वेदान्त पारिजात सौरभ (भगवद् निम्बार्काचार्य - द्वैताद्वैत वेदान्त ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य सटीक)

[sū. 2. 2. 10. ADH. 1 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 337 SŪTRA 10 "AND ON ACCOUNT OF CONTRADICTION, (THE SĀṂKHYA DOCTRINE IS) INCONSISTENT." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The view of Kapila is "inconsistent", because of the opposition between its prior and subsequent (statements) Vedānta-kaustubha The view of Kapila is "inconsistent" in every way. Why? Because of its opposition to the Vedānta,—that is, the Vedāntas, independent of all proofs, authoritative by themselves and eternally established, establish the omniscient and omnipotent Lord of all as the cause of the origin and the rest of the world, and the admission of the doctrine of a non-sentient cause is opposed to this,—because of that;—because of the rejection of a doctrine based on mere reasoning in the passage: 'This knowledge is not attainable through reasoning' (Kaṭha 2.9); and because of the opposition between its prior and subsequent (statements). Thus, they hold that puruṣa (or the soul) is all-pervading, devoid of attributes, mere consciousness, isolated (from prakṛti) by nature, non-attached like a lotus leaf ¹ and inactive Then again, they maintain also that prakṛti is an agent through its mere proximity to puruṣa; and that through the super-imposition of nescience that very same (puruṣa) comes to have the attributes of 'being an agent', 'being an enjoyer' and so on, to be afflicted by the three kinds of miseries,² and to be subject to transmigratory existence Again, they teach that the salvation of puruṣa proceeds from the knowledge of prakṛti and puruṣa Thus, a multitude of inconsistencies between prior and subsequent (statements) may be found there. In the case under discussion, on the other hand, since in accordance with the Smṛti passages: ' "The evil-doers, the deluded, and the vilest men do not attain me,—they whose wisdom is destroyed by nescience and who have resorted to demoniacal nature" ' (Gītā 7 15), 'Know- ledge is enveloped by non-knowledge; thereby beings are deluded' ¹ I e just as a lotus leaf is not wetted by water, so the soul is not attached to anything. ² Viz. physical, mental and elemental 22

[sū. 2. 2. 11. 338 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 2.] (Gītā 5.15.), ‘ ‘ ‘At the end of many births, one who is possessed of knowledge attains me’ ’ ’ (Gītā 7 19), ‘ ‘ ‘Those who attain me cross over this māyā’ ’ ’ (Gītā 7 14), ‘ ‘ ‘Many, purified by the penance of knowledge come to attain my nature’ ’ ’ (Gītā 4.10), the causes of bondage, as well as of salvation,—liberating the bound soul from its bondage, unprecedented, and characterized by the attainment of His nature,—is well-established, there is not even a shadow of any contradiction among prior and subsequent (statements) Hence it is established that there is no contradiction of the concordance of the scriptural texts (with regard to Brahman) by the view of Kapila, which is opposed to the Veda and is set forward by means of fallacious reasoning Here ends the section entitled “The impossibility of arrange- ment ” (1). COMPARISON While Nimbārka adduces two reasons as to why the Sāṁkhya doctrine is ‘inconsistent’, viz. (1) oppositon to the Vedānta, (2) internal contradictions,—others adduce only one, viz. Śaṁkara, Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva adduce the second,¹ Bhāskara adduces the first.² Hence they do not attach any special meaning to the particle “ca” in the sūtra Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled “The great and the long”. (Sūtras 11–17) SŪTRA 11 “FOR, JUST AS THE (ORIGIN) OF THE GREAT AND THE LONG FROM THE SHORT AND THE SPHERICAL (IS UNTENABLE) (SO EVERYTHING IS UNTENABLE IN THE VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY).” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Since if they bo possessed of parts, then there will result an infinite regress; and if without parts, then it will be impossible for them ¹ Ś.B. 2 2.10, p 513; Śrī. B 2.2 9, pp. 78 ff., Part 2; ŚK B. 2.2 9, p. 61, Parts 7 and 8; G B. 2 2.10, p. 96, Chap. 2 ² Bh. B., 2.2 10, p. 112.

[sū. 2. 2. 11 ADH. 2.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 339 to be the producer of other evolutes ¹,—there is inconsistency in the origin of the binary compounds from the atoms, and there is all the more inconsistency in the origin of ternary compounds from these (binary compounds) Like this, everything admitted by the main- tainers of the atomic view is inconsistent. Vedānta-kaustubha Apprehending the objection, viz . Let pradhāna, not superin- tended by an intelligent principle, be not the cause of the world; but let the groups of atoms, under the control of the wish of the Supreme Lord, be the cause of the world,—the author is now pointing out the inconsistencies in the atomic doctrine as well The procedure of the atomists is the following: A substance produces another substance, a quality another quality; and the pro- duction of the effect proceeds from three causes, viz. the inherent, the non-inherent and efficient ²; just as an effect, viz. a piece of cloth, is produced by the threads which are the inherent cause, by their mutual conjunction which is the non-inherent cause, and by the shuttle, the loom, the weaver and the rest, which are the efficient cause. Like- wise, there are four kinds of atoms, distinguished as earth-atoms, water-atoms, fire-atoms and air-atoms; and they are eternal, without parts, possessed of colour and the rest, and spherical in extension, and remain without producing effects at the time of dissolution. At the time of creation, the atoms become the inherent cause for the production of the effect (viz. the world), their conjunction, the non- inherent cause, and the unseen principle ³ the efficient cause. Thus, through the wish of the Lord, first motion arises in the air-atoms, then a conjunction (between them) and thereby an effect, viz. a binary compound, arises from two atoms; a ternary compound arises from three binary compounds; a quaternary compound arises from four ternary compounds, and so on, and through this process, finally, the great air arises and remains trembling in space. In the very same manner, fire arises from the fire-atoms and remains shining in the form of earthly fire and so on. In the very same manner, the great ¹ C.S.S. ed. reads “parimāṇa” instead of “pariṇāma”, p. 31. ² Samavāyin, asamavāyin, nimitta. ³ I.e. the merit or demerit attaching to a man's conduct in one state of existence and the corresponding reward or punishment with which he is visited in another.

[SŪ. 2 2 11. 340 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 2 ] ocean arises from the water-atoms and remains flowing. In the very same manner, the great earth arises from the earth-atoms and remains immobile in the form of clay, stones and the rest. Again, the qualities of the effects arise from the qualities of the cause. Just as the qualities of a piece of cloth arise from the qualities of the thread,—a red cloth being found to arise from red threads,—so the qualities of whiteness and the like, inhering in the binary compounds and the rest, arise from the qualities of whiteness, etc. inhering in the atoms. But the combination of two simple atoms, producing a binary compound, produces different measures, viz. minuteness and shortness, in the binary compound, but do not produce sphericity, the measure of the simple atoms themselves,—because, then, there will result an intense fineness (on the part of the binary compound which it has not). Similarly, at the time of dissolution, too, through the wish of the Lord, there is motion in the atoms, thereby the dissolution of their conjunction, thereby the dissolution of the binary compounds and so on, and in this manner, finally, there is the dissolution of the earth and the rest. This view is being refuted here. The particle "or" in the aphorism is meant for implying the aggregate (of defects in the atomic doctrine) left unsaid. The word 'inconsistent' is to be supplied from above. The phrase: "from the short and the spherical" is to be applied by dividing it in a compatible manner. This being so, like the doctrine of the origin of a short binary compound from two simple spherical atoms, and like the doctrine of the origin of the great and long ternary compounds from the short (binary compounds), everything else too, maintained by them (viz. the atomists), is inconsistent—this is the construction of the words of the aphorism. The sense is this: The origin of binary compounds from atoms is impossible. That being impossible, the origin of the ternary com- pounds from the binary compounds is all the more impossible. In exactly the same manner, whatever is maintained by the atomists is simply inconsistent. Thus, it is observed that the parts, viz. the threads and the rest, produce a whole, viz. a piece of cloth, only by being conjoined (with one another) by means of their six sides which are their own parts. An atom, too, is established to have six parts through its connection with the six quarters. As has been said: 'An atom has six parts because of its simultaneous connection with the six (quarters)'. Hence, even the atoms must be productive of effects

[SŪ. 2. 2. 12. ADH. 2 ] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 341 as possessed of parts indeed. If they be so, then they themselves will become effects like the binary compounds because of possessing parts. And the parts of the atoms too,—conjoined (with one another) by means of their six sides which are their own parts, and establishing that the atoms have parts,—must have parts; that parts, again, further parts and so on, and thus there must be an infinite regress. If the atoms be admitted to be without parts, then if there be the conjunction of even a hundred atoms which fill no space, there will not be any extension different from that of a single atom, and hence there will never be (different kinds of extensions like) minuteness, shortness and the rest. Thus, the origin of the binary compounds is impossible, in their absence, the origin of the ternary compounds is impossible; and hence the origin of the world must be impossible. COMPARISON Śaṁkara and Bhāskara Interpretation different. They take this sūtra as constituting an adhikarana by itself, concerned with refuting the Vaiśeṣika objec- tion, viz. that the qualities of the cause must inhere in the effect. Hence if the intelligent Brahman be the cause of the world, then the quality of intelligence must be found in the world. But since this is not the case, He is not its cause.¹ The answer is: Or just as (there is the origin of) big and long (ternary compounds) from minute and short (binary compounds) so there is the origin of the non-intelligent world from the intelligent Brahman.² SŪTRA 12 “EVEN IN BOTH WAYS THERE IS NO ACTION (ON THE PART OF THE ATOMS), HENCE THERE IS THE ABSENCE OF THAT (VIZ. CREATION).” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Because it is impossible for the unseen principle to inhere in the atoms, as well as because it is impossible for it, connected with the ¹ Note that an exactly similar objection has been put forward and refuted under Br. Sū. 2.1. 4–11. Hence there is no sense in repeating it here. As such Nimbārka’s way of interpreting seems preferable. ² Ś. B. 2.2.11, pp. 518-19; Bh. B. 2.2.11, pp. 113-14.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 12. 342 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 2.] soul, to be the instigator of the motion of the atoms,—thus “even in both ways” the first motion of the atoms is not possible. “Hence there is the absence” of the creation of the world through the successive order of binary compounds and the rest, due to conjunction, which again is due to the motion of the atoms. Vedānta-kaustubha The author is elucidating the statement (made in the last aphorism), viz. Like the (origin of) the great and the long, everything else, too, maintained by them, is inconsistent. “Even in both ways”, no motion is possible in the atoms at the time of creation. “Hence”, i.e for this reason, viz on account of the impossibility of motion, “there is the absence of that”, i.e. of the origin and the rest of the world through the successive order of binary compounds, ternary compounds and so on, due to the conjunction of atoms. The phrase: “in both ways” means: Does the first motion (of the atoms) arise by itself, or through the atoms ? The first alter- native is not tenable, being impossible. Never does motion, arising by itself, proceed to bring water in a pitcher. It cannot be said also that it arises through a cause, because at that time (i.e. at the time of creation) there exist no human effort, vibration, impact and the rest (which might have been such a cause). The second alter- native, too, is not tenable, because then the atoms must become sentient, it being impossible for non-sentient atoms to be the instigator of motion. In the building of a palace and the like, the stones and the rest do not themselves act in conjunction with other works (connected with the building). Or ¹, (if it be said that) the motion which arises in the atoms at that time is caused by the unseen principle, (we reply): There is negation of motion “in either way”. Thus, does the unseen principle which causes the motion of the atoms inhere in the atoms, or in the individual soul? The first alternative is not tenable, because the unseen principle, being originated by the good and evil deeds of the individual souls, cannot reside in something non-sentient; because being non-sentient, it is not possible for the unforeseen principle to be the cause of motion; because the performance of good and evil ¹ An alternative explanation of the word “Ubhayathā”

[SŪ 2. 2. 13 ADH 2.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 343 deeds being impossible on the part of atoms, the unseen principle must be necessarily admitted to be natural (to them), and in that case there will result the origin of motion at all times The second alter- native, too, is not tenable, because it is all the more impossible for the unseen principle, inhering in the individual soul, to urge the motion of the non-sentient (atoms) Thus, there is no motion "even in both ways". "Or ¹ else no motion is possible, whether it be due to the individual soul, or due to the Lord. Thus, does the individual soul give rise to the first motion through its own destiny (adṛṣṭa), or through its proxi- mity, or through its attribute of consciousness ? Not the first, because of the above-mentioned fault Not through its proximity also, because the proximity of the individual soul to the atoms being eternal, the consequence will be that it will ever give rise to the world. Nor even through consciousness, because of the absence of consciousness then And motion does not proceed from the Lord as well Is the Lord, according to your view, designated in the Veda or established by inference and the rest? If it be said: Designated in the Veda, then have faith in the procedure mentioned by Scripture thus. 'Every- thing has that for its soul' (Chānd 6.8 7, etc.), 'He became existence and that' (Tait. 2 6), and being overwhelmed with the sentiment of love for Him, be free from affliction,—what is the use of your doctrine of atoms ? If it be said: Established through inference and the rest,—(we reply :) that it (viz inference) is not even established has been proved above.² SŪTRA 13 "(THE VAIŚEṢIKA DOCTRINE IS UNTENABLE) ALSO ON ACCOUNT OF THE ADMISSION OF THE RELATION OF INHERENCE, ON ACCOUNT OF AN INFINITE REGRESS (ARISING THEREFROM) BECAUSE OF SAMENESS." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha "On account also of the admission of the relation of inherence," the doctrine of atoms is not possible, since just as a binary compound is connected with its own cause by the relation of inherence, being ¹ A third alternative explanation of the word "Ubhayathā". ² Vide V.K 1.1.3.

344 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2 2. 13 ADH. 2 ] absolutely different therefrom, so the relation of inherence itself, too, is to be connected with the two related objects by another relation of inherence, its absolute difference (from the two related objects) being the same, that, too, by another relation, and so on—thus there will be an infinite regress Vedānta-kaustubha The phrase: 'on account of the absence of that' is to be supplied For this reason also, the origin and the rest of the world in the successive order of the creation of binary compounds and the rest, due to the conjunction of the atoms is not possible Why? "On account of the admission of the relation of inherence." Among separable objects, there is a relation of conjunction,¹ as between a rope and a pot. Among inseparable objects, on the other hand, there is a relation of inherence,² just as a piece of cloth exists in the threads by the relation of inherence, a pot in the two pot-sherds, cowness in a cow and whiteness and the rest in a piece of cloth. The relation between objects which are causes and effects is just this relation of inherence, and this relation is proclaimed to be one, eternal, and all-pervading like the ether,—on account of the admission of such a relation of inherence—this is the sense If it be asked. What objection is there if such a relation of in- herence be admitted?—(the author) replies: "On account of an infinite regress because of sameness". That is, just as a binary compound, absolutely different from its inherent cause (viz. the two simple atoms), necessarily awaits a relation of inherence (for being connected with them), so the relation of inherence itself, being absolutely different from the two related objects, is to be connected with them by meaus of another relation of inherence,—"because of the sameness" of absolute difference (i.e because there is absolute difference equally in both the cases, also because what is itself unrelated is never observed to be a relation)—that, too, by another relation of inherence, and that, too, and so on; thus "on account of infinite regress", the atomic theory defeats itself ¹ Saṁyoga. ² Samavāya.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 14-15. ADH. 2.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 345 SŪTRA 14 "AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE EXISTENCE (OF) ETERNAL (ACTIVITY AND INACTIVITY) ALONE." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If the atoms be active by nature, there being the existence of (eternal) activity, there will result eternal creation; otherwise there will result eternal dissolution, and hence there is the absence of that (viz. creation). Vedānta-kaustubha For this, too, the atomic theory is untenable. Why? If the atoms be admitted to be active by nature, then there being eternal activity alone, there cannot be dissolution. If, they be admitted to be inactive by nature, there being eternal inactivity alone, the absence of creation will necessarily result—this is the sense. COMPARISON Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva This is sūtra 13 in the commentaries of the first two Interpre- tation different, viz. "(If the samavāya be admitted to be eternal, the terms related by it, viz ternary compounds, etc , i.e. the world too must be) eternal indeed, on account of the existence (i.e. eternity of the samavāya)".¹ SŪTRA 15 "AND ON ACCOUNT OF (THE ATOMS) HAVING COLOUR AND SO ON, THE REVERSE (VIEW WOULD FOLLOW), BECAUSE OF OBSERVA- TION." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha And on account of the atoms having colour and the rest in accord- ance with the respective effects, there must be non-eternity, which is the "reverse" of eternity, (on their part), since pots and the rest, possessed of colour and so on, are observed to be non-eternal. Other- wise, the effects must be devoid of colour, etc. ¹ Śrī. B. 2.2.13, p. 86, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.2 13, p 75, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.2.14, p. 107, Chap 2

[SŪ. 2. 2. 16. 346 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 2 ] Vedānta-kaustubha Since the effects are possessed of colour, etc., the atoms, too, are admitted to be possessed of colour and so on ¹ Thus, since the four kinds of atoms are possessed of colour and so on, i e possessed of colour, taste, smell and touch,—non-eternity, the “reverse” of eternity, results, as pots and the rest, possessed of colour and so on, are found to be non-eternal. If they be not admitted to be possessed of colour and the like, then the fact that the effects are possessed of colour and so on will come to be contradicted, and the initial proposition ‘Pos- sessed of parts and eternal’ too will come to be contradicted. For this reason too, there is the absence of that (viz. creation),—this is the meaning of the particle “and”. The sense is that an unseen object cannot be determined in accordance with what is seen Hence the cause of the world is to be understood in accordance with Scrip- ture. SŪTRA 16 “AND ON ACCOUNT OF FAULT IN BOTH WAYS ” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha If the atoms be possessed of more numerous qualities,² then the earth, water, fire and air will become similar. If they be possessed of less numerous qualities,³ then, too, all the different kinds of atoms being connected with one quality each, the earth and the rest too, having qualities corresponding to their causes, must be connected with one quality each,—this “on account of fault in both ways”, there is indeed the absence of that (viz. creation). Vedānta-kaustubha For this reason also, the procedure admitted by the atomists is not possible. Why? Because whether the atoms be admitted to be possessed of more numerous qualities, or to be possessed of less numerous qualities, “in both ways”, too, there is fault. Since the 1 An effect can have no qualities which the cause has not. 2 I.e. every kind of atoms are possessed of the five qualities of colour and the rest. 3 I.e. each be possessed of its peculiar qualities

[sū. 2. 2. 16. ADH. 2 ] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 347 qualities of the effect are due to the qualities of the cause, all the qualities of the cause, such as colour, taste and the rest, must attach to all the effects As a result, there must be smell and taste in fire; colour, taste and smell in air; and the grossness on the part of the atoms, since the earth, which has the most numerous qualities, is observed to be gross. If they be possessed of less numerous qualities, then all must have one quality each. If this be so, then there must be touch in fire, colour and touch in water; colour, touch and taste in earth, because, those particular qualities are absent from those particular atoms. Otherwise, there will result everything every- where. If it be argued : that the earth is observed to be possessed of colour, taste, smell and touch; water to be endowed with the attributes of colour, taste and touch; the fire to be possessed of colour and touch; and the air is to be possessed of touch. Corresponding to these qua- lities, some atoms are supposed to be possessed of more numerous qualities, others less numerous Hence the above objection cannot be raised,— (We reply :) No; for in that case, too, those that have more numerous qualities will be deprived of their atomicity.¹ In the case in hand, on the other hand, there is no fault whatsoever, since the world has the omniscient and omnipotent Lord of all as its material cause. COMPARISON Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva This is sūtra 15 in the commentaries of the first two. Interpretation different—viz. an elucidation of the previous sūtra, viz. “Because there is fault in both ways”, i.e. either if the atoms be possessed of colour, etc , or if they be not. On the first, they cannot be eternal; on the second, their effects cannot be pos- sessed of colour and the rest.² ¹ Since increase in qualities cannot take place unless there is a simultaneous increase in size. ² Śrī. B. 2 2.15, pp. 86-87, Part 2, ŚK. B. 2 2.15, p. 77, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.2.16, p. 107, Chap. 2

[sū. 2. 2. 17-18. 348 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 3.] SŪTRA 17 "AND BECAUSE OF NON-ACCEPTANCE, (THERE MUST BE AN) ABSOLUTE DISREGARD (FOR THE ATOMIC THEORY)." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha Because of the rejection of atomism by the wise, "an absolute disregard" for it is to be shown by those who are desirous of salvation. Vedānta-kaustubha Certain portions,—such as the doctrine of a pre-existent cause and the rest,—of the doctrine of the causality of pradhāna, though rejected on the ground of its opposition to Scripture and reasoning, has been accepted by those who are versed in the Veda. But "because of the non-acceptance", i.e. rejection, by the wise, in toto, of the doctrine of the causality of the atoms, imagined by the Vaiśeṣikas; because of its opposition to reasoning; and because of its opposition to the Veda, "there is an absolute disregard",—i.e. the doctrine of the causality of atoms is to be disregarded by those who wish for the highest. Hence it is established that there is no contradiction of the doctrine of the causality of Brahman by the doctrine of the causality of atoms which is to be rejected from a distance Here ends the section entitled "The great and the long" (2). Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled "The aggregate". (Sūtras 18-27) SŪTRA 18 "EVEN IF THE AGGREGATE HAVING TWO CAUSES (BE ADMITTED), (THERE IS) THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF THAT (VIZ. OF THE AGGREGATES)." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha The author is refuting the view of Sugata.¹ Even if the aggregates of the element and the elemental, the mind and the mental be admitted, still then, on account of the non- ¹ I.e. of the Buddhists.

[SŪ. 2. 2. 18. ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 349 sentience of the objects aggregated, as well as on account of non- admission of another cause of the aggregation, the aggregates are not possible Vedānta-kaustubha Kapila, the maintainer of the doctrine of pre-existing effects, holds that pradhāna, not having Brahman for its soul, is the cause of the world He has been refuted by reason of maintaining what is opposed to the doctrine of the causality of Brahman and the Vedic doctrine Kaṇāda, inferior even to him in intelligence and the maintainer of the doctrine of non-existing effects, holds the cause of the world to be of various kinds ¹, and hence he has been refuted by reason of maintaining what is opposed to the ‘great’.² Now, the doctrine of the Buddhists, inferior to that even, is being refuted, on account of its similarity to that.³ The doctrine taught by the Buddha being interpreted differently, four views were propounded by his four classes of disciples. These followers are called, (1) Vaibhāṣika, (2) Sautrāntika, (3) Yogācāra, and (4) Mādhyamika. Among these, the first two maintain the reality of external objects Among them, again, the first maintains that external objects are directly perceivable. According to him, external objects, like pots and the rest, are knowable by the evidence of direct perception. The other maintains that external objects are inferrible through cognitions. According to him, external objects like pots and rest, which are not directly perceived, are inferred through cognitions, produced in the forms of pots and so on and directly perceived. The third maintains the reality of cognitions alone without any substratum. He holds that external objects are like dreams. All of them maintain that the objects admitted by them are momen- tary. The view of the fourth is that everything is void. He holds that the continuous stream of cognitions, freed from object and subject-forms, persists from moment to moment of the basis of past impressions, like a lamp in a place sheltered from wind. But when past impressions are destroyed, it attains a complete extinction like the lamp itself, this attainment of non-existence is salvation. The others, on the other hand, hold that there is no interruption in the ¹ Viz. the four kinds of atoms. ² Vide Br Sū 2.2 17. ³ The Buddhists too admit the aggregation of atoms like the Vaiśeṣikas.

[sū. 2. 2. 18. 350 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA ADH. 3.] continuous stream of cognitions Among them, the views of the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika will be refuted later But in this section, the views of the realists, viz the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, are being refuted together Thus, they speak of five groups,¹ viz colour, cognition, feeling, name and impression.² Among these, the colour-group consists in the four elements, like the earth and the rest, and the elemental in the form of the body, sense-organs, and sense-objects. Among these, the earth-atoms, possessed of colour, taste, smell and touch, and hard by nature, are aggregated into the form of the earth, the water-atoms, possessed of colour, taste and smell, and viscid by nature, are aggregated into the form of water; the fire-atoms, possessed of colour and touch, and hot by nature, are aggregated into the form of fire, likewise the air-atoms, possessed of touch and mobile by nature, are aggregated into the form of air; and the four elements, like the earth and the rest, are aggregated into the form of body, sense-organs and sense-objects In this way, these four kinds of momentary atoms are held to be the cause of the aggregation of the elements and the elemental The colour-group, consisting of the elements and the elemental and due to the atoms, is the external aggregate. The cognition-group consists in a stream of cognitions like the cognition of a pot, cognition of a piece of cloth, and so on, based on the internal cognition of the 'I', and subsisting uninterruptedly. This alone is the agent, the enjoyer and the soul, and from it alone all ordinary practical transactions proceed The feeling-group consists in pleasur- able or painful experiences. The name-group consists in the cognition of secondary marks, e.g. (in the cognition.) 'a cow possessed of auspiciousness', the cow is distinguished by the secondary mark of auspiciousness. The impression-group consists in the mental qualities of attachment, aversion, delusion, pride, malice, fear, grief, depression and so on. These last four kinds of groups are said to be the mind and the mental. Among these, the cognition-group is said to be the mind or the soul, others mental; and thus they are internally aggregated in such a way as to be the substratum of ordinary practical transactions This is the internal aggregate, due to the four groups, beginning with the cognition-group. The soul and the ether, other than the 1 Skandha. 2 Rūpa, vyñāna, vedanā, samjñā and samskāra.

[SŪ. 2. 2 19 ADH 3.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 351 two aggregates, are non-existent by nature. These two aggregates make the course of mundane existence possible, and practical life being thus made possible, there is no need, it is thought, of an eternal soul (Correct conclusion.) With regard to it we reply: Even if there be the admission, in the above way, of aggregates, i.e. of groups having two causes, still then "there is the non-establishment of that",—i e establishment "of that", viz. of that which has two causes, too, is indeed impossible. The sense is : because the spontaneous aggregation of non-sentient objects, mutually independent, is not possible, and also because of their momentariness, the aggregate of the elements and the elemental, as well as the aggregate of the mind and the mental, are not possible. Further, because of the non-admission of a permanent enjoyer, of a sentient controller—one who brings about the aggregation, of an omniscient and universal Lord, as well as because of the consequence of the world becoming super-sensible by reason of the super-sensibleness of the atoms themselves, the course of mundane existence must disappear The sense is that this view is faulty, since it rejects Brahman, taught by the beginningless Veda; since it admits the aggregates of atoms, unseen and unheard, and since a cause for the aggregation is impossible SŪTRA 19 "IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (ON ACCOUNT OF THE MUTUAL CAUSALITY (OF NESCIENCE AND THE REST), (THE AGGREGATION) IS POSSIBLE, (WE REPLY:) NO, BECAUSE OF (THEIR) NOT BEING THE CAUSE OF AGGREGATION." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha It cannot also be that no account of the mutual causality of nescience, past impressions, cognition, name and form, six supports ¹ and the rest, the aggregation and the rest, are possible,—for they, too, are not the causes of aggregation. ¹ Avidyā, saṃskāra, vijñāna, nāma-rūpa, ṣaḍāyatana, etc. For explanation, see below V.K.

352 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [sū 2. 2 19 ADH. 3.] Vedānta-kaustubha If it be objected In spite of the non-admission of a sentient and omniscient being as bringing about the aggregation, no harm is done, since our view admits the mutual causality of nescience and the rest That which goes towards the effect as its cause is 'pratyaya', i e the cause; the state of that, no account of that,¹ all aggregation and the rest become possible. Thus, nescience and the rest, functioning from all eternity, are admitted to be the causes of the continuous stream of cognitions. Among these, the word 'nescience' is denotative of error, such as, taking the non-permanent as permanent, taking what is not the way (to salvation) as the way and so on Through it past impressions, consisting in attachment and so on to sense-objects like colour and the like, arises. It is through this that activity springs forth when occasion arises. Activity consists in good and bad deeds, in accordance with the declaration by the Buddha 'There is action, there is result'. Through this alone cognition arises. Thence the four (elements like) the earth and the rest, the cause of the aggregate, viz the body, arise, and that very thing is said to be name because of being the substratum of name From them arises the body, from it the six supports, viz. the five organs of knowledge and the mind, from them touch; from it feeling, viz pleasure, pain and the rest; from it nescience and the rest once more. Thus, the objects revolving unceasingly like water-wheels, aggregation is possible therefrom. Hence, everything in our doctrine is indeed consistent,— (We reply.) "no". Why? "Because of (their) not being the cause of aggregation," i e. because nescience and the rest are not the causes of aggregation; for it can by no means be said that nescience, consisting in the error of taking a person at a distance to be a post, is the cause of the aggregation of the already existing person. Likewise, attachment and the rest too, caused by it (viz. nescience), are not the cause of aggregation. COMPARISON Śaṁkara and Baladeva Reading different, viz. "Itaretara-pratyayatvād iti cen notpatti mātra-nimittatvāt". Interpretation different accordingly: viz. "If it be said that because of the mutual causality (of nescience and the 1 This explains the compound "pratyayatvāt".

[sū. 2. 2. 20. ADH. 3.] VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA 353 rest), (aggregation is possible), (we reply:) no, because of (their) being the causes of the origin only (of the immediately subsequent effects, and not of aggregation)”.¹ Bhāskara Reading slightly different, viz.: “Itaretara-pratyaya-manyat- vāt . . . .” ² ————— SŪTRA 20 “AND BECAUSE OF THE CESSATION OF THE PRIOR ON THE PRODUCTION OF THE SUBSEQUENT.” Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha For this reason, too, this doctrine is not reasonable,—since “on the production of the subsequent”, there results the destruction of the prior, it being momentary. Vedānta-kaustubha If it be argued that as the prior is the cause of the production of the later, so our doctrine is consistent,—(we reply:) no “Because of the cessation of the prior on the production of the subsequent.” In ordinary life, causality is observed to belong only to an existent lump of clay, the prior, at the time of the production of a pot, the subsequent. But on your view, on account of the momentariness of all existing objects, the prior moment is destroyed and cannot, there- fore, be the cause of the subsequent moment. Here a momentary existence is said to be ‘moment’. Now, to begin with, does the prior moment of the pot ³ give rise to the subsequent effect which exists at the same time, or as itself unoriginated, or as itself destroyed ? The first alternative is not tenable, because that (viz the effect) also (will give rise to) another effect existing at the same time, that, too, to another and so on, and thus everything will last only for a moment simultaneously; and because the conventional distinction between the prior and the subsequent will come to an end. The

¹ S.B. 2.2.19, p. 537; G.B. 2.2.19, pp. 113-114, Chap. 2 ² Bh. B. 2.2.19, p. 117. ³ I.e. the prior momentary existence pot. 23

[SŪ 2. 2. 21. 354 VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA ADH. 3.] second alternative, too, is not tenable, that being impossible More- over, to say that (the cause) is unoriginated is to imply nothing but its non-existence, and if it (viz non-existence) be a cause, then by reason of the absence of obstructions, there may be the origin of everything everywhere. The third alternative, too, is not tenable because the prior being destroyed, there will be again the origin of everything everywhere. It cannot be said that the prior momentary existence persists up to the origin of the subsequent momentary existence, for then, its momentariness will come to be abandoned. SŪTRA 21 "(IF IT BE ADMITTED THAT THE EFFECT ORIGINATES) WHEN (THE CAUSE IS) NOT EXISTENT, (THEN THERE IS) THE CONTRADICTION OF THE INITIAL PROPOSITION, OTHERWISE THERE IS SIMULTANEOUS- NESS." Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha On the admission of the origin of the effect when the cause is non- existent, there must result the "contradiction of the initial proposi- tion", viz. that there is the origin of cognitions from four causes, viz. sense-organs, light, direction of the mind and sense-objects. On the admission of the origin of the effect when the cause is existent, there must be the origin of another momentary existence when the prior momentary existence is still present, and thus there must be "simultaneousness" according to your view, the maintainers of the doctrine of momentariness! Vedānta-kaustubha The author condemns the causeless origin of effects. If it be argued that let there be the production of the subsequent (effect) without a cause, and this being so, the above objection cannot be raised—then we reply: If it be admitted that there is the origin of the effect even when the cause is non-existent, then there must be the "contradiction of the initial proposition". Thus, there must be the "contradiction", i.e abandonment, of your initial proposition that in the production of cognitions, there are four causes, the main cause, viz. the sense-organs like the eyes and the rest, the auxiliary cause, viz. light; the immediate cause, viz. the direction of the mind;

[sū. 2. 2. 22. ADH 3.] VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA 355 and the supporting cause, viz the sense-objects ¹ Moreover, even if the causeless origin of effect be admitted, the above-mentioned fault, viz. the origin of everything everywhere, remains unavoidable. If, again, to avoid this difficulty, the case be admitted to be "otherwise", i e if it be admitted that the effect originates when the cause is existent, then there must be "simultaneousness", i e. there must be simulta- neous existence of the cause and the effect. That is, the above- mentioned objection remains in force. Thus, does the prior momentary existence pot come to be the cause of another momentary existence pot at the time when it (the prior) itself exists, or does it become the cause of the subsequent moment,—which is being generated,—by lasting till the time of its production ? In either case, there is simul- taneousness. On the first alternative, all the momentary existences will come to be perceived at the same time, and the conventional distinction between the prior and the subsequent will come to an end. On the second alternative, their momentariness will be abolished, and owing to the persistence of two momentary existences, there must follow a simultaneous perception of two momentary existences in the same place. COMPARISON Baladeva The meaning of the phrase "pratijñoparodhaḥ" different, viz. contradiction of the initial proposition (viz. that the world originates from the skandhas) ² —————— SŪTRA 22 "(THERE IS) THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS DESTRUCTION ³ ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-INTERRUP- TION (OF THE STREAM OF COGNITIONS) " Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha There is no possibility for the causal or causeless destruction,⁴ because there is no possibility of an interruption of the continuous series and because there is a recognition of the members of the series. ———————————————————————————————————————————— ¹ Adhipati, sahakārin, samanantara, ālambana. ² G.B. 2.2.21, pp 115-16, Chap 2. ³ Prati-saṁkhyā and aprati-saṁkhyā. ⁴ For explanation, see below V.K.

356 VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA [SŪ. 2. 2. 22. ADH. 3.] Vedānta-kaustubha Thus, first the (doctrine of) origin, admitted by the opponents, has been disposed of. Now the (doctrine of) destruction too, admitted by them, is being disposed of The destruction which is preceded by an act of thought is "conscious destruction"; destruction not so preceded is "unconscious destruction". These two kinds of destruction are admitted by them. Among these, the destruction of existing objects,—which is caused by the blow of a hammer and the rest, which consists of the termination of a series of similar momentary existences, and which is perceivable and gross,—is said to be preceded by an act of thought. The destruc- tion of existent objects,—which is not perceivable, subtle, causeless and takes place in a series of similar momentary existences at every moment,—is said to be non-preceded by an act of thought. There is the "non-establishment", i.e. impossibility, of these two kinds of destruction with regard to the continuous series and the single members of the series. Why? "On account of the non-interruption of the series." First, no causal destruction of the series is possible. Thus, it being admitted by you that there is the destruction, at every moment of existing objects with regard to a prior member of the series, it is admitted that in spite of being destroyed, there is the origin from it of a subsequent (member) which is caused by it and is non-existent indeed. The sense is that in spite of a momentary member of the series being destroyed, at that moment, by the blow of a hammer and the rest, the origin of a subsequent member is possible, no account of the absence of impediments, and thereby a subsequent series being possible, the causal destruction of the series is not possible. In the case under discussion, on the other hand, origination and destruction are said to be the different states of clay and the rest that are indeed existent. But, on your view, the interruption of the continuous series is not possible even by the blow of a hundred hammers at all times— this is the sense. Moreover, if there be the destruction of the last member of the series through a cause, then there cannot be properly the destruction of others, too, without causes, and hence there must result the percep- tion of many pots in the place of one pot. It cannot be said also that they are subject to a causeless destruction, taking place at every moment in a series of similar momentary existences, and as such the