, the air, the light, water and the earth, the supporter of all” (Muṇḍ. 2.1 3) The substantiality of the ether was approved by the Buddha as well, who said out of compassion: ‘As long as there is the existence of the ether, and as long as there is the existence of the world, so long may there be the existence of me, the destroyer of the sufferings of the world’. COMPARISON Bhāskara This is sūtra 23 in Bhāskara ¹ Interpretation of the word “aviśeṣāt” different; viz. “from the same (scriptural text, viz. Tait. 2 1)” it is known that the ether like the air and the rest, arises from the soul.² SŪTRA 25 “AND ON ACCOUNT OF REMEMBRANCE.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha And on account of the recognition, viz ‘This is that’, this doctrine is untrue. Vedānta-kaustubha For this too the doctrine of momentariness is not reasonable. Why? “On account of remembrance”, i.e on account of the remem- brance of an entity, perceived by one. Hence an eternal soul, the experiencer, must of necessity be acknowledged, otherwise the cessation of all practical activities will result. —————— SŪTRA 26 “(THERE CAN BE NO ORIGINATION) FROM THE NON-EXISTENT, BECAUSE OF NON-OBSERVATION.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha An entity does not arise from a non-entity, “on account of non- observation”. ¹ Written as sūtra 2.2.24 in conformity with Śaṃkara’s number. ² Bh. B. 2.2.23, p. 121.

[sū. 2. 2. 27. ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 361 Vedānta-kaustubha It is assumed by the Buddhists that there is the origin of an entity from a non-entity. This is not reasonable. Why? Because the origin of pots and the rest from non-existent clay, etc is never observed,—on the contrary, their origin from existent clay and the rest alone is observed. COMPARISON Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva This is sūtra 25 in the commentary of Śrīkaṇṭha. He begins a new adhikarana here, ending with the next sūtra, concerned with the refutation of the Sautrāntika school of the realist Buddhists. According to him, the preceding sūtras are concerned with the refutation of the Vaibhāṣika school only But Nimbārka refutes these two schools together. Baladeva also takes this sūtra as concerned specially with the refutation of the Sautrāntika school, though he does not begin a new adhikarana since he takes the next sūtra to be referring to both the schools equally. They interpret the sūtra in the same manner, viz. ("There is no origin of things from) the non-existent, on account of non-perception". That is, the Sautrāntika view that an object is inferred from the impressions left on our mind by it is absurd, for a momentary, and as such a non-existent, something cannot produce any impressions.¹ SŪTRA 27 "AND THUS (THERE WILL BE) ACCOMPLISHMENT ON THE PART OF THE INACTIVE AS WELL." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Otherwise, there may be the "accomplishment" of ends like knowledge and the rest on the part of one who has not resorted to any means. ¹ ŚK. B. 2.2.25, p. 92, Parts 7 and 8, G.B. 2.2.26. p. 122, Chap. 2.

362 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū. 2. 2. 28. ADH. 4. Vedānta-kaustubha Moreover, just as it is admitted by you that there is the origin of entity from non-entity, so there will result the "accomplishment" of the desired-for effects, through the mere non-existence of implements, even "on the part of the inactive", i.e. on the part of those who have discarded the implements leading to their desired ends. But there is never any attainment of knowledge and the rest by one who is inactive, and a perpetual religious student, leading a life of chastity ¹ and unmarried, never gets a son. Hence, it is established that the demonstrated conclusion of Scripture is not contradicted by the views of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, based on a mere semblance of (and not real) reason Here ends the section entitled "The aggregate" (3). Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled "Percep- tion". (Sūtras 28-31) SŪTRA 28 “(THERE IS) NO NON-EXISTENCE (OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS), ON ACCOUNT OF PERCEPTION.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha There is "no non-existence" of external objects as held by the maintainers of the reality of consciousness alone; but they are, indeed, existent. Why? "On account of perception" Vedānta-kaustubha Now, the view of the Yogācāra is being disposed of. The Yogācāra Buddhist, the maintainer of the reality of consciousness alone, holds that those objects which are other than consciousness are all non-existent. Thus, to think that manifold external objects exist is an error. There are only manifold cognitions which are momentary, variegated, perceptible and have definite forms. Only cognitions like 'blue', 'yellow', which have definite forms, are revealed (directly to the mind). It must be admitted certainly even by the maintainers of the reality of external objects that the cognitions arising from the contact of sense-organs with those particular objects ¹ Naiṣṭhika.

[sū. 2. 2. 28. ADH. 4.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 363 have forms of those objects respectively If this be so, then all practical transactions being possible through those forms alone, what is the use of imagining external objects ? It (viz a cognition) being self-manifesting like a lamp, is directly perceived If what is non- perceived be cognized, then there will be non-distinction between one’s own cognitions and the cognitions of others But there is indeed a distinction (between them). A man acts or refrains from acting on the basis of his own cognitions. This has been declared by Viprabhikṣu as well thus: 'There is no understanding of the meaning of what is non-perceived The cognitive self, though non-divided, is yet looked upon by men of perverted understanding to be possessed of the differences of object perceived, the perceiver and consciousness'. Thus, the object-form is the object to be known, the perceiver-form is the act of knowledge, and his consciousness is the result, and thus these three are imagined in one and the same process of consciousness Hence there are no external objects For this reason also (there are no external objects—viz.). On account of being uniformly perceived together, there is no difference between 'blue' and its cognition. Whenever there is the cognition of blue, blue, too, is cognized at the very same moment Hence, there is no difference between these two For this reason, too, (there are no external objects, viz ) : The cognitions in our waking state are devoid of (i.e. do not correspond to) external objects, because they are mere cognitions, like the dream- cognitions and the rest If it be asked: How can there be a variety of cognitions in the absence of external objects ? We reply: owing to the variety of the past impressions The variety (of cognitions) is explicable by reason of the fact that the cognitions and the past impressions stand in the relation of mutual causes and effects, like the seed and the shoot. (Correct conclusion ) On this suggestion, we reply The non- existence of external objects is not possible. Why ? “On account of perception,” i e. because of the direct perception of external objects, other than cognitions. Although the individual soul, having the stated marks, is eternal knowledge by nature and its attribute of knowledge, too, is indeed eternal like the ray of the sun, yet since it has its knowledge veiled by nescience due to the beginningless māyā,¹ 1 I e. prakṛti or matter.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 29. 364 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 4 ] it errs in cognizing objects in birth after birth, as well as in one birth even. And it knows once more the sun and the rest, installed by the Highest Self, as well as the objects collected by its father and fore- fathers, which are all already existent, from the surrounding company of people. The sense is that, hence, there is no non-existence of the objects which are different from knowledge, the sun and the moon, fire, mountain, the earth, water, cow, horse and the rest being established on the ground of direct perception. The argument,—viz. It is to be admitted certainly even by the maintainers of the reality of external objects that cognitions arising from the contact of sense-organs with those particular objects have the forms of those objects respectively. If this be so, then all practical transactions being possible through those forms alone, what is the use of imagining external objects?—is not tenable, since in the absence of objects, the cognitions of the objects cannot have forms similar to them. Thus, an external object is other than knowledge and its knowledge is other than it. The argument—viz. that owing to their being uniformly perceived together, there is no difference between blue and its perception,—too, is not tenable, for there is an admission of difference through this very admission of a simultaneous perception.¹ SŪTRA 29 "AND ON ACCOUNT OF DISSIMILARITY, (THE WAKING COGNITIONS ARE) NOT LIKE DREAMS AND THE REST." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The baselessness of the cognitions of the waking state cannot be established on the analogy of the dream-cognitions and the rest, on account of there being no parallelism between the two cases; as well as on account of dream-consciousness too, having a basis. 1 That is, to say that A and B are perceived together is to say that there is a difference between them. Otherwise there is no sense in saying that A and B are perceived together.

[sū. 2. 2. 30. ADH. 4 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 365 Vedānta-kaustubha To the argument, viz. The cognitions in the waking state do not correspond to external objects, because they are mere cognitions, like the dream-cognitions and the rest, we reply. It cannot be said that the cognitions in the waking state are without a basis "like dreams and the rest", i.e. like the dream- cognitions and the illusory cognitions. Why? "On account of dissimilarity," i. e. because there is dissimilarity between the cognitions in the waking state and the dream-cognitions, as the former are due to attentive sense-organs, while the latter to inattentive sense-organs; also because—as indicated by the particle "and" (in the sūtra)— even the dream-cognitions have bases. ————— SŪTRA 30 "THE EXISTENCE (OF PAST IMPRESSIONS) NOT (POSSIBLE), ON ACCOUNT OF NON-PERCEPTION" Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Moreover, the "existence" of past impressions is admitted by you in order that there may be variety in knowledge; this is not possible, since according to your view, external objects are not perceived. Vedānta-kaustubha Moreover, if knowledge be without a basis, then its varieties, such as the knowledge of a pot, the knowledge of blue, the knowledge of yellow and so on, are not possible. If it be said that past impressions are the cause of the variety of knowledge,—(we reply). "the existence" of past impressions is not possible on your view. Why? "On account of non-perception", i.e. because of the non-perception of the cause of past impressions, or, because no such cause is possible on your view. The direct perception of external objects is the cause of past impressions, and that is not possible in your case, owing to your non-admission of external objects

366 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 31. ADH. 4.] COMPARISON Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha This is sūtra 29 in their commentaries. Interpretation slightly different, viz. “The existence (of cognition devoid of corresponding things) is not (possible), because of non-perception”.¹ SŪTRA 31 “ON ACCOUNT OF MOMENTARINESS ” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha There is no existence of past impressions, “on account of the momentariness” of their substratum on your view. Vedanta-kaustubha For this reason, too, the existence of past impressions is not possible. Why? “On account of the momentariness” of their sub- stratum, the receptacle-consciousness,² viz. the ‘I’, as well as of the single members of the uninterrupted series. Hence, the variety of knowledge is due to the variety of objects. Therefore, it is established that the settled conclusion of Scripture is not contradicted by the Yogācāra view which is but a childish prattle. Here ends the section entitled “Perception” (4) COMPARISON Śaṁkara and Baladeva They add a “ca” at the end ³ 1 Śrī. B. 2.2.29, p. 102, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.2.29, pp. 97-98, Parts 7 and 8. 2 Ālaya-vijñāna. The Vijñāna-skandha consists of vijñānas or cognitions of two kinds, ālaya-vijñāna and pravṛtti-vijñāna. The former consists of cogni- tions which refer to the ‘I’, the ego, while the latter those that refer to the so- called external objects. 3 Ś.B. 2.2.31, p. 557, G.B. 2.2.31.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 32. ADH 5 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 367 Rāmānuja, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha This sūtra is not found in their commentaries Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled "Incon- sistency in every way". (Sūtra 32) SŪTRA 32 “AND BECAUSE OF THE INCONSISTENCY (OF THE DOCTRINE OF A UNIVERSAL VOID) IN EVERY WAY.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The doctrine of void, too, is erroneous, because it is inconsistent “in every way”, being opposed to the evidence of direct perception and the rest. Vedānta-kaustubha Now the doctrine of universal void, as held by the Mādhyamikas, is being disposed of (The view is as follows·) All the objects mentioned in the sacred works composed by the omniscient one (viz the Buddha), are simply for the sake of suiting the intellectual capacities of his disciples, but are not really existent, owing to the impossibility of the origin and destruction (of things). The origin of entity from non-entity is inappropriate (And if an entity arises from another entity, the question is.) Is the entity which arises from another entity dissimilar to the latter or similar ? If the first, then there will be the origin of everything everywhere. If the second, then fruitlessness would result like the grinding of what has already been ground ¹ Owing to such inexplicability of origin, destruction, too, is inexplicable Hence, the doctrine of void is to be accepted. Thus, salvation consists in attaining a state of void,—such is the view of the Buddha. And this is perfectly reasonable, since void is not proved by anything else, (but is self- proved). The conventional distinctions of perceiver and the object perceived and so on are mere errors. 1 I e. on the first alternative a gold ring may arise from clay; on the second, there is no sense in producing something already existent, gold (ring) from gold.

368 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 32. ADH. 5.] With regard to it we reply The doctrine of universal void does not stand to reason. Why? Because if the maintainer of the doctrine of universal void be unreal, then there will result the reality of all; if real, then there will result the abandonment of the initial proposition. "And on account of the inconsistency, in every way," of the doctrine of universal void, the view that everything is void is unreasonable,— because the entire world is perceived to be true both by the disputant and the respondent, because there is no proof of void, and because it is in conflict with the Buddha's doctrine, establishing the existence of momentary objects. The sense is that the view of the Mādhyamikas who maintain that everything is void, who are unacquainted with the process of origination and destruction, and who are just like an owl not perceiving the sun by reason of defective eyesight, is erroneous in every way. It is established, thus, that there is not even an odour of contradiction in the view of Scripture. Here ends the section entitled "Inconsistency in every way" (5). COMPARISON Śaṁkara Interpretation different. He takes it as a refutation of the Buddhist doctrine in general, not particularly of the doctrine of universal void. He points out at the end of sūtra 31 that the third school of Buddhism, viz. the doctrine of universal void, is set aside by all evidence, and as such requires no special and separate refutation.¹ Bhāskara This sūtra too is not found in his commentary. He points out at the end of sūtra 29 (sūtra 30 according to Nimbārka) that the doctrine of universal void is refuted through the refutation of the doctrine of the sole reality of cognitions.² ¹ Vide Ś.B. 2.2.31, p. 558. ² Bh. B. 2.2.29 (written as 2.2.30 in conformity with Śaṁkara's number), p. 125.

[sū. 2. 2. 33. ADH. 6.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 369 Adhikarana 6 The section entitled "Impossible in one". (Sūtras 33-36) SŪTRA 33 "(THE JAINA DOCTRINE IS) NOT (TENABLE), ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY (OF CONTRADICTORY ATTRIBUTES) IN ONE (AND THE SAME THING)." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The Jainas ascribe contradictory attributes like existence and non-existence and so on to all things. This does not stand to reason, because the co-existence of contradictory attributes, like existence and non-existence and the rest, is impossible, like that of shadow and light. Vedānta-kaustubha The view of the Buddhists, who leave the hem of their lower garment loose and untucked, has been disposed of. Now the view of the Jainas, the naked, are being disposed of They hold that the universe comprises souls and non-souls, and is without a Lord. They maintain also that atoms are the causes of the world. They imagine couples of contradictory attributes, like existence and non-existence, in all the categories. Thus, according to them, there are seven categories, summing up all scriptural teachings, viz. soul, non-soul, influx (of foreign matter into the soul), (its) stoppage, freedom from decay, bondage and release.1 Among these, the souls are sentient, and endowed with the attributes of knowledge, perception, happiness and strength. Thus, knowledge means the apprehension of the real nature of objects through the right discrimination between the soul and the non-soul. Perception means cognizing objects, being free from attachment and detachment The souls in bondage have worldly happiness, while the freed souls have the happiness which inheres in themselves. Likewise strength means proper endurance. These souls are possessed of parts, and are of the size of the body. Among them, some are souls in bondage, some are freed souls, some are ever-perfect The freed souls are omniscient and possessed of unsurpassed happiness. 1 Jīva, ajīva, āsrava, saṁvara, nirjara, bandha and mokṣa. 24