पानीपत १७६१ (मराठा साम्राज्य एवं पानीपत महायुद्ध इतिहास)

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PĀNĪPAT VICINITY AT PRESENT SCALE FURLONGS 8 4 0 1 2 3 4 MILES

मानचित्र पर प्रमुख अंकित विवरण / Prominent Text on Map:

• मुख्य स्थल / Major Town: PĀNĪPAT (पानीपत)
• नदियाँ एवं नहरें / Rivers & Canals:
  • JUMNA RIVER (यमुना नदी)
  • W. J. CANAL / WESTERN JUMNA CANAL (पश्चिमी यमुना नहर)
• दिशानिर्देश / Direction: North Indicator (उत्तर दिशा सूचक चिन्ह)
• अक्षांश एवं देशांतर / Coordinates:
  • 29° 25' N — 29° 20' N
  • 76° 55' E — 77° 10' E

CHAPTER V PANIPAT To judge from the letters which were sent out in the first fortnight¹ from the Maratha camp at Panipat and even for a month after, the Maratha army and its commander² seem to be quite confident of victory This seems strange when we remember the hardships which the Maratha army had to bear since it started for the north, seven months earlier Not that they had no proper understanding of the strength of Abdali's army, but the spectacular vic- tory at Kunjpura and freedom from want of grain and fodder which followed seem to have worked out a change in the despondent mood on the Maratha side They had seen with their eyes the strength and use of Ibrahim Khan's splendid corps which, as Kashiraj says, 'in the twinkle of an eye smashed the defences of Kunjpura fort and entered it in no time" Intimate friends of Bhau, like Nana Purandare and Krishna Joshi Sangmeshvarkar, are not only confident but over-jubilant with expectancy of (what they judged as) Abdali's sure defeat It is true that full stomachs are prone to create enthusiasm and confidence, still it is strange to think that these intimates of Bhau who should have known better, were writing in the vein they have done Even Bhau is found writing in the same tone for a month more. Only during the last fort- night the crisis seems to have developed though even then Janakoji Shinde³ --writing no doubt to the revenue collector--does not betray any sign of hope- lessness when giving out the news at Panipat This is in sharp contrast with the writing of Kashiraj and the whole tone of it The Marathi chronicles, though they do not enumerate the events in a similar tone, are found criticizing Bhau for his attitude during the entire struggle It is difficult to believe that all the writers on the Maratha side were ignorant, not to understand the real situation and the strategy of such a consumate general as Abdali, and still that is the impression created while reading Kashiraj and even historians like Sir Jadunath Now we know by complete analysis of the whole material that, because the chroniclers wrote after the event, and because they wanted to shift and fix the responsibility of the disaster on those who had not survived it, they have assumed a sliding attitude so as dramatically to break on the rock of final disaster But we think this methodology wrong in history, and for that reason have not accepted chronicles as history where psychology plays a part In the first fortnight, before Abdali could build up his line of com- munication to bring in the supplies from the Doab and beyond, his army was definitely in a weak position, and comparatively the Maratha army was in a better position Why Bhau did not try to decide the conflict by a bold attack at that favourable juncture, we cannot say He seems to have put his faith in quite a different strategy--that of tiring out Abdali and his allies and mak- ing them fall on his well-fortified, almost impregnable lines In this strategy ¹ SPD 21 197, 27, Raj 1.261, 62, 64, 65, Purandare 391 ² SPD 2 134 ³ Shinde 1.222 [62]

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PANIPAT 63 Bhau was depending upon the activities of Govindpant Bundele and Naro Shankar. Had they succeeded in cutting off Abdali’s supplies and making him move from his camp, Abdali would have had only two alternatives before him, either to run away to his home without offering a battle, or attacking the Mara- thas in their strong positions. We do not think that it would have been dif- ficult for him and his allies to disperse to their homes, as suggested by Krishna Joshi in his letter,⁴ though ostensibly his road to Afghanistan was blocked by the Maratha camp at the very onset. But Govindpant was scarcely a fit man to carry out the orders of Bhau, because primarily he was not a soldier but a civilian. The military circumstances in the regions surrounding his area have also to be taken into account. Not only were the Rajput zamindars, with their strong fortalices, disaffected towards the rule of the Marathas internally, but externally also the Ruhela chiefs and Shuja’s nominee, Veni Bahadur, were vigilant and bent on taking advantage of the difficulties of the Marathas Shuja had taken only a small part of his army to the battlefield, leaving the main portion under Veni Bahadur⁵ to defend his dominions in his absence. Shuja himself had only willynilly gone to Abdali under strong pressure for avoiding the invasion of his own territories by Abdali and his Ruhela allies, and never took any important part in the whole campaign or in the final bat- tle. By his behaviour he was insuring his safety between two powerful rivals. When Bhau blames Govindpant for not devastating Shuja’s dominions so as to exert a pressure on him to return to his dominions for defence, he seems to be unaware of the fact that there was sufficient army on the spot to defend it. Govindpant’s leaving his dominions meant exposing them to an invasion by Veni Bahadur, as was found to his cost by Gopalrao Govind Barve⁶ in his attempt.⁷ But sometimes it is necessary to take the risk of completely exposing one’s dominions in order to gain a necessary military advantage. Only a man like Frederick the Great of Prussia or a Madhavrao Peshwa could dare it and reap the harvest. It was too much to expect such an action from Govindpant, and when he tried to perform it for escaping the charge of disobedience, he had to pay for the attempt with his life and complete defeat. This exposition should convince the reader that Bhau’s strategy was based on precarious means, and he was misguided in depending on a man of Govindpant’s calibre. There were other means of gaining his end, but Bhau never seems to have tried these. In the last resort, why Bhau should have waited up to the breaking point of the 14th of January, completely passes our understanding. Bhau knew of Govindpant’s death on 23rd December, and we can find no excuse for Bhau to defer the attack for three weeks, thus weak- ening still further the Maratha side during this long interval by starvation, exposure and disease. The only suggestion that might explain Bhau’s delay is the idea of his waiting for the coming of Nanasaheb from the Deccan so as to catch Abdali between two grind-stones. This suggestion finds no conclusive evidence in documents. The Peshwa seems to have been informed by his son, ⁴ Raj. 1.265. ⁵ A. L. Shrivastava, op cit., pp. 94, 111. ⁶ Ibid. 111. ⁷ See the section on The Trans-Ganges raids further on.

94 PANIPAT: 1761 Vishwasrao, and some other men about the gravity of the Maratha situation at Panipat, and if the Peshwa had correctly judged the situation, he should certainly have gone immediately to succour his cousin. From the correspondence it seems that the Peshwa had not received any communication from Bhau for more than a month, which means that Abdali was successfully intercepting all couriers. On the other hand, when the Peshwa's suspicions about the real state of the army in the north had reached their climax and silent dread had taken their place, he is found writing to Bhau in an almost repentent tone for not having done his duty, or, as previously promised, succoured Bhau. From this letter, the Peshwa seems to have promised to send a contingent from the Deccan so as to reach Panipat in February 1761.* If Bhau was hoping to carry on till this promised contingent reached its destination, by being able somehow to get supplies, then a different turn would have been given to the whole narration of the campaign. Apart from the truth of such a promise, it looks impossible from the military point of view that the promised help could have reached Bhau in time. If Bhau had been able to get supplies ad infinitum, there was no particular point why he should be wanting support from the south. If supplies were not forthcoming, the coming of the support would not have helped the matters in any way, at least not in time. Only such an il- lustrious captain of cavalry as Bajirao could possibly have reached Panipat in time to be of any help. But there was no such man available at Poona, at least not of such great calibre, to lead this express expedition. All these con- siderations, which historians can discuss at leisure now, should have been bet- ter understood by Bhau. He should have made up his mind, at least after Govindpant's death, to offer battle—whatever the result—then and there, without waiting till the last day, as he actually did. This waiting seems to

64 PANIPAT 1761 Vishwasrao, and some other men about the gravity of the Maratha situation at Panipat, and if the Peshwa had correctly judged the situation, he should certainly have gone immediately to succour his cousin. From the correspondence it seems that the Peshwa had not received any communication from Bhau for more than a month, which means that Abdali was successfully intercepting all couriers On the other hand, when the Peshwa's suspicions about the real state of the army in the north had reached their climax and silent dread had taken their place, he is found writing to Bhau in an almost repentent tone for not having done his duty, or, as previously promised, succoured Bhau From this letter, the Peshwa seems to have promised to send a contingent from the Deccan so as to reach Panipat in February 1761 ⁸ If Bhau was hoping to carry on till this promised contingent reached its destination, by being able somehow to get supplies, then a different turn would have been given to the whole narration of the campaign Apart from the truth of such a promise, it looks impossible from the military point of view that the promised help could have reached Bhau in time If Bhau had been able to get supplies ad infinitum, there was no particular point why he should be wanting support from the south If supplies were not forthcoming, the coming of the support would not have helped the matters in any way, at least not in time Only such an il lustrious captain of cavalry as Bajirao could possibly have reached Panipat in time to be of any help But there was no such man available at Poona, at least not of such great calibre, to lead this express expedition All these con siderations, which historians can discuss at leisure now, should have been bet- ter understood by Bhau He should have made up his mind, at least after Govindpant s death, to offer battle—whatever the result—then and there, without waiting till the last day, as he actually did This waiting seems to have considerably changed the prospect of giving the slip to the enemy, for- tune favouring, and marching past Abdali to Delhi, after losing only a part of the army instead of the whole For, on the 30th of December, 1760, Abdali changed his camp for the last time, and leaving his river side position, took post directly across the imperial road to Delhi so as completely to block the Maratha movement to the south We shall now proceed to describe the strategical position in the area surrounding Panipat This city is situated on the slopes of a small hillock, less than a hundred feet in height above the surrounding plain. In ancient times, the river Jamuna is reputed to have passed along the eastern edge of the * hill, but now it is some eight miles away to the east The river changes its course now and then, and we cannot be very sure what its actual course was in 1760 From our observations, it seems to have been a mile to the west of its present course in some places The river does not flow in one stream always, but now and then divides into a number of channels when it comes into a comparatively plain country Nowhere is the edge along the bank more than thirty feet high In most places it is less than twenty, and the average is somewhere near ten. There are large areas along the banks on both sides where there is scarcely any edge visible, the flood-water spreading far and wide into the interior where it ⁸ Purandare 1.395, Bhau Kaifiyat p. 20.

TO FACE PAGE 65 POSITIONS OF THE RIVAL CAMPS FROM 3RD TO 30TH NOVEMBER 1760 SCALE FURLONGS 8 6 4 2 0 1 2 3 4 5 MILES N KOH-I-MAULANA W. JUMNA CANAL SH. BEG UGRA KHERI SH. SHARAFUDDIN SIKANDARPUR SIKANDARPUR KHURD SH. FAKHRUDDIN BABARPUR MACHHROULI RAJAHERI NANHERA JUMNA RIVER SANOLI KALAN SHAH KUTUB PANIPAT V. THAL SH. GTY. B. DILIR KHAN SH. FAZLULLAH J. ABDUL AZIZ D. ALI KHAN SIKANDARPUR DILIRPUR SANOLI KHURD SH. HUSAIN D. ALI KHAN D. ALI KHAN MARATHA CAMP GAURI SHANKAR NALA AM SIWAH SIWAH KHURD KABIR RESHAPUR SONDHAPUR CHHAJJPUR KALAN JALALPUR RASLAPUR OLD JUMNA BED KHERI NANGAL PATTAN M. ALIPUR JALALPUR RAMPUR JAUHPUR ABDALI CAMP DIWANA PASINA KALAN PASINA KHURD GAURA KALAN GAURA KHURD M. B. BARTANKE, D. G. S.

creates a marsh and a bog To the south-east of Panipat such a condition prevails near the village of Goyenla At such places, ferrying by boats is neither possible nor necessary during the fair season, and people ford the river through knee-deep to chest deep water Where the edges are sharp and the river basin narrow—though nowhere would it be less than half a mile in breadth—the waters generally collect in one deep stream wh ch has then to be crossed by boat. This situation must ever be borne in mind when visualising Abdali's movements and changing camps The Maratha army had chosen for its camp the site to the north west and south west of Panipat The imperial road passed directly through the town of Panipat, and the Maratha army had completely taken possession of it on the northern side Though there is no mention of the canal in any original letter on Panipat, we believe that the famous Alı Mardan Khan Canal was still⁹ flowing along or at a short distance to the west of the Maratha camp, thus at once supplying a part of the camp with water, and also acting as a fosse to the Maratha camp on that side The Maratha camp seems to have spread over a long distance to the north of Panipat, if we are to believe in the traditional description supplied by the ballad singer o Siwa It provides the information that the 700 elephants of Bhau were kept at Gharonda, which is ten miles to the north of Panipat. Incidentally, it means that there was a sufficient water supply for these elephants in the vicinity, sug gesting that the place must be along a tank or canal ¹⁰ We have come to this conclusion from the fact that there was no complaint about the dearth of water, though there was a dearth of everything else Abdalı first came dı rectly opposite to Panipat with a view to meeting the Marathas and deciding the contest at one stroke But the Marathas, entrenching themselves strongly foiled Abdalı s plan of taking a quick decision by direct attack From their secure base they were able to defy hım in his camp and even to assume an of fensive Bhau marched out of his moat a little under the cover of his strongly placed guns, built temporary stands for his movable guns and from them opened fire on Abdalı s camp ¹¹ The shots reaching Abdalı s tents and killing his men and anımals, obliged hım to vacate it and pitch again at a distance of some five miles to the south east along the river bank near the villages of Behrampur, Bapaulı, Mırzapur and Goyen'a ¹² In making this retrograde movement, Abdali seems to have cared for the supply of water which was per haps completely stopped by the Marathas using up the canal water higher up above Panipat, as well as for the easy communication with the Doab by merely fording the river, so as to need no boats to fetch his supplies The Marathas had hit upon a well protected site, no doubt, with the canal marshes on the west side, the Panipat hill on the east side and a deep broad, dry moat on the front and facing side But once entrenched, they had no space to move one way or the other, while Abdalı remained free to change his camp as it suited hım At first his line had spread along the Dahad, Siwa, Risalu villages, but in a few days he receded and settled down along the Dimana village This first 9 See Appendix. "Was the Imperial Canal Flowing, etc" at the end of this chapter 10 BDCRI 41 3 11 SPD 2.131 12 Raj 3.224 Bhau Kaifiyat p 14, SPD 2.131, BDCRI 4.1 2-81 P F.-9

66 PANIPAT: 1761 camp he changed between the 26th and the 30th of November as a result of Bhau's cannonading as stated above, when he retreated to the riverside, the centre of the battlefield between the two armies lying along the village of Chhajpur. The reputed wooden war-pillar¹³ erected by the Marathas and found described in the Bakhar was somewhere on the plain of Chhajpur, and here the fight on the 7th of December took place, resulting in the death of Balvantrao Mehendale. For a month Abdali remained in the second camp till he moved to Pasina on 30th December, and his line spread across the im- perial road to Dimana. The main site of the final battle was between Risalu and Nimbdi This last move on the part of Abdali obliged Bhau to change his final plan of battle to suit the new disposition by Abdali. During the first month, or almost for five weeks, the Maratha army was on the aggressive. Every day they came out with their field guns, supported by some sardar's contingent, to the front and tried to cut off anyone from the Afghan side who had come out of his camp for skirmishing, or was loitering on the plain. The Pendharis on the Maratha side wandered round Abdali's camp and carried away horses, camels and even elephants which had been let loose for grazing outside. Still nobody from Abdali's side would come out and try to protect their animals and men The discipline in Abdali's camp was of the strictest type and he had issued orders to his army not to stir out of the camp and offer battle themselves. This seems to be due to the superiority of the long-range fire on the Maratha side. The big guns placed advantageously on the mud ramparts surrounding the Maratha camp were able to mow down anyone coming within their range for some two miles. The Marathas cap- tured more than a thousand horses, four hundred camels and four elephants during the first three weeks.¹⁴ The guns on the Afghan side were also not less effective though somewhat shorter in range, and their shots also could reach and kill men in the Maratha trenches. Krishna Joshi met his death from one such shot while he was sitting in his kitchen behind the trenches.¹⁵ But Abdali had probably taken the decision of not attacking in order to economise his powder and shot, which he thought could be used more effectively in an open battle. On the 22nd November there was a lunar eclipse and the Maratha camp was rather inactive on account of this. No one had possibly come out of the camp that day as usual. Abdali's Wazir Shah Wali Khan had come out to watch the Marathas that day. Seeing no danger nearby, he ventured to go very near the Maratha lines in the course of his patrol. As he was wait- ing near a well, the Maratha troops on the opposite side saw him and came out suddenly to take advantage of his unprotected state. A desperate battle ensued and the Wazir had great difficulty in holding his ground. But the Afghans in the rear were also watchful and ran to his rescue. Shinde's men drove them all back to their lines and inflicted considerable loss on them The Wazir lost four hundred of his troops and double that number were wounded.¹⁶ The loss on the Maratha side was forty dead and one hundred and fifty. —————————————— 13 Bhau Kaifiyat, p. 15; BDCRI 4.179 verse 36 14 SPD 21.197. 15 Ibid. 16 JADUNATH.SARKAR, op. cit., 2.302; Aitihasika Patra Vyavahar p. 97.

PANIPAT 67 wounded.¹⁷ The Marathas were able to capture more than a hundred horses and but for the nightfall the result would have been still more decisive, as men from that part of the Abdali camp which was attacked by the Marathas had begun to run away from their posts. There was again a similar skirmish after a few days, with no decisive result. The tone of the rank and file in the Maratha army, as well as of the commander-in-chief himself, is found to be all optimistic for over a month, and there is no ground for taking Kashiraj as a correct reporter for this period. Not only are Kashiraj's forebodings incor- rect, but the tone also of his narrative is vitiated by his personal predilections. As Abdali had to retreat from his first position to the riverside, it is proved thereby that the Marathas were in the ascendant till then. Kashiraj describes with awe all the actions of Abdali. He praises his arrangement to guard his camp and to watch the other side day and night. As no such vivid description is forthcoming from the Maratha side, a wrong impression is created in the mind of the reader, and he thinks that there was no such system followed by the Marathas. This is absolutely wrong. Just as parties of thou- sands were appointed to guard the camp on the Afghan side, similarly the Marathas were also mounting guard and patrolling around their camp at night. Kashiraj says that the Afghan monarch was in the habit of going round not only his own camp and that of his allies, but he also took a round about the entire Maratha camp from a distance, and every day returned by noon after having ridden fifty kos in person with a small escort. This seems a gross exaggeration of Kashiraj. We do not think that the Maratha watch- men and patrols were so slack as not to see even once the Afghan monarch go- ing round their camp during a period of more than two months, and one can guess that it was impossible for the daily rounds of Ahmad Shah to go un- seen, at whatever distance he might be encircling the Maratha camp. We also think that it was geographically not possible. The canal on the west side of the Maratha camp was a great impediment to such a movement, and on the east side also the land was not very favourable for such an excursion. The river on the north-east side coming very near and the bogs and the zils, which exist to this day, do not make such a supposition look feasible. Only during the last fortnight, when the Maratha army had become quite despondent and taken to heart the lesson of cold massacre, the Afghan monarch might have indulged in his rounds, though at great risk even then to himself. Kashiraj was perhaps remembering this last period when he wrote nineteen years after, and made it applicable to the whole period of two and a half months. A fortnight after the Wazir's discomfiture, a major engagement took place between the two armies. As we have noted above, Abdali had moved to the riverside by then. As the Afghan camp had now gone far beyond the range of Maratha fire and in a somewhat difficult terrain, and as the Afghans would not come out of their own accord to offer a battle, it became a teasing problem for the Marathas to pass the days in futile inactivity. The Marathas, therefore, hit upon a plan to call them out. At some distance from 17 Bhau Kaifiyat, p. 24

68 PANIPAT. 1761 the Maratha camp, and to the south east of it, they began to clear the jungle so as to make easy approach possible $^{18}$ They cut down the thick bushes of short palasa (dhak) trees and prepared a somewhat level battle field and planted a pillar there The site of this new battle field seems to have been, from the description in the ballad,$^{19}$ at Chhajpur, beyond which a big nullah separated it from the Afghan camp They began to drag out their movable cannon to this place and, standing behind them, to challenge the other side to come out and dare battle Cut to the quick by these challenges, the Ruhelas one day came out and began an engagement by firing from a distance The Marathas advanced a little but by this time it was about sunset Seeing that the Marathas would take some time to reach back to their camp, Najib's brother came out to deliver a flank attack as the Maratha army turned its face in the direction of their camp At this unexpected attack the Marathas had to leave their guns and run pell mell, which again drew the Ruhelas far- ther on, close on their heels They almost reached the edge of the Maratha camp when soldiers from the camp came out, finding their comrades in danger The Ruhela cavalry fled away, taking advantage of the pitch darkness of that new moon night, but their infantry was closed in from all sides They fought with their usual bravery and created havoc in the Maratha camp by their marksmanship They were well nigh defeated, with great slaughter of fifteen hundred Ruhelas, and pursued upto a distance But in the midst of this vic- tory, Balvantrao Mehendale received a bullet shot and came down from his horse Seeing that he was a sardar of some consequence, the Afghans tried to cut off his head so as to carry it as a trophy back to their camp, but some Maratha horsemen, noticing it, turned back to snatch it away just when it was being cut Khanderao Naik Nimbalkar was responsible for dragging back the corpse of Balvantrao Mehendale by the feet in the thick of that fight, though himself wounded Both parties then returned to their camps Though the Marathas were victorious, the death of Balvantrao had taken away the zest out of it from them There was a great wailing in the Maratha camp on that night of the 7th December, 1760 Balvantrao's wife, Lakshmibai, was one of the few women who had accompanied their husbands to that famous battlefield Her son, Krishnarao, alias Appa Balvant of later fame, a boy of fourteen or so, was also with them in the camp, still she at once took the decision of of- fering herself as a Sati on her husband's funeral pyre No dissuasion by Bhau himself or by the mother of Nana Fadnis, who was Balvantrao's sister, was able to change her decision She courageously made over her son to Bhau's care and faced immolation, making that incident the most dramatic in the whole Panipat campaign The seventh of December is taken as a turning point in the Panipat campaign No doubt it deprived Bhau of a most intimate lieutenant. The biased Maratha Bakhars and, following them, some Persian chronicles, have shown Balvantrao as the villain of the piece The Kaifiyat merely depicts the difference of opinion between Bhau's advisers from the south, and the north $^{18}$ Ibid. 14-5 $^{19}$ BDCRI 4.179

TO FACE PAGE 68 POSITIONS OF THE RIVAL CAMPS FROM 1ST DEC. TO 30TH DEC 1760. SCALE 0 1 2 3 4 5 MILES GOHANA JIND ROAD SHAH NAHAR (W. JUMNA CANAL) PANIPAT KALA AM RAJA KHERI BABAIL HABLA JUMNA RIVER UGRA KHERI CHANDPUR KHURD CHANDPUR KALAN JALALPUR BARALIPUR BATTLE FIELD OLD JUMNA BED SEHLA (VAJIRPUR) D. G. SANTURNE D. 1945

70 PANIPAT 1761 over a month ²⁵ That most of the letters sent were intercepted by Abdali is clear from Nana Fadnis' letter²⁶ to Ramchandrapant Natu at Delhi, which shows that this work of stopping the Maratha correspondence had begun from the third week of November, though occasionally a messenger was lucky enough to elude Abdali's patrols This should also have something to do with the Maratha distress, as the possibility of the outsiders knowing the real condition of the Maratha camp was lessened But there is no mention of any distress in the Maratha camp in the above mentioned letter of 12th December, from which it would not be wrong to conclude that Abdali had not upto that point succeeded in completely cutting off the Maratha supply from the north On that side the Sikhs and the Jats were quite well disposed towards the Marathas Alasingh Jat, the founder of the Patiala State, living at that time at Manuk, seems to have been actually helping²⁷ the Marathas as he was grateful for being relieved from the exactions of the Afghan soldiers of fortune like the chief of Kunjpura and the infamous Mian Qutb Shah The Sikhs were di- rectly interested in the result of the contest and even after the disaster were the chief beneficiaries of it Sir Jadunath's harping on the disaffected Jat villagers seems a figment of the brain There is no ground for such a supposition, though the Marathas suffered before, during and after the war by the vindictiveness of the Muslim population, who were equally numerous in those regions and incomparably more powerful than the submerged Jats and Gujars Bhau is still a hero in their ballad²⁸ and fire side stories, for whom they have the liveli- est admiration Within a fortnight of Balvantrao's death, Govindpant Bundele also met the same fate Throughout the Panipat campaign, nay, even before starting for it, Bhau had demanded money of Govindpant ²⁹ The latter sent two lakhs in the first instance and now at the beginning of December he came to Delhi with four lakhs and twenty thousand This was all he could possibly bring, though it was not even a fourth of what Bhau demanded from the beginning. Handing over the treasure to Naro Shankar, Govindpant sallied forth with his contingent and crossed over into the Doab He began to cut off Abdali's supplies coming from the trans Ganges districts and passing through the Meerut district to Abdali Bhau had intimated to Govindpant that there were none now to oppose him in the Doab as the Ruhelas had been tied up to the camp of Abdali So, leisurely and unguardedly, he continued his march, chastising the refractory local zamindars on the way He seemed to have been collecting grain also for carrying it to Bhau's camp across an upper ghat on the Jamuna, to Panipat But news of Govindpant's depredations soon reached Abdali's camp The Ruhelas became apprehensive of the safety of their homes The regu- larity of the food convoy reaching Abdali s camp through these regions had ²⁵ RAJ 3.210 ²⁶ Satara 2 300 Letter dated 12th December 1760 ²⁷ SPD 27.262, Purandare 1 416 ²⁸ BDCRI 1 ²⁹ SPD 40 129

PANIPAT 71 been taken away. Abdali, therefore, despatched a select force of some five thousand horsemen under impetuous Atai Khan, the Durrani Wazir's nephew, who had recently come from Afghanistan. A few thousand Ruhelas also joined him to show him the way and properly guide him in their home lands. Cross- ing the Jamuna at Baghpat and covering some fifty miles in a day and night, they suddenly alighted upon Govindpant as he was somewhere between Ghazi- ud-din-nagar (now Ghaziabad) and Meerut. It seems that one Jeta Gujar, a robber-chieftain in that area, had promised a ransom to Govindpant, and Govindpant was stopping to recover it. Jeta communicated the news to Abdali and he sent this force. It is also said that the Ruhelas had assumed different colours, seeing which Govindpant thought the army from a distance was that of Naro Shankar.30 While Govindpant was preparing to take a bath and to dine in the afternoon after a day's hard work, he was overtaken by Atai Khan's cavalry. He suddenly snatched a horse and began to run with his army. In the hurry of flight twice he came down from his horse, as he was not properly seated on a saddle, but reseated again by others. But when he fell for the third time, none returned to save him, even his son who was accompanying the army having fled away to a distance. Govindpant's head was cut off and his whole camp looted. The Maratha loss was some four hundred.31 The rest of the Maratha army with Govindpant's son Balaji after first having fled to the south, afterwards returned to Delhi. Atai Khan returned with the loot which con- tained a good quantity of grain, and Najib presented Govindpant's head to Ahmad Shah. He sent it to Bhau, announcing his triumph in the undertaking. The news had already reached Bhau by 23rd December,32 though the head reached Bhau's hands two or three days later, from which it appears that the attack on Govindpant must have taken place on 20th December or so, and not on the 17th as assumed by Sir Jadunath.33 Govindpant had atoned for all his past sins of commission and omission with his life, and, therefore, the gravamen of accusations against him is taken away. He might be called slovenly and not up to the mark in military matters; but none can say that he was disloyal. After Govindpant's death, when the plan of cutting off Abdali's sup- plies and directing these to the Maratha camp had failed, the real difficulties of the Maratha camp began. The Maratha camp was short of not only food and fodder, but also of coined money necessary to make cash payments for any supplies brought to the camp from the Panjab. Bhau found it difficult to fetch money from Delhi where it had been deposited by Govindpant. The first batch of soldiers from Payagude's troops under the leadership of Krishnarao Ballal, carrying with them one lakh, ten thousand, started on 22nd December and seems to have reached the Maratha camp in safety.34 But the second batch under Parashar Dadaji carrying one and a half lakhs with them, which started on 2nd January, 1761, was cut off by Abdali, as Abdali had shifted his camp for the last time on 30th December, and was now lying astride the imperial road

30 Bhau Bakhar 129 31 RAJ 1376. 32 Ibid. 1.272. 33 Fall 2.311. 34 RAJ. 1.281.

72 PANIPAT: 1761

from Delhi to Panipat.³⁵ The news of this shifting had not reached Delhi, and so the Maratha troops were passing along the road in the dead of night as usual. There were with him three hundred soldiers each carrying five hun- dred rupees. In the severe cold of January, with their bodies benumbed by night exposure, they unsuspectingly entered the Afghan camp five miles to the south of Panipat, thinking it to be the Maratha camp. They alighted from their horses and tried to warm themselves by the burning fire sides. Some took out their pipes and began to smoke. As they had entered from the back of the Afghan camp without fear, none at first seems to have recognised or obstructed them, the Afghans taking them probably as a batch of their allies. But when the Marathas began to converse, the Afghans got the clue and raised a hue and cry. Only one escaped from the tussle and returned back to Delhi.³⁶ The rest were deprived of their cash and horses and put to the sword according to Kashiraj,³⁷ while the Bhau Bakhar and the Ka fiyāt say that they reached the Maratha camp safely after the mishap.³⁸

As more than five lakhs of people were living in that small area from Panipat to Samalkha for more than two months (in the two camps together), all the wood and fodder in the vicinity had disappeared and the whole area had become one vast barren plain. Some ten villages had left their sites and gone to live elsewhere. The citizens of Panipat had to remain confined in the small walled area, with no space left for movement. Their farms and gar- dens had disappeared from the scene. Naturally they had become hostile to the Marathas and being Muslims for the most part, seem to have acted treacherously from behind in giving news to Abdali and carrying on nefarious activities in collusion with the Afghans of Kunjpura and the surrounding area. The civil behaviour of the Marathas with such people has cost the Marathas very dearly in history.

In their two and a half months' beleaguerment at Panipat, the Mara- thas must have spent practically every pie they possessed for buying the vic- tuals at ten fold prices. The system adopted for fetching grain from a distance was to send an escort of some thousands to accompany the caravan from Karnal to Panipat, and while returning to see them back with their pack- bullocks to Karnal again. But after a time this source also dried up, either because there was no grain to sell, or more probably because the Afghans had recovered their posts like Kunjpura and Karnal in the north. Abdali was fur- nished, some time in the second week of December, with fresh troops from Afghanistan to the extent of eight thousand. Atai Khan was their leader. Before joining Abdali, he seems to have followed not the direct route to Pani- pat, but the safer route across the Jamuna by the Budhia or the Andhera Ghat north and south of Kunjpura. Before entering the Doab, he could not but have driven out the small Maratha out posts at Karnal and Kunjpura with the help of his splendid troops. Diler Khan, the only son of Nejabat Khan, left

³⁵ Shinde 1.229 ³⁶ Raj. 1.231. 333 ³⁷ Battle of Panipat 19^6 p. 21 ³⁸ Bhau Bakhar p 132. Kaifyat p. 21

TO FACE PAGE 72 POSITIONS OF THE RIVAL CAMPS FROM 31ST DEC 1760 TO 14TH JAN 1761 SCALE N SHAH NAHAR OR JUMNA CANAL PANIPAT JUMNA RIVER GOELA KALĀN GOELA KHURD M. G. BARTAKKE

PANIPAT 73 free, now recovered Kunjpura with Atai Khan's help and made it impossible for the caravans to move on that side Added to this, fire started, either pur- posely or by random cannon shot, and destroyed the big haystacks heaped in the Maratha camp 39 This misfortune turned the situation from bad to worse and finally into utter helplessness As a result of this mishap, twenty thousand followers issued from the Maratha camp one night to gather firewood and fodder in the neighbouring woods, but they were overtaken, surrounded and massacred piece-meal by a body of five thousand horse under Shah Pasand Khan who was patrolling that area After this slaughter, terror struck the Maratha camp and nobody seems to have ventured out In the terrible cold of December and January, the Marathas, with their scanty clothing meant only for the cold in the Deccan, suffered terribly in addition to the want of sufficient quantities of good food and firewood As if this was not enough, it rained heavily that winter, generating biting winds in their wake 40 Thousands of bullocks, horses, mules and even men died of this calamity The unburied animals and corpses on the intervening battle field putrified the air 41 The crowded camp where within a small area men had to perform all their physical duties made it terribly dirty and full of noxious air Nana Fadnis vividly describes these conditions in his auto- biography Such was the condition of the Maratha camp and the state of the men and animals who were to offer battle to the strong, stalwart, efficient and un- perturbed Afghans who were well supplied with necessities and fully inured to these climes and circumstances As we have said above, we are completely in the dark as to Bhau's aim in not sallying out for battle three weeks earlier when he received the news of Govindpant's death Such a step would have appreciably reduced the suf ferings which the Maratha camp had to endure in the last period The men and animals would have been found in better condition for a march or a fight, before their reduction by starvation and misery for three weeks more Even their morale would have been found better and still Bhau would not take such a step A casual remark in the Bakhar (p 136) also supports the view that "had the Marathas started the next day after the heavy massacre of the Ruhelas in the intervening daily fights, the Afghans had no strength then to overpower the Marathas" "But," so remarks the chronicler, "the fate had ordained otherwise and so the Marathas remained inactive, carrying on the waiting game!" We do not know whether this was a case of fortune first taking away the wit and then striking hard afterwards Our wonder increases still more when we find the chronicles reporting the discussion in the Maratha camp previous to the battle While Bhau, judging that the army could not pull on even for a day more, wanted to offer battle the next day, Malharrao and Janakoji were proposing to postpone the 39 RAJ 6 406 40 Sardesai Commemoration Volume p 259 41 BDCRI 4 181

event by four days 42 If their argument has any sense in it, we must think the state of the Maratha camp not as bad as it is depicted, otherwise how could they have waited for four days more? Their confidence is curiously found sup- ported by a rare letter of Janakoji, written only ten days prior to the battle, and reaching its destination without being intercepted by Abdali's patrols 43 He does not betray any sign of fear or hopelessness He assures his revenue collector not to be troubled at the local pin pricks of the Rajput princes, as after the chief enemy (Abdali) is defeated, others will fall in the line with- out effort As we have said elsewhere, the tone of the men who escaped from the battle field was different from their own earlier writing They charged Bhau with being obstinate, not listening to milder and saner counsels, and casting his last die thoughtlessly and in a haphazard manner We take these to be afterthoughts only Had there been not even a thirty per cent chance of bettering their position—and not the hope of defeating Abdali decisively—how the Maratha chieftains could have consented to march out with a hollow square formation, we are not able to comprehend Let it not be forgotten also that notwithstanding the starvation of the Maratha camp, the Marathas were able to charge so effectively in the forenoon part of the battle that they seemed to carry everything before them On this central point, all the authorities on the battle are unanimous This clearly proves that but for some serious disobedience of orders issued after the final decision before the start, or for the sudden demoralisation due to Vishwasrao being shot down, there would not have been that debacle and that stampede which actually took place even to the dismay of such on lookers as Kashiraj and other reporters of the battle We have thought it necessary to put down all these facts before the description of the actual battle, because up till now it has been treated by his- torians in a faulty, not to say malignant, manner According to the chronicles, the rank and file of the Maratha army, perturbed at the prospect and desperate on account of starvation, proceeded to the tent of Bhau and besought him not to allow them to die of starvation and disease but to lead them to the battle, whatever be the destiny awaiting them We have said already that Bhau should have anticipated such a clamour and forestalled it with some continuous preparation spread over a number of days All the men, high and low, combatants and non combatants, in the Maratha camp, should have been completely made aware and tutored of their re- sponsibility and actual part in the battle which was to ensue Clear instruc- tions about the methods of self-protection in the event of a sudden disaster— we do not think inevitable and certain—ought to have been circulated Nana Fadnis says in his autobiography that Bhau had anticipated all possibilities in the conduct of war and provided for them as best he could, and we do not think that Bhau could have failed to take these obvious precautions, consum- mate master of affairs as he was The divergence in the military counsels of the Maratha chiefs was the basic cause for the opposite manner of acting on the 42 Kaifiyat 0.21 Bakhar 0 141 43 Shinde 1.222

PANIPAT 75 field of battle. But that was no fault of Bhau, but a national misfortune. All the various units and classes in the vast Maratha camp spread over miles were not equally affected by the dearth of grain or money, and that seems to be the reason why some still wanted, and thought it possible, to wait, while others less fortunate had reached the sinking point. Ultimately the clamour of the starved decided the day of the battle and not the convenience or forethought of the commander! This was a calamity, but perhaps there was no help for it. In any case, had the battle been fought a fortnight earlier, it would have been better in all respects, for the Marathas. The actual plan decided and adopted by Bhau in consultation with Ibrahim Khan Gardi and others was, however, made possible by Abdali's change of camp-site and could not have been devised prior to 30th December, 1760. A battle before that date would have been only a frontal attack or a march with a hollow-square formation liable to be disturbed on the flanks which is the weakest point in such a formation. The direction would have been from north to south and not north-west to south-east. The plan envisaged by Kashiraj and put down in a memory drawing of the field of battle, is cor- rect as far as it goes. Only the direction of the Maratha front he was un- able to make out. Kashiraj mistook the longer side of the rectangle on the right-hand side for a front, because guns had been judiciously placed on that side also, and these were pointed towards the Abdali front. The strategy was to march past the right-hand corner of Abdali's camp to the river side with the whole formation, so as to take the river at the back in the evening and then to meet the Afghan army from the right-hand side, which would then become the battle-front. The advantage in this move would have been that the camp-followers would have remained always safe at the back and would have found it possible to run away to the south towards Delhi or to the east across the Jamuna into the Doab in case of a defeat. Had the plan succeeded, the major battle would have come not on the day of the start but on the days following. This would have given double advantage to the Marathas. They would have found the much needed rest, as also time to refresh and recoup at night, and would have been attacking the Afghans on their flank, thus ex- posing their camp to loot. But the hollow square formation with a long rectangular side made up of mutually antagonistic generals was at best a precarious device, as was proved to their cost the next day. THE TRANS-GANGES RAIDS OF THE MARATHAS DURING THE PANIPAT CAMPAIGN At the beginning of July 1760, Shuja-ud-daulah finally made up his mind and went over to Abdali's side. From that date Sadashivrao Bhau began writing his letters to Govindpant Bundele, Gopalrao Ganesh Barve, Ganesh Sambhaji Khandekar and Gopalrao Bapuji, to foment rebellions in Shuja's dominions beyond the Ganges, and raid them. Many of the big zamindars un- der Shuja were small chieftains themselves with armies made up of their per- sonal retainers. Balawant Singh of Benares was the biggest and the most refractory amongst them, though there were others like Balabhadrasingh of

76 PANIPAT. 1761 Tiloi and Hindupat of Pratapgarh In fact, the times and the surroundings were such that no potentate could be taken as fully established and free from internal rebellions Shuja had placed Veni Bahadur with full powers in charge of his dominions during his absence in Abdali's camp The major portion of Shuja's troops he kept behind him for guarding his dominions, fully knowing the risks to which his dominions would be exposed once he antag- onised the Marathas In fact, his direct help to Abdali was his fine park of artillery and the moral prestige of his name only Sadashivrao Bhau appears from his letters to be unaware of this important fact Shuja's troops are found estimated at 20,000 at the beginning of July, but how many of these he took with him to Abdali's camp is doubtful, as none seem to give very reliable figures But if we take Kashiraj's figures as correct, Shuja had at Panipat 2,000 cavalry, 2,000 infantry and 20 guns with him, thus leaving 16,000 to guard his dominions All these troops were well disciplined and well equipped They were engaged on a permanent footing and very well paid with the re- sult that they had no cause to grumble and go against their master This was possible because Shuja possessed the most fertile lands in India and he could collect his revenues without any hitch The only possible loop hole in Shuja's dominions was the danger from his big zamindars who were always ready to rebel and would have liked to become independent When Bhau is found ordering Govindpant to invade the Ruhela lands beyond the Ganges and Gopalrao Barve to attack Shuja's dominions, he seems to be talking of something which he could not understand Abdali had sent many of the Ruhelas back to their homes during the rains to lessen the pressure on his scanty supplies of grain and possibly with a view to protect their province, thus making it impossible for Govindpant to move in the matter Govindpant occupied Ahmad Khan Bangash's lands in Farukhabad adjoining his, because these were on his side of the Ganges But beyond the river he could not go Similarly, Gopalrao found it impossible to move in the face of Veni Bahadur guarding the Ganges in full force The combined troops of the Marathas under all their captains in this region, are found estimated at only ten to twelve thousand troops Many of these were possibly infantry corps only, and not very well disciplined They were fit for collecting revenues from refractory zamindars hiding in their fortalices, but not fit to face regular troops under Veni Bahadur The rainy season passed in mere manœuvring without any actual invasion In the mid- dle of November, Govindpant turned towards Delhi on account of Bhau's ex- press orders, with his contingent of some 5,000 troops, and only Gopalrao Barve was left behind in the lower Doab, facing Shuja's dominions Sadashivrao had ordered Ganesh Sambhaji Khandekar to join his forces with those of Barve, but he does not seem to have crossed the Jamuna from the south at all Be- sides, Shuja's wise mother and Veni Bahadur had by this time quelled the rebel- lions of the zamindars and brought them over to their side by lavish expen- diture on them Gopalrao had written to Bhau in his letter of 22nd November, 1760 that he was presently crossing over into Oudh, actually he was unable to cross before 30th December, 1760, as a part of his army had been sent to Govindpant's help under Bajirao Barve, Ramchandra Krishna and Ghanashyam Pandurang, which he was expecting back But Bhau could not spare these